Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Henley

Wednesday 26th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My noble friend is of course correct: as he is aware, this is about carbon production. If we wanted to measure total consumption, we would need worldwide agreement with other countries and changes would have to be made. At this stage, that is not the case. We believe that this is an important moment to show the world what we are determined to do, and not to rest on our achievements.

I was not coming to an end, because now is the time to say a word or two, particularly as it came up in various interventions after Question Time, on the Motion—

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

Before the Minister goes on to a different subject, as I understood him the noble Lord, Lord Howell, was asking about carbon production. I do not think the Minister addressed that. I think his noble friend was talking about issues such as afforestation, so that we do things other than cutting out boilers in houses. Does the order address those aspects of climate change?

[Lord Henley]

The order addresses setting a new target. Obviously, we will have to address the questions about how we achieve it. As I understood my noble friend’s question—I may have misunderstood him—he was concerned about our production of carbon as a country. He was addressing consumption and what one could therefore say was displaced production: consumption by means of importing things that might otherwise have been produced in this country. That is what I was trying to address, and I hope that the noble Lord will accept that. On his other point about the means by which we do that—whether we can also reduce levels of carbon by planting trees, carbon capture and storage, or whatever—I imagine that all these matters will come up, but that is another issue and not for the order.

I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, because it might help if I say a few words now in advance of him, presumably, moving his amendment and then making a decision on what he wants to do with it. I believe that his amendment is unnecessary and that a bipartisan approach to the order is very important. As I put it earlier, this is something on which the bipartisan approach and the need to take people with us is important. Perhaps I can deal with the three points that he makes in his amendment.

On the first, I direct the noble Lord to the detailed and analytically rigorous report we have had from the Committee on Climate Change and assure him that it is just the start. We will build on the frameworks set out in our clean growth strategy and industrial strategy to deliver that target. As the climate change committee has acknowledged, those provide the right framework for action. In addition, our forthcoming White Paper will outline the Government’s vision for the energy system to 2050. On his second point, we are using the powers set out in the 2008 Act—an Act introduced by the Government of whom he was a supporter, and which again had cross-party support. The climate change committee’s report has also shown that that target is now feasible and deliverable, and can be met within the same cost envelope as the 80% target. I have also announced that the Treasury will publish a review on that point. On his final point, although emissions from international aviation and shipping are not formally included within the legislative target, we have made clear the need for action across the whole economy, including international aviation and shipping. As he knows, emissions from domestic flights and shipping are already covered by our existing domestic legislation—

Holiday Accommodation

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Henley

Tuesday 19th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

I am aware of my noble friend’s interests in this matter. Her question is slightly wider than the one on the Order Paper, but I will ensure that her point about making sure that it is legal is taken into account.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

I say to the Minister that there is no legislation to be reviewed because there is no legislation—in England it is voluntary. Wales passed legislation; so did Northern Ireland. When I launched the scheme, as chair of the Food Standards Agency, in December 2010, the plan was to get every local authority to join voluntarily. By about three years ago they all had. It does not cost anything to display membership of the scheme: the only cost involved for the person in the premises is to take the sticker out of the envelope that they have been sent, walk to the window and put it on the door. That is the only cost involved in making sure that we have mandatory display.

[Lord Henley]

I am very grateful for the advice that the noble Lord is passing on to us. He is right that there is no legislation that insists that food standards advice should be put up. There is consumer regulation in this field: I refer him to the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 and the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Payments) Regulations 2013, which he probably remembers from his time as a Defra Minister.

Smart Meters

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Henley

Tuesday 20th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

I do not know whether the companies have approached my noble friend but I hope that she will take the opportunity to have one installed when her supplier offers her a company. She will find that when she has the SMETS 2, she will have the benefit of being able to switch without any difficulty. That will be available for SMETS 1 meters in due course.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

Can the Minister give a guarantee that the cybersecurity of the meters is absolutely 100%, and that they cannot be interfered with by any external force? Do the consumers get the knowledge that the pattern of their household living, on a minute-by-minute basis, is recorded by external powers which will later monetise that figure? I have refused twice and will continue to do so.

