(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI very much respect my noble friend’s views on this, but I do not share his pessimism. The NATO-led ISAF combat mission was completed at the end of 2014, as noble Lords are aware. The Afghan National Defense and Security Forces are now taking the lead in the security of Afghanistan, and I believe that they have repeatedly proved that they are capable of carrying out their responsibilities. President Ghani himself has said that he believes that we have now turned an important corner. The momentum is definitely with the ANDSF and, as the Statement said, the Taliban cannot now win militarily. However, I acknowledge my noble friend’s point to the extent that significant challenges still exist in Afghanistan; we cannot get away from that. That is why the international community remains committed to the future of Afghanistan, and why NATO is clear that it is vital to continue to train, advise and assist Afghanistan’s forces through the means that I have referred to.
My Lords, as the person who invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, from which the Afghanistan mission derives, I commend the Government for this further reinforcement of our troops in Afghanistan. We cannot too often pay tribute to those who died or were injured and to the tens of thousands of British troops who have served in Afghanistan over these long years. However, I do not think that we do nearly enough to explain to the public in this country why we went there in the first place, how much we achieved when we were there and why it is of continuing importance that we maintain our commitment there. It is important that we get that message over and do much more about it.
I will just say to the Minister that Gordon Brown as Prime Minister made one speech in the House of Commons about Afghanistan. David Cameron made one speech in the House of Commons about Afghanistan. Mrs May has yet to make a speech about Afghanistan, yet our forces have been committed over that long period and have substantial successes behind them. Therefore, will more efforts be made in the information war to get out to the British public why their security and the security of the alliance, which is being questioned today in Brussels, depend on the resolution and unity of the North Atlantic Alliance?
I pay tribute to the noble Lord’s distinguished role in the early stages of our involvement in Afghanistan and to the support that he has given since leaving ministerial office through his various other commitments and responsibilities. He makes an extremely good point. I think that many of us at ministerial level appreciate that we do not say enough to the public. We do not tell the story sufficiently often and sufficiently clearly of why this mission is so important. We certainly should look for every opportunity to step up that effort. I shall take that advice back to my colleagues in the Ministry of Defence and see that it is relayed further up the chain.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberDoes the noble Earl realise that the continued delay in making key decisions about future capabilities is simply paralysing decision-making inside the Ministry of Defence and encouraging our opponents outside? Our allies in NATO will also be dismayed at the fact that these decisions are still pending, still waiting and seem to be kicked further down the road. Is he not concerned that this is affecting the security of this country?
As I said, we certainly want to make our announcement as soon as possible, but I would have thought that it would be even worse if I were to stand here and noble Lords were accusing the Government of making snap decisions, as I have heard criticism to that effect in relation to the 2010 SDSR. We are not in the business of making unconsidered judgments.
(7 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sterling, on getting this debate today, only two days after an almost historic statement by NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels on relations between NATO and the EU. In the statement, they said they would,
“strengthen our strategic partnership in concrete areas”.
That builds very much on the Saint-Malo declaration of 1998, which I played a part in, and on the Berlin-plus arrangements. That unique set of arrangements, although at the moment being adhered to in spirit rather than in the letter because of Cyprus, allows the European Union to use NATO assets—that is, American assets—when NATO does not wish to be involved.
The Statement this week is of considerable importance. I ask the Minister to explain why, last night, it was still not yet on the Foreign Office website. I got a copy of it from a retired American admiral who had spotted it on the NATO website but, given its significance, and given that the Foreign Secretary was there—when he was not going around insulting other countries—one might have thought some attention would have been paid to it. It is good stuff. It is concrete, sensible and practical. I believe it will reinforce the ability of the Europeans to do more, as indeed they should.
