Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Tuesday 15th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall be brief. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has rightly set out in some detail a strong case for Amendment 40BZB, with which we are associated. I will not attempt to repeat the points that have already been so effectively and powerfully made. The need to recognise in the Bill that harm can be caused by emotional ill treatment and emotional neglect as well as physical ill treatment and neglect is important, as is the substitution of “serious harm”, which is consistent with other areas of criminal law, for “unnecessary suffering”, including the inference that there can be necessary suffering.

The amendment also defines “harm” and “wilfully”, with the latter definition stating that the person has to have the capacity to foresee that an act or omission would be likely to result in harm but none the less unnecessarily took that risk.

We also support the amendment moved in the name of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede that it should be specific that the age of children to whom a child cruelty offence applies is “under 18”.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Walmsley for moving her amendment, to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—we are delighted to see her in her place, taking part in our debate—and to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for outlining their respective amendments. They have all brought extensive knowledge to this debate. We have missed my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who cannot be in her place this afternoon. I am sure the whole House wishes her well.

The amendments all relate to the scope of the offence of child cruelty in Section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. Before I address the amendments, it may assist the Committee if I explain our approach in Clause 62. I am grateful for the general welcome which the clause has received. I am grateful, too, for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Many of those welcoming the Bill spoke in support of the amendments. That I understand, and I will try to address their concerns.

The offence in Section 1 of the 1933 Act is committed when a person over the age of 16 who has responsibility for a child under that age wilfully assaults, ill treats, neglects, abandons or exposes that child in a manner likely to cause unnecessary suffering or injury to health, including any mental derangement. That is the law as it stands. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has been among those who have argued for some time—as she has pointed out, in her discussions with my right honourable friend Damian Green in his ministerial capacity and with me— that the offence of child cruelty in the 1933 Act lacks the necessary clarity when it comes to tackling psychological suffering or injury to children.

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[Lord Rosser]

I will raise one question, to which I hope the Minister will be able to respond. The right reverend Prelate has referred to the indication given in the Commons last week by the Prime Minister that the Government were looking at whether we should change the law so that there will be a requirement to report abuse and it will be a criminal offence not to report it. Can the Minister be more specific than he appeared to be on the last group of amendments about the timescale within which the Government expect these deliberations to be concluded?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this has been a very high-value debate whose contributions inform the Government. I will try to make sure that all colleagues in government with an interest in this matter are sent a copy of our debate.

I cannot give the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, any details of the timescale. If, in the course of time, I have more information, I will try to tell him in good time, but at the moment I cannot. In a way, this debate needs to be taken in conjunction with the one we had on my noble friend Lady Brinton’s debate; it covers very similar territory but it goes just that little bit further. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Walmsley for tabling this amendment to enable us to look at this particular aspect.

There is a significant difference between the amendments. Amendment 40BZEA would place a duty on those working in regulated sectors who are in a position of trust in relation to children or vulnerable people to report suspicions of abuse to the appropriate local authority within 10 days. Breach of that duty would be a criminal offence punishable by up to three years in prison. This would mean essentially that anyone who works with children or vulnerable adults would commit a criminal offence if they did not report suspected abuse of any kind.

I hope that I can provide some reassurance to my noble friend Lady Walmsley and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham about the current process of referrals to social services. The noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, referred to this. It is important to recognise that existing statutory guidance is already crystal clear that professionals should refer immediately to social care when they are concerned about a child or vulnerable adult. Many thousands of referrals are made to children’s social care each year. In the year ending March 2013, there were 593,500 referrals—that is nearly 600,000. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Walmsley for offering to provide me with figures that she has available, but I think that we need to bear that figure in mind and appreciate the scale of the situation that we are seeking to engage in.

The most important thing is that people understand how to spot abuse and neglect and the impact that it has on children and vulnerable adults. While we are continuing to review the evidence for the specific case of reporting in regulated settings, we are also continuing to take action to improve the knowledge and skills of professionals working with children and other vulnerable people.

As I indicated in my response to the previous group of amendments, the Government fully understand the public’s anxiety about the potential underreporting of abuse, particularly sexual abuse. I can wholeheartedly support my noble friend’s objective with this amendment; we all want to see improved safeguarding for all children and vulnerable adults. As I have said, we are actively considering the case for a mandatory reporting duty, but the issues are complex, as the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, pointed out. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, we need to consider what form such a duty might take, to whom it would apply and in what circumstances, and what the sanction for failure to comply should be. This amendment offers one approach, but we have just debated an alternative, more focused proposal, and the NSPCC has suggested a third model. Other organisations working to safeguard children and vulnerable adults will have ideas of their own as to how a mandatory reporting regime should be structured, as will other noble Lords. I have sought to encourage noble Lords to make sure that those conducting such investigations are aware of their views.

I can only again seek to reassure my noble friend and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham that we are actively examining the options and treating the matter with the urgency that it deserves. While I cannot undertake to bring forward government amendments on this issue on Report, I certainly expect that, by then, I will have more to say on where we have reached in our consideration of this important matter. Having put the issue firmly on the table as my noble friend has done, I hope that she will now be content to withdraw her amendment.

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[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, we are associated with these amendments and support them. I do not intend to go through the points already so eloquently made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, except simply to repeat that the current system of non-statutory notices does not encourage confidence in the system from victims and their families in the ability of the police to protect them when the provisions are breached. The notice leads to no action being taken unless the thresholds of an abduction threat have been met, which is not always the case. As has been said, the threshold means that the adult must have taken or detained the child.

Creating an offence of breach of a proposed child abduction warning order is likely to strengthen victims’ confidence in seeking help and protection, since it will lead to action being taken against the perpetrator if they breach the order. Once again, I hope that the Minister will be able to give a positive response.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Again, this has been an interesting debate, and I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in it. Child exploitation is an abhorrent crime and we are determined to tackle it in whatever form it takes. The findings of a recent parliamentary inquiry, of which noble Lords will be aware, chaired by Sarah Champion MP and supported by Barnardo’s, have been very helpful in contributing to the ongoing work being done by the Government to tackle child sexual exploitation. The recommendations of that inquiry will be crucial in helping to inform our policy and improve our understanding of this form of offending and, indeed, what more we should be doing about it. Specifically, the inquiry received significant evidence relating to child abduction warning notices and, as a result, this issue featured prominently in their report and is now the subject of these two amendments.

It might help if I updated noble Lords on government thinking in this area as at present. This Government have already taken clear action to tackle child sexual exploitation. As the Committee will recall, as part of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, we are introducing a number of new police powers. First, we are providing for more effective civil prevention orders, namely the new sexual harm prevention order and the sexual risk order. Secondly, new powers will allow the police to require hotels and similar establishments to provide information about guests whom they believe may be involved in sexual exploitation. Thirdly, we are bringing in strengthened powers for police to close premises associated with child sexual exploitation, a provision championed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, who cannot be in her place today but for whose support on this matter I am very grateful.

With regard to child abduction warning notices, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for articulating the case for putting these notices on a statutory footing. The Government note that proposals to strengthen the impact of these orders have the support of the police, legal experts, representatives of local agencies, young people who have been affected by sexual exploitation, children’s charities and others. As part of the work of the National Group on Sexual Violence against Children and Vulnerable People, my ministerial colleagues have given assurances that the Home Office would look at the effectiveness of the existing child abduction warning notices and, in liaison with police colleagues, examine how best this tool can be used in future. In doing so, we will consider carefully the operational benefits of putting these notices on a statutory footing and how such a statutory scheme might operate. We are currently consulting carefully with policing colleagues to seek their views on the potential use of a statutory notice and whether, in their view, further changes are required to better protect children.

Amendment 40CC is an important contribution to this debate. The existing non-statutory child abduction warning notices are issued by the police. That is entirely appropriate where breach of a notice is not, of itself, a criminal offence. But it would be an unusual step for the police themselves to impose what amounts to a restraint order or injunction, breach of which is a criminal offence. If we made it statutory, we would have to consider that. Compare, for example, restraint orders under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 which are granted by the courts. Other civil preventive orders, such as serious crime prevention orders and gang injunctions which are dealt with elsewhere in this Bill, are also subject to judicial oversight. We would need to see how that played in with the current arrangements of non-statutory warning notices.

Other issues that we need to consider are the test for the grant of an order, the prohibitions or restrictions that may be attached to an order and the penalty for breach. I note, too, that the amendment requires a child to have been found two or more times in the company of the person to be made the subject of an order. Elsewhere, the inquiry proposed amending the grooming offence in Section 15 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to remove the requirement for a second contact with the child. The Government have now tabled an amendment to the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill to that end, as my noble friend Lady Walmsley said. We need to consider whether the approach taken in child abduction warning notices should mirror that in the amended grooming offence.

Amendment 40CB seeks to raise the age threshold from 16 to 18 years for the child abduction offence in Section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, bringing it into line with the summary offence in Section 49 of the Children Act 1989 of abducting a child in care. Children in care are particularly vulnerable and that is why the Children Act 1989 makes it an offence to take any child who is in care, including a 16 or 17 year-old, away from the person responsible for them without lawful authority or reasonable excuse. However, while we recognise the arguments made for consistency, there are contrary arguments and difficult issues raised. Young people aged 16 and 17 can live independently of their parents and, in many respects, are able to make their own decisions about how they live their life, including their sexual relationships. It is in recognition of this that the Child Abduction Act 1984 applies only where the child is under 16 and the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ceases to operate when the child reaches the age of 16 years.

However, we are committed to examining the case for placing child abduction warning notices on a statutory footing. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has made a reasoned case for doing so and it deserves serious consideration. All speakers tended to favour the idea that statutory footing for the child abduction warning notices should be considered. While Report stage is some three months off, I cannot say to noble Lords that we will have completed our review by that point. I can undertake to update the House on progress and, of course, noble Lords are free to bring back the amendment, or a variation of it, at the next stage. I hope that I will be able to update noble Lords on how the Government have progressed arguments. Clearly, the debate we have had today will be helpful.

I cannot say the same in connection with Amendment 40CB. That amendment would have significant wider implications and for the reasons I have given I am not persuaded of the case for that particular change. However, given what I have said, I hope that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in proposing the amendment at the beginning of this debate, will feel free to withdraw the amendments tabled in her name and that I will have the opportunity when we return to this subject of updating noble Lords accordingly.

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[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes it an offence to engage in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to an intention to commit or assist another to commit one or more acts of terrorism. It also makes it an offence under Section 6 to provide or receive training for terrorism. The Act also provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction so that an offence may be tried in this country in respect of acts committed abroad. However, this is limited or non-existent in respect of the Section 5 and Section 6 offences to which I have referred.

Clause 65 would provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Section 5 offence and extend the existing extraterritorial jurisdiction for the Section 6 offence. Such extraterritorial jurisdiction is considered appropriate for Section 5 and Section 6 offences because the places where training or preparation for terrorism are taking place are increasingly likely to be located abroad and will enable prosecutions in this country of people preparing or training more generally for terrorism who have, in the current circumstances, travelled from the UK to fight in Syria, where various groups are involved in the conflict.

We do not oppose this clause being in the Bill but have some points to raise about what the impact of the provision is expected to be—hence this debate on whether the clause should stand part of the Bill. I appreciate that the Minister may not be in a position to be too specific in his response, but can he give some examples of the kind of prosecutions which it will be possible to pursue under Clause 65 which it has not been possible until now to pursue under the existing legislation, and which would have been pursued had Clause 65 been effective? If prosecutions have already taken place for the offence of preparing for terrorist activities, what does Clause 65 add in reality to the legislative armoury? Has there been consultation with the Director of Public Prosecutions on the need for Clause 65? If a loophole in the current legislation has been identified which constitutes a potential threat to our security, does the Director of Public Prosecutions believe that the provisions of Clause 65 constitute the best way of addressing that loophole?

As I understand it, prosecutions under Clause 65 would need to be in open court and any evidence brought would have to be evidence acceptable in open court and disclosable in open court. If I am right in saying that, presumably intercept evidence and the evidence of informers, for example, will not be usable. In respect of people coming back from Syria, how is it envisaged that it will in practical terms be possible to gather evidence for a prosecution which relates to what the individual has done in Syria that can be pursued in open court? If the evidence to pursue a prosecution under Clause 65 cannot be used in open court, will a terrorism prevention and investigation measures order be sought, which would enable, for example, intercept evidence and the evidence of informers to be used, albeit it would be to obtain the appropriate order rather than to seek a conviction? Or are the Government claiming that Clause 65 will remove the need for TPIMs in a situation where no one on a TPIM has ever been prosecuted and when, in his last report, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said that TPIMs continued to be needed?

I hope that the Minister will be able to address these points in his reply. Bearing in mind that Clause 65 relates to an extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction to enable offences to be tried in this country in respect of acts committed abroad under Sections 5 and 6 of the Terrorism Act 2006, it is not clear what the actual impact of Clause 65 will be as much of the evidence that becomes available is, if I have understood the situation correctly, unlikely to be able to be presented in open court and could be used only in seeking a TPIM order.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for affording the Committee an opportunity to debate this issue. I am sure that the noble Lord and, for that matter, the Committee as a whole will be in no doubt about the significant threat posed by foreign fighters, particularly in relation to Syria, and the importance the Government place on protecting the public from those who may seek to harm the UK or UK interests.

The nature of the threat from terrorism has evolved since the passing of the Terrorism Act 2006. Many of the threats we face today have significant overseas connections and the places where UK-linked individuals, and those seeking to harm UK interests, may now be training, or otherwise preparing for terrorism, are increasingly likely to be located abroad. Syria, in particular, has become the number one destination for jihadists in the world today, posing a threat to the region and beyond. However, the issue of individuals from the UK seeking to engage in combat and conflicts abroad is not new, nor is it specific to Syria. As my noble friend Lady Warsi, who is sitting next to me preparing to respond to the debate following this Committee stage, will be aware, the recent events in Iraq further demonstrate the fluidity of movement of foreign fighters and we are concerned that groups such as the al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant—or ISIL, as it is known—are now able to operate in the large areas of ungoverned space that have been created by the conflict. ISIL’s advances in Iraq in particular demonstrate the serious threat that that group poses to both countries, so it is right that we respond to this threat.

In support of wider government efforts to ensure that the full range of operational responses under the Contest strategy are being applied to counter this threat, Clause 65 amends Section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2006. This extends fully the jurisdiction of the UK courts over the offence of preparation of terrorist acts under Section 5 and the offence of training for terrorism under Section 6 of that Act so that preparation and training that take place abroad can be prosecuted. This measure will enable prosecution, on their return to the UK, of individuals who have travelled overseas to prepare or train for terrorism as though their actions had taken place in this country. Any prosecution under this measure will require the express consent of the Attorney-General, in addition to satisfying the Crown Prosecution Service that there is sufficient evidence and that prosecution is in the public interest. Our priority is to dissuade people from travelling to participate in conflicts abroad in the first place, but it is vital that our legislation is as robust as it can be against those who may seek to harm the UK in particular, and leaves no doubt in the minds of individuals engaging in preparatory acts of terrorism, or training for terrorism overseas, of the action we are prepared to take to protect the public.

The noble Lord asked whether it would enable us to prosecute cases which were not prosecutable at present. Recent cases show that these offences can be operationally useful. Mashudur Choudhury was recently convicted under Section 5 of preparing for terrorism in the UK. If, for example, he had undertaken these preparations outside the UK, he could not have been prosecuted. This measure seeks to address this anomaly.

How will this measure have an impact on foreign fighters? We assess that by extending UK territorial jurisdiction for this offence and bringing evidence of activities overseas within its scope, we will potentially strengthen the evidential case that can be made and enhance the prospects of a successful prosecution in some cases. In cases where there is only evidence of activity abroad, it will enable a prosecution to be brought where it is not currently possible.

The noble Lord asked whether we had consulted the Director of Public Prosecutions. We have worked closely with law enforcement partners, including the Crown Prosecution Service, in developing this measure. They fully support it and have suggested that this will be operationally useful. As for the question about gathering evidence and how law enforcement agencies will obtain the evidence required for a prosecution, particularly as it involves evidence gathering abroad, law enforcement agencies are accustomed to working with the relevant authorities in other countries for the purpose of gathering evidence for prosecutions. We fully expect that this established arrangement will continue to be employed for future prosecutions.

We recognise that any evidence gathering which involves other countries is inherently more challenging than if it were confined to the UK, but this does not mean that prosecution is impossible. That is the purpose of introducing these measures in Clause 65. These changes will ensure that UK linked individuals and those who seek to harm UK interests and travel overseas to prepare or train for terrorism can be prosecuted as if their actions had taken place in the UK and that they are not beyond the reach of the law. It is essential that our law enforcement partners are equipped with the right powers to counter the threat posed by foreign fighters who travel overseas to undertake terrorist activities and may go on to carry out terrorist attacks.

I hope that with those explanations the noble Lord will be prepared to accept that Clause 65 should form part of the Bill.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Code of Practice for Examining Officers and Review Officers) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 7th July 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I will be giving the Minister a somewhat easier time than he has just been given by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

I thank the Minister for the explanation of the purpose of this order, which brings into operation a code of practice for examining officers and review officers in respect of the exercise of the powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and under Schedule 8 to that Act where the powers are exercised in connection with Schedule 7, as amended by Schedule 9 to the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. The code of practice revises the preceding code of practice to take account of amendments made to Schedules 7, 8 and 14 to the Terrorism Act 2000 by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

The Explanatory Memorandum refers to commencing the remaining provisions of Schedule 9 to the 2014 Act this month to coincide with the issue of the code of practice brought into operation by this instrument, with the exception of the provision to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, referred requiring review of the detention of persons detained under Schedule 7, which are being delayed until next April to allow sufficient time to develop, accredit and train all examining and review officers. I shall pursue some of the points she raised. Will the Minister say how many examining and review officers still require to be trained, how long the training of each officer takes and why the required training has not been completed by this month and has had to be delayed? The need for such training must have been known for some time. Could the Minister also spell out the impact of this delay, in practical terms, including any impact on the provisions of this instrument, which comes into force at the end of this month?

The Explanatory Memorandum also refers in paragraph 4.5 to consultation on this issue having taken place with “National Business Leads”. Perhaps the Minister could remind me who or what this organisation is or these people are.

As the Minister said, the Explanatory Memorandum states in paragraph 7.2 that:

“Schedule 7 is an important part of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy and key to the UK’s border security”.

The memorandum goes on:

“The changes to Schedule 7 in the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act are intended to reduce the potential scope for Schedule 7 powers to be operated in an unnecessary or disproportionate way, whilst still retaining their operational effectiveness”.

It then lists the changes made under the 2014 Act. They include ensuring access to legal advice for all individuals examined for more than one hour. In that regard, could the Minister clarify what legal entitlements people have when detained under Schedule 7? Will they have access to free legal advice?

The changes also include reducing the maximum period of examination from nine hours to six hours. The Government and others recently expressed concerns about the numbers going from this country to Syria apparently to be trained and engage in violence in the current conflict, and the possible consequences of that. In the light of concerns about what might happen if and when these people return to this country, with or without others, and what their intentions might then be, is it the Government’s view that all the changes made by the 2014 Act, including reducing the maximum period of examination from nine hours to six hours, actually enhance our ability to minimise the risk of those potential threats? Do the Government believe that the new code of practice provided for in this order—reflecting the amendments made to Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act by the 2014 Act—contribute to rather than potentially diminish our security in the present climate?

I simply conclude by commenting that the Explanatory Memorandum states that,

“the majority of consultation respondents agreed that the revised code clearly reflected the changes made to Schedule 7 powers in the”,

2014 Act. What it is not able to say is that the majority of respondents agreed that in today’s climate all those changes are still appropriate. We will not oppose this order, but I hope that the Minister will respond directly to the points and questions I raised, as well as those of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I thank both my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for their contributions to our discussions on these issues. It is important that I try as best I can to answer the questions now. If there are things left unsaid at the end, I am obviously very happy to write. It was fortunate that there was a brief adjournment before we started because it gave my noble friend a chance to have a word with officials and give advance notice of the things that she was particularly concerned about. Perhaps I can deal with the details.

On paragraph 7.2, we can give an undertaking that we will correct the wording so that it reads as it should. It is perhaps not capable of being interpreted at the moment. As my noble friend admitted, she was on slightly weaker grounds when it came to annexe A because the wording is designed to ensure that the code of practice works equally well whether the person is stopped at a GB port or the person is stopped at the Irish border. That is why the wording is as it is. Perhaps my noble friend will tell me if she feels that that is not correct.

She asked whether training was on track. It is on track and is a nationwide programme. We are working out a training package and rolling it out nationally because we want to make sure that we operate to consistently higher standards. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked for quite a few details about the training programme, the time taken and what was involved. If he is happy for me to do so, I should be pleased to write to him with further details of what the training involves.

[Lord Rosser]

I am happy to await a letter from the Minister but can he cover in his reply why the training has been delayed? The word “delay” is used in the Explanatory Memorandum. I mentioned that the need for such training must surely have been known for some time. He could address that point in his letter, as well as the impact on the instrument of the delay referred to in the Explanatory Memorandum.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am quite prepared to do so. I know off the top of my head that the problem is that standards are not equal across the country, but we are obviously now trying to make sure that officers’ roles under these powers are considerably enhanced and need to operate properly at every point. We are cutting down the hours, which is fine; there is no security risk by doing that as long as the process is properly managed and dealt with. That is part of the reason for the change.

My noble friend said that she thought there was perhaps already an opportunity for consultations. As I say, the interview depended on whether it involved those detained at a port or those detained in a police station. Those detained within a port were not necessarily supported with the same rigour as those detained within a police station. That will change under this new regime.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked which organisations we consulted. I do not have those names but I would again be happy to write to him. If I may, I will write both to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and to my noble friend Lady Hamwee together, so that they will also have the answers to each other’s questions. I know that they share an interest in those answers.

That more or less concludes my response, although I wish to mention a couple of other things. Review provisions will commence on 1 April 2015. Audio recording is delayed to allow facilities at ports to be provided; noble Lords will understand that facilities at ports are not as good as they may be elsewhere, but it is already a requirement to report interviews at police stations.

I hope that I have been able to deal with at least some of the questions. I remind everyone that only 1% of examinations result in detention, and 96% of those examined under Schedule 7 are held for less than an hour. We are dealing with those in detention, who are a relatively small number of individuals, but we must make sure that they are properly safeguarded and that we have processes in place to ensure that the security of the country is maintained.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Lord wishes to respond to me now or in a letter, but I referred to the reduction in the period for examination from nine hours to six hours, and to the concerns expressed very recently about what is happening with people going to Syria, then perhaps returning to this country, and what their intentions may be. I asked the Minister whether the Government feel that the provisions covered in the code of practice, and which arise as a result of the 2014 Act, are all still appropriate in the light of the security concerns being expressed by the Government and others in relation to Syria.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I can assure the noble Lord that they are appropriate. Indeed, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation recorded in his report in 2012 that these particular interviews have been instrumental in securing evidence which has assisted in terrorist prosecutions, and that they are very important. The truth of the matter is that the number of people detained for over six hours is very small and usually confined to circumstances where the examination was more protracted than it needed to have been. We are now satisfied that we can do this within six hours, otherwise we would not be bringing this legislation forward.

Serious Crime Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 2nd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The three amendments in this group are concerned with recovering money from overseas or in response to such requests from overseas jurisdictions. Many investigations into stolen assets parked in this country do not get off the ground because the Home Office routinely fails to respond, or is unable to respond, to requests for help from other countries. The Home Office has shown in Parliamentary Answers that, despite UK courts freezing more than £200 million at the request of overseas jurisdictions, not a single penny of this has been repatriated to the country asking for the money. Since 2010, it seems that only two bilateral agreements have been signed with overseas jurisdictions to ensure co-operation on mutual legal assistance.

Last year, the former head of the UK financial intelligence unit—part of the National Crime Agency—indicated that when an investigation was initiated from the victim country, and moneys were suspected to be in the UK, the request went out through all the proper channels but there was no great keenness to comply, as there was a mindset that we could just be giving ourselves a headache. Assuming that is a fair analysis, such an approach does not help foster greater reciprocity at international level and cannot help us in securing co-operation when we want it from overseas jurisdictions. The Minister may well contest this analysis, since it suggests there are somewhat different reasons for the problem from those given in the Government’s impact assessment.