[Lord Henley]

It is entirely open to the noble Lord to refuse to have a meter, if he so wishes. All we are trying to ensure is that everyone is offered a smart meter if they should so wish, because we feel that to go on using metering technology that is somewhat over 100 years old is not the right approach and that new meters would be better. I can give him an assurance that GCHQ and other people have looked at the security of the smart meters and are satisfied that they are suitably secure.

Energy Security: Gas Production

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Henley

Tuesday 17th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, my noble friend makes the very point I would have made if I had been able to develop even further my Answer to the three recommendations from the noble Baroness on the Liberal Benches. He is quite right: other countries are overdependent on imports from Russia, and it is not surprising that Russia opposes our attempts to look at the opportunities available through domestic shale gas.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

Can the Minister therefore explain why the Government reduced our storage capacity by closing storage in the North Sea? There was three weeks’ capacity of storage there. Given the vagaries of gas supply, notwithstanding the interconnectors, to lose that much storage and reduce us to, I think, less than a week’s capacity for storage is, frankly, irresponsible.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I do not accept that. Levels of gas storage in the United Kingdom are often compared unfavourably with those on the continent. Direct comparison between countries does not reflect the amount of our indigenous gas production or the other storage that we have available. If all that is taken into account, our storage is broadly in line with that of the rest of Europe.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Henley

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 22nd February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

I was coming to the noble Lord’s amendment to make quite clear our ambitions for that future relationship and how we see it developing, before I was interrupted first by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and then by his noble friend Lord Warner interrupting him. I will now deal with how we want to ensure proper clarity on where we are going. The information I will provide to the Committee particularly relates to Amendments 2 and 16 from the noble Lord, Lord Warner.

The noble Lord will remember that we made a Written Ministerial Statement on 11 January. I am sure that he knows it off by heart by now. It included a commitment to continue to provide quarterly updates—it is information that noble Lords particularly want in this matter—addressing the progress on the wide range of issues relating to Euratom exit. That will include progress on those negotiations, but also on how they will develop into our future relationship with Euratom, as well as progress made by the ONR on establishing the United Kingdom’s domestic safeguards regime. I cannot tell where those negotiations will take place. The noble Lord will have to bear with me. What he wants, as far as I understand it from his Amendment 2 and the other amendments, is a guarantee that information will be provided by the Government. All I am saying is that we have made one Written Ministerial Statement—actually, we have made more than one—and we will continue to do so. That reporting commitment goes far further than the proposed amendment, by keeping Parliament regularly updated on the key issues that have been raised. I hope the Committee will welcome the fact that we will continue to provide further updates on those. The noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, asked for one. There will certainly be one before the Easter Recess.

I turn to Amendment 12 on our future relationship with Euratom. The Committee will be aware that in her speech on 22 September 2017 in Florence my right honourable friend the Prime Minister set out her desire for an implementation period after the United Kingdom has ceased to be a member of the EU. This is now well understood in the EU and I do not think that the amendment is consistent with this position. It remains the Government’s intention to ensure continuity for the nuclear industry and to avoid the possibility of the cliff edge that noble Lords referred to for the industry on exit day.

I hope that the Committee will not need to be reminded that the UK will not be a member after 29 March next year, whether an implementation period can be agreed with the Commission or not. That much is clear. If it is not, I will repeat from page 1 of the letter that the Prime Minister sent to President Tusk:

“I hereby notify the European Council in accordance with Article 50(2) of the Treaty on European Union of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Union. In addition, in accordance with … Article 50(2) as applied by Article 106a of the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, I hereby notify the European Council of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw from the European Atomic Energy Community. References in this letter to the European Union should therefore be taken to include a reference to the European Atomic Energy Community”.


In other words, there can be no question of separately attempting to prolong our membership of Euratom beyond the point at which we leave the EU. That is a very different matter from having an implementation period, which is something we are aiming at. That is a period after we have left the EU and Euratom, during which we continue to be covered by the EU acquis. By “acquis” we mean the regulatory framework that applies to EU member states. In exchange, the Government expect that the United Kingdom would be able to continue to benefit from its current access to the EU’s markets for the duration of the implementation period.