That brings us back to the question posed by the Motion of the noble Lord, Lord Sterling: will our leaving the EU affect our Armed Forces and our Diplomatic Service? My opinion is firmly this: it will certainly affect our Armed Forces and Diplomatic Service, and not for the better. Our leaving will damage the UK and its reputation and influence; it will damage the EU and its partnership with NATO in tackling the myriad problems, challenges and perils that face us in the world today; and by opting out as a key player in the EU side of that partnership, which was reforged this week, leaving will weaken NATO at a time when, historically, the alliance has never been more needed. I remind noble Lords of the letter to the Times during the referendum debate from five previous Secretaries-General of NATO, of which the final paragraph reads:
“While the decision is one for the British people, Brexit would undoubtedly lead to a loss of British influence, undermine NATO and give succour to the West’s enemies just when we need to stand shoulder to shoulder across the Euro-Atlantic community against common threats, including on our doorstep”.
People should listen carefully to these words of warning from Carrington, Solana, De Hoop Scheffer, Rasmussen and myself.
The fact is that as a non-EU NATO member we will be in a small party. That role is recognised in this week’s Statement. I can tell noble Lords, from my own experience forged in the flames of the early part of this century, that Britain being in the group of nations that consists of Norway, Iceland, Canada and Turkey clearly unbalances that equality of purpose that existed with Britain in both organisations. In the event that the EU has to act in its own interests and in its own area, and the United States does not want to be involved—you can bet your life now that that will be a frequent occurrence—Europe will need the UK and its Armed Forces. An endeavour in which the EU was involved, and that British forces did not form part of, would be a very limited one. But here is the rub: who will decide what is necessary? Who will set out the political objectives? Who will lead any military force? Who, if anyone, will determine an exit strategy for any operation? Since we will not be full members of the EU, what say can we really expect on these critical issues? The fact that there is no answer to that question at the moment should give us all serious concern.
It is a tragedy that, just as the problems we face—migration, terrorism, a resurgent Russia, pandemics, proliferation and much else—have gone global, the politics have gone local and far too parochial for the safety of our people.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, I declare an indirect interest, as recorded in the register of interests.
The Government have had six years to prepare for this debate and for the vote that will take place in the Commons on Monday. This is one of the most important decisions that will be taken by our generation of politicians. The continuation of the nuclear deterrent is fundamental—fundamental—to the safety of this nation and to our contribution to the strength of NATO and the Atlantic alliance, and the security umbrella that creates. It is therefore a scandal and a disgrace that we in the upper House of this Parliament are being given three hours for this debate—six minutes per Member—at two days’ notice to consider whether the United Kingdom is to go ahead with the Trident nuclear deterrent.
It is of course widely known, especially by those of us who were charged with some responsibility for it, that the deterrent exists not as a military weapon but as a political one, whose very purpose is for it never to be used in anger. It is there to deter aggression against this country and our allies and to counter nuclear blackmail that would threaten Britain’s essential interests and those of our allies. It is committed to NATO and, along with the French and American deterrents, plays a crucial and successful part in the defence of the alliance. In the ludicrously limited time that we have, I intend to make three points.
First, as other noble Lords have said, we cannot possibly foresee the threats and challenges to our security that will emerge over the next 40 years when Trident will be in service. As has been said, we find it remarkably difficult to predict what will happen day by day just now. Just look at what has happened, and taken us by surprise, over my political life: the invasion of the Falklands, the invasion of Kuwait, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism in Europe, 9/11 and the Arab spring. Those are just a few instances to prove that unexpected events can trigger very serious consequences. It would be recklessly optimistic to abandon our deterrent on a very rosy view of what we think we face at the moment. It would do a grave disservice to generations to come, as yet unborn.
Secondly, we need to face the serious fact that if we abandon the building of the four new submarines, there is no going back. If the security environment were to change and become even more malign than it is today, it would be simply impossible to recreate the deterrent, with all its infrastructure. The decision next Monday, therefore, is crucial.
Thirdly, there is no cheap and cheerful alternative to continuous at-sea deterrence; there are no half measures in nuclear deterrence. Continuous at-sea deterrence is an absolute. Our submarines are invisible, invulnerable and undetectable. The 2013 Trident Alternatives Review, already referred to, which was insisted on by the Liberal Democrat part of the coalition Government and reported to the Liberal Democrat Chief Secretary, clearly said:
“The highest level of assurance the UK can attain with a single deterrent system is provided by SSBN submarines operating a continuous at sea deterrence posture”.