It would be helpful if the Minister could provide information on the number of asset recovery requests received from foreign authorities over the past three years, how many have been referred to investigative bodies and how many cases are pending. The World Bank estimates that, each year, developing nations lose between $20 billion and $40 billion through corruption. Between 1994 and 2009 only $5 billion of stolen assets were recovered globally—which is apparently less than 2% of the lowest estimate of the amount stolen, according to an analysis by the World Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

Amendment 22 in this group requires the Secretary of State to set up,

“an independent review of the effectiveness”,

of our mutual legal assistance arrangements,

“with overseas jurisdictions in cases concerning the proceeds of crime”,

since the figures that are available, the comments made by people who have been on the inside and, indeed, the rather different causes of the problem that are set out in the Government’s impact assessment all strongly suggest that everything is not well. Criminals here also seek to hide their ill gotten gains overseas, and a significant proportion of unpaid Serious Fraud Office confiscation orders are thought to relate to funds located overseas. Criminals put their assets where the UK authorities find it hardest to recover them, which usually means a jurisdiction with which we have no standing mutual co-operation arrangements. Even where this is not the case, without mutual recognition of confiscation orders in the jurisdiction where the assets have been hidden, those charged with enforcing the orders effectively have to relitigate the issue abroad, which can be hard, slow and not very effective.

In Clause 7, proposed new Section 13A provides that in every confiscation case the court will be required to consider making an order to ensure that a confiscation order is paid. In particular, it will have to consider placing a “restriction or prohibition” on the defendant’s overseas travel to prevent that defendant travelling abroad to dispose of his or her assets. Perhaps we ought to consider going further. At the moment, there is nothing the courts can do about people who sell overseas property funded through proceeds of crime because it is in another jurisdiction. We consider that a court should be in a position to fine or jail someone, possibly by making it a contempt of court, if he disposes of property based overseas that is subject to a freezing or confiscation order. Amendment 2 provides for Clause 7, on compliance orders, to be amended to that effect.

We also consider that there should be a consultation on introducing a legal obligation to repatriate liquid assets that are subject to a restraining or confiscation order and which appear to have been moved overseas. Amendment 21 in this group provides for a consultation along these lines. I hope the Minister will be able to give a helpful response to the amendments in this group, since we are at one in seeking to make sure that crime does not pay.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, Amendment 2 relates to compliance orders. Under the provisions in Clause 7, the court will be required to consider making, in every confiscation case, any order it considers appropriate to ensure that a confiscation order is paid. Under the new order, the court will be able to impose any restrictions, prohibitions or requirements it believes appropriate to ensure that a defendant pays a confiscation order and that the order is effective. A compliance order will normally be made at the time that a confiscation order is granted. If the court determines that a compliance order is not necessary at that confiscation hearing, the prosecutor will be able to apply for an order any time afterwards as long as the confiscation order remains unpaid. This type of order is not new to the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, as the Act already confers on the Crown Court the power to make any,

“such order as it believes is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the restraint order is effective”.

Amendment 2 would require the court to consider attaching to a compliance order a restriction on selling overseas property that is the subject of a confiscation order. It is, however, already possible to impose such a restriction as part of a restraint order, as the noble Lord will understand from what I have just said. A restraint order can be obtained at a significantly earlier stage in an investigation—for example, before the defendant has been charged. Such a restriction may also be added to a compliance order where there is no restraint order in place. As such, it is not necessary to make express provision for the court to consider such restrictions or prohibitions. The court already has that discretion. It is worth adding that, once a confiscation order has been made, it may be necessary to sell property to enable the order to be paid off. In high-value cases, this may fall to a court-appointed receiver. In addition, not all defendants will have assets overseas so it would not be necessary to require the court to consider imposing such a restriction in every case.

Amendment 21 seeks to confer on the court, when making a restraint or confiscation order, a power to require the defendant to repatriate liquid assets held abroad back to the UK. The Proceeds of Crime Act already allows the court to make any order that,

“it believes is appropriate for the purpose of ensuring that the restraint order is effective”,

as I have already said. That could include, for example, a requirement for liquid assets to be returned to the UK. Breach of the terms of a restraint order, including selling property that is frozen under the terms of the order, will be a contempt of court and, as such, punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to two years.

Finally, Amendment 22 calls for a review of mutual legal assistance. The movement of money and assets quickly across borders means that it is essential that the UK seeks the assistance of its international counterparts so that it can quickly freeze and recover the proceeds of crime, and it can likewise assist jurisdictions that ask the UK for assistance. Historically, international co-operation on asset recovery has been poor, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said. We depend on other countries to enforce our orders on our behalf, but these orders may not be given priority. Some countries are witting or unwitting safe havens for criminal assets.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for his reply on this group of amendments. As I understand it, the Minister was saying that, as far as Amendments 2 and 21 are concerned, the current legislation already gives the power to do what is set out in those amendments—at least, I think that was the thrust of the Minister’s reply. Obviously, at least if I have understood the essence of his reply, I just wish to leave the matter in the context that clearly I will wish to read in Hansard the details of the Minister’s response.

On his response to the last issue, on mutual legal assistance, I am sure that the Minister will understand if I say that I will want to read it, since he gave some statistics and information on the current situation. I shall read that with interest when Hansard appears.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The noble Lord asked me some questions about numbers, which I did not have to hand in my papers. I am willing to see whether I can find further information which I can give him, because I agree that it is an area where a modest improvement in performance could lead to considerable improvement in the amount of money that we recover.

[Lord Rosser]

I am grateful to the Minister for those comments. I suppose that part of the reason for my saying that I would want to see the detail of the figures that he gave was to see whether he had in fact responded to the questions that I asked, but if he, too, is going to look at that, and if there are parts to which he did not respond on which he will write to me, I will be grateful. In view of that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, as we have already said today, under this Government around £746 million of criminal assets have been seized under POCA, which is more than ever before. Around 60% of confiscation orders for sums up to £500,000 are discharged within six months, but it is clear that we need to do more to ensure that confiscation orders, particularly the higher-value orders, are robustly enforced. That is what lies behind the measure that the amendments seek to address.

A key mechanism in POCA for incentivising prompt payment of confiscation orders is the availability of default prison sentences where somebody fails to pay. It is clear that for lower-value orders default sentences have the desired effect, with nearly 90% of orders under £1,000 being discharged. But at the other end of the spectrum, just over 18% of orders over £1 million are settled in full. There is anecdotal evidence that serious and organised criminals would rather spend a few extra years in prison in the knowledge that they can enjoy the fruits of their crimes when they come out. It is clear that we need to provide further incentives to persuade these hardened offenders to pay up. It is with that in mind that we are legislating. Clause 10 accordingly increases the length of default sentences for higher-value orders. For orders between £500,000 and £1 million, the maximum sentence is increased from five to seven years, while for orders over £1 million the maximum sentence will increase from 10 to 14 years.

In addition to increasing the maximum default sentences for higher-value orders, we have looked again at the early release arrangements. Current provisions allow for automatic release at the halfway point of a default sentence. Early release reinforces the view of certain offenders that a default sentence is worth serving in order to retain criminally acquired assets—I think that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made the same assessment when introducing his amendments. Unconditionally releasing offenders at the halfway point of their default sentence seriously impairs the intended deterrent effect of the default sentence, particularly for the highest-value orders. So this clause will also end automatic early release for those serving a default sentence for failing to pay an order valued at over £10 million. The combined effect of these changes will mean that, in such a case, an offender will serve up to 14 years in prison rather than five years, as now. This is a significant increase which will make offenders think long and hard about serving the time rather than paying their confiscation order.

The noble Lord quite rightly asked why we set the threshold for ending early release at £10 million and not, let us say, at £1 million or £500,000, as Amendments 6 and 7 propose, or indeed at any other level. What is the rationale behind the Government’s decision? As I have said, evidence suggests—I have given figures earlier—that the existing default sentences do not have sufficient deterrent effect for the highest-value orders. We have therefore focused the changes made by Clause 10 on the upper end of the scale.

As a responsible Government, and as the noble Lord will know, we are committed to eradicating the deficit which we inherited from the previous Administration. We naturally took into account the potential cost of changes to the default sentencing arrangements. As we have set out in the financial effects section of the Explanatory Notes, the combined cost of the changes made by Clause 10, all other things being equal, is £1.78 million, or 60 prison places, by 2033. Ten of those extra prison places are attributable to the ending of early release for default sentences for confiscation orders of more than £10 million. The cost of these provisions should not be viewed in isolation. Elsewhere in the Bill, the new participation offence will cost some £6.6 million, including some 45 additional prison places.

I was intrigued by the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. He seems to have reined in the Opposition’s ambitions, because the proposals put forward by the shadow Home Secretary and shadow Attorney-General as recently as May stated:

“Labour would end early release for criminals serving default sentences who refuse to pay”.

I wonder whether the noble Lord can tell us what the cost of such a proposal would be. If not, I can tell him. Again, if there was no change in offender behaviour, such a policy would require an additional 900 prison places, at a cost of some £25 million per annum by 2033, although the great majority of those costs would kick in by 2020. This of course assumes that the capacity will be available within current prison facilities. However, given the impact of this proposal, it is likely that further facilities will need to be provided, which will result in a considerably higher total cost. It is therefore reasonable to ask the noble Lord where the money would be found to fund the proposals as set down in his amendments.

We have made a judgment. Our view is that the changes made by Clause 10 represent a well judged package. It is our expectation that the increases in default sentences and the ending of early release will lead to a change in offender behaviour. Faced with 14 years in prison, rather than five as now, we believe that an offender with a confiscation order of more than £10 million will not be so ready to serve the time rather than pay up. Fourteen years is a long time in prison.

However, it would be prudent to test that proposition before we go further. That is why the clause contains two order-making powers. The first will enable us to change the structure of default sentences, including by further increasing maximum sentences and introducing minimum sentences. The second delegated power will enable us to lower the £10 million threshold for ending early release. We will keep the changes made by Clause 10 under close review, and if they are having the desired effect then we will not hesitate to exercise these order-making powers.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether the Government had considered alternatives to the £10 million threshold. The answer to that is yes. I do not propose to get into a debate about whether we considered this threshold or that. Suffice it to say that Ministers considered a range of options and came down in favour of the proposition in Clause 10. I can tell the noble Lord that we estimate that the cost of ending early release for orders of £500,000 and over would be approximately 180 prison places, costing an estimated £5 million per annum by 2033. Ending early release for orders worth £1 million and over would lead to an increase in the prison population of approximately 70 places by 2033, costing an estimated £2 million.

The Government have considered this carefully and concluded that it would not be appropriate to lower the threshold for ending automatic early release until it was proven that it resulted in improved payment and was an effective deterrent, and that it was affordable to do so. We therefore believe that the provisions in Clause 10 are the appropriate way forward, while building in flexibility for the future.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the Government’s attitude to the conclusion of the Delegated Powers Committee that it would be inappropriate to introduce minimum default sentences through secondary legislation. We are considering carefully the points made by the committee about this order-making power, and in doing so we will want to take into account the points that the noble Lord made in today’s debate. Accordingly, I cannot take up the noble Lord’s suggestion that I respond to the report today, but I can undertake to reply to the Delegated Powers Committee report in advance of the Bill’s Report stage in the autumn.

In view of that commitment and the fact that I have valued the opportunity to explain the way in which the Government arrived at our judgment to introduce the measures in Clause 10, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for his reply and for giving the information about the projected increase in the size of the prison population if the figure were £1 million or £500,000, and indeed what the increase would be if there were no threshold figure at all.

If the Minister thinks there has been a change in our policy, I shall put his mind at rest. I shall requote to him what I said in my contribution: our view is that criminals who do not meet the requirements of the default sentence for not paying the terms of a confiscation order by the due date should not be allowed out of prison early. That is our approach. I said it in my contribution. I also made it clear that our two amendments are probing amendments to find out why the Government believe that the threshold of £10 million is appropriate.

We shall consider what the Minister has said, but I think that with regard to the £1 million threshold he said that the figure was 70 additional places at a cost of £2 million; I think he said that for the £500,000 threshold the figure was 180 additional places at a cost of £5 million; and for no threshold the figure was 900 prison places at, I think he said, the cost of £25 million. I just want to ensure that I have understood correctly what he said.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I would like to reassure the noble Lord. I emphasise that I said that 10 of these extra places would be attributable to the ending of early release from default sentences for confiscation orders over £10 million. I actually said that as part of my presentation to the noble Lord.

[Lord Rosser]

But I think I am right in saying that the impact assessment assumes no change in the behaviour of the criminals concerned. I think, and perhaps the Minister will confirm this, that the figures he has given of an increase of, respectively, 70, 180 or 900 places and increased costs as a result also assume no change in criminal behaviour, and therefore no more money coming back in as a result of the ending of automatic release at the halfway point of a default sentence. A lot of people would find that an extremely unlikely assumption on which to base the impact assessment and the Minister’s figures.

However, I will leave it at that. I thank the Minister for the information and for his comment that we will have the Government’s response to the Delegated Powers Committee before Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Licensing Act 2003 (FIFA World Cup Licensing Hours) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I welcome the debate on this order. I am not entirely sure where the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, stands on the issue before us—

[Lord Rosser]

I thought that I made that clear when I started. I said that we were not opposing it as we accepted that there was a need to provide arrangements for extended hours during the World Cup. What I am raising with the Government is how views were sought from a number of stakeholders, to which I have referred. They covered the police and the Mayor’s office, as well as local government and residents, who were not saying that there should not be an extension but asked why we could not stick with the current procedure of temporary event notices, which allow local circumstances to be taken into account, rather than doing it on a blanket basis, which, unless the Minister is going to tell me to the contrary, does not allow local circumstances to be taken into account.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

It was that point of which I was uncertain—as to whether the Opposition were in favour of doing it through this measure. I am still unsure. I understand exactly what he has said—

[Lord Rosser]

I am asking the Minister to explain in rather more detail why, in the face of those points made by the organisations to which I referred, the Government are saying that the best approach is the national blanket decision rather than a continuation of temporary event orders. We are not opposing this order as we recognise that there has to be a facility for extension of licensing hours. But we are curious as to why the Government are so keen to go down the road of the national blanket order, which does not allow local circumstances to be taken into account, bearing in mind the nature of the comments that came back from the police and the Mayor’s office, residents’ organisations and the Local Government Association.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Of course, the overwhelming number of comments were in favour of using this measure. I accept what the noble Lord says. He is quite right to challenge the Government on why they have made this decision. I think that England’s participation in the World Cup is an occasion that many people will want to enjoy in an atmosphere of clubs or bars where they will be enjoying themselves with other people. We consider it appropriate that the World Cup is seen as an event of exceptional national significance for the purposes of Section 172 of the Licensing Act.

Before I go on to the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I would like to respond to my noble friend Lord Addington, who mentioned the very serious consideration of domestic violence. It is interesting that we have a domestic violence debate tomorrow, which I am also involved in. In truth, there is very little recent evidence that shows that incidents of domestic violence increase during sporting events, although in the past there have been occasions when such phenomena have been reported. Women’s Aid will run a campaign to raise awareness about domestic violence during the period of the World Cup, and that campaign is supported by the Home Office.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked whether we are going to extend the blanket provision to matches when England is not playing, such as the World Cup final. It is acknowledged that an awful lot of people will probably watch those games, but the power under which this order is being made allows for the relaxation for events of exceptional national significance and we consider that this would not meet the criteria if England was not playing in the final.

On that basis, the noble Lord has clearly read with interest the impact assessment. I am pleased that he is impressed by the intellectual rigour with which the Government draw up those assessments. He is quite right. It says that England are certain to play in the matches of the first period of the tournament—I think that we can all agree on that—but that there is a high probability that England will not play in later matches. That is a matter of opinion, and I am sure that other noble Lords will have different views on that issue. But the use of Betfair and its interactive website was the basis for that assessment.

[Lord Rosser]

As I understand it, the Minister has said that a blanket order could not apply to the final if England was not participating in it. Am I not right in saying that Section 172 can be applied to mark occasions of exceptional international significance as well as national significance?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The noble Lord is absolutely right, but the Government have not taken the view that that particular definition applies in this instance. We are limiting it to those games in which England is playing.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about additional policing costs, crime and disorder and the cost to the taxpayer. We are mindful that late-night drinking can lead to crime and disorder as well as public nuisance but, because these matches will be identified and the situations known, the order is restricted to the sale of alcohol and late-night refreshment in pubs, clubs and anywhere else where alcohol is consumed on the premises. It is not an off-the-premises order.

The noble Lord asked about giving the police extra funding for this. No, this is not an event for which extra funding would be provided. He also asked whether there would be other occasions on which football events would be covered, and mentioned the women’s World Cup. Each occasion is assessed on a case-by-case basis, based on whether they could be considered of significance, alongside other circumstances, such as time, location, and the impact on public safety. Those things are carefully considered before orders such as this one are brought before the House.

The noble Lord asked how it would be possible to plan policing. The police will use their relationship with premises to determine which premises would be extending their licensing hours and will manage risks accordingly. He asked how we squared this proposal with our localism approach. The Government have decided that England’s participation in the World Cup is an exceptional national event. Due to the late kick-off times, which we cannot help, since Brazil is west of here, it is appropriate to relax licensing hours for a modest length of time in relation to these matters. This order provides a temporary change only in licensing hours during World Cup 2014.

Licensing hours have been relaxed before, as I have said. The order provides a temporary change, specifically for England’s matches. Future events and occasions will be considered on a case-by-case basis. This licensing hours order will reduce the burden on businesses, which is why we have chosen this path, when otherwise they would need to use temporary event notices to extend their opening hours. It will reduce the burden on licensing authorities, which would have to process the notices.

[Lord Rosser]

I am still not clear on the question of additional policing costs. Can the Minister say that the additional policing costs will be less than what the Government described as the benefit to on-trade premises of £1.35 million?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I cannot say categorically what the actual increase in costs will be and I certainly cannot state categorically the degree to which the order will increase police costs. I think that a far more difficult situation would arise if England were playing, clubs, pubs and bars were not open and there was informal activity on private premises. At least the order allows policing to be planned as it enables the police to know which licensed premises will be open during these events.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I certainly understand exactly what my noble friend is saying. As I said, the Home Office is supporting an awareness campaign on this issue. I cannot give him a specific promise that there will be a continuing commitment in this regard. However, we will discuss this issue tomorrow afternoon and I hope that the noble Lord will participate in that debate. I am prepared to write to him about a continuing commitment if that would be helpful in the event that he is not able to attend tomorrow’s debate.

[Lord Rosser]

I wish to ask the Minister a question following what he said a moment ago—that premises which decide to stay open later under the blanket order will have to advise the police in advance of their decision to do so. I thought the Minister was arguing that the blanket order made it easier for the police to keep control of the situation. However, the letter from the Association of Chief Police Officers says that the advantage of temporary event notices is that they allow police forces,

“to adapt their public order plans to more accurately reflect the probable demand based upon targeted intelligence”.

Does it mean, therefore, that under this blanket order premises which are intending to stay open later within the terms of the order will have to advise the police in advance?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

No, that is not the case. However, the police will be able to ask whether such places intend to remain open. That is entirely up to them.

[Lord Rosser]

Can we be clear, therefore, that under the blanket order the police have to ask premises whether they are staying open whereas under the temporary event notice, where people would have to apply, the police would know in advance who would be staying open?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

If the police consider it is important for them to know that information, they will ask the question. If they do not think it is important to know that, they do not have to ask the question; it is entirely up to them. It is a policing matter, not a question of the licensing arrangements. We are making it clear that the whole point of this measure is to liberalise the licensing hours available to licensed bars and pubs to enable them to have extra licensing hours, if that is what they seek, to enable their customers to watch matches and have a drink at the same time. I think it is quite clear what the arrangements will be. I would have thought that the noble Lord would accept that it is a perfectly sensible and practical arrangement. As I said in my opening speech—

[Lord Rosser]

The Minister says he hoped that I would accept that this is a perfectly practical arrangement. I have made it clear that there is no argument about the need for a procedure for extended hours. However, the points I am raising are ones the police have raised.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think I have given the answer, have I not? My job is to present the reasons why we have chosen to go ahead with the order. We have done so because we consider that this is an event of national significance. As it is an event of national significance, we have decided that the Licensing Act approach is the right one to take to provide the opportunity for licensed premises to stay open during the matches. We have made it quite clear why we have done that. The job of the police is to maintain order. They are entitled to say that they do not particularly like our approach; that is entirely up to them. However, the Government have made this decision because they think it is in the interests of the public as a whole that they have an opportunity to view the matches while attending licensed premises. I think that is a perfectly reasonable thing to do. The order is conditional on England playing in any particular match. The coalition Government believe that the decision to relax licensing hours for England matches during the World Cup strikes the right balance between recognising the benefits of alcohol when it is enjoyed responsibly and maintaining proper safeguards for the public. On that basis, I hope that these orders are agreed.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Thursday 3rd April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, this is a serious issue. The order that the Minister has moved was agreed in the House of Commons yesterday and, as he has said, if it is agreed by this House today it will come into effect tomorrow. I thank him for the letter that he sent to my noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon on 31 March, which set out the case for the proscription of the three groups named by the Minister, and he has of course repeated that case in moving the order today. This is an issue of national security, and we are happy to accept the Government’s assurances on the basis that all three groups seem to have been involved in terrorism at the highest end of seriousness, including some directed at our citizens and allies.

There are, however, two points that I wish to raise about the issue of proscription, though not specifically about the three groups in question; as I indicated, we are happy to accept and agree the order. I am sure that the two issues will not come entirely as a surprise to the Minister. As I understand it from what was said in the Commons yesterday, there are apparently 52 international and 14 Northern Ireland-related terrorist organisations that are already proscribed, and I gather that between 2001 and the end of March last year 32 people have been charged with proscription-related offences as a primary offence in Great Britain and 16 have been convicted, so there are a number of organisations on the list.

I am sure that the Minister will not be too surprised if I say that it appears that one organisation is not yet on the list: Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is of course the one that the Prime Minister said when he was leader of the Opposition that he thought ought to be banned. It is not clear why after all this time that organisation has not been proscribed if apparently, in the Prime Minister’s view, the case was so clear-cut a number of years ago when he announced his personal view of what he would do. I would be grateful if the Minister could throw any light on that, purely in the sense of whether this organisation is likely to be banned or not. What are the Government doing on this at the moment? Have they come to the conclusion that it does not require to be banned, or is it after all these years an issue that they are still considering? They seem to be taking a remarkably long time to come to a conclusion.

The other issue that I would like to raise, and it is the final one that I want to talk about, is the issue of de-proscription. This was raised in the House of Commons yesterday but I want to put a question about it to the Minister. Obviously we have a procedure for, quite rightly, putting organisations that are threats to national security on the list so that action can be taken. I have referred already to the figures that the Minister in the House of Commons gave about the number of organisations currently proscribed. My question about the issue of de-proscription is on the understanding that the only group that has ever been de-proscribed obtained that through judicial review. It is of interest to raise this issue because, according to the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, the Home Office was at one point considering an annual review of the proscribed list to see which groups still met the criteria.

That independent reviewer suggests—I do not know whether it is true—that there is no current evidence of terrorist involvement, even in this century, for some proscribed organisations. According to the independent reviewer’s website, last summer the Home Office had compiled a list of up to 14 groups that no longer met the criteria for proscription and the independent reviewer has been calling for the annual review of proscribed groups to which I have referred and which it was claimed that the Home Office was at one point considering.

In conclusion, since it appears that the Home Office now wishes to go down a different road for de-proscription for individuals or organisations, why is it not in favour of at least a regular review of the proscribed groups to see if they still meet the criteria that necessitate their being on the proscribed list in the light of an apparent view—whether right or wrong—of the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation that a number of organisations on that list no longer meet the criteria for remaining on it?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his support for this order. I will do my best to answer his questions. As he said, there was a lengthy debate yesterday in the House of Commons where my honourable friend James Brokenshire presented this order for approval by that House. The noble Lord asked first about Hizb ut-Tahrir. Hizb ut-Tahrir has been considered by the Home Secretary. The Government have significant concerns about it and we are continuing to monitor its activities very closely. Of course, individuals are still subject to general criminal law. We will seek to ensure that the group and groups like it cannot operate without challenge in public places in this country. We will not tolerate secretive meetings behind closed doors on premises funded by the taxpayer. We will ensure that civic organisations are made aware of this organisation and groups like it, the names under which they operate and the ways in which they go about their business. I can comment no further on that organisation.

As the noble Lord will well know, de-proscription is by application. While we keep a watch—and it is quite proper that we do—on organisations about which we are concerned, it is up to organisations to apply for de-proscription. Under the current regime they can write to the Home Secretary and request that she considers that they should be removed from the list of proscribed organisations, and they should state the grounds under which they should be de-proscribed. The Home Secretary is required to make a decision on that application within 90 days. I hope the noble Lord will understand that there is a proper mechanism for dealing with de-proscription. However, it is not a proactive one. It is one made by application.

[Lord Rosser]

The noble Lord will accept that if you are not meant to be a member of that organisation at the time you apply it is a bit of risk applying for it to be de-proscribed—by definition you are almost admitting to be associated with the organisation that you are not allowed to be associated with.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

That is the procedure, my Lords. That is the consideration that the Home Secretary makes. I think the noble Lord will understand that you do not get on the proscribed list without the Government having real concerns about the aims and objectives of the organisation. I ask the noble Lord to accept that assurance.