Again, I must emphasise that any agreed implementation period is not a way of delaying our departure from Euratom. It is a way of making the transition smooth, rather than sudden. My reason for asking noble Lords not to press their amendments is simple: the amendment does not seek to establish an implementation period after exit; it seeks a transitional period before exit. My honourable friend the Minister for Business and Energy set out on 7 February that there can be no question of separating the situation for Euratom from that of the wider EU. The two are, as we know, uniquely and legally bound. Again, I made that clear at earlier stages.

Finally, I turn to Amendment 17, which seeks to require the Government to lay a strategy for maintaining existing arrangements once the UK withdraws from Euratom and for this to be considered by both Houses before the main substantive provisions of the Bill can be brought into force. As I have said, the Government have made it absolutely clear that they will seek a close and effective association with Euratom in the future. As was mentioned in the Written Ministerial Statement, the Government set out the principles on which our Euratom strategy is based, including to aim for continuity with current relevant Euratom arrangements, to ensure that the United Kingdom maintains its leading role in European nuclear research, to ensure that the nuclear industry in the UK has the necessary skilled workforce, and to ensure that on 29 March 2019 the United Kingdom has the necessary measures in place to ensure that the nuclear industry can continue to operate. In respect of our future relationship with Euratom, we will also seek a close association with Euratom’s research and training programme, including the Joint European Torus and the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor projects. We will also want continuity of trade arrangements to ensure the nuclear industry can continue to trade across EU borders, and to maintain close and effective co-operation with Euratom on nuclear safety.

The Committee will be fully aware that the nature of our future relationship with Euratom is part of the next stage of negotiations, which is yet to begin. An implementation period may well be agreed and we hope that it is, but there are no guarantees. In any case, without such a period the United Kingdom will legally leave the EU and Euratom in March 2019. The Bill and the regulations made under it are crucial to make sure that we can establish that domestic nuclear safeguards regime to meet international safeguards and nuclear non-proliferation standards when Euratom’s safeguarding arrangements no longer apply in the United Kingdom. From that point, the United Kingdom will be responsible for its safeguards, including having its own state system of accounting and control.

[Lord Rooker]

In that case, are we not all wasting our time? Could the Minister say whether the International Atomic Energy Agency has already agreed in the discussions that have taken place that the contents of the Bill lead it to believe that the safeguards office will be able to demonstrate the independence it requires? If not, we are wasting our time.

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Henley

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Thursday 22nd February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for having gone through all that. That session of the committee which I chair was an eye-opener. That is why I tabled my Amendment 10, which we will consider in the next sitting of the Committee. The amendment is about labour mobility, which is an absolutely key factor in terms of not just safeguarding but the nuclear industry as a whole. I look forward to continuing that debate on that occasion and very much agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that I can respond to and deal with the various points that have been made. I am very grateful for all the contributions that have been made, particularly from my former noble friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, who stressed that she wanted reassurances. I think that was the gist of what the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said as well. He was seeking reassurances on when the ONR would be ready and whether we would meet the appropriate standards under the IAEA and so on.

I will refer back to the letter that I sent to all noble Lords, to which the noble Lord referred, and remind them of that. I also remind the Committee that we have committed to a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that is equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom. That is the commitment that we have made and I repeat it to the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. That means a level of inspections and other regulatory arrangements—it is not just inspections—that goes beyond the normal international standards as applied by the IAEA that would be expected from the United Kingdom: for example, additional assurance and verification activities at additional facilities.

It is crucial that we meet all those international standards following our withdrawal from Euratom. Compliance enables the United Kingdom to discharge international commitments and would also underpin international nuclear trade arrangements with key partners such as the US, Canada, Japan and Australia. It is right therefore that the ONR focuses its efforts on ensuring that the United Kingdom is able to meet those standards immediately on withdrawal from Euratom and seeks to move to Euratom standards as soon as possible thereafter. The important thing is that we get to the IAEA—I hope I have got the letters in the right order; it is difficult to remember sometimes—as soon as possible thereafter.

