Victims and Courts Bill

Lord Russell of Liverpool Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I have four amendments in this group, three of which, like that just proposed powerfully by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, seek to explore the thinking behind the four-year minimum prison sentence required by Clause 3 to trigger the duty of the Crown Court to make a prohibited steps order to restrict the offender’s parental responsibility. My Amendments 15 and 19 would lower the minimum sentence required to one of more than six months.

Before I develop the argument a little further, I will comment on a couple of points made by the noble Baroness. Much of what she said, I entirely agree with, but please let us not talk about parental rights. The central reform of the Children Act 1989 was to substitute for the concept of parental rights the concept of parental responsibility, which is why it appears in the Bill and has been part of our law for a long time. As I have already said, it replaced the reference to rights as determining who had authority over aspects of the child’s life or upbringing. The other point I am afraid I take issue with is her suggestion that, in too many cases, the court sees matters only through the eyes of the parent who is seeking to assert his rights or responsibilities. That, I suggest, is not correct, and it is certainly not my experience of how the family courts work.

Returning to the substance of these amendments, it is clearly difficult to determine where to draw the line in such cases, bearing in mind that a convicted person whose sentence does not cross that line is still quite liable to have any parental responsibility restricted by the family court if it cannot be done in the Crown Court. During debates in another place, the logic of the four-year minimum sentence was questioned. The Minister there argued that the four-year threshold provided a predetermined marker of seriousness for cases in which the restriction of parental responsibility by the Crown Court is to happen automatically.

The Minister said that the Government wanted to minimise the strain placed on the family court. There is force in those points at a practical level. As I suggested at Second Reading, one reason to draw the line at four years is to make best use of the resources, expertise and powers of both the criminal and the family court respectively, without overburdening either. However, one disadvantage of leaving too many of these cases to the family court is that it would deprive the mother and other family members of the benefit of the automatic suspension of parental responsibility, which the Bill provides. Indeed, it would require those who want to restrict parental responsibility to make their own applications to the family court, possibly without legal assistance, as the noble Baroness has indicated.

It is possible, by use of Ministry of Justice statistics for 2023, to get some approximation of the cases involved, which would give some idea of the number of offenders and the number of children who would be affected. In this respect, I am indebted to Amanda Newby, associate professor at Northumbria University, for her research and expert assistance on this and other amendments. In 2023, in England and Wales, there were 1,924 cases of serious sexual abuse, where an immediate prison sentence of between four and 15 years was imposed, in addition to which there were 44 sentences of life imprisonment. In the same year, there were some 1,093 cases involving serious child sexual abuse, where an immediate prison sentence of more than six months and less than four years was imposed. Only 59 such offenders were sentenced to six months or less.

Those statistics all involve adult offenders. It is clearly not possible to ascertain how many of those held parental responsibility for a child at the time of sentencing, but I suggest that it could have been considerably lower. On that basis, moving the threshold down to more than six months’ imprisonment would or could increase the number of potential cases by approximately 1,000 annually—although I repeat that many of those probably would not hold parental responsibility. That likely increase does show that a significant number of children would not be protected under the Bill if the threshold is not lowered. That is indeed an argument for lowering the threshold, as I hope I have indicated.

Amendment 27, in my name, perhaps illustrates some of the difficulties in drawing lines. The offence of sexual communication with a child under Section 15A of the 2003 Act is not covered by the Bill as presently drafted, because the maximum sentence for that offence is two years. That was an offence added in 2015 to the 2003 Act to cover a specific form of sexually motivated grooming, and it might now be thought that it should be covered by the provisions of this Bill. Essentially, it should be accepted that one real difficulty is that the Crown Court, under the Bill, is going to be required to make orders under the Children Act for which the family court is generally the more appropriate forum. Further, the Bill does not contain any provision for mandatory review by the family court, as was provided under Section 18 of the Victims and Prisoners Act, known as Jade’s law. In the family court, the other parent would have the status of a party and could be represented, and that court would have access to the relevant family history and to evidence in the form of professional welfare and other reports if required. In other words, quite frankly, there are compelling arguments either way.