[Lord Rosser]

I hope that the Minister would accept that my comments have been prompted to some extent by what the independent reviewer has claimed. I do not know whether that is true or not, but a number of organisations on the list would apparently no longer meet the criteria. I am certainly not raising it in a flippant manner—this is an issue of national security. Frankly, however, if there are organisations there and the independent reviewer is questioning whether they still meet the criteria, the effectiveness of the list is surely a factor of the organisations on it being ones that should be on it.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Well, I am satisfied with the arrangements. On the question of incrimination, I can reassure the noble Lord that, in fact, if a person makes an application for a group to be de-proscribed, Section 10 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides that evidence submitted in relation to de-proscription application is not admissible in proceedings against an individual for an offence under that Act. I hope that reassures the noble Lord to some extent about the self-incrimination process of writing to the Home Secretary to apply for de-proscription.

Finally, proscription is not targeted at any particular faith or social grouping but is based on clear evidence that an organisation is concerned with terrorism. We are satisfied that the three groups about which we have been talking today meet that statutory test and it is appropriate in each case for the Home Secretary to exercise her discretion to proscribe the group. The proscription of ABM, Al Murabitun and AAS-T demonstrates our condemnation of the activities of these groups and our support for the efforts of members of the international community to tackle terrorism. On those grounds, I commend the order to the House.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Thursday 3rd April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

I have only one brief comment to make; indeed, the Minister has already touched on it with his comment about the suggestions that have been made, in at least one case, that the affirmative procedure would be more appropriate. I am not quite sure why the Minister is arguing that he thinks that the negative procedure would be equally effective. If the Government believe that the negative procedure is just as effective as the affirmative procedure presumably they see no distinction between the two. Clearly there is a distinction. Clearly Parliament believes that the affirmative procedure is a more effective one, since it requires an affirmative resolution by Parliament in support of the proposition that the Government have made. Can the Minister put forward a more convincing argument than he has as to why they will not accept that it should be by affirmative procedure and why they think it should be by negative procedure?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I suppose we could argue about this for quite a long time if we chose to. I laid out consistency with the employers’ regulations, which are very similar in content. As I mentioned in the previous debate, the thing about the negative procedure is that it is open to any Member to bring the subject matter to debate in this House. Parliamentary scrutiny is not overridden. My hope is that it will be possible, by the time we get to this phase, that we will indeed have a situation where the House is well informed with the issues involved, well informed with the evaluation of the scheme, and well informed of the way in which the scheme is intending to work. I believe that at that point government and Parliament will be confident that they can proceed and that proper scrutiny has been provided. One would have to say that this has been very carefully considered by the Government and we have come to the conclusion that the negative procedure is the appropriate form of introducing this statutory instrument.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has brought this back, and it has been very useful to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve, about her take on this issue. She raises some of the subtle things at the edge of any blanket restriction that might be made.

I said right at the beginning when we debated this issue in Committee that the Opposition and the Government are not very far apart at all in this area. It is a matter of time and place rather than the detail of the amendment. I think the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, accepts that the amendment may not be quite perfect. I cannot commit to come back on this issue at Third Reading. There is likely to be an announcement very shortly on this whole issue, so it would be more appropriate to wait until that announcement has been made, as it will make clear what the Government’s position is. I do not think that the Opposition or any other noble Lords will find themselves very far from the Government on this issue.

To look at where we are, the Government are committed to protecting the rights of UK workers. We have said that, and as I said in Committee, the Government have already taken tougher action against abuse of the national minimum wage, both as regards its enforcement and by increasing the financial penalty for breaches. We are taking a more robust approach to the employers of illegal workers, including through a doubling of the maximum civil penalty to £20,000, which has now been approved by both Houses.

We are ensuring greater collaboration across Government to increase our “enforcement reach” and the range of sanctions that can be brought to bear against exploitative employment practices. Furthermore, the Government have commissioned a report by the Migration Advisory Committee into the causes of low-skilled migration and its social impacts.

That is why we are trying to look at the bigger picture. The amendment identifies a particular problem—and I acknowledge that it is a problem—but there is a bigger picture: why is so much of migration into this country in low-skilled jobs? We know that the social impacts of this cause concern across wider communities. We are taking action to prevent abuse of our public services and benefits systems by migrants, including those who come from the European Economic Area. As I have said previously, employment levels have risen, since this Government came into office, by 1.3 million, of which 78% is accounted for by UK nationals. However, I recognise there is a problem with a small number of unscrupulous employment agencies that source labour exclusively from overseas, particularly eastern Europe, and subject their workers to exploitative conditions. We have to acknowledge that.

We are sympathetic to the intentions behind this amendment but, as it stands, it would not achieve its aims at all. It will need very careful review because an agency could evade its scope and be in the clear simply by signing up a single UK recruit. That will not address the problem which the noble Lord has brought to the attention of the House. The ordinary residence test is very weak and easy to pass. However, more does need to be done to tackle such unfair recruitment practices, a view which I think noble Lords generally share. Ministers are actively considering how best to protect British workers from this type of discrimination and, as I have said, the House may expect announcements to be made very shortly on this issue. In the light of the points I have made, I hope the noble Lord will agree to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I am disappointed by the Minister’s reply. In Committee, he said that,

“more should be done to tackle these types of unfair recruitment practices. Ministers will actively consider how best to protect British workers from this type of discrimination and we will seek to bring forward proposals shortly”.—[Official Report, 17/3/14; col. 19.]

We do not seem to have made any progress at all. The Minister is clearly not prepared to pick up what was inherent in my suggestion: that I would be happy to withdraw my amendment if he gave a commitment to come back with the Government’s own amendment at Third Reading.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Tuesday 1st April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has spoken with his considerable knowledge of the enforced removal process and of restraint techniques. It is fair to say that his criticism is not confined to what he thinks is going on at the moment but extends to what has gone on under previous Governments as well. I do not think that his comments are geared to a particular Government; I think that they are geared to what has been happening over a period of years.

We are aware of what the noble Lord has proposed about a code of practice, and I have to say that there seem to us to be some fairly strong arguments for seeking to have such a code, in view of some of the terrible difficulties and events that there have been and to which the noble Lord has referred. He has referred today to the redrafting of paragraph 5, as I understand it from the closing words of his speech.

We on these Benches have sympathy with the arguments that he is putting forward, which are clearly addressed to trying to resolve the significant difficulties that have arisen, and may well continue to arise, with the current process and techniques. We very much hope that we will hear a helpful response from the Minister to the quite powerful points that the noble Lord has just made.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I do not think that there is going to be any marked division in this House on this issue, to the extent that I think we are agreed that whatever is done in our name should be done in a civilised and proper fashion. I am grateful to the noble Lord for bringing this issue to the House’s attention through Amendment 7, but perhaps I might start by repeating what I previously said in Committee. The provision in Schedule 1 to extend the use of force affects only those powers exercised by immigration officers. It does not make any change to the separate statutory powers of detainee custody officers and escorts, who are private contractors, to use reasonable force in the exercise of their particular functions.

As the noble Lord kindly mentioned, last week the Minister for Immigration and Security, my honourable friend James Brokenshire, and I had a very helpful and thoughtful meeting with the noble Lord where we discussed the proposals in his draft codes of practice for enforced removals and where I believe we agreed that there are a number of areas of common ground where the Home Office is making improvements. I think the noble Lord will know that my honourable friend Mr Brokenshire and I share an interest in this matter. He kindly mentioned my trip on a removals flight, which I found extremely interesting. I feel much better informed through having made that journey.

The noble Lord has proposed in the draft code of practice on use of restraint that any use of force must be justifiable, proportionate, accountable, necessary, safe and supportive and must be applied for only the minimum period necessary to achieve the lawful objective. Published enforcement instructions and guidance explain that the use of force must be proportionate, lawful and necessary in the particular circumstances, and also set out that force should be used for the shortest possible period, be the minimum needed, be used only when all other avenues of securing co-operation have been exhausted and should be de-escalated as soon as possible. Whether that use of force was reasonable must be justified by individual officers on a case-by-case basis. I can assure noble Lords that only those immigration officers who are fully trained and accredited may use force. Arrest training is currently provided by the College of Policing, and training on the use of force, including control and restraint techniques, is in line with ACPO standards.

If we were to accept this amendment, although it would maintain the status quo, there are half a dozen coercive powers which sit in the 2004 and 2007 immigration Acts, where there is no specific reference to the use of reasonable force. Although the use of force is currently implied in these arrest and entry powers, it is our intention that this should be set out explicitly in statute to ensure that there is greater transparency. I previously gave noble Lords the example of an immigration officer trying to safely arrest a person for the specific offence of assaulting him or her, under Section 23 of the UK Borders Act 2007, where it is not expressly stated in the legislation that an immigration officer can use reasonable force to restrain that person in doing so. The extension of the power for immigration officers to use reasonable force beyond that contained in the 1971 and 1999 immigration Acts will ensure that existing powers can be operated effectively and are in step with other law enforcement bodies’ powers and that current enforcement practices are not at risk of legal challenge on the grounds that the ability to use force is not explicitly set out in statute.

The noble Lord asked whether the Home Office monitored the restraint techniques used at Colnbrook removal centre in 2004, which led to the tragic death of a 16 year-old. I cannot answer that question at the Dispatch Box but will write to him and copy the letter to other noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.

With the assurance that we in the Home Office very much value the noble Lord’s input in this area, which reinforces our interest in making sure that these jobs are done in a proper fashion, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, will fell able to withdraw his amendment.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 17th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply and all other noble Lords who contributed to this debate. The Minister said that the type of sentiments I expressed in my contribution were not dissimilar to those of the Government. However, I still am not sure whether the Minister is anticipating, in any of the areas that I have covered, bringing anything back to this House before Report. He made a comment about formulating proposals shortly but I am not clear whether that meant in time for Report. It would be extremely helpful if he could clarify that point.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, to give matters proper consideration, it is unlikely that we will return to these matters on Report. However, legislation, including the slavery Bill, is likely to come before this House. There will be other opportunities where a change may occur that does not require primary legislation and which can be effected through secondary legislation. I have indicated that a work programme is going on in this area and I hope that noble Lords will accept that our objectives very much reflect the thinking that lies behind the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for that response, although I am a bit disappointed that, apparently, nothing will come forward before Report. I am sure one point he would accept is that the world can be full of good intentions and measures that intend to be taken, but it is also about, first, whether those intentions are taken and in what form that counts and, secondly, if they are taken in an appropriate form, the extent to which they are enforced. That is one of the issues I raised in relation to the minimum wage and how effectively it was being enforced. Obviously, that issue no doubt will be discussed on other occasions.

I am not sure whether I should be pleased with the comments that the Minister made about the Gangmasters Licensing Authority on the basis that more areas of work might be coming under the terms of that authority or whether I should be concerned because perhaps a look is being taken at the powers and scope of that authority, and they might be diminished in the future. Perhaps he will give me an assurance that no one is looking in any way at diminishing the power and scope of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority in the light, I thought, of his reference to a triennial review.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am happy to respond immediately to that request. As noble Lords will know, the triennial review looks at all public bodies and their effectiveness. The truth of the matter is that the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, despite comments that have been made in debate, has been remarkably effective at regulating a difficult area of exploitation. There are other areas which the noble Lord mentioned and we are looking to extend the role of the GLA or a body which can perform that function, without prejudging the issue, in such a way as to make sure that we cover more ground and not less. The powers will be adequate to ensure that the same sort of regulation that occurs in the agricultural sector occurs elsewhere where exploitation takes place.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for that response. I will leave the matter in that context. Obviously, I will want to read carefully what the Minister has said in response and to look at the extent to which the specific concerns that we have raised in the amendments in this group are or are not being addressed by the work that the Minister has said that the Government are already undertaking. I know he agrees with me that, if we are to have a reasoned debate on immigration in this country, we need to address the concerns to which immigration can contribute, although not cause exclusively or solely, in housing and employment through exploitation of migrants by people who are not entirely scrupulous in their intentions and motives. Our doubts at the present time concern the extent to which this Bill, and the measures contained in it, will promote such a reasoned debate, certainly in employment and housing, hence the amendments in this group.

I thank the Minister for his reply and I will read carefully what he has said. I thank all other noble Lords who have contributed to this debate.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 12th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

I, too, thank the Minister for his response. I am in much the same position as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, in the sense that it went rather further than I thought it would go, so I genuinely thank the Minister for what he had to say in his reply. I am also sure that the Minister might wish to reflect on the number of points that have been made after he sat down. Bearing in mind that he has said that he will send a letter to pick up any points he has not covered, perhaps he will reflect further on some of the points that have been raised in the past few minutes.

I do not expect the Minister to respond to the questions now because he has said that he will write a letter. He has certainly not responded to some of the issues that I raised but I accept that he will do so in the letter. One of those issues, of course, is why it does not say in the Bill that the money will go to the NHS—why not put that in there? We are not proposing, are we, that the National Health Service will be disappearing within the next few years, so it is not the usual argument that you do not want to put this in the Bill because it might not be there for very long? Or at least I hope that that is not the point. I have not received a specific response yet, but I know that I will when the Minister sends the letter about whether this will be additional money to the National Health Service or whether it will simply be used to reduce the amount that the Government provide.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

It will be an additional sum.

[Lord Rosser]

I also asked about whether there would be any transitional costs as opposed to transitional arrangements. I take it that the Minister will respond to that question, too.

The Minister will be aware that doctors and other parts of the health service have expressed a view that the kind of checks they will have to make will be an administrative burden. I asked a couple of questions about whether a hospital, if a patient has been referred to it by a doctor, can assume that the doctor has done the check and not have to do a double-check, and how a GP can know whether a patient who is already in the country, and therefore not covered by these new arrangements, requires a renewed application to remain here. I am sure that that will be picked up in the Minister’s reply.

My general point—bearing in mind that some doctors have expressed a concern about what they feel will be an administrative burden, and that the Minister has said that a Statement will be made to Parliament—is whether the Statement will also cover whether the arrangements have imposed an administrative burden on doctors. As some doctors have raised the issue, this would be one way of getting an analysis of it and discovering whether there is any substance to it, or whether their fears have not been realised. Perhaps the Minister can also comment on that point when he sends the letter. Once again I thank the Minister for his reply, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 3rd March 2014 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a welcome start to the Bill. Although we have strayed into some of the subsequent elements in discussing this, that is inevitable because the Bill knits elements together. It is proper that we see how the provisions of Clause 1 fit into the other aspects of the Bill.

I think that we can all agree that our current system for removal is too complex. It requires a number of decisions and notices to be made and served. Separate refusal and removal decisions can cause confusion to migrants as to when they need to leave the UK and lead to legal challenges being made later in the process

I start by considering the two amendments so ably moved by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. We know that she works assiduously on these Bills, whether or not she has taken home the guidance brochure this past weekend. Amendments 1 and 2 would ensure that a person must be given written notice of their removal. Amendment 1 also mandates setting out the date and approximate time of that removal. While I understand the broad intention behind Amendment 1, this would inadvertently reintroduce a layer of complexity, which the whole purpose of the clause is to reduce.

The intention behind Clause 1 is to move to a system where only one decision is made and served, giving, refusing or varying leave. Following that decision, those who require leave but do not have it will be removable.

I can confirm to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and indeed to other noble Lords, that such people will all receive notice of the decision in writing, in accordance with Section 4 of the Immigration Act 1971, so it is unnecessary to place an additional notice requirement within this clause. This notice will inform them of the decision on leave, of their liability to be removed if they do not depart voluntarily, and the proposed destination for any enforced removal.

It would not be feasible to provide a date or approximate time of removal in this notice. Not all those who become liable to removal will be facing an enforced removal, as we—and, I think, all noble Lords—would always prefer that those who do not have valid leave to be in the country should return home voluntarily. This allows the migrant to depart on their own terms, is more cost-effective for the taxpayer, and, if the migrant leaves without the use of taxpayer resources, they can reduce the likelihood of, and possibly avoid, a re-entry ban.

I turn to the comments of my noble friend Lady Hamwee on the deemed service of the decision. She will be well aware that “deemed service” replicates the existing notice provisions, which have been shown to work effectively and are interpreted with a degree of flexibility, such that if the person can show that they received the notice at a later date, we will accept that as the date of service. There are established procedures on the delivery of notice and, indeed, they are set out in the regulations.

All migrants will be given the opportunity to raise with the Home Office any asylum, human rights or European free movement reasons why they believe they are entitled to stay in the UK. They will be informed that they are under a duty to do so at the earliest opportunity if their circumstances change, and will be advised to seek any legal advice as early as possible.

I hope I can reassure the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York, who I am delighted is participating in our debates today, that the common law principles of access to justice mean that migrants will be given sufficient time—a minimum of 72 hours—to raise such grounds before any removal can be enforced. They will be reminded of the fact that they may be removed from the UK if they do not depart voluntarily during any contact management events. If the migrant’s removal is enforced but they are compliant with the process, they will be informed of when to check in to the port of departure. If the migrant is not compliant, they will first be detained, where they will be informed when removal is imminent.

The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, mentioned our very productive meeting. Although I cannot share his view of the hard-working people we ask to handle this difficult task on our behalf, I note what he says about oversight. I should say that quality assurance checks are part and parcel of the process. However, we recognise that there is room for further improvement. As such, we have an ongoing programme of work to continue to monitor and progress our decision quality.

Amendments 4 to 7 seek to remove the discretion in the regulations as to whether we notify family members of removal. We have already stated our intention that family members will always be given notice where they are to be removed. I hope that it pleases the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord Avebury, that it is our intention to work out how to address the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on Clause 1. We will amend the Bill on this subject. However, I remind noble Lords that it was only on 21 February that we received the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, making some similar recommendations. We are working out how to address both issues on Report. I hope I will return on Report. I reiterate that we will amend the Bill to meet the issues raised by these reports.

I now turn to Amendment 8. I appreciate the concerns raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the processes surrounding the removal of family members which have led to his tabling this amendment. At the risk of jumping ahead of ourselves, Clause 67 sets out the proposed parliamentary procedures in respect of various order and decision-making powers provided for in the Bill. It already specifies that any power to make an order or regulations is exercisable by statutory instrument and that, for this particular power, it is under the normal process of negative rather than affirmative procedure. The draft affirmative procedure is normally reserved for those orders or regulations that amend or repeal primary legislation, or develop policy in a way to require significant parliamentary debate, or where the intention behind the power to make them is not clearly set out in the Bill. This Bill is clear on the intent of the regulations. The scope for a Government to construct anything that would require significant debate in a statutory instrument deriving from it is limited.

The existing removal powers that are in force allow the removal of family members. Unlike in deportation cases, there is currently no statutory definition of what constitutes a family member. That is a matter left to the Home Office. By defining this in regulations—noble Lords have referred to the draft regulations that have appeared in the memorandum that has been circulated—the Bill will give new clarity to families so that they will know exactly who may be liable to removal. It will also provide further parliamentary oversight that has until now been absent. Following scrutiny of this clause in the House of Commons, and at the request of the right honourable Member Mr David Hanson, my honourable friend Mark Harper, the former Immigration Minister, arranged for a draft of these regulations to be published and a copy is placed in the Libraries of both Houses.

[Lord Rosser]

Perhaps I might ask the Minister a question. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee referred to the Government’s argument that these matters are best placed in regulations because the definition of “family member” or the time limits for removal may change within a limited extent. It commented that this purported justification is undermined by no such change having been needed over a period of very many years during which there have been numerous immigration Acts and a litany of immigration rules changes. Since the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, subject to what the Minister may say, appears to have shot the Government’s arguments to bits, why is the Minister still resisting ensuring that this is done by the affirmative process?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think that I have made it clear that the affirmative process is used where there is an opportunity for the Government, in effect, to change policy through a statutory instrument, which then gives rise to a reasonable demand by Parliament for the opportunity to debate the measure. As I have said, we are going to bring forward more explicit changes to the Bill to reflect the concerns shown by the comments of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It would probably be best if we waited until then to see what they say before we rush to change the procedure by which these matters have been considered in the past. It would be helpful to the House to wait until these changes are produced.

The draft regulations are designed to reflect the immigration rules. If a person can come to UK and be granted leave on the basis of a family relationship with another migrant, it is only right that such a person could be removed along with the lead person who has no leave to be in the UK. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee made recommendations about this clause that I am considering further. I will respond in detail on these recommendations before we consider the matter again on Report. That would be the right time, and I urge noble Lords to wait and see where these considerations lead us.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked a number of questions. If I do not cover them all now, I will certainly write to him. We will write to address his questions about the timescale of decision-making on removals and the carrying out of those decisions because I understand that this matter is of interest to a number of noble Lords. As to the impact on the number of removals, Clause 1 does not permit new categories of people to be removed; all those who can be removed under the clause can already be removed. It does not extend the powers to remove people but there is currently a more complicated set of procedures than will exist through the measures in the Bill. Clause 1 is about making removals more efficient.

[Lord Rosser]

Is the Minister saying that the provisions in Clause 1 about what the Government would regard as streamlining the procedure are not actually designed with the intention or hope that they will lead to more people who are not entitled to stay here and do not have leave to remain in the United Kingdom leaving the country than at present? Is that not the purpose of these changes?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

No, the purpose of the changes is to make sure that people who are subject to removal leave voluntarily rather than through enforced removal. I am sure that the noble Lord and most noble Lords would agree with that proposal.

We will ensure that family members who have valid leave to remain in the UK in their own right will not be removed. We propose to remove only dependants of persons with no right to be in the UK. Where dependency is broken, such as when it involves a victim of domestic violence, the former dependant is expected to apply for leave to remain in their own right—and, if necessary, they will be removed if they were unsuccessful as a main applicant. We will also look at the best interests of the child in making any decision under our obligations—of which noble Lords are well aware—regarding victims of human trafficking.

This has been a helpful debate. I hope that I have been able to whet noble Lords’ appetite for a government response on this important clause before Report. I can reassure them that family members will always be notified if they are facing enforced removal. The draft regulations underscore this and make it clear how notice is to be given. In the light of those points, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I can be certain that when people get a decision about the refusal of their right to remain they will be removed if they do not make arrangements to go voluntarily. That is a step forward. I hope noble Lords will appreciate that much of what the Government are trying to do, including bringing Border Agency activities into the Home Office, is designed to make sure that as we develop better oversight of decision-making within the Home Office and within UKVI we will have a more efficient process in the detail that the most reverend Primate suggested.

[Lord Rosser]

How long will those who have been told that they no longer have leave to remain be given to make arrangements to leave voluntarily and how long will it be before a decision is made that they are not going to leave voluntarily and that enforced removal is required?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

It will be for them to make arrangements with UKVI on the basis of the notice that they have been given. We are not looking for enforcement as being the primary objective of the policy. I think the noble Lord would agree that voluntary departures are what we would prefer to see happen.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My noble friend Lady Williams of Crosby and the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of York joined the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in raising the question of the effectiveness of quality control in terms of outcomes, how we enforce contracts, and whether we hold contractors responsible. We do exactly that. We have contract monitoring teams at each detention facility and individual detention and escort contractors are certified by the Secretary of State, and this certification can be withdrawn. As the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, will know, a new training programme is being undertaken by the Home Office in this area. I have invited him to come along and look at the programme and perhaps contribute to its development because we feel it is very important that at the heart of good practice in this area lies oversight on the one hand, good management on the other and, at the bottom of all of that, good training for the operatives. I think it would be the wish of the House and, indeed, the Home Office that that is provided for. My noble friend Lady Benjamin asked if there was particular training given to officers on medical conditions. I am not in a position to give that answer on the spot but I am happy to write to her.

I turn to Amendment 13. We should make it clear that the provision to extend the use of force affects only immigration officers and does not make any change to the powers of contractors, those detainee custody officers and escorts, who have separate statutory powers to use reasonable force in their functions. We believe that immigration officers should be able to use their powers to the fullest extent, where it is necessary. If paragraph 5 were to be removed, it would not affect the majority of immigration powers of examination, arrest, entry, search, detention and fingerprinting, where officers are able to use reasonable force if necessary, as most of these are contained within the Immigration Act 1971 and the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, as my noble friend Lord Avebury pointed out.

However, there are a small number of coercive powers, which sit in later legislation, where there is no specific reference to the use of reasonable force. Although the use of force is currently implied, we intend that this should be set out explicitly in statute to ensure greater transparency. The use of force in these situations may be necessary for immigration officers to carry out their role effectively and safely, and I have given illustrations of that earlier in my response. I am sure noble Lords will agree that it would be hard to see, for example, how immigration officers could safely arrest a person for the offence of assaulting an immigration officer if they were unable to use reasonable force to restrain that person. It should be noted that the new enforcement powers proposed in the Bill make amendments to either the Immigration Act 1971 or the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, so will already be covered by the existing provision for immigration officers to use reasonable force where necessary.