That was not the only report. The following year, the British American Security Information Council—BASIC, an organisation opposed to Trident renewal—set up its own commission. It concluded:
“The Trident SSBN … system meets the criteria of credibility, scale, survivability, reach and readiness”.
It also said that successive British Governments,
“have not considered it prudent to disarm the UK’s nuclear arsenal given the nuclear danger that could yet resurface, and given the limited benefit to reducing global nuclear dangers that such a step would have. We agree”.
I started my life in politics as a young man carrying a banner that said “Ban the Bomb”—and was eventually to become Secretary of State for Defence, in charge of the nuclear deterrent. As Defence Secretary I conducted a defence review, which abandoned all our tactical nuclear weapons, reduced significantly our arsenal of warheads and missiles for submarines, lowered the system’s operational readiness and made new inroads into the transparency of the whole system. In my “Ban the Bomb” days I believed that such a move would start a benign response worldwide. No such luck. Others are inventing, acquiring, modernising and accumulating nuclear weapons all the time. That is precisely why we need to go ahead with the four new submarines.
(8 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberFirst, I express my agreement with what the noble Lord has rightly said about the Chiefs of the Defence Staff and the Chiefs of Staff generally during the Iraq war and immediately afterward. They are all men of the highest ability and we owe them our gratitude, as much as we owe to the men and women in the field. I also agree that there is a distinction to be drawn between the processes of decision-making and the political judgments that are made. I simply point out that, in my view at least, the strength and integrity of the process underpins the reliability of the political judgments.
My Lords, I add to the tributes paid to those who fought, those who died and those who were injured in this conflict. We must regret and mourn those who have been affected by doing their duty. I also thank those who served on this remarkable report that has taken so long and will require so much reading before we can finally come to judgment.
I express one small regret that the committee was not allowed to consider the military action taken by the Blair Government in 1998 against Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction centres. Military action was taken in Operation Desert Fox, when cruise missiles were launched against what we believed at that time to be the centres for weapons of mass destruction. In a very brief reading of the report, I notice that paragraph 496, which is worth reading, covers the basis on which Robin Cook and I, Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton, Bill Cohen and the Prime Minister came to the conclusion that Saddam was breaking the UN Security Council resolutions that had previously been there and that he represented a threat to his neighbours and therefore to the region.
As my noble friend has said, it comes down eventually to a political judgment. We underestimated Saddam in 1990 when he invaded Kuwait and thousands died. We chose not to take action when Saddam massacred hundreds of thousands of Shias in the marshes of southern Iraq. Decisions can be taken one way or the other but, if they are taken in good faith, at the end of the day they have to be supported, although we must draw lessons where they are there.
I am sure that the House listened with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Robertson, and takes account of his direct experience of those times prior to the Iraq war. My understanding is that the report does take into account Desert Fox but, in doing so, as I am sure the noble Lord would agree, it puts into context Mr Blair’s clear belief that Saddam Hussein was giving the runaround to the international community and was out to deceive. I am sure that that will be one of the points that everyone should consider when reflecting in a measured way on what the report tells us.
(8 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I start by congratulating two noble Baronesses who have spoken today, one for the last time and one for the first. The noble Baroness, Lady Perry, has a very distinguished record, and it was interesting to note that she apparently once whipped the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, a prospect that most people in Scotland would find very entertaining. My noble friend Lady Jowell made a speech that was patriotic, optimistic and inspirational. It is clear that she is going to make a big contribution to the House, as she has done in politics up to now.
I would like to use my few minutes to remind the House of two letters that were published in the Times and the Daily Telegraph two weeks ago. One was from former Secretaries-General of NATO, including me, and the other is signed by a series of senior American defence experts. They speak volumes for what the referendum on 23 June is all about and why it matters to this country and to the Atlantic alliance. The letter from the Secretaries-General is signed by: the noble Lord, Lord Carrington, the last surviving member of the Churchill Government; Javier Solana, once a Foreign Minister of Spain; Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, a former Foreign Minister of the Netherlands; and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the former Prime Minister of Denmark. We said:
“As former secretaries general of Nato, we have followed the EU referendum debate carefully and with growing concern. Given the scale and range of challenges to peace and stability we face collectively, the Euro-Atlantic community needs an active and engaged United Kingdom.
