Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Lord Rooker Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Thursday 22nd February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rooker (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendment can only be delivered by people, and it is the issue of people that I want to raise with the Minister, because I think that his letter is in fact quite worrying. I first go back to the evidence taken by the Lords EU Energy and Environment Sub-Committee on energy security on 13 September. We had two groups of witnesses, and the second group was essentially on Euratom, with witnesses from the Institution of Mechanical Engineers and EDF—which of course runs most of the nuclear power stations and is building one—and Dr Golshan, the deputy chief inspector at the Office for Nuclear Regulation.

Having been asked how we were going to be able to deliver what is needed by the IAEA, Dr Golshan, in answer to Question 37 asked by the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, said:

“I started off by saying that we are building capability and capacity and we are recruiting experts in the safeguards area … the extent to which we can equip ourselves depends on the scope of the safeguards arrangements that the Government are working towards. That, in turn, depends on the outcome of the negotiations with both IAEA and Euratom. We are working towards having a regime in place that enables the UK to fulfil its international reporting obligations to the IAEA and to meet the reporting requirements of our nuclear co-operation agreements. We see that as a much more realistic starting point that we can build upon and build in additional layers of assurance as currently provided by Euratom”.


That was basically telling us, “We are not going to deliver”. That is what that means. Dr Golshan concluded her answer to that question:

“To seek to replicate Euratom standards arrangements by the end of March 2019 will be highly challenging and, while we would work towards that, we want a starting point that allows the UK to meet its obligations”.


Later on, in answering another question, Dr Golshan said:

“We currently have 10 staff in our safeguards function. I should not call it an inspectorate. We need another 12 to get to a level where we are able to provide the required reporting arrangements. If additional assurance layers are required we will need to staff to a higher level. Currently what we have, as I said, is based on the fact that we have been a member state of Euratom”.


She went on to alert us to what would need to be put in place to meet the roles and responsibilities that will be placed on the ONR. In answering a question from the chairman, the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, she said:

“The first one is to have an IT system that allows us to collect and process data and then provide a report to the IAEA”.


I have seen nothing about that because clearly a new IT system is required. Dr Golshan continued:

“That means the UK would meet its international obligations as part of the non-proliferation treaty. The second element is that we should be able to facilitate IAEA’s activities in the UK. The third element is that we should have suitably experienced staff to undertake verification activities”.


In a later question, Dr Golshan was asked about the staff and she said:

“The biggest risk that I see is our ability to recruit”.


Of course, there has been free movement while we have been in Euratom and recruitment has not been a problem. Not everybody that is needed in the nuclear industry fulfils the Home Office requirement for getting into the country. We are not going to be able to build Hinkley, for a start, because we cannot get the steel erectors into the country. We need half the country’s steel erectors on Hinkley at one point. We will not be able to get them in. They are not qualified in terms that allow the Home Office to let them in.

I am sticking to the point of what will happen about the staff because we were then told in the report, which was published only a few weeks ago, that the training programme to train people to become fully trained new inspectors lasted between 12 and 24 months. Therefore, my first question is: why have six months been lopped off that figure in the Minister’s letter? What has happened to change that timescale between now and when the committee received the evidence? Have more resources been put in? Have the criteria changed? That is quite a big change, bearing in mind the timescales we are working to. We do not have a lot of time. In addition to the training lasting from 12 to 24 months, the committee was told that we need more staff anyway because the existing staff are not inspectors. The Minister’s letter flags that up and refers to 11 safeguards officers, all of whom will undertake training to become inspectors by March. The Minister then chose to put the next sentence in bold type. I assume that that was his choice to reinforce his assessment that the ONR will be in a position to deliver the international standards. The international standards mean lower standards than we have now. That is the assumption because they are not the Euratom standards.

The Minister went on to say that the ONR will require a team of 30 to 35 people, which was implied in the answer given by Dr Golshan that I cited earlier when she said that the ONR would need more staff. The ONR is recruiting but the fact of the matter is that a far more interesting choice of jobs in this industry is available in the rest of Europe than in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the fact that I understand that a quarter of Euratom’s inspections take place in the UK, so there is quite a big capacity there. But, of course, we have not been doing that. We did not need to recruit or train people because we are members of Euratom.

The Minister went on to tell us that since the evidence was taken back in September and October—the report says the end of October—the ONR has managed to recruit the princely sum of four individuals. Where did they come from? I would like to know. Are they from the UK? Some 98% of its staff were from the UK or had dual nationality when the evidence was given. Where did the four come from? Why is it only four? If this matter is being dealt with urgently does that figure reflect salary levels or other matters relating to the job such as promotion prospects or seniority? Can the training programme cope with upskilling the safeguards officers to become safeguards inspectors?

The issue here concerns the staff but the Minister’s letter did not really address that issue. First, we are told there are only four. That is not enough. They cannot be trained in time, and in the Minister’s letter someone has lopped six months off the period given to the Lords Select Committee. Why is that? There must be a reason for it. I presume that someone reads the evidence given to your Lordships’ Select Committees from representatives of industry and other sectors. I would like to know the answers to those questions because if there is confusion about the number of staff, their training and recruitment at this point in time, we are heading for real trouble. That is clearly the case. Therefore, I hope the Minister has come to this debate prepared. I know that we are in Committee, so I apologise for the detail of my questions, but that is what this stage is for. We need some answers on this issue before we move on to the next stage.