[Lord Rooker]

We all have the same problem.

[Lord Henley]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I will not refer to his socks, which might have been distracting me.

I also say to the noble Lord that we will be ready; the ONR is sure that it will be ready and we are working closely with it to ensure that it will be in a position to regulate the new civil nuclear safeguards regime following our withdrawal from Euratom. The ONR is in the process of expanding its safeguards function by recruiting and training additional inspectors, building additional institutional capacity and developing necessary IT systems.

The ONR requires a multidisciplinary team to be able to deliver safeguards responsibilities. The staff essential to its safeguards function include safeguards inspectors as well as nuclear material accountants and information management and reporting specialists—so a whole range of different specialists. Current estimates—I set this out in my letter—suggest that the ONR would require a team of 20 to 25 staff, which would include at least nine safeguards inspectors, with the precise number depending on the exact requirements of the domestic regime set out in regulations. I remind the Committee again that we have made the regulations available to the House, and I am sure that noble Lords are studying them in some detail.

The ONR already has 11 safeguards officers in post, who are all in training to become safeguards inspectors by 29 March 2019. It is my assessment, and that of my honourable and right honourable friends in the department who have specific responsibility for this as the Ministers responsible, that, based on current progress, the ONR will be in a position to deliver to international standards on withdrawal from Euratom.

However, the speed with which the ONR is able to move from international standards to a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that is precisely equivalent in coverage and effectiveness to Euratom standards obviously depends on a wide range of factors. In particular, timing will depend on negotiations with the EU and negotiations on future co-operation with Euratom and the level of its involvement in the United Kingdom’s safeguards. The ONR estimates that, to be able to deliver its functions—I emphasise its independence—to a standard equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to Euratom, it may require a team of around 30 to 35 staff, which would include around 20 safeguards inspectors.

The ONR is already—again, as I made clear in the letter—actively recruiting and interviewing further candidates to meet this level. I cannot give precise levels as to exactly where it is at this moment, but it is actively recruiting and interviewing. The first phase of recruitment last year was successful: four individuals were recruited and are currently in training to become safeguards inspectors. A further recruitment campaign is under way. Successful candidates will join the ONR’s training programme, and ONR assesses—again, this is its assessment—that it will take 12 to 18 months to upskill new recruits to inspector level.

I hope that the publication of preconsultation versions of draft regulations in January, which set out more detail on the proposed domestic safeguards regime, indicates our genuine intention to deliver standards that are broadly equivalent to the Euratom regime as quickly and effectively as possible. However, the important point to get over to the Committee—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I could go back but I think that I would try the patience of the Committee if I repeated a great deal of what I said at Second Reading and at other points about safety. The ONR has been dealing with safety for many years and it will continue to do so. Safeguards are another matter. In effect, they relate to the transference of certain things, ensuring that they cannot be used for nuclear warheads or whatever. Safeguards are different from safety. This Bill relates to safeguards and that is what we are trying to get over to the noble Lord. We will meet our IAEA standards on safeguards under this Bill once we have the powers so to do.

I hope that that provides noble Lords—with the possible exception of the noble Lord, Lord Judd—with the appropriate assurances. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, will feel that the information I have provided is sufficient in stressing that we will have a domestic nuclear safeguards regime equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom. That is what the Bill is intended to do. We are leaving Euratom. We have to make sure that we have the appropriate safeguards regime in place, and that is what the Bill tries to do.

[Lord Rooker]

Perhaps I may come back on that point. We are in a very vulnerable position, are we not? As a country, we have not been in charge of safeguarding; Euratom has been doing that. It is quite clear that international staff, with free movement under Euratom, have been doing the work. We are hoping to create a cadre of inspectors who will upskill people from various offices, but I have no idea of the industry salaries and so on. We have recruited only four inspectors. Are they UK or EU citizens? I am curious and would like to know that. Are we applying any contractual arrangements to people once they have been upskilled?