“The European Union, with its 500 million people and significant economic power, is a key partner for Nato. The imposition of sanctions on Iran and Russia, led from within the EU by Britain, has been a striking example of the importance of this union for our security. So has the work the EU is doing in the Balkans, in tandem with Nato, to help stave off instability in that region.
“At a time of such global instability, and when Nato is trying to reinforce its role in Eastern Europe, it would be very troubling if Britain ended its membership of the EU.
“While the decision is one for the British people, Brexit would undoubtedly lead to a loss of British influence, undermine Nato and give succour to the West’s enemies just when we need to stand shoulder to shoulder across the Euro-Atlantic community against common threats, including those on our doorstep”.
These are the powerful views of those of us who have had stewardship of the alliance in the last decade and more.
The letter published in the Times is signed by seven White House national security advisers, four US Defence Secretaries and two Secretaries of State. It also sends a powerful message, especially since the signatories come from all political parties in the US:
“The United Kingdom and the United States have a special relationship and longstanding friendship. Having worked closely with the British government in our different capacities, we are loyal friends of the UK. While fully respecting that this is a decision for the British people, we feel it is our duty to articulate our views as to some of the likely consequences of a Brexit vote.
“The world needs a strong and united Europe to work with the US to address the many geopolitical and economic challenges we face. The strong bonds between the US and Europe are rooted in shared values, shared interests, and common history. The United Kingdom has played a key role in strengthening the transatlantic alliance. But we are concerned that should the UK choose to leave the European Union, the UK’s place and influence in the world would be diminished and Europe would be dangerously weakened.
“In our globalised environment it is critical to have size and weight in order to be heard. The special relationship between our countries would not compensate for the loss of influence and clout that the UK would suffer if it was no longer part of the EU, a union of 28 nations with 500 million inhabitants … the large economic bloc in the world. This would be true in foreign policy, defence policy and international trade matters, and other areas where the EU is a significant voice.
“The decision that UK citizens will make on June 23 is of critical importance. All involved must weigh carefully the consequences of the decision not solely from the perspective of domestic economic interests but from the broader perspective of the impact on the European and international geopolitical landscape”.
The names of Robert M Gates, George Shultz, William S Cohen, Madeleine Albright, Bill Perry, Jim Jones, Leon Panetta, Steve Hadley and others are at the bottom of the letter, and I think that the British people, this House and others should pay heed to its wise words.
A previous wise person once said that some decisions are so important that future generations should have a vote. I hope that the people who vote on 23 June pay due regard to those future generations.
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, although the review is light on detail and timing, it is at least strategic and therefore sets itself apart from the exercise in 2010. In the light of events that took place across the channel 10 days ago, I do not think this is the time for picking holes in the review, although there are a few holes to be picked. It is a time, however, for us to assert to our enemies and adversaries, both actual and potential, that this country still has robust defences and that we are still capable of deploying those forces in the defence of this country and of our allies and playing our part in the international community. After all, we are the second military power in the West.
I will make two points about the review. In relation to the deterrent, I fully support the reinforced decision made today to order the four new nuclear submarines. Will the noble Earl’s department be a bit more robust in taking on the opponents of Trident who say that it does not address the biggest threats that we face today? Were it not for the deterrent, we would face even bigger threats to our national safety and security today—that is, nuclear coercion and blackmail.
Finally, the noble Earl has the responsibility with other government Ministers to ensure that the safety and security of the people of this country does not depend on the military alone. If further raids are going to be made on the budget of the Foreign Office, the World Service and the British Council, then huge damage will be done to the reputation of this country abroad, and to the safety and security of the British people.
My Lords, as regards the last points that the noble Lord made in his speech, we will have to wait for the spending review announcement. However, I take on board all that he says, particularly about the Foreign Office. We are clear that we must maintain the global representation that we have at the moment, if we are to support this country’s interests.