I can assure noble Lords that only immigration officers who are fully trained and accredited may use force. Arrest training is currently provided by the College of Policing, and training on the use of force, including control and restraint techniques, is in line with ACPO standards. Published guidance explains that the use of force must be proportionate, lawful, necessary, and age appropriate. It also sets out that force should be used for the shortest possible period, should be the minimum needed, should be used only when all other avenues of securing co-operation have been exhausted, and should be de-escalated as soon as possible.

Every instance where force is used is recorded in a comprehensive incident report. Out of 14,598 enforcement visits in the financial year 2012-13, force against the person was used in a little over 2% of cases. The issue of whether that use of force was reasonable must be justified on a case-by-case basis, as I have been explaining to my noble friend Lord Mawhinney. The extension of the power to use reasonable force will ensure that existing powers are able to be operated effectively, that they are in step with other law enforcement bodies’ powers, and that current enforcement practices are not at any risk of legal challenge on the grounds that the ability to use force is not explicitly set out in statute. Now I hope that I have been able to explain the context in which these provisions of the Bill are being proposed. In the light of these points, I hope that noble Lords will be reassured and feel able not to press their amendments.

[Lord Rosser]

Is the Minister still looking at what I understand is a code of practice—which the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has discussed with him—or are we to take it that the answer he has just given means that he does not see the need for a code of practice?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, by the actions I took following the meeting that I had with the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham. He gave me a copy of the code of practice that he had produced following his review and I was pleased to take it back to the Home Office and feed it into the department. I would like to believe that the points that the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has made are being reflected in the approach that the Home Office is taking at the moment. There is naturally great interest in what he is suggesting. As I said, we are looking forward to the opportunity to allow him engagement with us on the development of the training programme.

[Lord Rosser]

I am not entirely sure whether that means the code of practice will see the light of day in any schedule to the Bill or whether it simply—I do not use the word “simply” in a derogatory way—means that the Minister intends that the Home Office may take account of what is in that code of practice in the practices that the Home Office seeks to ensure are adopted. I think the answer I have had is the latter rather than the former. That is what the Minister’s response indicates. As I understand it, the Minister said in his reply that the oversight powers throughout the United Kingdom are already there through the relevant postholder or commission. I think he has said that the extension of powers under Schedule 1 apply only to immigration officers and not to private contractors, and that appropriate training is or will be given in relation to the extension of the powers on reasonable force. That is what I have understood from the replies the Minister has given.

I shall obviously want to read in Hansard the words the Minister has actually used since it is easy to gain an impression when it is not the correct one. However, I thank him for his detailed response and, if noble Lords will forgive me for not naming them all, I thank them for taking part in the debate on these amendments. I was particularly impressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Crosby, who indicated that my amendment should have gone further than it did. I am not often told that, but there we are. I have to say that the points she made were extremely relevant. In the light of what the Minister has said, and on the basis that I intend to read his words carefully in Hansard to make sure that I have understood them fully, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 20th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

I am not sure that the noble Earl and I should be having too lengthy a dialogue on this matter. I am not sure whether I got a very clear answer from him as to whether he accepted that what the Government are proposing may well put in jeopardy a very successful initiative, which over a period of years has had a very positive impact on the level of burglaries.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, with this amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Harris, has brought back the issue of the important role that design has to play in preventing crime and anti-social behaviour. It is important to stress that the Government recognise the importance of design in crime prevention. Nothing in the current proposals is designed to weaken that. I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, will accept that.

Before I respond in detail to the noble Lord’s amendment, I should like to emphasise that the housing standards review, which is the project under consultation at the moment and at the centre of the noble Lord’s concerns, was not initiated to cut standards irrespective of impact or to agree to a lowest common denominator approach. I cannot emphasise that enough. Its clear objective was to review a number of the voluntary standards—there are a number of voluntary standards—most frequently called up by local authorities. The aim was to identify opportunities for simplification, clarification and, if appropriate, those standards that are so important that they justify inclusion in a possible national standard or building regulations, which is a situation that may not always exist at present.

We are entirely supportive of the police continuing to advise local planning authorities on the layout of new development. We are all, I think, also in agreement that it is important to ensure that the police can continue to contribute their intelligence on crime to the development and implementation of standards. There will be no diminution of the role of the police in that respect. The new clause that the noble Lord proposes would place a mandatory duty on a body representing chief officers of police to publish guidelines on designing out crime that local planning authorities may then require builders to follow as a condition of granting planning permission.

As the noble Lord will be aware, the Government have spent considerable time tidying up the policing landscape to create a set of bodies with a clearly defined purpose. The Association of Chief Police Officers fulfilled an important role as the professional voice of the police service for many years, but as policing is changing, so too must ACPO. Many former functions of ACPO have transferred to the College of Policing and, in the light of the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners’ review of ACPO, there will be further consideration of the future delivery of some additional national functions. I am not persuaded that it would be right to pre-empt those considerations by designating a new or existing body, as the noble Lord is proposing today.

Many different expert groups have a role to play in the design, building and construction of the places where we live and work. Although I recognise that the noble Lord’s intention is to ensure that guidelines are drawn up in an open and transparent way in discussion with experts, I believe it should be left to the police and others to decide on the most appropriate groups to consult according to subject area. As a matter of good design, technical building standards and standards for the design and layout of the wider built environment are often considered together. That is indeed the approach taken by Secured by Design. However, in regulatory terms, the former are the domain of building regulations while the latter are matters for planning. Of course, the role of planning and building regulations needs to be understood in the broader context of crime overall, and on that matter I should like to offer some points of clarification.

When last we discussed these matters, the noble Lord set out a range of figures to exemplify the importance of security standards in new homes. While I have no wish to extend the debate unnecessarily as these figures have become a matter of public record, I think it is only right that we ensure that they are placed in context. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, suggested that if appropriate measures were installed some 700,000 burglaries could be prevented each year saving nearly £2 billion. According to the latest crime survey estimates, not only is this more than the total number of burglaries in England and Wales in 2012-13, it reflects burglaries in both old and new housing. The housing standards review sets out standards only for new development, not existing homes. Furthermore, the housing standards review does not propose stopping bodies such as Secured by Design bringing their own standards to the market for developers to use on a voluntary basis.

In relation to the question asked by my noble friend Lady Hamwee, local authorities are currently able to impose requirements on new development in relation to security, including adopting the principles of standards such as Secured by Design. Such standards may be delivered as a condition of planning permission, provided that the condition is necessary, relevant to planning and to the development to be permitted, enforceable, precise and reasonable in other respects—in other words, fitting the considerations that planning permission requires.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

The Minister has reminded us that when a very similar amendment was considered in Committee he, as the Minister, said that the issue was how the existing by-laws were enforced rather than that the existing powers were inadequate. It was in that context that he proposed holding the meeting to which he referred, and which has now been held. It would be of some interest if the Minister were in a position to tell us, in the light of that meeting, why on the face of it Westminster City Council and the police were not able to enforce the powers that he said were already there and were adequate to deal with the situation that we are addressing.

Presumably, Westminster City Council must have had something to say on that, as did the police, since they were present at the meeting which the Minister held. He said in Committee that he needed to satisfy himself that the existing provisions were not being enforced by the council and the police, so it would be helpful to know what those two bodies had to say when they were asked why the existing provisions were not being enforced.

I appreciate that the Minister has said that there are different penalties. He referred to penalties of £5,000 against the £500, I think, under the powers for Westminster City Council, and to differences over no pre-notification for noise. That does not fully explain why the existing by-laws were apparently not being enforced. It would be helpful if the Minister could comment on that.

Since the Minister said that it is his intention to leave it to the House, I would make just one other point. The Minister said in Committee—I use his own words—that we need to be,

“very careful about taking any action that may impact disproportionately on people’s right to protest and their freedom of speech”.—[Official Report, 25/11/13; col. 1215.]

How is the Minister satisfied that we are being careful about not taking any such action, since I assume that that matter will have been discussed at the meeting which was held and to which he referred?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his general support for the steps that we have taken to try to resolve this issue. As I said, it is a matter for the House. The interests of those demonstrating are, I believe, best served by the facility of pre-booking a demonstration based on availability, which this protocol will provide for. It is not essential and there is no attempt to say that this will be the only way in which people can demonstrate. There is no imposition on people demonstrating, other than that they obey the requirements of the by-laws in respect of the noise made through amplified sound. This provision is made explicit by my noble friend Lord Deben’s amendment. Throughout, the right to demonstrate and to assemble has been seen as a key feature of what we consider to be proper here at this end of Parliament, as it is in respect of Parliament Square.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked why the enforcement of noise by-laws has not been effective. The one thing which came out of our first, extremely productive, general meeting with everybody present was that people were in effect operating in their own little silos. If I explain that responsibility for the George V statue and the paved area in front of it lies with Westminster City Council while responsibility for the green part beyond it lies with the Royal Parks, your Lordships might understand that co-ordinating action was also difficult.

It was quite clear, too, that the police did not realise that one of the most frustrating elements was that those police serving the Palace’s interests were not engaged in any enforcement of noise requirements in respect of the area that we are talking about. The police recognised that while they had had a strong focus on provisions in Parliament Square, this area had not been considered by them to be an important priority.

The noble Lord, Lord Deben, was able through tabling his amendment at Committee to bring this to the attention not only of this House but also of the police and other authorities. As a result of that, the protocol, which I am certainly reassured will be an effective mechanism, provides an opportunity for safeguarding democratic rights and, at the same time, ensuring that enforcement can in fact occur. So I hope the noble Lord is satisfied.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Tuesday 14th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think that I can answer that best by saying that if the evidence were provided and the Government were persuaded that creating this offence was a practical and effective way of dealing with a policy issue that I am sure all noble Lords in the Chamber agree with, they would wish to see it introduced through primary legislation. However, I am not in a position to be definitive in my answer, and I think that my noble friend will understand the reasons for that. I can assure noble Lords that we are committed to reducing the availability of tobacco to children and young people. However, our actions must be guided by evidence and effectiveness. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I would be grateful if the Minister would first clarify what he has just said. One interpretation is that the Government do not really intend to do anything further themselves but are urging anyone else who thinks that there is any evidence to put it in front of them. I am not sure whether that is what the Minister is saying. Obviously, if anyone else does have evidence on this issue, of course they should submit it to the Government—but are the Government themselves seeking to do anything to ascertain or produce evidence? The Robinson and Amos study of 2010 looked at how young people’s sourced cigarettes and attempted to circumvent underage sales. It concluded that there was a problem, and one suggestion was that regular national smoking surveys should include questions that would capture more accurately the nature and extent of proxy purchases. What I am asking the Minister is whether it is now purely up to other people to put the evidence in front of the Government, or are the Government, through the Department of Health, actually doing any work themselves to seek to ascertain evidence of their own?

The amendment that I moved would be a key tool by which the authorities would know that there was a problem in a particular location because of evidence that proxy purchasing was taking place. Again, is the noble Lord’s response that it is basically up to everyone else to provide the Government with evidence, or is he saying, “If you have any evidence, provide it to us, but we are also”—whether it be through the Department of Health or anyone else—“seeking that evidence ourselves”?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

I note what the Minister has said about the situation in Scotland. I do not know whether that means he has had further information since we discussed it in Committee, but the Government said then:

“The Scottish Government, who we have talked to about this issue, say they do not currently hold any information about the numbers of convictions or, as yet, any evaluation of the effectiveness of the new offences”.—[Official Report, 4/12/13; col. 279.]

It appears from what the Minister has just said that, since 4 December, the Scottish Government have now said to the Westminster Government that the provision is not working. I do not know whether the Minister has had that information since we discussed it in Committee.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I do not want to give that impression. I am not prejudging this and I simply gave an evaluation. The results are disappointing because there have been no convictions and just one offence has been reported.

[Lord Rosser]

That is slightly different from what was said in Committee, when the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon, on behalf of the Government, referred to the fact that, as far as the Scottish Government were concerned, there had been no evaluation of the effectiveness of the new offences. However, I will leave it at that and do not intend the pursue the issue any further.

I would like to think that the Government’s view is that they will play a part in seeking to evaluate the evidence for the measures set out in this amendment and that it is not simply up to other people to provide it to them. I hope that is what I can draw from what the Minister has said. I might have drawn the wrong interpretation, so I will not say that I will withdraw the amendment on that basis, but, in the hope that that is the correct interpretation and that the Government in fact intend to take an active role in evaluating the evidence and not simply rely on others to provide it, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 8th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I will be brief. The Minister has been asked a number of relevant questions and I am sure that noble Lords will be waiting to hear the responses. In particular, do the Government anticipate that their proposal, with provision for suspending Section 49 of the 1933 Act, is likely to lead to a significant increase in the number of children being named as a result of that suspension of Section 49? Or do they take the view that it will lead to very little increase at all because they think that courts will regularly make decisions—an active choice—not to name the child in question? The question has already been asked about the Government’s intentions, not in respect of numbers or an exact figure, but whether they are looking for a significant increase in the number of children named. Is that the purpose of this? Or is their view that even though they are making the change, it may not make a great deal of difference because the courts are more likely to look at this matter and make the active choice not to name the child in question?

The answer may be that it is already covered in the draft guidance. I have not looked at the guidance to see if it is. However, if it is not already in the guidance, is it the intention that the guidance which will be issued to professionals will say anything about making applications to courts for children not to be named where professionals are directly involved? If it is not in the guidance is it the intention that it should be put in that guidance, and what in fact would it say?

I will leave it at that; the concerns have been expressed about this. Obviously there are already circumstances where children can be named as far as legislation is concerned, and I do not want to pretend that that is not the case. Clearly the Government were expecting that numbers of IPNAs would be issued and, therefore, that that might have an effect on the numbers of children being named. Whether that would still be the case in light of the amendment that has now been carried will remain to be seen. Nevertheless IPNAs will still be around, and that may lead to an increase in the numbers of children being named. It would be helpful to know the Government’s stance. Is that what they are looking for—or do they not see it making a great deal of difference? Will they be giving advice to anybody? I know that they cannot give advice to the courts, but will they give advice to professionals who might be appearing in court in order to make sure that courts are reminded at the very least that they do have this power to make the decision that children should not be named?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this again has been a good debate on an important issue. Though it is a small part, it is an important part of these provisions. I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Ripon and Leeds for presenting these amendments for our discussion.

As the House will know, the Government do indeed believe that there is a need for reporting restrictions in respect of under-18s in certain cases, where it is both necessary and proportionate to allow for effective enforcement of an injunction or criminal behaviour order. This will enable communities to play their part in ensuring that the injunction and criminal behaviour order are effective in tackling anti-social behaviour by alerting the police if the respondent or offender breaches their conditions. Publicising the injunction and the order in certain cases will provide reassurance and increase public confidence in agencies’ willingness and in their ability to take action against perpetrators of anti-social behaviour. Potential perpetrators will be deterred from committing anti-social behaviour due to reporting. So while I understand the sentiment behind these amendments, I believe that there is a strong case for maintaining the default position under Clauses 17, 22 and 29. This mirrors the current position for anti-social behaviour orders.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) (No. 2) Order 2013

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Thursday 12th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government are determined to do all that they can to minimise the threat from terrorism to the UK and our interests abroad. Proscription is an important part of the Government’s strategy to tackle terrorist activities. We propose to add Imarat Kavkaz, also known as the Caucasus Emirate, to the list of international terrorist organisations, amending Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. This is the 13th proscription order under that Act.

Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that Imarat Kavkaz meets the statutory test for proscription and that it is appropriate to exercise her discretion to proscribe it. Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides a power for the Home Secretary to proscribe an organisation if she believes it is currently concerned in terrorism. The Act specifies that an organisation is concerned in terrorism if it: commits or participates in acts of terrorism; prepares for terrorism; promotes or encourages terrorism, including the unlawful glorification of terrorism; or is otherwise concerned in terrorism. If the test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe the organisation. In considering whether to exercise this discretion, the Home Secretary takes into account a number of factors: the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the United Kingdom; the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the organisation’s presence in the United Kingdom; and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism.

Given the wide-ranging impact of proscription, the Home Secretary exercises her power to proscribe only after a thorough review of the available relevant information and evidence on the organisation. This includes open source material, intelligence material and advice that reflects consultation across government, including with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Home Secretary is supported in her decision-making by the cross-Whitehall proscription review group. Decisions to proscribe are taken with great care by the Home Secretary and it is right that the case for proscribing new organisations must be approved by both Houses.

Having carefully considered all the evidence, we firmly believe that Imarat Kavkaz is currently concerned in terrorism. Noble Lords will appreciate that I am unable to comment on specific intelligence that leads to any decision to proscribe, but I can provide a brief summary of its activities. Imarat Kavkaz, or the Caucasus Emirate, is a terrorist organisation which seeks a Sharia-based caliphate across the north Caucasus. It regularly uses terrorist tactics and has carried out attacks against Russian state and civilian targets. The organisation claimed responsibility for the January 2011 suicide attack on Domodedovo Airport in Moscow that killed 35, including one British national, and a suicide attack on the Moscow metro in March 2010 that killed 39. Since then, there has been continued activity by Imarat Kavkaz, including renewed threats of activity in Russia made during the summer of 2013. The organisation is designated by the US and listed by the UN under the al-Qaeda sanctions regime. Subject to the agreement of this House, the order will come into force on Friday, 13 December.

In conclusion, I believe it is right that we add Imarat Kavkaz to the list of proscribed organisations under Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

The Minister explained the statutory power available to the Home Secretary to proscribe an organisation that she believes is currently concerned in terrorism and the factors that she has to take into account before exercising her discretion. The United States proscribed Imarat Kavkaz in 2011 after it was linked to the two deadly attacks in Moscow to which the Minister referred—namely at the international airport, when 35 people were killed, and in the Moscow metro, in which 39 people were killed. Imarat Kavkaz was formed in late 2007 and is an Islamic militant organisation based in Russia’s north Caucasus. Its stated goal is the liberation from the control of Moscow of what it considers to be Muslim lands. It regularly conducts attacks against Russian security forces and is linked to al-Qaeda.

We support the order, but I have three points to raise. When the order was discussed in the House of Commons on Tuesday, Diana Johnson MP asked the Minister in the other place about the effects of proscription on the social media, given that Imarat Kavkaz has a number of Facebook pages, and a range of fan pages are directed towards its leader. She asked the Minister to,

“clarify whether Facebook will be prohibited from hosting such fan pages and allowing people in the United Kingdom to access them once the group is proscribed”.

The Minister replied:

“The group’s Facebook page has been referred to the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, which has responsibility for assessing such issues. If the site is assessed to be illegal, the CTIRU will flag that up with Facebook directly and have it taken down”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/12/13; cols. 204-05.]

I appreciate that it is only two days since that question was asked but this order, as the noble Lord said, is due to come into effect tomorrow. What, then, is the position in relation to the group’s Facebook page? This is the 13th order of this kind to be laid. Does the Minister know whether previously proscribed organisations had Facebook or any other social media pages and, if so, whether those pages have been taken down?

The consequences for a proscribed organisation are considerable for both the organisation and its adherents. It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to or invite support for a proscribed organisation. It is also a criminal offence to arrange a meeting in support of such an organisation, wear clothing or carry articles in public that arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter. A proscribed organisation or any person affected by the proscription may apply to the Secretary of State for deproscription. If the Secretary of State refuses, the applicant may appeal to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission. First, how many separate applications for deproscription have been made to the Home Secretary since the Terrorism Act 2000 came into force? Secondly, how many appeals have been made to, and been determined by, the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission over the same timescale?

Time-limiting proscription was recommended by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, who felt that a proscription order should be subject to a review after a fixed period, following which it could be renewed or would lapse. My final question is: what is the Government’s position on David Anderson’s recommendation?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I hope that I shall be able to answer most of the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. I appreciate his support for the order. I strongly believe that Imarat Kavkaz should be added to the list of proscribed organisations.

The noble Lord asked a number of questions. The first was about the internet and the relationship of this proscription and others to organisations such as YouTube and Facebook. We have been removing illegal terrorist content from the overt space where it is hosted in the UK or overseas and we have good relationships with those in the industry—for example, YouTube and Facebook. To date, the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit, which the noble Lord referred to in commenting on the reply in the Commons, has removed more than 18,000 pieces of illegal material. This particular group’s Facebook page has been referred to the Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. If it is assessed as illegal, the CTIRU will flag this directly with Facebook for removal.

The noble Lord also asked about applications for deproscription. There has been none since 2009, and indeed there have been no appeals to the POAC. There was one successful appeal in 2007-08 by the PMOI as a result of a judicial review of the case, as the noble Lord will be aware.

The noble Lord’s last question was about the recommendation made by David Anderson. We obviously take note of that, and indeed matters have been set up. In response to David Anderson, the Home Secretary said that under the current regime any person affected by a proscription can submit a written application to her requesting that she considers the removal of a specified organisation from the list. The Home Secretary is required to determine the application within 90 days. If the Secretary of State agrees to deproscribe an organisation, she will lay an order before Parliament removing it from the list of proscribed organisations. That is subject to the affirmative procedure, as is this order. The Home Secretary’s consideration of these matters following applications from the groups themselves is an effective process. There is a right of appeal and challenge, should the Home Secretary’s decision be negative. Any valid application for deproscription will be considered by the Home Secretary in accordance with the Act. I hope that that helps the noble Lord.

[Lord Rosser]

Does that response mean that the Government are not looking at going down the road of what I understand to be his recommendation—time-limiting proscription, which would be subject to a review after a fixed period, following which it could renewed or it would lapse? Are the Government not looking to doing that?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I have described the position, and I have a note here which helped me to do so. It presents the Home Secretary’s role and the Home Office’s view on the best way of dealing with deproscription, subject to application and considered within 90 days. In the event of a negative response there is a right of appeal. That is the current procedure and it would apply to any of the current 14 bodies that have been proscribed through the order.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 11th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

We indicated at Second Reading that we intended to propose a new clause on this issue since it was clear that action had to be taken to address how covert policing operations were authorised and managed. Of course, we support undercover policing, since such operations are a vital part of the fight against organised crime and terrorism and are essential in keeping communities safe. We recognise the dedication and bravery of those officers who undertake this work. However, any such operations must be subject to the highest ethical and operational standards. That is essential for both their operational effectiveness and public confidence. Our amendment today, therefore, seeks to deal with the issue of accountability.

There are two cases that highlight how important it is that changes of the kind that we are proposing are made. The first is the case of Mark Kennedy who, as a police officer, infiltrated—I think that is the word—protest groups over a period of years: groups which said that they were involved in lawful demonstrations, rather than crime. The former policeman, it appears, had relationships with women in the protest movement and travelled to eco-protests across Europe. He later told a Channel 4 documentary of his remorse, including his regrets about and feelings for a woman with whom he had had a long affair. HMIC reviewed the activities of Mark Kennedy and other undercover officers and stated that his actions had led to the collapse of a trial of environmental protesters and that he had “defied” management instructions. The report found that Mr Kennedy had helped to unearth “serious criminality”. However, Mr Kennedy said that, while the subject had never been broached directly, it was “impossible” that his superiors had not known he was having a sexual relationship with some protesters. The report suggested that an independent body might be required to authorise such undercover operations. It also said that Mr Kennedy was inadequately supervised and that oversight of undercover officers needed to be strengthened.

The second case is that of the Lawrence family. Twenty years ago, Stephen Lawrence was murdered at the age of 18. He was, of course, the son of Neville and Doreen, who is now my noble friend Lady Lawrence of Clarendon, a Member of your Lordships’ House. Stephen was cruelly murdered by racists and there was evidence of racism in the way the police inquiry was conducted. Serious allegations have now been made that the police spied on the Lawrence family with a view to discrediting them. Peter Francis, a former undercover police officer and a member of the somewhat controversial Special Demonstration Squad, has spoken of his activities as part of an operation to spy on and attempt to smear the Lawrence family.

These two cases and other incidents have led to serious concerns about the accountability of the undercover police operations that were undertaken and raised questions about the accountability of future undercover police operations. Our amendment seeks to ensure that all long-term undercover operations are signed off by a relevant independent body, to ensure that, where needed, covert operations are used proportionately, sensitively, only when necessary and with clear and improved accountability arrangements. Additionally, we do not currently have effective oversight of these operations. There are various options we can explore and we hope that the Government will look at these options carefully. Judicial oversight is just one that could be considered.

There also appears to be an anomaly, because currently, if the police or security services want to enter—perhaps to break in, to bug a room or to intercept a phone call—they need justification that to do so is in the interests of national security in order to get a warrant. Attaining a warrant requires judicial approval. However, those undercover police officers who entered into relationships in an attempt to retrieve certain information needed no warrant.