Once they have been upskilled to carry out safeguarding, Euratom will be their world—not the UK. The career or job enhancement opportunities and so on will be marvellous for the individuals in question, but I am concerned about my country. Are we placing any restrictions on them? Are we going to say, “We’ll upskill you and get you trained but, by gum, you’ll have to work in the UK for five years”? I do not know whether that will be the case but if we do not do something like that, we will be laying ourselves open to the vagaries of the market. We are entering a completely new area here. We cannot recruit fast enough—we have only four inspectors so far. Upskilling these people places them in a very advantageous position. I am really supportive of that—I want them to be upskilled and better qualified, and to have the freedom to move to better jobs if they do not like what is on offer in the UK. Presumably they will not all be British. They might take advantage of getting skilled and then, because of how we have treated foreigners since the referendum, say, “Right, we’re off to the rest of Europe”. Therefore, are any restrictions being placed on upskilling and training these people?

[Lord Henley]

The noble Lord is enjoying himself, although I do not know why.

[Lord Rooker]

Answer the question.

[Lord Henley]

I am answering the question but the noble Lord is enjoying himself. The ONR is recruiting and will make sure that it has the right people to provide the appropriate safeguards regime on 29 March next year to meet IAEA standards. Obviously we are not going to impose restrictions on where employees go thereafter. Is this a new policy being developed by the party opposite, that once people are trained in any job, they cannot move on and have to stay? These people will be employed by the ONR, and it is then a matter for the ONR to make sure that they have an attractive career and wish to continue working for the ONR. I am sure they will find that it is an attractive career and will want to stay

I am equally sure that they will do the job very effectively and that the ONR will feel confident that, with its recruitment processes, it can provide the appropriate safeguarding regime to make sure that we meet IAEA standards by 29 March next year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rooker]

I want to break the rules and come to the defence of the Box. It is quite unfair to attack the briefs that Ministers have. The briefs may be poor not because of those who prepared the brief but because of the policy behind it. We should not level an attack at the civil servants in the Box.

[Lord Henley]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for making that point. I followed the noble Lord into Defra some years ago. He and I know exactly what all those who have served us in the Civil Service do for us and how well they do it. If briefs ever fail, it is the failing of Ministers, and Ministers—including the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and other noble Lords I see in this Chamber—know that it is our fault and we take responsibility for it. On this occasion, I think that everything we have said and done has been absolutely marvellous and wonderful and we will continue to argue our case.

May I now make my second attempt to draw stumps, if the noble Lord is prepared to withdraw his amendment?

Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Debate between Lord Rooker and Lord Henley

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)]

My Lords, before I set out the context surrounding, and the key features of, the Nuclear Safeguards Bill, I think it would be helpful to explain again the meaning of nuclear safeguards. Investing a little time in this will, I believe, help with our discussion of this important but rather technical issue.

Nuclear safeguards are about non-proliferation and demonstrating that the United Kingdom is a responsible nuclear power. Nuclear safeguards are the reporting and verification processes that nuclear states use to demonstrate to the international community that civil nuclear material is not diverted into military or weapons programmes. The Bill has a very specific purpose in a very technical area: it ensures that the United Kingdom can put a domestic civil nuclear safeguards regime in place.

It is important to make clear at the outset, as it is key to understanding the subject matter covered by the Bill, that civil nuclear safeguards are entirely distinct from nuclear safety and nuclear security. Nuclear safety concerns the prevention of nuclear accidents, and nuclear security concerns physical protection measures. Both nuclear safety and nuclear security are already the responsibility of the Office for Nuclear Regulation and are unaffected by the Bill.

As a responsible nuclear state, the United Kingdom is a committed member of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which provides international oversight of civil nuclear safeguards. The United Kingdom has voluntarily accepted the application of international safeguards through agreements with the agency and is seeking to conclude new agreements with the agency that follow the same principles as our current agreements. We were a founder member of the IAEA back in 1957 and we continue to be at the forefront of its activities. Leaving Euratom will not change that.

The United Kingdom’s nuclear safeguards regime is currently provided primarily by Euratom with some support from the Office for Nuclear Regulation. The European Union and Euratom are uniquely legally joined, so when the Prime Minister formally notified our intention to leave the European Union, she also commenced the process for leaving Euratom. The United Kingdom therefore served notice of its intention to withdraw from Euratom at the same time as withdrawing from the European Union. The Bill therefore enables the United Kingdom to ensure that a domestic nuclear safeguards regime can be put in place when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply to the UK.