[Lord Teverson (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for having gone through all that. That session of the committee which I chair was an eye-opener. That is why I tabled my Amendment 10, which we will consider in the next sitting of the Committee. The amendment is about labour mobility, which is an absolutely key factor in terms of not just safeguarding but the nuclear industry as a whole. I look forward to continuing that debate on that occasion and very much agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Rooker.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (Lord Henley) (Con)]

My Lords, I hope that I can respond to and deal with the various points that have been made. I am very grateful for all the contributions that have been made, particularly from my former noble friend, the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, who stressed that she wanted reassurances. I think that was the gist of what the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said as well. He was seeking reassurances on when the ONR would be ready and whether we would meet the appropriate standards under the IAEA and so on.

I will refer back to the letter that I sent to all noble Lords, to which the noble Lord referred, and remind them of that. I also remind the Committee that we have committed to a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that is equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom. That is the commitment that we have made and I repeat it to the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester. That means a level of inspections and other regulatory arrangements—it is not just inspections—that goes beyond the normal international standards as applied by the IAEA that would be expected from the United Kingdom: for example, additional assurance and verification activities at additional facilities.

It is crucial that we meet all those international standards following our withdrawal from Euratom. Compliance enables the United Kingdom to discharge international commitments and would also underpin international nuclear trade arrangements with key partners such as the US, Canada, Japan and Australia. It is right therefore that the ONR focuses its efforts on ensuring that the United Kingdom is able to meet those standards immediately on withdrawal from Euratom and seeks to move to Euratom standards as soon as possible thereafter. The important thing is that we get to the IAEA—I hope I have got the letters in the right order; it is difficult to remember sometimes—as soon as possible thereafter.

[Lord Rooker]

We all have the same problem.

[Lord Henley]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I will not refer to his socks, which might have been distracting me.

I also say to the noble Lord that we will be ready; the ONR is sure that it will be ready and we are working closely with it to ensure that it will be in a position to regulate the new civil nuclear safeguards regime following our withdrawal from Euratom. The ONR is in the process of expanding its safeguards function by recruiting and training additional inspectors, building additional institutional capacity and developing necessary IT systems.

The ONR requires a multidisciplinary team to be able to deliver safeguards responsibilities. The staff essential to its safeguards function include safeguards inspectors as well as nuclear material accountants and information management and reporting specialists—so a whole range of different specialists. Current estimates—I set this out in my letter—suggest that the ONR would require a team of 20 to 25 staff, which would include at least nine safeguards inspectors, with the precise number depending on the exact requirements of the domestic regime set out in regulations. I remind the Committee again that we have made the regulations available to the House, and I am sure that noble Lords are studying them in some detail.

The ONR already has 11 safeguards officers in post, who are all in training to become safeguards inspectors by 29 March 2019. It is my assessment, and that of my honourable and right honourable friends in the department who have specific responsibility for this as the Ministers responsible, that, based on current progress, the ONR will be in a position to deliver to international standards on withdrawal from Euratom.

However, the speed with which the ONR is able to move from international standards to a domestic nuclear safeguards regime that is precisely equivalent in coverage and effectiveness to Euratom standards obviously depends on a wide range of factors. In particular, timing will depend on negotiations with the EU and negotiations on future co-operation with Euratom and the level of its involvement in the United Kingdom’s safeguards. The ONR estimates that, to be able to deliver its functions—I emphasise its independence—to a standard equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to Euratom, it may require a team of around 30 to 35 staff, which would include around 20 safeguards inspectors.

The ONR is already—again, as I made clear in the letter—actively recruiting and interviewing further candidates to meet this level. I cannot give precise levels as to exactly where it is at this moment, but it is actively recruiting and interviewing. The first phase of recruitment last year was successful: four individuals were recruited and are currently in training to become safeguards inspectors. A further recruitment campaign is under way. Successful candidates will join the ONR’s training programme, and ONR assesses—again, this is its assessment—that it will take 12 to 18 months to upskill new recruits to inspector level.

I hope that the publication of preconsultation versions of draft regulations in January, which set out more detail on the proposed domestic safeguards regime, indicates our genuine intention to deliver standards that are broadly equivalent to the Euratom regime as quickly and effectively as possible. However, the important point to get over to the Committee—

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[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I could go back but I think that I would try the patience of the Committee if I repeated a great deal of what I said at Second Reading and at other points about safety. The ONR has been dealing with safety for many years and it will continue to do so. Safeguards are another matter. In effect, they relate to the transference of certain things, ensuring that they cannot be used for nuclear warheads or whatever. Safeguards are different from safety. This Bill relates to safeguards and that is what we are trying to get over to the noble Lord. We will meet our IAEA standards on safeguards under this Bill once we have the powers so to do.