Of course—and we appreciate this—undercover operations vary. Some will be as short as an hour or so and may involve relatively minor matters; it would be impractical to ask for independent approval for all such operations. However, our proposed new clause is intended to target long-term covert police operations, and these can span from six months to 12 months or even several years. When such operations are undertaken, there needs to be clarity about the goals, the methods and the priorities. Therefore, there should be independent approval prior to any such lengthy operation. It does not necessarily have to come from a judge, but it must be truly independent, and the very process of seeking such approval would help to ensure proportionality, and clarity of objectives and methods. Our proposed new clause would help to ensure that operations such as the hugely inappropriate and totally wrong campaign against the Lawrence family cannot take place again. That campaign and operation against the Lawrence family showed appallingly bad judgment. Surely, we all want to ensure that any operation undertaken is accountable, justifiable and in the wider public interest.

On Report in the other place, the Minister Damian Green stated that it was the Government’s,

“intention to legislate to enhance oversight of undercover law enforcement officer deployments”,

and this could,

“be done through secondary legislation”.

He outlined the Government’s proposals to increase accountability and oversight. However, proper scrutiny is necessary and we need the opportunity to scrutinise those proposals as part of this Bill. Damian Green promised in the House of Commons that he would,

“lay the appropriate order before the House shortly”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/13; col. 634]

As I understand it, we have not yet seen the order, although I may be wrong in saying that. However, we feel that it would be much better to deal with an issue of this importance in what the Government regard as a flagship Bill on crime and policing. I hope the Minister, when he replies, will be able to give a helpful response.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for tabling this amendment because I agree with him that the whole question of undercover policing is very important. I do not think that any noble Lord should be in doubt that covert techniques, including undercover policing, are an important weapon in the fight against terrorism and other serious and organised crime. Undercover police officers play a crucial role in keeping us all safe. It is difficult and dangerous work and I welcome this opportunity to pay tribute to all who undertake it.

The new clause proposed by the noble Lord seeks to introduce a system of independent authorisation for undercover policing operations. I do not believe there is any great difference of view between the noble Lord and me on this point. We both believe that there must be proper safeguards to ensure that these covert techniques are used only where appropriate and that the mechanisms for approving all such deployments are fit for purpose. However, I hope that it will help noble Lords if I set out why I do not believe that this amendment is required, not least because the Government have already instigated changes that are designed to meet the concerns that have arisen in the light of some allegations of past misconduct, which were sympathetically described by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

Undercover deployments are authorised under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, commonly known as RIPA, which stipulates that the use of an undercover deployment can be authorised only at a senior level within the police force or other law enforcement agency concerned. In giving an authorisation, the authorising officer must balance the seriousness of the crime being investigated, and the value of the evidence likely to be gathered, against the right to privacy of the person under investigation and of those others who are likely to have their privacy intruded upon, such as family, friends and other associates.

Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary conducted a rigorous and independent review of undercover policing last year and made a number of recommendations to improve the way authorisations and deployments are made. Earlier this year, the inspectorate reported on the progress made in implementing its 2012 report and was generally positive about the work already done. The noble Lord referred to the role played by my ministerial colleague, the Minister for Policing, Criminal Justice and Victims, the right honourable Damian Green, who announced to the Home Affairs Select Committee our intention to strengthen this regime to enhance oversight of undercover law enforcement officer deployments. I am pleased to say that the order to give effect to this commitment was laid in October and is due to take effect on 1 January next year.

I will set out the effect of the changes that the Government are bringing forward. First, law enforcement agencies will need to notify the surveillance commissioners —all retired judges—of undercover deployments. In practice, what will happen is that a surveillance commissioner will see the same papers that were presented to the authorising officer and will have the opportunity to raise any concerns. Noble Lords will appreciate that most deployments are short-term in nature and, in many cases, last no more than a few hours. However, some are long-term, and these may give rise to the greatest concern. Initial authorisations last for a maximum of 12 months. Accordingly, the second change we are putting in place is that an authorisation can be renewed beyond 12 months only with the prior approval of a surveillance commissioner—who, I remind your Lordships, is someone who has held a senior judicial office.

In addition, we are increasing the rank of the authorising officer. Deployments of undercover law enforcement officers will henceforth need to be authorised at assistant chief constable level or equivalent. Any deployments lasting longer than 12 months will be authorised by a chief constable or equivalent, as well as by a surveillance commissioner, as I have already explained. The seniority of those who will now be required to authorise these deployments is an indication of how seriously the Government take proper oversight of undercover law enforcement activity. We believe that these changes will promote the highest standards of professionalism and excellence in this most sensitive area of policing. We also believe that they will achieve the aims of this proposed new clause by ensuring judicial scrutiny of long-term deployments while preserving the flexibility of law enforcement agencies to act swiftly where necessary.

Covert activity is a necessary part of the armoury of law enforcement but it is absolutely right, as is the intention behind this amendment, that it must be properly controlled and regulated. That is why the Government are making the changes that I have described. In the light of these changes and the new regime that we are now putting in place, I do not believe that this amendment is required and I hope the noble Lord will withdraw it.

[Lord Rosser]

I shall of course withdraw the amendment but, before I do, I have one question for the noble Lord. Does the proposal that is to be implemented in relation to the role of the surveillance commissioners also include, for particularly lengthy covert operations lasting many months, any sort of regular oversight of the operation by the surveillance commissioners, or is it a case of getting their approval beforehand and, once that prior approval has been given, that is the end of the independent oversight?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The prior approval is of course designed to make sure that there is no extension without the surveillance commissioner being a party to the decision. I cannot give the noble Lord a clear answer on this but I would suspect that the surveillance commissioner could make his approval dependent on an update at some point during the extended 12-month period. I will write to the noble Lord and give him some indication of how this would operate. I understand entirely what he is getting at and am quite happy to investigate and provide that to him.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the noble Lord for his reply and for his offer to write to me on the issue that I have just raised. I will obviously want to reflect on the reply that we have received but I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I will be brief with what has been described as my blunt instrument on Clause 141. I will not repeat the detailed arguments put by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbots. As he said, Amendments 88 and 90 seek to preserve the automatic right to appeal against an extradition order by deleting provisions in the clause that would make the ability to appeal against an order subject to obtaining the permission of the High Court. Essentially, it appears that the Government are now proposing to remove a key safeguard for individuals at risk of extradition by repealing the automatic right of appeal. We have real concerns about this change, which of course removes safeguards for UK citizens.

The automatic right of appeal is a key safeguard against the wrongful extradition of individuals, which allows them to raise new evidence that was not available at the time of the extradition hearing or to challenge the decision of the original judgment. It was surely this automatic right of appeal that allowed Gary McKinnon and his family to challenge the initial decision to extradite him to the US, leading ultimately to the decision not to extradite him at all. Without the right of appeal, he might have been extradited without any further consideration of the evidence, old or new, showing that extradition posed a serious risk to his right to life. Indeed, in the Statement that the Home Secretary made on 16 October 2012, she specifically referred to this issue when she said:

“After careful consideration of all of the relevant material, I have concluded that Mr McKinnon’s extradition would give rise to such a high risk of him ending his life that a decision to extradite would be incompatible with Mr McKinnon’s human rights”.—[Official Report, Commons, 16/10/12; col. 164.]

Yet, subject to what the Minister may say, the Government appear to be introducing changes to the Act that would mean that if a similar case occurred after this Bill had been passed, the Home Secretary would not be able to make the same decision.

Clause 141 amends Sections 26 and 108 of the 2003 Act to provide that an appeal will lie only with permission from the High Court, and no indication is given in the Bill of what criteria will be used to decide whether permission should be granted. I hope that the Minister will be able to indicate the reason for the Bill being so vague over an issue—namely, the criteria—that could have significant human rights consequences. What in fact do the Government expect the criteria to be, do they expect them to be evidence-based and will they be available for scrutiny? What impact do the Government believe any likely criteria will have on the number of cases able to be appealed?

Once an individual has been extradited, of course, there is virtually nothing that can be done if new evidence arises to show that that was not the appropriate or fair decision and was contrary to the interests of justice or their human rights. Does the Minister not agree that, because of that, it is crucial that people effectively have an automatic right to appeal against a decision to be extradited, or at least some other means of ensuring that justice is done, and that we do not end up in a situation which, frankly, does our own extradition system no credit?

I cannot vouch for this personally, but Liberty says that extradition experts are of the view that a large number of cases that have been successful on appeal probably would not have been granted leave under the Bill. Removing the right of automatic appeal will potentially have considerable human rights and legal implications. If the Minister cannot offer some movement on this issue when he replies tonight, I hope that he will at least be able to explain why the Government appear to be taking such a major backwards step, having previously placed such emphasis on their concern for Gary MacKinnon’s human rights.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, as my noble friend has explained, Clause 141 makes the right of appeal against a decision to order extradition subject to the leave of the High Court. Similarly, it makes the requesting state’s right of appeal against a decision to discharge a person from extradition proceedings subject to the leave of the High Court. Clause 141 also allows the requested person to make an application for leave to appeal out of time in certain circumstances. This does not apply to the requesting state.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, using his blunt instrument, gives me the opportunity to broaden the debate beyond the immediate amendments and explain how this process will work and why the Government feel justified in introducing Clause 141. My noble friend Lord Hodgson, in tabling his Amendments 88 and 90, challenges us on why we are making these changes. At present, a person has an automatic right of appeal against a decision to order his or her extradition, and the requesting state also has an automatic right of appeal against a decision not to order extradition—an important factor to bear in mind.

As noble Lords are aware, the Government commissioned a review by Sir Scott Baker of the UK’s extradition arrangements. One of the key findings of his review was that the success rate of appeals was extremely low: less than 13% in 2010. In other words, the court system is burdened by unmeritorious appeals, a fact to which my noble friend Lord Hodgson referred, which then delay hearings for all appellants and means that justice is deferred. Clause 141 addresses this problem by making appeals subject to permission from the High Court. This filter applies to appeals against, for example, a judge’s decision to order extradition to a Part 1 territory, that is, another member state; a judge’s decision to send a case to the Secretary of State to consider extradition in Part 2 cases, that is, where the requesting country is not an EU member state; and to a decision by the Secretary of State to order extradition in Part 2 cases. To provide parity, it also applies to appeals against decisions to discharge a person.

My noble friend Lord Hodgson asked what sort of issues a court would consider in deciding whether to allow an application to be heard. This will be, as one would expect, a matter for the judge concerned. They will, of course, give full consideration to all the relevant factors raised by the appellant before reaching a decision. We do not think that they are appropriate to be set out in legislation, as it is a matter for the court itself to consider. I understand that noble Lords will have questions about what safeguards will be available. Let me reassure noble Lords that this provision does not prevent anyone from applying for permission to appeal. Once an application has been made, the High Court will decide which cases proceed to a hearing, but each application will be considered by a High Court judge. Furthermore, Clause 141 sets out that the High Court must not refuse to entertain an application for leave to appeal by the requested person solely because it has been submitted outside the normal time period, if the person did everything reasonably possible to ensure that the notice was given as soon as it could be.

That point brings me to the matters that my noble friend Lord Hodgson raised in relation to this in his Amendments 88A, 89, 91 and 92. My noble friend proposes to amend Clause 141 to insert a requirement for the courts to allow an appeal to be made out of time if it is in the interests of justice to do so. As I said, Clause 141 allows the High Court to hear an out-of-time appeal where the person has done everything reasonably possible to bring the appeal as soon as possible. Our approach follows that of the Supreme Court, which ruled last year that out-of-time appeals should only be considered exceptionally. We believe that this provision gets the balance right: the timetable for an appeal is clear and there must be an onus on an appellant to meet the statutory requirements, as happens in the vast majority of cases.

My noble friend is also proposing to extend the time limit for appeals in Part 1 cases from seven days to 14 days. As he has explained, this was one of the recommendations that Sir Scott Baker made in his review of our extradition arrangements. We have therefore considered it very carefully in developing the provisions in the Bill. Our view is that extending the time limit in this way would have no practical effect beyond increasing the likelihood for delay. As I said, we have introduced new protections where people are unable to submit their appeals on time through no fault of their own. We believe that this new provision will address the concerns raised by my noble friend, and indeed by Sir Scott Baker, on this issue.

What safeguards will exist under these new provisions? We do not believe that we are removing any existing safeguards. We need to get the balance right between ensuring proper protection for those subject to an extradition request while ensuring that people do not delay their proper surrender by burdening the courts with unmeritorious appeals. We believe that this approach gets these matters right. The court itself will decide the issues and the relevance of any out-of-time considerations.

The changes set out in Clause 141 will allow the courts to focus their attention on the right appeals, removing the burden of unmeritorious appeals while ensuring that proper safeguards are in place for those subject to extradition. I commend the clause to the Committee and I hope that my noble friend will be prepared to withdraw his amendment, and that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will see the merit in the clause.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 4th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I will be brief. My noble friend Lady Henig indicated that this is a probing amendment which has been tabled as there are doubts about whether undertakings given previously still stand. In view of the obvious importance of this issue, which is clear from the contributions made to this debate, we shall certainly listen with interest to the Minister’s answer.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions and for the concise way in which they have addressed this important issue. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, for presenting these amendments—not that I am going to accept them—as the SIA is one of my departmental responsibilities within the Home Office. She mentioned commitments that I made last year at the annual general meeting of the SIA. I made similar commitments by video link; unfortunately, I could not be there as I was dealing with a Bill and could not be in two places at the same time.

I reiterate our commitment to the SIA. No one knows more than the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, how important that body is, given her distinguished service as its chairman. We also appreciate the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, on the importance of business licensing for the development of the industry. We are at one in that aim and we have not been idle on this issue. There has been a public consultation on the process and we have published the Government’s response to it. As the noble Baroness may know, we do not need primary legislation —we do not need to put anything in the Bill—to introduce business licensing. It would be introduced by secondary legislation and would cover issues such as door supervision, security guarding, cash and valuables in transit, close protection, CCTV and public surveillance, and key holding—the traditional areas. However, noble Lords will be aware that one of the consequences of the Leveson report is that private investigators should also come within the ambit of the regulatory body—the SIA. Therefore, there is a lot to do. I reassure my noble friend Lady Harris of Richmond that we are still very much on target.

I turn to the amendments. Amendment 56QA seeks to link the application of the complaints and misconduct framework overseen by the IPCC to SIA-regulated businesses. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, said, the police work with the private sector on many different aspects of their work, many of which are outside the security industry and, as such, it was never the intention that the provisions of the Private Security Industry Act would apply. I shall describe the sorts of thing that I am talking about. These include, for example, call handlers in police control rooms or inquiry office staff. In addition, forensic science work, which is, of course, integral to the police service, is regulated by the forensic science regulator, and would be excluded.

The intention behind Clause 121 is to ensure that the oversight of complaints and conduct matters by the IPCC extends to all private contractors, subcontractors and their employees carrying out functions for the police where those functions have been traditionally carried out by police officers and police staff, so that where there has been a move towards the civilianisation of police functions, these should be covered. Police forces are increasingly entering into contracts with private sector organisations—I come from Lincolnshire, a county which probably pioneered that—many of which fall outside the SIA-regulated regime, but which should, none the less, be subject to investigation by the IPCC for wrongdoing. I think that the public would rightly expect this to be the case.

Amendment 95ZA raises similar issues in the context of the transit through the UK of people being extradited from one country to another. Again, I understand the noble Baroness’s concern to prevent untrained and potentially unsuitable individuals being given delegated authority for facilitating these transits.

Although I agree with the intention behind the amendment, I believe that we can achieve all this through other, more workable means. I say that because the Government plan to amend this clause in recognition of similar concerns raised by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee—namely, that the power to specify descriptions of those who might in future facilitate the transit through the UK of persons being extradited from and to another country is cast in wide terms. The committee felt that this should be seen in the context of the powers of authorised officers, which include the power to detain persons in custody, and therefore that the delegated power should either be circumscribed in the Bill or subject to the affirmative procedure.

We have listened to the views of the committee and, in response, have tabled an amendment which will apply the affirmative resolution procedure to this order-making power. This will mean that the only categories of persons able to undertake escort duties will be those approved by both Houses. An example of the type of persons who might undertake this escort role is Border Force officials. Whoever is empowered to carry out the role will be subject to the extradition codes of practice, which are based on the equivalent PACE provisions. I hope that the noble Baroness will be reassured that there will be proper oversight and scrutiny of those who undertake quasi-police functions and exercise police powers, and that she will be content to withdraw her amendment.

In relation to the SIA, the Private Security Industry Act 2001, which underpins the SIA’s regulatory activities, specifically states that licensing requirements do not apply to activities carried out by a detainee custody officer and a prison custody officer, both as defined by the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Therefore, the effect of this amendment would be to create conflicting legislation, with a question as to which Act was supposed to apply to these people. The SIA currently has no remit for regulating this type of activity; nor is it the Government’s intention for it to do so in the future.

I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Henig—I keep thinking of her as “my noble friend”, although, according to the traditions of the House, I should not call her that—will accept my commitment on business licensing and on the determination of the Government to continue their policy objective of advancing the interests of the SIA. We see it as developing an increasingly important role in public protection in this country.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I will resist the temptation to go beyond the amendment that we are principally discussing, Amendment 105. We acknowledge that the Government appear to have a strong wish to bring personnel into the police from overseas, but there is an obvious concern that has been powerfully expressed tonight over the implications for the security responsibilities of the posts mentioned in Amendment 105 and their access to the highest classification of intelligence. The question has been powerfully raised of whether it is appropriate that the positions indicated in Amendment 105 should be held by a non-UK national on national security grounds. The strength of the amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Hope, has indicated, is that it does not say no, but it requires that written advice be sought from the Intelligence and Security Committee as to whether there are any considerations of national security and intelligence that would need to be examined in relation to the appointment of a non-UK national to the posts mentioned in the amendment. Obviously, there is also the requirement that Section 126 would not come into force until the views of the Intelligence and Security Committee had been obtained and given to the Secretary of State and,

“a copy of those findings has been laid before both Houses of Parliament”.

I always say, “subject to what the Minister has to say, since he might persuade me otherwise”, but it seems to me that, in view of the concerns that have been raised— which seem legitimate—Amendment 105 is eminently reasonable. It is not giving an answer to the question, but it is saying that surely the issue is of sufficient importance that advice should be sought from the Intelligence and Security Committee. We will await the Minister’s response with interest, particularly on whether they have already assessed the security implications of a non-UK national filling one or more of the positions listed in Amendment 105 and have come to the conclusion that there are no national security considerations.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. One or two things have been said that I would have to refute. I disagree with the view of the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, on police and crime commissioners, and they are not really the subject of this amendment or this debate. With the greatest respect, I have to say that I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Imbert, on the views of this Government about policing. There is no way in which any member of the Government who I know holds the police in disdain, and there is no sense that the Bill is in any way about getting at the police, as the noble Lord implied. I must put that on the record because I owe it to all my colleagues to do just that.

There is a serious issue in these amendments and I am grateful to noble Lords for addressing them and to the noble Lord, Lord Blair, for bringing them to our attention. I am also grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for being a non-policing lay person who wishes to contribute to this debate. I hope that I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, as well on this issue.

I understand the concerns that the noble Lord, Lord Blair, has raised, and I am grateful for the experience and knowledge of policing that he and his colleagues have brought to bear on this important issue. I agree that it is essential that those who are appointed as police officers undergo vetting appropriate to the role that they undertake. In the case of posts that have responsibility for counterterrorism policing, such as those that are pointed out in the amendment, it is of course vital that very stringent checks can be carried out.

Of the posts mentioned in the amendment, though, only the post of the Metropolitan Police Commissioner would be affected by the proposals in Clause 126. All the others are not mentioned in this clause or indeed relevant to it. Clause 126, as the noble Lord says, removes the requirement for an applicant to have served as a constable in the UK before being appointed as a chief constable or as the commissioner—where they have certain alternative relevant experience, which is important to emphasise as well. I have to say that there is no requirement under law to have served as a constable in the UK before being appointed as a deputy or assistant commissioner. With regard to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, it will be for the Home Secretary to decide whether to include further restrictions beyond those set out in primary legislation in advertising for the role when a vacancy arises.

That is the same position as now. As things stand, no policing posts are restricted to British nationals by legislation. I recognise that there will be some posts that will require UK nationals only. However, we do not feel it necessary to start specifying this in legislation. We have not done so up to now; why should we start? The Home Secretary has the ability to impose nationality requirements for the commissioner post if necessary, as indeed she did when the post was last advertised. Similarly, the Home Secretary can also impose this requirement when appointing the deputy commissioner and the director-general of the National Crime Agency. It is for the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police to make the decision when it comes to assistant commissioners—they are not a Home Office appointment.

The noble Lord, Lord Blair, has explained why he does not believe that this is a sufficient safeguard, and that the Home Secretary and Parliament must be required to consider the advice of the Intelligence and Security Committee. However, it would be more appropriate for the Home Secretary to take advice from whom she thinks relevant when she is in the position to make these appointments, so that it is current and pertinent to the role being recruited at that time. However, I reassure noble Lords that, whatever nationality restrictions are imposed, no appointment would be made by this or any future Home Secretary that would put national security at risk. We would always expect the successful candidate to undergo the appropriate vetting procedures. If an applicant cannot be vetted, they will not be appointed.

I shall inform the House about current vetting requirements. The UK has reciprocal agreements with Governments of some EU and NATO countries whereby we recognise their vetting as equivalent to ours. Decisions will need to be made on a case-by-case basis. There is currently no bar to foreign citizens undergoing developed vetting, nor is there a requirement to have a British parent, but 10 years’ residency is usually required.

While I accept and acknowledge the expertise in the ISC, I do not believe we need to be obliged by law to refer this matter to it. I am satisfied that there are sufficiently robust vetting arrangements in place for these sensitive posts—they are, indeed, sensitive posts. Any change in the law to exclude foreign nationals being appointed to them would be introducing a requirement that has not hitherto applied. With these assurances, I hope the noble Lord will be content not to move his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

Clause 129(4) gives the definition of anti-social behaviour. It is that it,

“causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress”,

rather than the nuisance or annoyance definition that relates to Clause 1 for the power to grant injunctions. That is the IPNAs. In Clause 94(6) on out-of-court disposals, anti-social behaviour is also defined as harassment, alarm and distress rather than nuisance or annoyance. I am not particularly expecting the Minister to give me an instant answer. If he is unable to do so, which I think may well be the case, I would be very grateful if he could subsequently let me know why there is a distinction and why it refers to the definition as being “harassment, alarm or distress” in Clause 129, which is different from the definition given in Clause 1 but is the same as the definition given in Clause 94(6).

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I will not seek to give an off-the-cuff answer to that question. If the noble Lord is happy for me to write to him I will do so, particularly as I am sure we wish to expedite the business. I hope that we can agree that Clause 129 should stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I would be happy to.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, for her contribution and for the information that she gave. Of course, she drew attention to the significant geographical discrepancies, the question of whether it was harassment or stalking that was being pursued and whether it was the right charge in each case. That is a significant point.

I understand why the Minister asks, “Why pull out this particular offence and treat it differently as far as a review is concerned?”. But when discussions were taking place in 2012, there was a strength of feeling about this which led the Government to make the decision that they did. It is understandable that, having partially achieved what was wanted—namely, it is in legislation—the next part is to see whether anything is being done with that legislation.

We will want to reflect on what the Minister said before deciding whether to pursue this at a later stage of our discussions on the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 4th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

I assume this is something the British Transport Police wants. I can hardly imagine that it is something the Government are imposing on it. Is this something it has been pressing for some lengthy period or has it been pressing for it only recently?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, indicated that considerable extra burdens have been created for the British Transport Police in undertaking its responsibilities in this direction. We have been made aware of it. The noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, has been a very strong advocate of the issue. I am pleased that the Home Office has been able to respond favourably.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment we are considering, which was moved so ably by my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, would create a specific offence of assault against workers in public-facing roles. Reference has been made to various people who fall in that category such as shop workers, and they also include bus drivers and health workers. The proposed offence would carry a period of imprisonment not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale.

Reference has been made to statistics provided by organisations such as the Association of Convenience Stores, USDAW and the British Retail Consortium. The latter estimated that 30,000 attacks on shop staff were reported last year. Women comprise a high percentage of staff in shops, and that is the case with a great many public-facing roles. Given that it is their employment, if they see a potential incident arising it is not particularly easy for them to walk away from the scene.

It has been argued that there is no need to create a different category of offence. I think that the issue is fairly clear cut. The noble Lord, Lord Condon, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, have expressed the same view on this issue and we wait to hear whether it is shared by the Minister. However, I think a lot of people feel that those who are attacked and assaulted in the course of their employment are entitled to greater protection than might be the case in other circumstances.

The current sentencing guidelines for assault indicate that an offence committed against those working in the public sector or providing a service to the public should be regarded as an aggravating factor adding to the seriousness of the offence. However, as has been said, that is just one of a number of possible aggravating factors. There is a wide range under the sentencing guidelines for common assault offences of this kind.

We are also aware that many of these assaults do not seem to be reported where they happen in the course of people’s employment, which is what we are talking about. The survey by USDAW, as I think my noble friend Lord Foulkes mentioned, showed that 17% of retail staff who had suffered a physical assault at work had not reported it as they believed that nothing would be done. There is also a feeling among some employees that many cases which are reported are not prosecuted, even where the assailants are known to the police.