The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from Euratom will in no way diminish our nuclear ambitions. Maintaining the continuity of our mutually successful civil nuclear co-operation with Euratom and international partners is a key priority for us. We remain absolutely committed to the highest standards of nuclear non-proliferation, including safeguards, and the United Kingdom will remain a committed member of the global architecture that provides the framework for non-proliferation.

Civil nuclear safeguards and reporting, by assuring the international community about the proper use of certain nuclear materials, underpin international civil nuclear trade. Alongside the consideration of this Bill in the House of Commons, the Government have been engaging in negotiations with the European Union, the IAEA and third countries. The United Kingdom has held several rounds of discussions with the European Union in the first phase of negotiations and there has been good progress on Euratom issues.

Negotiations with the IAEA on future voluntary agreements for the application of civil nuclear safeguards in the United Kingdom have been constructive and fruitful, and substantial progress has been made. Substantial progress has also been made in negotiations to put in place new nuclear co-operation agreements. In particular, constructive progress has already been made in discussions with key partners such as the United States, Canada, Australia and Japan.

It is clear that we need continuity and must work to avoid any break in our civil nuclear safeguards regime if we wish to support the United Kingdom’s nuclear industry and its nuclear research community. A civil nuclear safeguards regime and safeguards agreements with the IAEA are critical for the continued operation of our civil nuclear industry and research. As set out in the Written Statement laid on 11 January, our strategy for withdrawal and our future relationship with Euratom is two-fold: first, to seek, through our negotiations with the European Commission, a close association with Euratom; secondly, and simultaneously, to put in place all the necessary measures to ensure that the United Kingdom can operate as an independent and responsible nuclear state from day one. This is vital to ensure continuity for industry, whatever the outcome of negotiations.

We will also seek to include Euratom matters within any negotiated implementation period. The Government also made the commitment to report back to Parliament every three months, by way of further Written Statements, about overall progress on this strategy, including in respect of negotiations. We have been working closely with the Office for Nuclear Regulation to ensure that it can be ready to take on new responsibilities for a domestic safeguards regime, in place of Euratom’s current regime.

As my predecessor, my noble friend Lord Prior, set out in a Written Statement on 14 September 2017, our intention is for the new domestic regime to exceed the standard the international community would expect from the United Kingdom as a member of the IAEA. The Government are aiming to establish as soon as possible after the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union a robust regime that is as comprehensive as that currently provided by Euratom.

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but this issue was raised recently in the EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee inquiry into energy security. The ONR cannot be independent in the same way that Euratom was. The accounting officer is appointed by the DWP accounting officer. The chair of the ONR is appraised by the DWP. How can it be sold to the IAEA that the ONR is as independent as Euratom?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I will take advice but my understanding is that the IAEA does not have concerns about this issue, which is part of the ongoing discussions with that body. As I said, discussions have taken place and they will continue. The Bill will be considered in this House for some weeks and in due course, I will give a further reassurance to the noble Lord to make sure that he and others are satisfied that the ONR can perform this role.

Perhaps I may continue with my remarks. Currently, under the Euratom treaty, all members including the United Kingdom subject their civil nuclear material and facilities to nuclear safeguards inspections and assurance which is carried out by Euratom. Euratom then reports specific information on member states to the IAEA, which has international oversight for those nuclear safeguards. The Nuclear Safeguards Bill ensures that the United Kingdom can put this domestic regime in place and it will enable the ONR to oversee nuclear safeguards when Euratom safeguards arrangements no longer apply to this country.

To ensure continued international verification and oversight of the United Kingdom’s safeguards, as I have said to the noble Lord, we will continue in our discussions with the IAEA to agree replacement voluntary safeguards agreements that reflect the fact that the Euratom arrangements no longer apply to the United Kingdom. This Bill provides us with the ability to implement those new agreements as well as the new domestic regime that underpins them.