Amendment 34 is in my name and has the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. It does not concern sexual offences but, rather, seeks to extend what is now known as Jade’s law, which was enacted under the Victims and Prisoners Act 2024. As the noble Baroness reminded us, Section 18 restricts parental responsibility where one parent kills the other and is convicted of murder or a specific category of manslaughter. At the suggestion of the Victims’ Commissioner, we seek to amend that provision to include the attempted murder by one parent of the other.

I do not recall that being suggested when the 2024 Act passed through Parliament—the omission of attempted murder may have been an oversight—but there was some caution when, at various stages, suggestions of extending Jade’s law to other offences of violence were ventilated. Be that as it may, I submit that it is clearly appropriate to include attempted murder involving the most extreme form of non-fatal assault. To do so would relieve the victim from the obligation to seek the perpetrator’s agreement on decisions concerning the child and, if agreement is not forthcoming, from having to apply to the court.

The Victims’ Commissioner has become aware of the concerns of survivors of attempted murder when the offender has retained parental responsibility over their children. Without giving details, I had to deal with a case where the convicted parent used his status to obstruct the other parent, clearly motivated only by a desire for revenge, causing the other parent further distress and expense, as well as an inescapable fear of what he might try to do when released from prison. People in that position should be relieved and shielded from having to go to court unless absolutely necessary to do so.

Finally, I join the noble Baroness in mentioning the commencement of Section 18—Jade’s law. It is not retrospective and has yet to be brought into force, so the reality is that nobody has yet benefited from it. Can the Minister say when it will be put into effect?

I do not want to trespass on arguments to be advanced on other amendments, but I share the curiosity about the provisions in the Bill covering what would happen in the event of an acquittal on appeal or when a sentence is reduced on appeal. To that I add the question of whether prohibited steps could be made where a sentence is increased on appeal or under the unduly lenient sentence scheme to one of more than four years.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly to support the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, on Amendment 34. As they mentioned, the Victims’ Commissioner has been approached by a variety of individuals who survived attempted murder by their other half or partner. In those cases, they face a dilemma. In some cases, the difference between being murdered or not is a matter of an ambulance arriving two minutes earlier and managing to stop a murder attempt, whereas if it arrived two minutes later that person might have died. Alternatively, it might be a matter of a neighbour hearing what was going on and making a telephone call so that the authorities arrive in time. It is a very narrow difference, frankly, as to whether somebody ends up dead or injured but alive.

In some of those instances, the perpetrator, who has gone to prison, retains parental responsibility but may not know that. The surviving partner has a dilemma: if they bring it to the attention of the partner who is in prison and he is unaware of those rights, he may be tempted to try to use them to disrupt the life of the surviving partner. I do not think that anybody would wish that to happen.

In the instance that a survivor feels strongly enough that they want to try to go through the courts to have the parental responsibility of the person who tried to kill them stripped away, the onus is on the survivor to go through the family courts. That can be quite a lengthy and complicated process. It is often made more difficult because the quality and flow of relevant information between the criminal court, which sends the attempted murderer to prison, and the family court is not always as open and as clear as it might be.

For all those reasons, I hope that, when she comes to reply, the Minister can clarify the Government’s view on this and, in particular, why commencement of the original Jade’s law seems to have been delayed. What is holding it up? How quickly can we expect it to be put into operation?

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[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have tabled amendments in this group which concern the operation of Clauses 6 and 7 and the scope and operation of the victim contact scheme. I turn first to Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. I recognise the intention behind this amendment and the principle that underpins it: that victims whose close family members have been murdered, killed unlawfully or subjected to infanticide abroad should not find themselves falling between the cracks of the victims’ code simply because the offence occurred outside the United Kingdom. There is a strong case for ensuring that any victim should receive clear information and appropriate support on how to engage with the criminal justice system. The amendment seeks to give effect to that principle by requiring an appendix to the victims’ code setting out how it applies in such circumstances.

That said, it is also right to acknowledge that this amendment raises practical and operational questions that would need careful consideration. These include questions about jurisdiction, the extent to which criminal justice processes are engaged domestically, and how responsibilities would be allocated between domestic agencies and those overseas. I therefore look to the Minister to address how the Government would envisage this operating in practice while recognising and engaging with the important principle that the amendment seeks to advance.