Reference has been made to the separate offences of assaulting police officers in the execution of their duty and, in Scotland only, assaulting emergency service workers. The offence in Scotland in respect of emergency service workers is defined by the Emergency Workers (Scotland) Act 2005 and is, I think, subject to a maximum of nine months in prison or a fine of up to £10,000. Prosecutions using that Act have grown year on year since its introduction. There were 324 prosecutions in 2010-11 and, in total, there have been just over 1,100 prosecutions since the Act came into force, with the implementation of the Act raising the profile of assaults on those who provide emergency services.

The evidence indicates that if we had a separate offence in England and Wales of assaulting public-facing workers—we are talking about people in contact with the public in the course of their employment—with tougher penalties than for common assault, that would increase the likelihood of cases being prosecuted. It would restore what is clearly waning confidence among many public-facing workers that the judicial system will protect them, and it would act as a deterrent, as preliminary evidence from Scotland shows that while the number of prosecutions for assaulting emergency service workers has gone up, the number of such incidents has declined. That suggests that the message may be getting over, but I am afraid that attacking and assaulting people in the course of their employment when they are carrying out that role in direct contact with the public just will not be accepted. There has to be a change in attitude towards assaults of this kind, and I suggest that that can only properly be reflected in making clear that the penalties will be higher than they would be for other kinds of assaults.

The present arrangements in England and Wales do not appear adequate, as assaulting a public-facing worker in the course of his or her employment is not a separate specific offence and is regarded as being only one of a number of potentially aggravating factors relating to the crime of common assault. The result is that such assaults are not regarded as being much more serious than many other assaults in the way that applies, as it should, to assaults on a police officer in England and Wales and emergency service workers in Scotland.

If the Government want to assert that this Bill is about putting the victim first, they should recognise that public-facing workers are all too often victims of assault in the course of their employment, and they should accept this amendment, which creates a separate specific offence, with tougher penalties, for assaults of this kind.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I welcome this debate. It is very interesting that the speeches we have heard have all referred to behaviour which the earlier parts of the Bill are designed to address. Often, assaults arise from anti-social behaviour in the first instance. It has been a very useful debate. The Government cannot support the noble Lord’s amendment but perhaps I may explain why. It has been discussed twice in the House of Commons, so it will not come as a surprise to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, that I am not in a position to accept it.

I wholeheartedly share the view of noble Lords that assaults on people whose work brings them into contact with the public are unacceptable. I assure your Lordships that the Government take this matter very seriously. The speeches in this debate reflect our equal concern at the large number of assaults on people serving the public.

The Government entirely agree that no one should be expected to face violence in the course of their work, particularly when they are serving the public. We have a wide range of people on whom we depend to deliver services—nurses, teachers, police officers and firefighters, to name a few. Assault is wrong and a crime, whoever the victim. Transport workers and shop workers also form part of our essential infrastructure, as do many others whose work brings them into contact with the public. Staff of small shops may be particularly vulnerable because they may need to stay open long hours to make a profit and may operate with minimal staff. The noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, referred to people who work in the retail drinks industry. It is vital that the criminal justice system treats violence against these essential members of society adequately.

However, I do not believe that changes to the law, or a new specific offence, are necessary to achieve that. The noble Lord, Lord Condon, articulated that view well. I do not consider the proposed changes would mean more prosecutions or warrant the higher sentences which might follow. For example, I think that noble Lords would accept that if someone is assaulted in their own home and must live with the sense of fear and anxiety that that may cause, that, too, warrants a stiffer sentence. Nor do we believe that a higher sentence would necessarily have a deterrent effect. The evidence on that point is decidedly mixed. There is already a range of offences having general application which criminalise violent behaviour, and which would already apply in the context envisaged by this new clause. Further offences would only complicate the law and make prosecution more complex rather than make it more straightforward. I reiterate: assault is wrong, whoever the victim.

All cases referred to the Crown Prosecution Service by the police are considered under the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Under the code, prosecutors must first be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction, which I think we all understand. In every case where there is sufficient evidence to justify a prosecution, prosecutors must go on to consider whether a prosecution is required in the public interest, which, again, we would understand. However, the section of the code giving guidance on this public interest test says:

“A prosecution is also more likely if the offence has been committed against a victim who was at the time a person serving the public”.

That is in the prosecution’s guidelines and is an important recognition of the point which the amendment seeks to address. If the evidence is there, and the code is satisfied, the CPS will prosecute.

Finally, mention has been made by my noble friend Lady Hamwee of the sentencing guidelines, which specify that where an assault is committed against someone providing a service to the public, whether in the public or private sector, this is an aggravating factor and so should result in a higher sentence within the current maximum. The Sentencing Council has made clear in its guidance that that phrase includes those who work in shops and the wider retail business sector, which reinforces the way in which the implementation of the law already reflects the concerns of noble Lords on this issue.

I listened to the speeches made by my noble friend Lord Bradshaw, the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, as well as the speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. It has been a useful debate. I intend to draw the attention of the Crown Prosecution Service and the police to the terms of the debate because it reinforces the message that we take this issue seriously in this House as well as within government. With that assurance, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, will be prepared to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Enforcement is, of course, part of the issue. If we decide that we need to restrict the supply, we will need to have the methodologies of enforcement. However, I think that I have made it clear that having evidence and information is equally important to underpin any legislative background against which we are operating. There is much going on in this area and I make a commitment to keep noble Lords informed of developments. With that in mind, I hope that the noble Lord will be able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I will ask the Minister to clarify one point before I make my main response. Did he say that officers, whether police or trading standards officers, had been going around the country to head shops and warning them of the error of their ways—those were not the Minister’s exact words but that was the general thrust of them—and that those officers were also saying to them that legal action could be taken against them? Or were they just going around and chatting to them, giving no indication at all that they had any powers to do anything?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I cannot recall any such reference in what I said.

[Lord Rosser]

I am sorry if I misunderstood. I thought that there had been a reference to such approaches being made. I will make one particular point on that, which is really a follow-up to the point that I just made, even if I misunderstood what the Minister had said.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I have come across the point referred to by the noble Lord. The police have indeed been visiting head shops across the country to send out the message that legal highs cannot be assumed to be safe or legal. I think that is a reasonable thing to say. It is part and parcel of the communication that the people who are engaged in this trade need to be aware of their social responsibilities and the legal risk in what they are doing. It is a reasonable task to ask of police, who are enforcing the law in this area.

[Lord Rosser]

I have no problem at all with the police going around and doing that. I was asking: if the police are going around doing that—I have no problem with it; it is a good idea and they should be doing it—are they able to say to those they meet who are involved in that particular trade that any legal action can be taken against them?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

If the drugs are illegal, clearly that is exactly the position, and that is the point they make. The assumption those people may have, that some of the formulated chemicals that they are selling are legal or safe, may well be wrong. The noble Lord will know that some chemicals on the list of banned substances under recent legislation—last time we brought in 10 proscribed formulations—may well be present in products that those people may not be aware are illegal.

[Lord Rosser]

One of the main points is whether those are illegal drugs, in which case action can be taken. That is one of the issues around many of those psychoactive substances. If the noble Lord says that the police are going around and saying that some of those substances may well not be legal, can he tell me whether any prosecutions are forthcoming as a result of those visits?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Certainly, if people were found to be in possession of illegal drugs, an offence would have been committed and the opportunity to prosecute undoubtedly exists. The point is that there are people in this business who assume that what they are doing is beyond the scope of the law. We seek to make sure that they are properly informed of the fact that there is no such hiding place. The law is there to protect the citizen, and the current and future drugs legislation is designed to do just that—to make it clear to them that there is no hiding place for them.

[Lord Rosser]

If the Minister had been able to give me some assurance that he felt that action could be taken through the law against people involved in supplying those particular substances, I would feel greatly relieved. However, I have listened to what the Minister has had to say and there have been an awful lot of mays, ifs and maybes, and nothing specific. He is not saying that, as a result of looking at current legislation, the Home Office and the Government are satisfied that action can now be taken under a particular Act. My understanding and the information I have—the Minister may well tell me that I am wrong—is that some local authorities have attempted to take action under existing legislation but have not been successful. However, if the Minister is saying that there is legislation under which we can take action against those people in relation to those substances, I would be greatly relieved. However, I would like to know what that legislation is and what action is being taken.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I promised to keep Peers informed of the outcome of that campaign, and will do so. However, it is quite clear that with some of those psychoactive drugs—I believe that I debated that issue with the noble Lord in Grand Committee, when we passed that legislation—the truth is that people may be dealing in those chemicals who are unaware of the illegality of their actions. I will keep noble Lords informed and I hope that we can move on.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

They have access to the means to test the substances, which is a reasonable enough basis on which to alert the people running those premises that they might be dealing in illegal drugs.

[Lord Rosser]

Obviously, I shall withdraw my amendment. I feel that the Minister seems rather nearer to me than virtually all other noble Lords who have spoken in the debate in feeling that legal action might be possible and have some value.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

We have identified harmful legal formulations. The noble Lord sat with me while we discussed that in Grand Committee. This House has approved statutory instruments that identify those substances. We are quite clear that our war on dangerous drugs will include the restriction of supply of harmful psychoactive drugs. It does that at present and will do so in the future. However, the development that the proposed new clause seeks to put into the Bill takes this further than what we consider to be our current policy. We ask the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment because we are working in that area. My honourable friend Norman Baker is likely to produce his views on this matter shortly. I have committed to informing noble Lords on that basis.

[Lord Rosser]

I appreciate the Government’s position, which is that if any of those substances sold contained controlled drugs, they would expect the retailers to be prosecuted. That is what Norman Baker was quoted as saying in the press. However, the issue is that many of the substances involved are not illegal, for all the reasons that we have been discussing. That is one of the reasons why we have the problem that we have. I am aware that the Government are not entirely unsympathetic to the issue of law enforcement, even if there has not been much support for that idea from anywhere else in your Lordships’ House today. I am referring to the Government’s approach, which we are dealing with. When I say “legal enforcement”, I mean as per the amendment that I put forward. I do not suggest that people are suggesting that legal action should never be taken.

In the Written Statement to which the noble Lord recently referred, which was published towards the end of November, he quoted the Minister for Crime Prevention, Norman Baker, who said that the G8 member states had,

“identified a need to speak with one voice to source countries, creating a space for dialogue about substances of concern and pressing for domestic controls in source countries and law enforcement cooperation”.—[Official Report, 26/11/13; col. WS79.]

I am not entirely sure what “law enforcement cooperation” refers to, although I am not asking the Minister that now.

I will certainly withdraw the amendment. This has been an interesting debate. I am well aware that I have not had any friends as regards the amendment that I moved. My concern is that there has been a general recognition that there is a problem in this area and that it is getting worse. I do not think that any noble Lord has sought to say anything to the contrary. The real concern must be that we do not spend all our time discussing what to do, not taking any action at all and finding that the problem gets worse and worse, which could happen. Let us hope that that is not the case; I note what the Minister has said about actions they seek to take. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I, too, thank the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey for tabling these amendments. Clearly, their principal purpose is not so much to be specific but to provide the welcome opportunity to hear from the Minister what the Government’s future intentions are in relation to the IPCC, particularly concerning its independence. Very important comments were made by the noble Lords, Lord Blair and Lord Stevens, about the need to ensure that there are suitably qualified people within the IPCC to carry out the investigations that are needed. We, too, hope that the Minister will be able to indicate how the Government see the future of the IPCC, in particular what changes and objectives they are seeking for the IPCC in the years ahead.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, when we discussed police integrity last Thursday, I felt that there was a degree of unanimity in the House. In the debate that we have just had on these amendments, there was also a degree of unanimity, certainly with regard to the direction of travel that we want to see the IPCC adopt. We had a very good debate last week, initiated by my noble friend Lord Paddick, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Doocey for the contribution she made to that debate, and for tabling these amendments today.

As the noble Lord, Lord Harris, and my noble friend Lord Tyler said, we need to address perception as well as reality. The IPCC confidence survey reported that 85% trusted it to handle police complaints impartially but we cannot be complacent in our drive to rebuild the IPCC as a truly independent body.

In connection with Amendment 56QZE, noble Lords will be aware that the Government are transferring resources to the IPCC to enable it to undertake all serious and sensitive investigations—an intention that is entirely consistent with my noble friend Lady Doocey’s amendment. An announcement will be made shortly, in line with the police annual settlement process, on the level of those resources. I can assure noble Lords that the expansion of the IPCC is on track and it will begin to take on more cases from next year.

However, in requiring the IPCC to carry out “the majority of investigations”, the amendment does not specify the nature of those investigations. My noble friend Lady Doocey talked about serious investigations and that is probably what she intends the amendment to deal with. Of course, some complaints made against the police are best dealt with at local level. We will still have the police investigating the police at a local level; for example, where it is a matter of service levels or a lack of civility. But I think we can all see that with the more serious investigations the IPCC must independently be in a position to investigate those matters.

As a Lincolnshire man, I am finely tuned to poachers and gamekeepers. As regards Amendment 56QZF, I note that my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, are anticipating our direction of travel. I appreciate that the requirement for the director of investigations to be someone who has not held the office of constable in the United Kingdom would seem to provide a stronger guarantee of independence. However, I question how the public’s best interests would be served by the IPCC having to dismiss someone who currently performs this function effectively and impartially; indeed, I am doubtful whether this would even be possible under current employment law.

I am with the noble Lords, Lord Condon, Lord Blair and Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington, on this issue. We need a skills base within the IPCC if it is to be able to perform the task we expect of it. Similarly, the target—and it is a target, even though the Government have all but forsworn targets—of at least 75% of those employed as investigators by the IPCC being from non-police backgrounds by January 2017 is intended to address concerns about impartiality.

However, this amendment overlooks the steps the IPCC has already taken to ensure a diverse and multidisciplinary staff, and the training scheme aimed at those from a range of backgrounds. It is worth noting that according to the latest published figures, the proportion of investigatory and caseworking staff with a background in policing is below 16%. Of course, what is most important is the way in which all IPCC staff work and their commitment to the values and culture of the organisation. I am sure that the noble Lords, Lord Condon, Lord Blair and Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington—and, I hope, the noble Lord, Lord Imbert—share these sentiments. It is good to have such a distinguished group of former Met commissioners participating in this debate. I am sure they will agree that it is the culture of the organisation that dominates the way in which it responds to its independent role.

Moving to Amendment 56QZG, I can see that for the Home Secretary to receive annual figures on the proportion of staff from non-police backgrounds, and the number and nature of their investigations, would provide a degree of detail and certainty as to operational conditions within the IPCC. However, the commission already has a statutory duty to report to the Home Secretary on the carrying out of its functions each year. It already publishes details of the organisation and its investigations in its annual report and in annual statistics. I can see no benefit from prescribing the content of the annual reports in the way that the amendment seeks to do. Indeed, it might be suggested that that is not a very independent thing for the Independent Police Complaints Commission to be asked to do. I know that is not what my noble friend intends but it would certainly add to the bureaucratic burden of the organisation.

Having said that, I agree with my noble friend that the IPCC must be independent and be seen to be independent. In the light of my comments, I hope that she will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 91 is headed “Offences connected with riot” and presumably the intention is again to put victims first. In that case, I come back to an earlier point: why are there two classes of victim of riotous behaviour? Riotous activity by a tenant of social housing or an assured tenancy can lead to eviction, but riotous activity by an owner-occupier cannot, and there is no redress of comparable severity that would apply to an owner-occupier but not to someone in rented accommodation. Will the Minister address this point? In a Bill intended to put the victim first, what is the thinking behind the Government’s apparent decision that there should be two classes of victim when it comes to action that can be taken against those who cause misery through the activity defined in Clause 91?

Under Clause 91, tenants, including the individual convicted of riotous activity, who have caused no nuisance, annoyance or harassment, alarm and distress to anyone living in their own locality could be evicted. Children could be evicted. This clause appears to have more to do with punishment over and above that handed down by the court for riotous activity. This additional punishment is not evenly applied, since it can affect only those in social housing and assured tenancies and not owner-occupiers. Is that fair and just?

Finally, Clause 91 refers to,

“an offence which took place during, and at the scene of, a riot in the United Kingdom”.

Could this include an offence unrelated to the riot, but at the scene of the riot, such as careless or dangerous driving, or a minor assault? If so, could a family in rented accommodation face eviction for such an offence as a result?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

With regard to the question that the noble Lord asked me before our tea break, I have nothing further to add. The two classes of tenure are different. Therefore, the possession of property which is owned by someone and the possession of a property which is tenanted by someone are not comparable. The noble Lord is seeking to introduce a red herring. It adds nothing to whether anti-social behaviour should be grounds for possession.

[Lord Rosser]

I understand what the Minister is saying, but he seems reluctant to admit that under this Bill someone in rented accommodation can be treated much more severely than an owner-occupier. He seems unwilling to face up to there being, for the same offence, unequal treatment and indeed considerably more drastic treatment for those in rented accommodation, who can lose their homes while owner-occupiers cannot. There is no penalty of equal severity for an owner-occupier that does not apply to someone in rented accommodation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am grateful to my noble friend for his intervention, which points to a difference. There is a difference in the treatment; there is not a difference in the way in which the victims are dealt with.

[Lord Rosser]

I am always interested to listen to a lawyer explaining the law. However, that point does not answer the point that I have made: for the same offence there is a much more drastic penalty for somebody in rented accommodation than for an owner-occupier—namely, loss of their dwelling.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The noble Lord has made that point several times. It is up to other noble Lords to judge whether it correctly identifies anti-social behaviour, which is what the Bill seeks to address.

I would like to talk about the subject of this debate—that is, the specific proposals in Clause 91. As the law stands, thuggish behaviour against neighbours or in the locality of a tenant’s home may be a basis for eviction. However, looting, or other riot-related criminal activity, by tenants further away from their homes would not usually be taken into account. I do not think that is right, although the noble Lord may think that it is. People who wreck other people’s communities through riot-related offences should face the same consequences that they would if they carried out such behaviour in their own neighbourhoods. Clause 91 enables that to happen. It also sends out a strong and important message for the future that if you get involved in a riot, whether that is near your home or not, there may be consequences for your tenancy.

However, I emphasise that we would expect landlords to seek to evict under this new ground for possession only exceptionally. With regard to the concern raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights—that the ground amounts to a punishment and may disproportionately affect women and children—it is important to note that safeguards will be in place. The new ground is discretionary, and so, just as is the case for the existing discretionary grounds for possession for anti-social behaviour, the court would have to consider whether it was reasonable to grant a possession order in the light of the facts of the case. The impact on the whole household and any young children is likely to be a relevant factor in this.

Amendments 56AM and 56CC to this clause would mean that possession action under the provisions of Clause 91 could be triggered only where the tenant, and not a member of their household, had been convicted of an offence. Amendments 56B, 56C, 56D and 56E would mean that only convictions for “serious offences”, as defined for the purposes of the new absolute ground for possession, could trigger possession action under the provisions of Clause 91.

As I have said before, it is an established principle of tenancy law that a tenant is held responsible for the behaviour of members of their household. There is also an issue of wider parental responsibility here. In practice, though, the landlord would need to prove that it was reasonable to grant possession, and we consider it unlikely that the court would find this to be the case where a child of a tenant has, as a one-off, got caught up in, and committed, an offence during a riot. Clearly, a tenant, or any other parent, should be held more responsible if their teenage child makes their neighbours’ lives a misery over a period of years than if they just let them out of their sight for a few hours. Similarly, in practice we would not expect this new ground for possession to be used where the conviction was for a minor offence. We would expect these provisions to be used only exceptionally and in relation only to serious riot-related offences. Therefore, a landlord might, for example, consider possession action where one of their tenants had been convicted of a serious assault on a police officer, but not where they had stolen a pair of trainers from a shop. Again, even if a landlord were to apply for possession on the basis of a minor offence committed at the scene of a riot, we would not expect the court to consider it reasonable to grant possession. Therefore, we would, in practice, expect the impact of Amendments 56AM, 56CC, 56B, 56C, 56D and 56E to be limited.

I recognise, however, that, through these amendments, my noble friends—I was also grateful for the speeches made by my noble friends Lady Berridge and Lord Faulks—are seeking to ensure that we establish in law that only serious offences committed at the scene of a riot by a tenant could provide a trigger for possession under the new ground. I am, therefore, ready to consider these amendments further, without commitment, in advance of Report.

Amendments 56CA and 56CB would enable the court, when granting possession against a tenant, to order that the tenancy be transferred to another individual. There may be occasions, for example where relationships break down, where it is appropriate for a court to determine to whom within a household a new tenancy should be granted. In general, however, decisions about who should be allocated available social housing locally should rest with the landlord or, where nominations agreements are in place, with the local authority. They, not the courts, understand who is most in need of social housing locally, and are best placed to make decisions in the light of that knowledge.

In short, I believe that these provisions make entirely appropriate changes to the discretionary grounds for possession available to landlords. It will still be for the landlord and the courts to decide whether possession is reasonable in all the circumstances. That said, in relation to the riot-related provision, I will, as I have indicated, take away Amendments 56AM, 56CC, 56B, 56C, 56D and 56E and consider them further. With that assurance, I commend Clauses 90, 91 and 92 to the Committee.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I confess that I am a little confused by the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. As I understand it, he supports the concept but takes issue with differentiation between tenures. However, in supporting the concept and saying that different tenures should be dealt with in a similar way, I assume that he is talking about confiscation of a property. However, we do not have to go there as that is not what is provided by the Bill. Obviously, I am very grateful to my noble friend—

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 2nd December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments with which we are associated relate to Clauses 86 and 89 and whether they should remain in the Bill in their present form. We also wait with considerable interest to hear the Government’s response to the different points that have already been made in the debate on this group of amendments.

As the government documentation on the Bill indicates, the existing grounds for possession for anti-social behaviour are discretionary and require the county court, on application from the landlord for possession on an anti-social behaviour ground, to decide that the ground is made out and that it is reasonable to grant possession. The Government say that it takes on average seven months to get an outcome from the courts in anti-social behaviour possession cases, and that the existing discretionary grounds apply only to anti-social behaviour and criminality in, or in the locality of, the property. Indeed, in the light of the riots two and a half years ago, the Government are also proposing later in the Bill to extend the scope of the discretionary ground so that landlords can seek to evict a tenant who adversely affects the lives of those in neighbouring communities through rioting and looting, or who attacks or threatens landlords’ staff away from their homes.

The purpose of the new absolute ground for possession, say the Government, is to speed up the possession process in cases where anti-social behaviour or criminality has already been proven by another court. The Government’s draft guidance states that the court must grant possession subject to any available human rights defence, provided that set procedures have been followed. In addition, the court’s discretion to suspend possession will be limited to no later than 14 days, or six weeks in exceptional circumstances.

It is worth reflecting on the conditions that have to be met for a grant of possession; at least one of them has to be met. The first is that a tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a person visiting the property, has been convicted of a serious offence. The second is that the tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a person visiting the property has been found by a court to have breached an injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance—in other words, an IPNA. The third is that the tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a person visiting the property has been convicted of breaching a criminal behaviour order. The fourth is that a tenant’s property has been closed for more than 48 hours under a closure order for anti-social behaviour. The last is that a tenant, a member of the tenant’s household or a person visiting the property has been convicted of breaching a noise abatement notice order.

These powers have potentially significant effects. Will the Minister say—this question has already been asked—whether the number of evictions is expected to increase as a result of these provisions, particularly in the light of the Government’s implied comments about the deterrent effect of the current length of eviction proceedings on landlords taking action? These would seem to imply that an increase in evictions is likely if the length of time to complete court proceedings is reduced.

Will the Minister confirm what will happen to those families who are evicted, including any children or elderly or disabled people? Who, or which body if any, will have responsibility for finding accommodation for such families who become homeless as a result? Alternatively, will such families simply be left to their own devices, even if that means being on the streets, on the basis that they will be deemed to have made themselves—including any women, children, elderly or disabled people—intentionally homeless?

As I understand it, the power to evict under Part 5 relates to those in social housing and to those in assured tenancies in the private sector. Will the Minister confirm that that is the case? The power to evict does not appear to apply to owner occupiers, including those living in a mortgaged house who might well have secured their mortgage under a state-backed scheme that is ultimately supported by all taxpayers, including by those in rented accommodation. To that extent, it does not appear that there is equality of treatment for victims irrespective of tenure. It would appear that under the Government’s Bill, which is intended to put victims first, a victim who lives in social housing and has had their life made a misery by a person or persons in a nearby owner-occupied property does not have eviction available as a possible solution—unlike a victim who lives in their own home and has had their life made a misery by a person or persons living in social housing or an assured tenancy.