The noble Lord began by making some very welcome remarks, for which I thank him, about the strategic nature of the review. It is indeed strategic. It has been a two-year exercise. It included the lessons that we learned from the last SDSR. More importantly, it involved a deep analysis of the evidence base and wide consultation across diverse stakeholders both at home and abroad. We have tried to be truly strategic in identifying what we wanted to achieve in the national security arena, as outlined clearly in the national security strategy, and how we will achieve that in the SDSR.
Further details will emerge over the coming days, which will flesh out some of the high-level aspirations set out in the document. Unfortunately, I cannot release those at the moment.
We still have a global power projection capability second only in NATO to the United States. We should remember that. We have among the most capable troops and aircraft ships and submarines in the world. The Joint Force 2025 that we have designed is genuinely better equipped, more capable, more deployable and more sustainable than ever before.
As regards the deterrent, I welcome the noble Lord’s comments. The nuclear deterrent exists to deter the most extreme threats to our national security and way of life. Other states have nuclear arsenals. There is a risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is a risk that states might use their nuclear capability to threaten us or to try to constrain our decision-making in a crisis, or to sponsor nuclear terrorism. We cannot rule out further shifts in the international order that would put us or our NATO allies under grave threat. That is the rationale and the context for the substantial investment that we are making in the successor programme.
The document tries to make and refresh the case for the deterrent. We thought it important to do that, to go back to first principles and to demonstrate why this was something that we felt it absolutely right to include in the forthcoming defence programme.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Boyce, as a former commanding officer of HMS “Superb” speaks with more authority than anyone in this House on nuclear-powered submarines. I listened very carefully to what he said and thank him for his support on this issue. The Government are committed to CASD and I can confirm that the decision to refuel HMS “Vanguard” will not affect our posture and can be contained within the refit timescales. It is a precautionary measure timed to coincide with the planned refit period precisely to avoid any impact on CASD. Neither will it affect the successor programme.
My Lords, I add my condolences on the events in Helmand province. It is a very sad announcement but we have grown used to it in the past and such events are rare at the present moment.
I very much support the Government in the precautions that they have taken here. They are absolutely right to err on the side of caution, however inconvenient or costly that might be. The safety of submariners and the staff at Dounreay, Devonport and Faslane must be of paramount importance. The House will also be reassured that this announcement will not affect the four submarine continuous at-sea deterrent patrols. Does he not agree that the events of recent days show clearly why nuclear deterrence is still crucial in the world today? Perhaps I may follow up one of the questions that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked. Can the Minister confirm that, without the test reactor at HMS “Vulcan” in Dounreay, the new reactors will involve sufficient assurance to allay any public or indeed private concerns that might exist?
My Lords, I missed the noble Lord’s last word. What was the word that he used after “sufficient”?
I asked whether the new reactors would involve sufficient assurance to allay any public or private concerns that might now exist.
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord for his support. As he said, this is a precautionary measure. Although this is not a safety issue, obviously the safety of the civilian workers and of our crews is very much in our minds. The noble Lord mentioned the events of the past few days. There is no current nuclear threat to the UK, but we can never discount the possibility that one could re-emerge in the future. I can vigorously give the noble Lord the assurance that he asked for.
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI shall read that again. I refer to the period immediately after we come out of Afghanistan and finish combat operation there at the end of this year. So this is all absolutely in accordance with a strategic design that flows through the National Security Strategy.
We would all agree, I am sure, that this programme should be subject to proper and effective scrutiny. We have put forward a government amendment to do precisely that, with a report put to Parliament where it will be for the business managers to decide in the normal way what to do with that report. Leaving that report aside, the performance of defence as a whole is already subject to considerable external scrutiny, be that the National Audit Office, the House of Commons Defence Committee, or in defence Questions from MPs or Peers. Furthermore, as the Secretary of State said during an evidence session with the Defence Committee on 5 November, the strategic defence and security review 2015,
“will certainly want to look at the Future Force 2020 construct and decide whether it needs to evolve further to 2025 in response to a changing environment”.
The next strategic defence and security review will take place at a time when the programme has had some time to develop and demonstrate maturity.