Amendments 47A and 47B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Russell, extend the definition of “victim” to include those who have experienced persistent antisocial behaviour meeting the statutory threshold for an antisocial behaviour case review. They also create a victim identifier linked to compliance with the victims’ code across criminal justice agencies. Both proposals are ideas that I am sure will instigate interesting debate; I look forward to hearing the noble Lord expand on them, and the Government’s response.

Amendments 56 and 57 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby—which may or may not be spoken to—concern transparency and accountability in decisions taken by hospital managers not to disclose information requested under Sections 44F or 44K. Clearly, if hospital managers are to be entrusted with the discretion to withhold information in cases that may directly affect victim safety, it is entirely reasonable that there should be clear written reasons for such decisions and a meaningful route to appeal. Transparency in decision-making is essential, not only for victims but for other parties, such as the Probation Service, which are tasked with managing risks.

I turn to Amendments 36 and 37 in my name. Amendment 36 is a technical amendment that adds the National Crime Agency to the list of relevant bodies to which Clause 6 does not apply. Given the National Crime Agency’s distinct operational role and intelligence-handling functions, it may be appropriate that it be expressly included in that provision. I hope the Government will see this amendment as a sensible clarification rather than as a point of contention.

Amendment 37 would require the Secretary of State to extend the victim contact scheme to certain categories of victim who are currently excluded from it—victims of offenders sentenced to less than 12 months for violent and sexual offences; victims of coercive or controlling behaviour, stalking or harassment; and bereaved families in cases of manslaughter or death by dangerous driving. It would also require information to be communicated in a timely manner and for annual data to be published on the scheme’s uptake and accessibility.

The importance of this amendment has only been heightened by recent legislative developments. The Sentencing Bill, which has now passed, represented a marked shift in sentencing policy, particularly through the automatic and blanket presumption against short custodial sentences, regardless of offence type. During the passage of that legislation, particularly in debate in this House, a number of noble Lords repeatedly raised the consequences for victims. Although the Government may respond by saying that in exceptional circumstances this presumption may be overturned, the reality is rather clearer. An increasing number of offenders convicted of violent and sexual offences will now serve their sentences in the community, rather than in custody.

From the victim’s perspective, that is not an abstract policy choice. It has immediate and practical consequences for their perception of justice being served, for their sense of safety, for their ability to plan their lives and for their need to receive appropriate information. Under the current framework, many of these victims are excluded from the victim contact scheme because the custodial threshold is not met. That is now, I suggest, a glaring inconsistency in the light of the Government’s Sentencing Act. If anything, victims whose offenders are serving sentences in the community have a greater need for timely, accurate and trauma-informed information, not a lesser one. Further, without timeliness the scheme risks becoming meaningless. Information provided late is often information too late to be of use, and, without transparencies, such as through the publication of annual data on uptake and accessibility, there can be no meaningful accountability for offenders or for the Government.

We now live in a sentencing landscape that places a far greater reliance on community supervision. The Government have said that they expect to more or less double the number of people being tagged rather than incarcerated. The need for transparency and accurate data has never been more pressing. Amendment 37 insists that, where the state chooses to sentence offenders in the community, it must accept the corresponding responsibility to support and protect victims properly. In the absence of custody, robust victim engagement is really not an option; it is essential. I therefore urge the Government to engage seriously with this amendment and, if they are minded to resist it, explain how victims are to be adequately protected in a system that is going to leave an increasing number of offenders in the community. I beg to move.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 42, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay; to the two amendments in my name, Amendments 47A and 47B—I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for adding her name to them; and to Amendments 55, 56 and 57, on which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, may speak to us by some supernatural means. I am not quite sure, but the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, and I will try to cover it.

I point out that what all these amendments have in common is that they have been laid with the active engagement and support of the Victims’ Commissioner, Claire Waxman. The Minister mentioned that she knows and has a high regard for her. Rather than going on at great length about each amendment, although I am sure that your Lordships are dying to hear about them, I suspect that it would be better to have follow-up meetings involving Claire Waxman to go into the detail as to why she feels, and we feel, that these amendments are important enough to raise in Committee.

On bereaved victims of murder abroad, as in Amendment 42, we covered this ground in previous legislation when we attempted to get it into a Bill. My noble friend Lady Finlay will be able to go into much more detail about this but, in essence, we are dealing with a slight anomaly in the way that victims are treated. On average per annum, between 80 and 90 individuals who are UK citizens are murdered while they are abroad. At the moment, the experience of their families when those unfortunate incidents happen ranges from quite good to absolutely appalling. That is because there is no consistency in the way they are treated.