If the Government’s intention is to put the victim first, why are there apparently two classes of victim, one for whom eviction of the perpetrator and their family is a possible solution, and another for whom it is not a possible solution and for whom there is no alternative additional sanction available? Will the Minister address this point? If I am right, will he confirm that the Government nevertheless regard this as totally fair and just, when there do appear to be two classes of victim?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, Clauses 86 to 88 introduce a new absolute ground for possession for anti-social behaviour for secure tenancies generally—local authority tenants and some tenants of other social landlords in secure tenancies. Clause 89 makes equivalent provision for assured tenancies, which applies to housing association tenants or tenants in the private rented sector. This is about possessions of tenanted property. It is not designed to address owner occupiers, because they are not tenants. They are under a different form of possession.

[Lord Rosser]

Does the Minister not accept that that in itself means that there are two classes of victim? If you are a victim in an owner-occupied property, having your life made a misery by somebody in a rented property, eviction is a possible solution. However if you are living in a rented property, whether under a social or an assured tenancy, having your life made a misery by someone in an owner-occupied property, eviction is not a possible solution. Does that not mean that under the Bill there are two classes of victim?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

No, under the Bill there are two categories of housing occupation. It is perfectly possible for someone living next door to an owner occupier who is being anti-social to use any of the other measures in this Bill. Eviction is not one that is currently open to the courts, but there are plenty of other measures. That is one of the reasons why we have discussed things such as the community trigger, about which the noble Lord asked me a lot of questions on the previous occasion the Committee met. Existing grounds for possession—

[Lord Rosser]

I do not want to put words in the Minister’s mouth, but I think he is agreeing with me that there are two different classes of victim. There is different treatment. If you are a victim living in an owner-occupied property having your life made a misery by somebody in rented accommodation, eviction is a possible solution. However, if it is the other way round and you are a victim living in rented property, whether social housing or an assured tenancy, and your life is being made a misery by somebody in an owner-occupied property, eviction is not a solution. I am asking the Minister not to tell me what is in the Bill but simply to agree that it creates two different classes of victim.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think the noble Lord is being disingenuous on this point. There has never been a power of possession applied to owner occupiers in such cases as there is no landlord-owned property to possess; it is the property of the person living in the house. We have already debated the mechanisms whereby that sort of anti-social behaviour is dealt with both by individuals who might consider themselves victims and by authorities whose job it is to enforce those mechanisms. I do not accept the premise behind the noble Lord’s question.

Existing grounds for possession for anti-social behaviour under the Housing Act 1985 are discretionary. This means that the court may grant possession only if the ground is made out and it considers it reasonable to do so. In practice, this means that a significant amount of time is required for the court to consider the matter, leading to extensive delays. This prolongs the suffering of the victims who have to continue living next door to the perpetrators. Indeed, the evidence we have suggests that it can take an average of some seven months from application to the grant of a possession order, as the noble Lord said. The provisions in these clauses seek to short-circuit that process by removing the requirement on the landlords to prove to the court that it is reasonable to grant a possession order where criminal or anti-social behaviour has already been proven in another court.

Under the new absolute ground, the court will be required to grant possession, subject to any human rights defence, if any one of five conditions is met. These all relate to anti-social or criminal behaviour. The offence or anti-social conduct must have been committed in the tenant’s property or in the locality of the property, affected a person with a right to live in the locality, or affected the landlord or a person employed in connection with the landlord’s housing management functions. I would like to emphasise that it is not our intention or belief that the new absolute ground will increase the number of evictions for anti-social behaviour. The available evidence shows that eviction for anti-social behaviour is an exceptional course of action. There are, on average, some 2,000 each year in the context of 4 million social homes in England. Overwhelmingly, landlords look to alternative remedies and tools to address the anti-social behaviour and its causes before resorting to possession proceedings. However, where landlords do seek eviction, it will avoid duplication and delay in the process.

The noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, was concerned that these new arrangements might lead to an increased number of evictions. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked about that. I wish to cite a few examples from evidence that was given to the House of Commons. Angela Mawdsley, Anti-Social Behaviour Manager at Leeds City Council, said:

“It takes a significant period of time to get possession orders through the court. For a lot of these crimes or offences, we would be looking to take possession action anyway, so I do not think it will increase the amount of possession action that we take. I agree with my colleague that it is about the amount of time it is taking to get through the court, and it is very difficult to keep witnesses on board while a court case goes on for more than 12 months”.—[Official Report, Commons, Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 18/6/13; col. 32.]

Chris Grose, anti-social behaviour adviser and senior consultant at the Chartered Institute of Housing, said that,

“although we see the proposed absolute ground for possession, we do not necessarily see that there will be a lot more evictions. As I said before, we are really good at nipping things in the bud and getting in there early with early intervention work”—[Official Report, Commons, Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Committee, 18/6/13; col. 31.]

People want to sustain their property. These are just the points that have been made by my noble friend Lord Deben.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 25th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I thank noble Lords for raising this issue because it gives me a chance to provide some detail and, to the extent that I am not able to answer all the factors, I will certainly write to all noble Lords who have spoken on these amendments.

Perhaps it would help if I explain briefly how Clause 62 provides a process by which a public spaces protection order can be challenged. The heading is “Challenging the validity of orders” and that is what the clause seeks to achieve. Within six weeks of an order being made or varied, any interested person can appeal to the High Court to challenge its validity. It is only right that those with an interest in the area should be able to do this and, as such, this route is not open to those who do not live in, regularly work in or regularly visit the area.

A challenge can be made on two grounds. The first is that the local authority did not have the power to make the order. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is quite right to draw the attention of the Committee to Clause 55, which stipulates the power that the order is designed to provide for. For instance, this could be in cases where the person challenging the order believes that the test for making an order had not been met. The second ground is if the requirement in this part of the Bill was not met; for example, if local community representatives were not consulted as required by Clause 55(7)(b).

The court has the power to quash the order, uphold it or quash any of the individual elements, including its time and duration. The court can decide to suspend the public spaces protection order in full or in part until the proceedings are complete. However, it does not have to do so; an appeal does not necessarily mean that restrictions are lifted. But this appeal mechanism acts as a valuable safeguard to ensure that local authorities do not use the order disproportionately.

My noble friend Lord Greaves has tabled Amendments 55 and 56, which raise the question of who should be able to challenge the issue or variation of a public spaces protection order.

I stress that it is important that we strike the right balance between councils being able to protect communities from harm and providing the right opportunities for people affected by it to challenge such action. That is why, as I have explained, we have sought to restrict the ability to challenge an order to those who have a direct interest—namely, those who live in, regularly visit or work in the area. I believe that in doing so we have given the right people an appropriate safeguard. There is, of course, nothing to stop national bodies raising a challenge through a local group or even an individual, but someone directly affected by an order should at least object to it for it to be challenged. Our reforms are all about putting the victim first, and it is only right that they have the ability to shape the local solution.

I hope I have been able to satisfy my noble friend, although I suspect not, because he strongly believes that national organisations should be involved in this process. That is not the Government’s view.

I shall seek to answer some of the particular questions that have been raised. The High Court is the appeal route for the three orders being replaced; the designated public places order, the gating order and the dog control order all have an appeal to the High Court. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked when the restriction could be challenged when conduct does not justify the proposed restriction—so, in other words, there is improper balance. That is in Clause 55(3)(c). The noble Lord also asked why no one need agree to an order for it to be made. The council will have to consult the police and any community representatives they think appropriate. They may not reach agreement on the order but, none the less, if they were unreasonable in not reaching agreement in that consultation, that, too, would provide grounds for review. The intention is not to close the door on judicial reviews.

I will reflect on the noble Lord’s point on the whole business of the balance between the High Court application and judicial review—and, if I may, I shall write to him about it, because he raises a lot of detailed questions, particularly on the question of legal aid, and suchlike.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for that. Until he made the comment about writing to me, I was going to ask him whether, if somebody considered a public spaces protection order to be unreasonable in any way at all, the Minister would say that they should pursue it under Clause 62 or do it through other legal channels. I gather that that is one issue that the Minister is going to consider and write on.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I certainly give that commitment. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also asked how long it would take to get an appeal heard. As he will know, that is a matter for the courts having regard to a number of factors, including the urgency of the case. He also asked how quickly a PSPO could be made; each one must be made following the requirements of the Bill, especially the consultation requirement. This will take different times in different circumstances; what is appropriate will include an assessment of the need for immediate and urgent action if this is the case. I have said already that the High Court can suspend a PSPO pending the outcome of the challenge under Clause 62, so I hope that the noble Lord will accept that. There was a lot of detail in his questions, which I think that only correspondence will be able to settle.

[Lord Rosser]

Does the Minister accept my interpretation of what the Bill says or not? It is an individual who has to take the case there—presumably, they must use professional lawyers and, presumably, there is a cost involved. Presumably, they have to feel sufficiently confident to take a case to the High Court, if it is the case that an individual has to take it and an organisation cannot take it on their behalf.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I have made it clear that this does not pre-empt the judicial review route, if that is considered preferable by the individual.

[Lord Rosser]

Then I come back to the point to which I know the Minister will respond. Is this the key clause for dealing with the belief that a public spaces protection order is unreasonable or unfair, or is judicial review the appropriate channel? The question that has just been raised goes to the heart of whether it is Clause 62 or judicial review, which is obviously not covered in the Bill. I hope that the Minister will clear up what the Government’s intentions are when he writes.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey has made the very powerful point that, frankly, everything depends on how intelligently or otherwise community protection notices are sought and applied and—to use the Minister’s words—whether anybody is acting mischievously in trying to seek or impose these notices. I am sure that when the Minister responds to the debate he will assure us that everybody will use them intelligently and everybody will work together in a great, grand partnership. That has been his basic theme throughout our debates but, of course, the Minister has no idea whether that will actually happen. I am sure that it will happen in the vast majority of cases, but it certainly will not happen in every case. The Minister must know that it is almost certain that, before long, the provision for community protection notices will be used in a way that is not being envisaged at the present time and, to that extent, is likely to be abused.

I will speak in particular to Amendments 22NB and 22NG which stand in my name. If a community protection notice is issued to an individual or body, the Bill states that they are required to,

“take reasonable steps to achieve specified results”.

Amendment 22NB deletes this wording because we would like to hear a little more from the Minister as to how this phrase will be interpreted and how it is expected to work. Can the Minister explain what counts as “reasonable” in this context and who will define what would be “reasonable steps”? Is it the intention that the person or body issued with a community protection notice will be told by the person issuing it what will be deemed to constitute,

“reasonable steps to achieve specified results”,

or is that all to be left up in the air?

Clause 40(3)(a) and (3)(b) refer to “specified things” with no requirement to take reasonable steps to do them but Clause 40(3)(c) refers to “specified results” and has a requirement to “take reasonable steps”. Why is there a difference in wording? If the reference to “reasonable steps” is so important, why does it not appear in Clause 40(3)(a) and (3)(b), which refer to “specified things”?

I turn now to Amendment 22NG. Clause 40(8) states:

“A community protection notice may specify periods within which, or times by which, requirements within subsection (3)(b) or (c) are to be complied with”.

Can the Minister explain why the Government have chosen to use the word “may” and not something more specific, such as “must” or “shall”? Why do the Government feel that there is no need for a specified period within which the requirements will be complied with—that is, requirements that are fair and clear to both the recipient of the community protection notice and the community itself? In what circumstances would a specified period not be helpful or would cause difficulties?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments seek to make a number of changes to the test for a community protection notice and to the arrangements of the service of a notice and the appeal against a notice. They also deal with the relationship with existing legislation, namely the statutory nuisance regime. I will first address the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee.

Amendment 22NA seeks to ensure that any detrimental effect on an individual is “significant” in order for the test to be met and the notice issued. I appreciate that a community protection notice should not be issued lightly. However, the test already includes appropriate safeguards. Not only does behaviour have to be persistent or continuing as well as unreasonable, but the individual in question has also to be served with a written warning. That is on top of any formal interventions that the council or a police officer may have already tried. By the time a community protection notice is issued there can be no doubt in the perpetrator’s mind that their behaviour is unacceptable. At that point the council or the police should be able to act, and quickly, to prevent further harm being caused to victims or communities.

I do not believe, given the multi-limbed test and written warning, that trivial or benign behaviours will be dealt with using the new notice. Not least, it is hard to see how those could be considered “unreasonable”. As my noble friend is aware, we have already published draft guidance for professionals, which provides some information on how the test should be interpreted. We are working closely with professionals and victims’ groups over the coming months to ensure that this is as helpful as possible. I will be very happy to look at this further to ensure that guidance is fit for purpose.

Amendment 22NF is well intentioned and I can understand why my noble friend raises it. When a community protection notice is issued, she is right that the person issued with it should fully understand the consequences of what is happening. In fact, as the draft guidance outlines, we would consider it good practice for some of this detail to be also included in the written warning. Under Clause 40(7)(b), the effects of Sections 43 to 48, including the possibility of remedial action and the financial implications of that, have to be outlined in the CPN, so that is already covered. Councils or the police should not be required to outline exactly what remedial action could be undertaken in case the situation changes. However, there is certainly nothing to stop the local agency from including it if appropriate. The purpose of a community protection notice is to require the person on whom it is served to take specified action. The power for a local authority to take remedial action is very much a fallback.

Amendment 22QB seeks to delete the ability for an authorised person to enter premises to serve a notice. I assure my noble friend that this is not a power of entry in the traditional sense. It simply allows the authorised person, when the occupier or owner is unascertainable, to serve the notice. That is only possible,

“to the extent reasonably necessary”.

For instance, where the problem occurs on derelict land that is owned by someone who cannot be identified, the authorised person can go on to the land to post the notice on, for instance, a prominent building on the site such as a shed. In many cases, posting the notice on the exterior of a building may be sufficient. It certainly does not give the authorised officer the ability to break down doors to serve the notice.

Amendments 22QD and 22QE seek to clarify the powers of the court when an individual appeals against a CPN served on them. I agree with my noble friend in the case of Amendment 22QE: the courts should be able to vary the notice by reducing the requirements. However, I believe that this is already covered in Clause 43(4)(b), which allows for the notice to be modified. I can also understand the point made by Amendment 22QD. It is hard to envisage a situation where an appeal would result in a notice being modified in a way that was not in favour of the appellant. However, the courts should have the flexibility to modify a notice in this way if it thinks that it is appropriate. Therefore, I do not believe that we should make this change to the legislation.

Amendments 22ND and 22NE bring us back to the subject of statutory nuisance. As my noble friend explained, the amendments are designed to ensure that there is no overlap between the new CPN and the statutory nuisance regime, established under Part III of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. Amendment 22ND would ensure that the new notice was not used wherever conduct was already subject to a control under another statute. Amendment 22NE goes further still and seeks to carve out noise nuisance from the new CPN. This goes completely against what we are trying to achieve through these reforms, and I hope my noble friend will now understand the way in which we see this working alongside the existing powers. Victims do not care which power is being exercised or from which statute it is derived. They do not really care who deals with their problem or who answers their telephone call at 3 am. They just want anti-social behaviour to stop. That seems like a pretty reasonable wish to me; that is what this Bill is seeking to provide. Those tasked with stopping the behaviour should be able to respond quickly and effectively, using more than one power where this is appropriate and justified. This is not least because the community protection notice can cover behaviour which does not fall within the ambit of statutory nuisance, even though there may be some overlap. These amendments could result in officers being unnecessarily risk averse, potentially not using the new power and so allowing anti-social behaviour to continue, ruining victims’ lives for longer than necessary.

The new CPN will be available to deal with a wide range of anti-social behaviour. To say “It can be used for this behaviour but not that behaviour” would simply return us to mistakes from the past. We must move on from focusing on the behaviour and instead understand the impact it is having on the victims and communities that are being damaged.

I was asked by my noble friend Lord Greaves for 10 ways CPNs could be used. I can give him three—I have three prepared already—and no doubt a certain amount of inventiveness will allow me to write to him with another seven, but at least these give an idea. They can be issued to any individual or body persistently behaving in a way that has a detrimental effect on the quality of life of people in the locality. That is the essence. For example, there is no current notice system to cover an individual who regularly allows their dog to foul a communal garden. A group regularly taking the same route home late at night while drunk, making noise and waking their neighbours: this behaviour is not covered by the statutory nuisance regime. A third example might involve a takeaway which persistently allows its customers to drop litter on the pavement outside and causes noise nuisance late at night. It could be required to put bins outside the shop and ensure that customers leave quietly after 10 pm. Current notices can only be used to deal with one particular type of behaviour. I am trying to give illustrations of the sort of issues that have considerable anti-social consequences and which can be dealt with through a CPN regime.

I have to say to my noble friend that we have acknowledged the importance of the statutory nuisance regime in guidance. We have acknowledged the wealth of experience available on the subject and made it clear that, when problems are persistent, police officers and social landlords should speak to their partners in the local authority to determine which action is most appropriate. The CPN is a simple but powerful tool, available to protect communities from persistent and unreasonable behaviour that is having a detrimental effect on people’s quality of life. It must remain so and, as such, I urge my noble friend to withdraw her amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I would certainly wish to consider the concept that my noble friend has presented to the Committee by tabling the amendment. It is well worth noting the illustration that he has given; we need to be certain that we have protected against that sort of situation. I shall no doubt be getting in touch with him and will try to consider this matter before Report. Meanwhile, I am grateful to him for raising this issue. Transferring the interest after a notice is issued may solve a problem, but it is not a ground for appeal, as he will understand.

My noble friend also asked about the difference between nuisance and annoyance and detrimental effect and how come the definitions are different. We have taken elements from existing powers; nuisance and annoyance has worked well, as we have said, in housing law, while detrimental effect is used in current environmental powers. It is also well understood. That is why we have transferred that language to this notice.

I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. On Amendment 22NB, the provision specifically allows for a requirement to be attached to a community protection notice that includes reasonable steps to achieve specified results. This preventive limb of the new notice is integral to the process and I am surprised the noble Lord wishes to see it removed. Under this provision, authorised officers could, for example, include a requirement for a dog owner to attend dog training classes to ensure they are better able to control their dog in future. If there was any doubt as to why the provision is necessary, I hope I have clarified the issue.

[Lord Rosser]

In Clause 40(3)(a) there is,

“a requirement to stop doing specified things”.

In Clause 40(3)(b) there is,

“a requirement to do specified things.”

In Clause 40(3)(c) there is,

“a requirement to take reasonable steps to achieve specified results”.

I should have thought that what the Minister has just described is a requirement to do specified things and is covered by Clause 40(3)(b). What kind of things does Clause 40(3)(c) cover? Why is it, in relation to Clause 40(3)(c), a requirement to take reasonable steps to achieve specified results, whereas in Clause 40(3)(b), which is a requirement to do specified things, there is no reference to taking reasonable steps?

It is clear that, in the eyes of the Government, there is some significance in putting the requirement to take reasonable steps in Clause 40(3)(c), but not in Clause 40(3)(a) or Clause 40(3)(b). I should be grateful if the Minister could explain what that is and what the distinction is between a requirement to do specified things and a requirement to achieve specified results. I asked whether it was intended that the person or body issued with a community protection notice will be told, by the person issuing it, what will be deemed to constitute,

“reasonable steps to achieve specified results”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, my much less elegant interpretation of these provisions is that paragraph (c) is about “how” and paragraphs (a) and (b) are about “what”. There is an absolute requirement to achieve paragraphs (a) and (b) but there can be only a reasonable requirement—and a choice of ways—as to how to to get there.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I would see it as being about outcomes as opposed to methodology. Noble Lords are familiar with this concept and understand the particular example.

Moving on to Amendment 22NG, while I cannot think of a specific example where it would not be necessary to include the specified time for actions to be undertaken on a notice, I am not the front-line officer dealing with anti-social behaviour on a daily basis. Those officers have told us that the additional flexibility afforded by the new powers is exactly what they want. They do not want to be constrained on a time limit. This is directional and they want to be satisfied that the direction of travel is working properly. To put a time limit on it may be counterproductive. The amendment would erode that flexibility.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what is meant by “reasonable”. We have discussed “reasonable” before. In this case, the power will be used by council enforcement officers and police officers. These are trained professionals who make this judgment on a daily basis. What is reasonable in one situation is not reasonable in another. The judgment has to be made on a case-by-case basis. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that.

The noble Lord, Lord Harris, came up with the notion of CPNs for a string of shops promoting payday loans or for an off-licence. The conduct has to be defined as being unreasonable and a notice that imposes unreasonable requirements can be appealed. However, if an off-licence has benches outside encouraging people to congregate and engage in conduct that would be detrimental, it could be required through a CPN to remove the benches. That would be a perfectly reasonable request.

Except for the seven examples that I owe my noble friend Lord Greaves, I hope that I have given noble Lords the answers to their questions—but I appear not to have done so.

[Lord Rosser]

I really would like to hear the answers to my questions. I asked whether it was the intention that the person or body issued with a community protection notice would be told by the person issuing it what would be deemed to constitute,

“reasonable steps to achieve specified results”,

or will that be left in the air? Presumably, if there is an argument about the matter, it will be left for the courts to determine. Is that the case or will they be told what will be deemed to be reasonable steps to achieve specified results?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

We should not make the methodology of serving the notice, which is what the noble Lord is referring to, specific. We discussed this when we talked about the requirement to do certain things. The steps that might have to be taken to achieve specified results may be up to the individual to judge. What is not in doubt is the need to indicate the specified result that is required. We discussed this issue when we were talking about the difference between paragraphs (a), (b) and (c).

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 20th November 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

I certainly await with interest what the Minister has to say in response to these amendments. Subject to what he may say, at the moment it is not entirely clear why Clause 21(3) does not say that the court has to be satisfied “beyond reasonable doubt”. After all, other parts of the Bill lay down the standard of proof, whether that be reasonable doubt or the balance of probabilities.

The draft guidance on criminal behaviour orders, under the heading “Test” on page 29, states:

“If the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt”.

Therefore, one thinks that the term is in the draft guidance, although it is not considered important enough to be in the Bill. However, when one turns to page 30, under the paragraph headed, “The Test”, it states:

“For a CBO to be imposed, the court must be satisfied that … the offender has engaged in behaviour”,

et cetera. There is no reference to “beyond reasonable doubt”.

So there is one case where the draft guidance states “beyond reasonable doubt”, and on the following page it is not put in. On page 31, under “Standard of proof”, the guidance states:

“It is expected that courts will follow the reasoning in”—

the case of Clingham v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea—

“and apply the criminal standard of proof”.

Therefore, in one version it is expected that that is what the court will do. The reference to the test on page 30 does not say anything about the court having to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. However, on the previous page—29–when reference is made to the test, the words “beyond reasonable doubt” are put in. There is an inconsistency in the draft guidance over the wording and there is no reference at all to it in the Bill. I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is making the point that it has to be beyond reasonable doubt.

I have a further issue with the criminal behaviour order. The draft guidance states:

“The prosecution, usually the Crown Prosecution Service … may apply for the CBO after the offender has been convicted of a criminal offence … The CBO hearing will occur after, or at the same time as, the sentencing for the criminal conviction. The CPS will rely on the police or council to build the case to be presented to the court”.

However, the following paragraph states:

“There is no scope for retrospective applications”.

Does that mean that if the application is not made at the same time as sentencing but is done after the offender has been convicted of a criminal offence, there could be a separate hearing into the criminal behaviour order, with the police or the council having to present their case to the court and prove it beyond reasonable doubt? Perhaps the Minister can confirm that if the application is made in that way, the case has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

How long after the offender has been convicted of a criminal offence can the application be made for the CBO—bearing in mind that the next paragraph appears to say that there is no scope for retrospective applications? Does that just mean that there cannot be a retrospective application in a case that has already been heard and dealt with? It would be helpful if the Minister could clarify how long after the offender has been convicted of a criminal offence an application can be made for a CBO. Is it envisaged that it will be heard on the same day? What happens if the conviction occurs at 4 pm? If the police and the council have built up a case to present to the court, do you then continue on that day with the case being presented for a CBO? Do you adjourn the proceedings? How long can they be adjourned for? It would be very helpful if the Minister, as well as responding to the issue about reasonable doubt, could tell us something about how the logistics of an application for a CBO will work in the light of what is in the draft guidance.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, these amendments move us on to Part 2 and another series of issues, with us now considering the criminal behaviour order. I will deal with Amendments 22C and 22D first, but on Amendment 22B the Government expect that the courts will follow the reasoning in the McCann case and apply the criminal standard of proof—that is, beyond reasonable doubt—to the first condition of the test for the criminal behaviour order. We acknowledge that the criminal standard is apt in this case because of the serious consequences that flow from a breach of the order, namely a criminal conviction attracting a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment.

For that reason, we did not consider it necessary to specify the standard of proof for the order in the Bill. The clear ruling of the House of Lords applies equally here as it does to ASBOs under Section 1C of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Clause 1 specifies the standard of proof for the new injunction because, in that case, we are applying a new civil standard. That is not the case here. The approach we have taken in Clause 21 is exactly the same as that taken in the provisions in Part 9 of the Bill which provide for the new sexual harm prevention orders and sexual risk orders, which we have of course already debated. However, I am very happy to confirm that the criminal standard of proof will apply in this instance, a point that is already made in the Explanatory Notes.