I hope that that provides noble Lords—with the possible exception of the noble Lord, Lord Judd—with the appropriate assurances. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Grantchester, will feel that the information I have provided is sufficient in stressing that we will have a domestic nuclear safeguards regime equivalent in effectiveness and coverage to that currently provided by Euratom. That is what the Bill is intended to do. We are leaving Euratom. We have to make sure that we have the appropriate safeguards regime in place, and that is what the Bill tries to do.

[Lord Rooker]

Perhaps I may come back on that point. We are in a very vulnerable position, are we not? As a country, we have not been in charge of safeguarding; Euratom has been doing that. It is quite clear that international staff, with free movement under Euratom, have been doing the work. We are hoping to create a cadre of inspectors who will upskill people from various offices, but I have no idea of the industry salaries and so on. We have recruited only four inspectors. Are they UK or EU citizens? I am curious and would like to know that. Are we applying any contractual arrangements to people once they have been upskilled?

Once they have been upskilled to carry out safeguarding, Euratom will be their world—not the UK. The career or job enhancement opportunities and so on will be marvellous for the individuals in question, but I am concerned about my country. Are we placing any restrictions on them? Are we going to say, “We’ll upskill you and get you trained but, by gum, you’ll have to work in the UK for five years”? I do not know whether that will be the case but if we do not do something like that, we will be laying ourselves open to the vagaries of the market. We are entering a completely new area here. We cannot recruit fast enough—we have only four inspectors so far. Upskilling these people places them in a very advantageous position. I am really supportive of that—I want them to be upskilled and better qualified, and to have the freedom to move to better jobs if they do not like what is on offer in the UK. Presumably they will not all be British. They might take advantage of getting skilled and then, because of how we have treated foreigners since the referendum, say, “Right, we’re off to the rest of Europe”. Therefore, are any restrictions being placed on upskilling and training these people?

[Lord Henley]

The noble Lord is enjoying himself, although I do not know why.

[Lord Rooker]

Answer the question.

[Lord Henley]

I am answering the question but the noble Lord is enjoying himself. The ONR is recruiting and will make sure that it has the right people to provide the appropriate safeguards regime on 29 March next year to meet IAEA standards. Obviously we are not going to impose restrictions on where employees go thereafter. Is this a new policy being developed by the party opposite, that once people are trained in any job, they cannot move on and have to stay? These people will be employed by the ONR, and it is then a matter for the ONR to make sure that they have an attractive career and wish to continue working for the ONR. I am sure they will find that it is an attractive career and will want to stay

I am equally sure that they will do the job very effectively and that the ONR will feel confident that, with its recruitment processes, it can provide the appropriate safeguarding regime to make sure that we meet IAEA standards by 29 March next year.

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[Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan]

For someone of my age and generation, it was always fashionable to attack the Wilson Governments of 1964 and 1966. In the light of the Blair Middle Eastern excursions, which I have to say I supported at the time, history now favours Wilson on the basis that he did not send any troops to Vietnam. Equally importantly, those of us who in those days were marching against nuclear weapons often forgot that one of the great achievements of the Wilson Administrations was their sponsorship of the non-proliferation treaty. At the heart of the amendment is a degree of clarity and a redefinition of civil activities. It would be useful to have a clear and explicit definition, which is why this amendment deserves support. It is not against the Bill; it is not going to harm Brexiteers or frighten the horses. It is a straightforward amendment—and, at this late stage of the afternoon, for God’s sake give us something!

The Minister has hidden behind what are quite clearly inadequate ministerial briefs. The noble Baroness, Lady Vere, went on and on. I was reminded of the story about Lord Willie Ross, when he was shadow Secretary of State for Scotland at a time when Labour was in opposition. He dismissed the speech of the then Secretary of State for Scotland, saying that there were three things wrong with it—first, that he read it; secondly, that he read it badly; and, thirdly, it was not worth reading in the first place. I absolve the noble Baroness of the second charge, but the first and third points are still relevant. We are not on the same side as the Liberals, I have to say; it is only the Conservatives who get into bed with the Liberals. This is an amendment that we are quite happy to support, but do not let us have this obfuscatory nonsense that we have been getting. Give us something that makes today’s efforts worthwhile—if not, we will be after you at the next stage, and we will win because we have the majority in the House of Lords.

[Lord Rooker]

With the Liberals.

[Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan]

With the Liberals.

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[Lord Rooker]

I want to break the rules and come to the defence of the Box. It is quite unfair to attack the briefs that Ministers have. The briefs may be poor not because of those who prepared the brief but because of the policy behind it. We should not level an attack at the civil servants in the Box.

[Lord Henley]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for making that point. I followed the noble Lord into Defra some years ago. He and I know exactly what all those who have served us in the Civil Service do for us and how well they do it. If briefs ever fail, it is the failing of Ministers, and Ministers—including the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and other noble Lords I see in this Chamber—know that it is our fault and we take responsibility for it. On this occasion, I think that everything we have said and done has been absolutely marvellous and wonderful and we will continue to argue our case.

May I now make my second attempt to draw stumps, if the noble Lord is prepared to withdraw his amendment?