The Government have made attempts to get their house in order on what happens within the United Kingdom’s jurisdiction. Where we seem to have an issue is in getting the FCDO to apply a form of guidance, and above all training, across its key consulates in the areas where these incidents take place to ensure that those consulates are properly equipped, if and when such a tragedy appears, to deal with it effectively and consistently. The experience from the victims whose loved ones have been murdered abroad is that, in some cases, the consulates are absolutely brilliant and go out of their way to be helpful, while in other instances the victim truly is left entirely on their own. In particular, if this has happened when the partner of the person who has been murdered is abroad, they may find no help whatever and not be familiar with the language of that country. You can imagine the complexity and agony of trying to deal with all of that, on top of the shock of having had somebody very close to you murdered. However, my noble friend will go into that in more detail.

What Amendments 47A and 47B have in common is that for certain victims of antisocial behaviour, when that behaviour really is persistent—it often conforms to an escalating pattern—and has a deep effect on the victim, there is not consistency at the moment in the way that is dealt with. Amendment 47A tries to ensure that the authorities are more effective in identifying that pattern of behaviour and are able to join the dots, put them together and recognise that the behaviour has triggered a threshold at which proper support and access to victim services should be allowed.

Again, Amendment 47B is about joining up the dots. The way in which antisocial behaviour is dealt with is that it might come to the attention of the police, or it might come to the attention of a local authority or a housing association. There is no consistent way of that information, first, being recorded in a consistent and helpful manner, and, secondly, being communicated across those different boundaries in a way that enables whichever of those three jurisdictions is looking at the pattern of behaviour to pull the evidence together that it needs to understand exactly what has been going on. This is a request for a unique identifier for each victim which would, I hope, be the start of a process to enable that information to be channelled in a more consistent and co-ordinated manner. That would obviously be helpful to the victims, but also extremely helpful to whichever authority is trying to identify just how severe that pattern of antisocial behaviour is, and whether the effect it is having on the subject—the victim—is sufficient for it to trigger comprehensive wraparound support.

Lastly, I will deal with the three amendments that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, will deal with in more detail. They concern where somebody in one’s family has been murdered by an individual who is identified as mentally disordered and who is then detained because of their mental disorder. The ability of the victims to get access to the sort of information which they can get from the Prison Service and the courts is completely different from what is able to be accessed from the hospital system. Again, some hospitals and hospital managers go out of their way to be understanding and helpful, and try to give the victims whatever succour and information they can. Others refuse point blank. They say that a variety of laws and processes prevent them doing that and that they are not at liberty to do it. All that we and the Victims’ Commissioner are asking is to look at this closely.

Julian Hendy, the founder of an organisation called Hundred Families, is very involved in this; he can give chapter, book and verse. First, we need to establish just how much of a problem this is, perhaps through meetings. Secondly, what are the different ways in which we might do something about it? Thirdly, how complicated is that: does it need to be in primary legislation, or are there other ways of doing it?

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[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this point. Our current position is that we do not believe that that is necessary, but I am happy to meet her and get her to try to persuade me why I am wrong and she is right—there is my challenge to the noble Baronesses, Lady Brinton and Lady Finlay.

[Lord Russell of Liverpool (CB)]

The FCDO has a duty of care and a responsibility for UK citizens when they are in whichever country. It does not seem too bizarre or extreme to hope that it would accept a degree of responsibility for the very small number of unfortunate victims who, for whatever reason, are unlawfully killed in the course of a year. For the FCDO to accept that that is part of its responsibility—a very small part, albeit an important one—and to prepare itself thoroughly enough to be able to fulfil that duty in a professional, proper and sensitive way in the unhappy event that it is required does not seem too much to ask.

[Baroness Levitt (Lab)]

The noble Lord, Lord Russell, puts it very persuasively and it is extremely tempting, particularly given that I do not speak for the FCDO, to say that it sounds utterly reasonable. However, I am sure he will understand why I cannot give that kind of commitment from the Dispatch Box, but I can commit to meeting and discussing this further.