Amendment 22D seeks to add a test of reasonableness to the first limb of the test for issuing a criminal behaviour order. As my noble friend has explained, this amendment imports Section 1(5) of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and it has the same purpose as Amendment 20H, which we have already debated in the context of Clause 1. As I said when we debated that amendment, we expect that the courts will consider, as a matter of course, whether it is reasonable on the facts to make an order. However, we will consider the matter further so that we have done everything necessary to ensure that this is the case.

Finally, Amendment 22C would introduce a test of necessity for the order. I am afraid that I cannot be so conciliatory on this amendment. The explicit additional inclusion of a necessity test could in practice raise the evidential burden on the prosecution, since the requirement may be interpreted in a way that the order cannot be granted unless the court is absolutely sure it will reduce anti-social behaviour. That is not an appropriate test, since whether this is the case will not always be clear and the court should be able to take action where it considers that the order “will help” with the prevention of such behaviour. In all, I fear that this amendment could unnecessarily complicate the application process and delay the bringing of respite to victims. The Government want to make it easier to help victims. This amendment would prevent that. That is why I do not agree with it.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked a number of questions. We believe it would be possible to apply for a CBO after sentencing. We will consider this further in advance of Report and meanwhile I may well write to him with our thinking on the matter, and indeed meet him if necessary to discuss it further.

Having secured an undertaking to consider one of the three amendments in this group, my noble friend will be at least partially satisfied, I hope, and will agree to withdraw the amendment.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Amendment: Qualifying Offences) Order 2013

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Tuesday 15th October 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his explanation of the terms and purpose this order. As he said, the rules relating to the retention of DNA samples by the police were changed under the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 in the light of a European Court of Human Rights judgment. On this side, we felt that the changes pushed through by the Government went further than necessary. Currently, if a person is convicted, their DNA can be held indefinitely, except in a few specific types of case. Under the provisions of the 2012 Act that come into force at the end of this month, people arrested for, or charged with, qualifying offences but not convicted may have their DNA and fingerprints retained for a specified period. Those of people arrested but not charged may be retained for three years if the Biometrics Commissioner agrees. In the case of those charged, they will be retained automatically for three years. As the Minister said, qualifying offences are the more serious ones, which are mainly sexual and violent. As I understand it, the order ensures that offences under previous legislation that has now been repealed are included, so that biometric information can be taken where appropriate. The order provides also for those additional offences to be designated as qualifying offences, which addresses the issue of how long the biometric information can be retained. As the Minister said, the order adds further offences to the list of qualifying offences.

The issue that I will raise regards the actions that the Government may have been taking or not taking prior to the coming into force of the 2012 Act. It appears that police forces were told last year to start deleting DNA samples in order to comply with the provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 that relate to the circumstances under which, and the length of time for which, such samples can be retained after this month when the provisions of the Act come into effect. However, the Government do not appear to have put into effect any interim arrangements to cover the fact that the appeals arrangements to the Biometrics Commissioner that the police can use when they do not think that it is appropriate to delete a sample in accordance with the provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 were not in place, and do not come into effect until the end of this month.

Likewise, the arrangements for when the police feel that national security will be an issue if a DNA sample is deleted and so make their own determination not to delete such a sample do not come into effect until the end of this month. It appears that no interim arrangements were made to cover this situation, bearing in mind that the police were told last year to start deleting samples in accordance with the pending legislative requirements of the Protection of Freedoms Act. Under the 2012 Act, the police can make such a determination, which must then be reviewed by the Biometrics Commissioner. However, the powers of the commissioner do not come into effect until 31 October this year.

Apparently, the police have already deleted hundreds of thousands of DNA profiles and samples. A figure of 600,000 was mentioned. Why were they told to do so when the DNA retention arrangements were not in place? Or did Ministers have informal arrangements in place under which they would make a decision on whether the police could retain a DNA sample for longer than the time provided for in the 2012 Act, pending the coming into being of the Biometrics Commissioner and his or her statutory powers? Did Ministers make informal arrangements to address national security considerations by allowing the police to retain samples for longer than the time provided for under the 2012 Act, under which they would have to be deleted to comply with the terms of the Act and its provisions, which would take effect from 31 October 2013? As I understand it, the powers of the police to make their own determination in such cases, subject to review by the Biometrics Commissioner, do not come into effect until 31 October of this year.

When the order was discussed in the House of Commons last week, the Home Office Minister responding was asked if there were any examples of the police not being able to keep DNA samples when they wanted to. He replied that,

“the process for the implementation of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 … has been worked through closely with the police and other partners”,

and that he was,

“unaware of cases in which the police have expressed a desire to apply in this way. Indeed, the police clearly have the right from 31 October to make such an application to the Biometrics Commissioner”.—[Official Report, Commons, First Delegated Legislation Committee, 9/10/13; col. 8.]

I am not sure whether the answer to the question of whether there were any examples of the police not being able to keep DNA samples when they wanted to is yes or no, but it is to be hoped that the Minister will be able to throw some light on it since I am asking the same question of him.

The other interesting part of the reply from the Commons Minister was the statement that from 31 October the police clearly have the right to make such an application to the Biometrics Commissioner. That rather accepts that they do not have such a right until 31 October, which is precisely the point I am raising; namely, how have the police, faced with being told last year to start deleting DNA samples that cannot be retained when the terms of the Act come into force at the end of this month, been able to apply since last year for the retention or extended retention of samples which they deem it necessary to keep but which cannot be retained under the terms of the 2012 Act when it comes into force at the end of the month and when the procedure for enabling such applications to be pursued through the Biometrics Commissioner under the provisions of the Act do not come into effect until the end of the month? The effect of the Government’s actions appears to be that, for example, the police have been unable to retain or even apply to retain the DNA of someone arrested but not charged with serious offences such as rape, the sexual assault of a child or manslaughter since at least December 2012, and this government-created loophole lasts until the end of this month.

The Government had pledged that the police would be able to apply to the Biometrics Commissioner to retain DNA if, for instance, the victim is under the age of 18 or,

“the retention of the material is necessary to assist in the prevention or detection of crime”.

However, the mechanism for such appeals has not yet been brought into being by the Home Office, and rather than allowing the police to hold these data until the legislation has been implemented, the DNA records are apparently being deleted. Will the Minister indicate at what level within the Home Office the decision to proceed with the deletion of DNA records for those arrested but not charged with a qualifying offence was discussed and then made? Will he say how many police forces have ignored the demands to delete DNA samples in the interim period prior to the coming into force of the relevant provisions of the 2012 Act? Further, how many DNA records have been deleted, and what impact has this had on policing capability? Alternatively, will the Minister indicate that there is no truth at all in the matters I have raised? As regards the Home Office e-mail published by the Times as stating: “This record”—of someone arrested but not charged with rape—“will have been deleted as a part of the legacy deletions for stage 1a. As the individual was NFA’d and for legacy data, forces cannot apply to the Biometrics Commissioner for an extension, this will only happen from 31 October 2013”, will he indicate whether that was incorrect or was addressing a completely different and unrelated issue?

These are potentially quite significant issues around what has been happening during the interim period between the end of last year and the coming into force of the provisions of the Act. I accept that what I am saying may not be correct, but it is an issue that we on this side have raised before in the other place, and we do not seem to have had very specific answers to address our concerns. I hope that the Minister may be able to do so when he comes to reply.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, the noble Lord will know that the policy to delete the DNA records of innocent people is something that has been widely welcomed around the House and, indeed, by the Opposition. That work has been going on. It has created a gap which the noble Lord has pointed to; I have to acknowledge that. However, the Government and the police, in considering the management of the issue, have come jointly to the conclusion that there would be no retrospective applications to the Biometrics Commissioner. That is because to have done so would have required police scrutiny of the case file of every innocent person arrested for a qualified offence in the past three years. That is reckoned to be 180,000 case files. This was considered disproportionate to the circumstances which the new legislation is designed to address because, according to our knowledge of those files, it would have identified only a very small number of cases suitable for application to the Biometrics Commissioner. It would have significantly delayed the entire programme to delete innocent people from the databases. I do not think that the Government are seeking to make an apology for that decision, because we consider that Parliament’s wish was that the DNA of innocent people should indeed be deleted from the database.

[Lord Rosser]

Was it not also Parliament’s wish that there should be an appeal mechanism in existence before that happens? It does not come in until the end of this month.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

That is exactly what is being put in place.

[Lord Rosser]

Why did the Government not abide by Parliament’s wishes and not bring it in until the appeal mechanism was there, since Parliament wished that there should be one?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Because the deletion of DNA had been agreed by Parliament. The Government have been under considerable timetable pressure on that. As a Minister, I have been very much involved with the deletion of DNA records and that programme was under considerable pressure to be effected. We have had debates in the House on this matter, widely supported by the Opposition.

[Lord Rosser]

But was it not agreed by Parliament on the basis that there would be an appeal mechanism in place to which the police could refer cases if they had doubts about deleting them? I understand what the Minister is saying about the Government wanting to implement government policy in the form of legislation, but did that legislation not also provide for an appeal mechanism? That was a fundamental part of it.

Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill: Joint Committee Report

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Tuesday 23rd April 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser]

If the Minister is about to close, is he able to address the question that I asked about what happens to those who are on TPIMs at present? I understand that at least some, if not all, TPIMs will come to an end at the beginning of next year. What is going to happen to them? I asked whether, if those people were still considered a threat to national security, the Government could seek an ETPIM in respect of them or whether they would fail to meet the criteria if they had not committed any “new” terrorist activity. I also asked whether, if someone is subject to an ETPIM, the Government envisage renewing it or extending it in any form because presumably, under their own definition, they could do so only if the individual had committed some “new” terrorist activity while under the EPTIM which, if the EPTIM was being effective, the individual would not have done.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think that I can answer the noble Lord best by saying that all cases are reviewed properly. I gave a description in response to my noble friend Lady Doocey’s question about the disengagement of subjects from a TPIM order. The future conduct of individuals who have been subject to a TPIM or an ETPIM will be subject to review regarding the nature of the threat that they present to national security. That is how this legislation works in relation to the individuals who are subject to it.

I was going on to say, about the introduction of this draft Bill and the exceptional circumstances that might lead to its presentation to Parliament, that I am sure noble Lords will say that they hope that such circumstances never arise, that this diligent work conducted by noble Lords may not be necessary and that we do not face the exceptional circumstances that would mean that the Government were forced to present the Bill to Parliament. I thank noble Lords.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Monday 25th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am afraid that I have to follow practice in this respect because I believe that advice given by law officers to the Government is always considered to be confidential. However, I have reported the substance of that advice to the House in this debate, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will accept it.

I turn to the issue that the noble and learned Lord raised right at the beginning of our debate, before we even started considering Commons amendments. I understand his concerns about this matter but, as I made clear in my Statement to the House on 16 October last year in response to the review by Sir Scott Baker of UK extradition procedures, the Government wished to legislate as quickly as possible to introduce provisions on forum. We made that clear at the time.

The Government have worked hard, taking into account the views of prosecutors, to develop an approach which will be acceptable to Parliament and the public. The Official Opposition gave a relative welcome to these proposals when they were tabled in the other place, which I think shows broad acceptance that we have got these proposals right. If we were to remove these proposals from the Bill now, it would be a year or more before those facing extradition would see the benefit of this new and important safeguard. In light of these comments and the response I have given to this debate, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment and all noble Lords to support Commons Amendments 24, 25, 49 and 136.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, a number of questions and points on the impact of the forum were asked by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, in his powerful speech, by my noble friend Lord Dubs in his significant contribution and by me. I am not sure that they have all been fully answered. The case has been made that the proposed change in extradition arrangements will not speed up the process but will work the other way. I do not think that point has been fully addressed either.

This major change in our extradition arrangements is being taken through without full and proper consideration and without Parliament having the opportunity to test and challenge the case for the Government’s proposals or to reflect on the Government’s responses. Parliament is, frankly, being effectively bypassed on this important issue by the way that the Government have dealt with it and the lack of time they have given in tabling their amendments. We have not had the opportunity of considering the amendments in depth. I am afraid that is the reality; I do not honestly think the Minister can suggest otherwise.

I do not think all my questions on the deportation amendments have been answered either. I hope that, at least, the Minister will respond in writing to the unanswered questions and points raised on extradition and deportation in this brief debate. I ask him seriously to consider doing that because he has not responded to all the questions and points that have been raised, albeit that he has, I accept, responded to some of them. We note the Government’s position on our amendment. They have indicated that there will be scrutiny of how the arrangements work, albeit that they are not prepared to agree to an amendment to the Bill. However, I do not intend to pursue that matter any further.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

Before the noble Lord sits down, he will know that it is always my wish to make sure that the House is informed on matters that may have been raised in debate. I undertake to write to him on these matters and will copy in other noble Lords who spoke in this debate.

Just to clarify the point I made about legal advice, because I do not want to get this wrong, I was correct in what I said. It is not the practice to publish legal advice, nor to confirm or deny that law officers’ advice has been sought in any case. These are matters of legal professional privilege and, as a non-lawyer, I defer to that privilege.

[Lord Rosser]

I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Armed Forces) (Amendment) Order 2012

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 5th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. It is not often that a Minister thanks a Member of this House for drawing the House’s attention to a statutory instrument by means of a Motion of Regret, but I do indeed thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, for bringing this matter to the attention of the House. It gives me an opportunity to update the House on this important issue.

I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will know that I would not intend any discourtesy. I understood that the usual channels were informing the Opposition that I would take this Motion, as I am the Home Office Minister responsible for DNA.

[Lord Rosser]

I assure the Minister that I do not regard it as a discourtesy. I had not picked it up—perhaps I did not listen as hard as I should have—but I am very pleased to see the noble Lord at the Dispatch Box.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I thank the noble Lord.

Perhaps I may begin by saying that the Government are deeply committed to protecting the privacy and human rights of its citizens. At the same time, they are committed to maintaining an effective and powerful database that protects the public and reduces crime. To this end, as noble Lords have pointed out, they introduced the Protection of Freedoms Act to ensure that innocent people’s DNA and fingerprints are no longer held on databases.

As my noble friend Lord Palmer of Childs Hill pointed out, this is a complex matter, and so to get it right involves quite a lot of technical application and detail. I have been much engaged, in my short time in the Home Office, in trying to make sure that this is all in place. I am pleased to be able to say that the preparatory work required before implementing the Act is substantially complete. I have now received advice on the timelines of the implementation of the Act, and will announce the full details of this to the House within the next few days by way of a Written Ministerial Statement. However, it may help the House if I give some indication of the detail involved.

We anticipate that the elimination of the estimated 6 million DNA samples covered by the provisions of the Protection of Freedoms Act will begin this month, and will be completed by the end of May 2013. All other material covered by these provisions will be destroyed by the end of September 2013. As I say, I will be able to give fuller details of schedules to noble Lords in a Written Ministerial Statement which I expect will be made in the next few days.

There has been some confusion because this interim statutory instrument, laid by my noble friend and tabled through the Ministry of Defence, appears to contradict the thrust of government policy by extending the period of DNA retention. However, this is an interim measure, and I hope to be able to reassure my noble friend Lord Goodlad, whose work in scrutinising this legislation has perhaps prompted the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, to bring this Motion to the House. I hope to be able to assure him that a further statutory instrument in consequence of the commencement of these provisions will be tabled by the Ministry of Defence to bring its police powers in line with civil police powers.

I hope that noble Lords can see that this particular debate occurs at a critical point in the process. Over the next few months we will see the Government’s commitment translated into action by the destruction of this material, which is held on innocent people and should not be in the hands of government. With that, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be able to withdraw his Motion.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Tuesday 27th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have a difficulty with this amendment because it seems to seek not pre-appointment scrutiny, as the noble Lord has described it, but appointment veto. Pre-appointment scrutiny, questioning a proposed candidate but then leaving it to the appointer to take the final decision in the light of that scrutiny is something which, as the House will know, I have advocated in other contexts. For very senior and important positions I think that that is very desirable. However, I do not go so far as wanting to see Select Committees approving appointments such as this. Although the noble Lord’s speech was very persuasive, what he is seeking the House to agree to is something even more than he was arguing for.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I agree with my noble friend that this amendment seeks to make the appointment of the director-general of the NCA subject to the approval of the Home Affairs Select Committee. This is a step up from the amendment tabled by noble Lords in Committee, which provided only for consultation with that committee.

As my noble friend Lord Henley outlined during the Committee stage, the Home Secretary is ultimately accountable for public protection. She will account to Parliament for the progress made by the National Crime Agency. It is right, therefore, that she is responsible for appointing the director-general. Of course, there is a place for departmental Select Committees to approve certain key public appointments, but we do not believe that this is one of them.

In the Government’s June 2012 response to the House of Commons Liaison Committee’s report on public appointments, we indicated that,

“there are some posts where it is appropriate for Parliament to exercise a formal control over appointments”.

However, the response went on to say:

“This is exceptional and where the remit is associated with the functions of Parliament”.

That is not the case with this appointment, as it was not the case with the appointment of the director-general of the Serious Organised Crime Agency. The Home Affairs Select Committee will, of course, have a role in scrutinising the work of the National Crime Agency, in the same way as it has scrutinised the work of SOCA, and I believe it is in this capacity that it can best contribute. Indeed, Keith Bristow gave evidence to the committee as recently as 16 October, and I expect that he will be frequently before that committee to be challenged on how the NCA is performing.

The Government do not agree to Select Committees having an effective veto on a wider range of appointments and for that reason I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for his response. He said that he does not agree with the Select Committee having what he described as the power of veto over an appointment. I do not exactly have the impression that the Minister is in favour of the Select Committee having any say in, or even being able to express any view on, the appointment to the post of director-general. I do not think the issue with the Minister is over the type of role the Select Committee should play but rather of it having any role in relation to the appointment of the director-general of the National Crime Agency, even to be able to interview the individual and to express a view to the Secretary of State on the appointment that he or she wishes to make. We need to be clear about that. This Government’s opposition is in fact to any involvement of the Select Committee in the appointment process for this post, unless the Minister wishes to stand up and contradict me over that. No, he is not contradicting me, so I think I have got it right. It is not about the wording of this amendment, and what the Minister has described as a power of veto, it is about any Select Committee involvement at all.

One can only say again that that is contrary to what is in the coalition agreement. Of course I can understand why the Minister is not too happy about the coalition agreement, because it provides a specific commitment to,

“strengthen the powers of Select Committees to scrutinise major public appointments”.

I should have thought that this was a major public appointment. There are real dangers over the occupant of this post being under pressure from the Secretary of State. The appointment is going to be made by the Secretary of State apparently without reference elsewhere. This individual will not have the protection of any sort of board between this individual and the Secretary of State. Clearly, everyone will want to be sure that the person appointed to this post is the kind of individual who will be capable of dealing with potentially very sensitive issues, including ones that may have political implications, and will not allow themselves to be in any way influenced by the Secretary of State in the decisions they make in what should be an operational matter. I should have thought that that was something that the Select Committee could at least seek to satisfy itself would be the case before the appointment was finalised. The Minister said that the Select Committee will have a role in scrutinising the work of the National Crime Agency. That will be a bit late when it comes to looking at what the director-general is doing because the director-general by then will have been appointed.

I note the Minister’s response. I cannot say that I am entirely surprised at the response that he has given on behalf of the Government, but I regret that response. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Police: Strike Action

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Thursday 18th October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The Government do not underestimate the strength of feeling among officers at the moment. The Home Secretary and the policing Minister regularly meet with representatives of the Police Federation, the Police Superintendents’ Association and members of the Association of Chief Police Officers to discuss ways of tackling this issue. We are looking of ways in which we can ensure a greater input from officers of all ranks in policing matters. We will continue to engage with police officers and staff to ensure that their opinions help shape future policing policies.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, does the Minister accept that whatever the outcome of the ballot, it will be a fair and valid expression of the views of Police Federation members, and particularly so if the turnout is higher than in the forthcoming ballots for police and crime commissioners? Can he also give an assurance that any government response to the outcome of the likely Police Federation ballot will not be given by the Government Chief Whip in the House of Commons for fear that he uses the kind of language he normally reserves for addressing on-duty police officers?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am sorry about and rather disappointed by that question. The relationship between government and police is clearly very important, and we are aware of the difficulties at this particular time. I think we all recognise that this is a period of change for the police. The Government want to engage in particular with the Police Federation, because it is holding the ballot, and with all sections of the police force to see a new era for policing that brings the police fully into the modern era.

Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Wednesday 1st December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I am pleased to move on to this series of amendments, and I will first turn to the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Arbitration Tribunal. This was set up under the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977 and related to the nationalised industries in aircraft manufacture and shipbuilding. These nationalised industries no longer exist and the tribunal is redundant. Similarly, the purpose of abolishing British Shipbuilders as a corporation is to simplify the administration of the funding and handling of British Shipbuilders’ residual liabilities. These liabilities will be transferred directly to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, which will provide a long-term solution to managing these liabilities.

The Government are committed to making compensation payments to former employees of British Shipbuilders, and I can give an indicative figure of the level of those compensation payments. They come to about £7 million a year. I hope that helps. The tribunal itself does not cost anything, as there are no standing costs and it does not have any employees. The compensation payments for former employees cover such injuries as mesothelioma, which were the result of their employment with British Shipbuilders. The payments are in line with the obligations that British Shipbuilding had to its employees.

British Shipbuilders Corporation was set up under the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977. The corporation has no active trading operations and exists solely to meet its residual liabilities—litigation, insurance claims and other contractual matters— relating to its former employees. British Shipbuilders is effectively a shell company. In light of my assurances, I hope the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

I am not entirely sure whether the Minister was also replying to Amendment 24 as well as Amendment 22. Amendment 22 is about the Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Arbitration Tribunal, which is the one that hears appeals over valuation in relation to the nationalisation of the aerospace and shipbuilding industries. As far as I understood it, we were dealing with Amendment 22 separately. It seemed to me—though I am obviously prepared to stand corrected—as though some of the comments that the Minister made related to Amendment 24, which is about British Shipbuilders and any subsidiary of that company. I did raise a number of points—

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I did speak to Amendment 24 because my speaking notes represented a grouping which is not current, and I apologise to the noble Lord. Perhaps he will confine himself to my response in respect of the tribunal, because that is what he was speaking to. I apologise.

[Lord Rosser]

I was not entirely clear about what the Minister said. He did say that it was moribund, so do I take it that the answer to my question as to how many times it met in each of the past three years is that it has not met at all? Is it the case that, despite the comments made by the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, no costs are being incurred by this body, because it is moribund and it has not met?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I confirm that is the case. It does not cost anything, there is no standing cost and it does not have any employees.

[Lord Rosser]

I thank the Minister for that clear response and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Rosser and Lord Taylor of Holbeach

Tuesday 23rd November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

As noble Lords will know, an amendment follows on from this that concerns functions—not this evening, I hasten to add; this is just a trailer for Monday—so we will look at another amendment that reinforces the message of this amendment and the intervention by my noble friend Lord Maclennan.

We do not intend to hide anything but there is a difference between presenting a statement covering the whole Bill before the Bill is implemented, and explanatory documents giving full information each time a statutory instrument is laid. The Government take the view that that is the focus that Parliament requires, and that to seek to provide a comprehensive review of all reforms in the Bill before it can be enacted would be an unnecessary delay, and not necessarily a particularly precise operation. That is why I suggested to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that he withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response, and other noble Lords who have participated in this brief debate. During it, reference was made to difficulties in obtaining the kind of information sought under the terms of the amendment. Yet that is presumably information that the Government have already, or how were decisions made on which bodies it would be advantageous to place in Schedules 1 to 6 if some decisions had not already been made as to whether their functions needed to be continued in future, or whether their functions could be placed better elsewhere and what the costs would be? There is some difficulty in accepting that the Government do not already have the information sought in the amendment.

One argument that the Minister just put forward was that there would be delay to the programme, but surely that should not be the primary consideration. The primary consideration should be providing the information necessary for this House to make decisions on what the Government intend to do, to scrutinise those actions and to query them. In the light of what the Minister said, it is clear that his motive is not to provide this House with sufficient information in good time to make reasoned judgments; his only consideration appears to be to get through his programme as quickly as possible. An open, transparent and accountable Government need to declare their hand, thinking and reasoning before the Bill comes into force, to ensure proper time for debate based on considered statements by the Government setting out which functions of which bodies will go, which functions will be transferred and to whom, how they will be carried out in future and the costs involved.

I am sorry that the Minister has not been prepared to go further. As I said, I believe that the Government already have much of this information, and the concern is that when the information is provided it will not be in sufficient time for proper debate and consideration before the Government seek to push the order through Parliament. I am disappointed with the Minister’s reply. He could have gone further; he has been urged to. I hope that he will reflect on the matter; I certainly will. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.