The Minister mentions the SDSR of 2015. That is presumably ongoing at the moment as 2015 is, after all, next year. What consultations has the department had with the various stakeholders in defence, such as Her Majesty’s Opposition, the trade unions, the press, the diplomatic corps, the think tanks and the academics who will be involved? Is there any outside involvement whatever in achieving a degree of consensus on what will be published around the time of the next general election?
My Lords, I will try to answer the noble Lord’s question when I respond to other noble Lords’ questions. I repeat that the next SDSR, which will take place at a time when the programme has had some time to develop and demonstrate maturity, would be the right time to scrutinise the force structure and whether it needs to adapt to reflect new threats, opportunities or other such variables. I beg to move.
My Lords, we, too, welcome the Minister’s Amendment 18. As he said, there was broad support for this when it was debated in the House of Commons. It is therefore appreciated that the Government have brought forward this amendment and accepted the principle of the new clause to be agreed in this House.
Amendment 18F calls for a report within one year of enactment. Its wording is too restrictive to reflect accurately issues as they may arise around viability and cost-effectiveness and we would not wish to support that proposed clause.
Providing an annual report to the Secretary of State, which must also be laid before Parliament, provides reassurance that the position will be kept under review for all three services. We have quite naturally concentrated more on the Army than the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force, partly because of the numbers involved and partly because the Reserves are integrated already, in a different way, with the Royal Air Force. Obviously within the annual report it will be helpful to identify where there are differences between the three services and to identify examples of best practice which might cross-refer between them.
As the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, said in his remarks about mental health, there is a general agreement that this is an important issue. We agree with the Minister that this is covered within Amendment 18 and we do not see the need for additional medical detail, particularly in the Bill. There may well be a case for having guidance which sets this out more clearly, but not in the Bill.
It is timely that today sees the publication of the Veterans’ Transition Review of the noble Lord, Lord Ashcroft. Almost certainly within that there will be recommendations which will help to influence the response to or implementation of what is happening to the reserves under this Bill. Will there be a government response to that review? It would be helpful to have a debate on it in the light of the recommendations of the noble Lord, Lord Ashcroft.
In summary, we support Amendment 18, and while seeing value in the proposed two new clauses of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, we do not see them as essential to the Bill.
I would like to say a few words in relation to some of the more general issues concerned here. I return to the question I asked about SDSR 2015 because it concerns me that we might be going through exactly the same kind of exercise as we did for the SDSR that was done previously in six months. I do not want to draw any comparisons with the one that I supervised in 1998; it lasted a lot longer than it should have. It still managed to do so but it was affected by the circumstances which came after it, as the noble Lord, Lord Dannatt, said. However, it did not become outdated as quickly as the SDSR that the new Government brought in, which quickly came face to face with the reality of Libya after it was put in place. It focused on 2020 but was then faced with the situation in Libya as well.
Importantly, the defence review that we did in 1998 established a consensus. Perhaps for the first time in military history, the review was accepted by all the defence chiefs both in public, as one might have expected, and in private because it represented a view that was consensual. After the new Government came into place, we embarked upon a consultation exercise that made sure that all the stakeholders had an opportunity to express a view. The Ministers, Robin Cook and myself, and the Permanent Secretaries in the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Development did a roadshow that went round the country, and which also embraced pretty much every stakeholder in the business. When it came out, it was therefore a genuine security and defence review.
The failure of the last SDSR was, essentially, that it was a Treasury-led exercise, done far too quickly and involving far too few elements. I fear that that is precisely what is happening at this stage. I have consulted the Opposition to see whether anybody has bothered to ask them about the initial preparation or any of the discussions taking place at present, and the shadow Defence Secretary assures me that no such approaches have been made. We look as though we are again getting ourselves into the trap of something being prepared at or around the next election campaign, which will essentially be based on a Treasury view about what the country can afford and how the rest of it fits into that.
My noble friend is saying some important things but does he agree that if the Government are serious about producing or drafting an SDSR, they ought at an early stage to be consulting not merely with the list of people who he quite rightly set out—the academics, think tanks and other stakeholders in this country—but with our allies, particularly the United States and our EU allies? If they do not consult them, the review that comes out may be inconsistent with the strategic intentions and plans of our key allies. Opportunities for fruitful collaboration or for the division of labour will be lost and it may well be that unfortunate misunderstandings will be sown.
Indeed, my noble friend makes an extremely good point. In many ways, it goes without saying. It may well be that there are some discussions going on with our allies and inside NATO about it. I would hope so, although I am a bit pessimistic about most of these things since it becomes opaque. Part of the dispiriting nature of the way in which the British political system works is that you go from everything to zero quickly, as my noble friend will know only too well from being in government. In government, you know everything and then when you are in opposition you are allowed access to pretty much nothing at all. Therefore, having been Secretary-General of NATO and knowing everything that was going on inside that organisation, it was a grim experience to then dredge the newspapers and the occasional website to try to find out what was actually going on. The point that is being made is that the widest possible consultation is required, so that, at the end of the day, the review is fixed, has traction and makes sense in the light of the international circumstances as well as of domestic public opinion. Without that, it will fall apart, and fall apart quite quickly.
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeThe said Mr Norman Baker is now a Minister at the Home Office. Has the noble Baroness any indication that he has perhaps pursued these matters and some of the other eccentric matters that he was interested in before he became one of Her Majesty’s Ministers?
I do not know why the noble Lord finds it an eccentric matter, but I have not discussed this with Mr Baker before speaking today or, indeed, at any time. I am simply quoting the Hansard entry from those years as an example of one of the parliamentarians. I could give many others, but I do not want to take the time of the Committee. They are certainly not eccentric.
I should clarify for the noble Baroness that I was referring to Mr Baker’s other eccentric issues. This one might not be classified as that at the moment.
I do not think we are discussing the other issues at this moment, so I shall return to the matter of the debate. The fact is that Parliament has time and again raised this issue. Indeed the Defence Select Committee in another place also raised it. In October 2004, a number of changes of use at Menwith Hill were put through as Written Statements prompting the Defence Select Committee to tell the then Secretary of State, Geoff Hoon, that:
“Despite the Secretary of State’s unequivocal statement that he wanted the decision to be informed by public and parliamentary discussion, he has acted in a way that has effectively curtailed such discussions”.
It went on to recommend full parliamentary debate of the proposals. There were none. In January 2008, my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire spoke about how much Menwith Hill remains subject to British control and said that he was,
“extremely unhappy about the extent to which it remains effectively under British sovereignty”.—[Official Report, 10/1/09; col. 987.]
There is a long history of Parliament being left in ignorance on this issue. I do not know the reason for that. Was it because Secretaries of State did not know what was going on there or chose not to let Parliament know? However, the fact remains that the legislative framework applies to UK operators and all communications between the UK and abroad. We now have the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which was brought in to cover some of these advances in technology. It will not come as a surprise to Members of the Committee that, under the framework, authority and warrants must be given if anything is to be done that would interfere effectively with the private lives of UK citizens. We need to know that what happens on UK soil, whether it is done on American bases or by people in the UK, is covered in the same way. That is the point of these amendments. In Amendment 15, we would give responsibility to an individual to ensure a reporting mechanism. My noble friend Lord Hodgson already referred to what an unenviable position that might be.
We have a heavy responsibility here to make sure that the very unsatisfactory state that has continued for decades comes to an end. In last week’s State of the Union address, President Obama promised to work with the US Congress to reform surveillance programmes. All we suggest in these amendments is that we in the UK Parliament play our part in making surveillance accountable. I fully accept the need for a security programme but of course I am equally concerned about where the lines are drawn and whether GCHQ overstepped its remit. At least I am assured that GCHQ has a line of accountability to the Government and our Ministers, and appears before committees of Parliament. In the case of the visiting forces, that is something we can remedy by amending the Bill as we suggest. I strongly feel that that needs to happen.
To conclude, when in 1994 Bob Cryer brought up the worry about these developments at Menwith Hill, the then Minister, Mr Hanley, said that,
“what he peddles is ill-informed, second-hand fantasy based on prejudice against our allies which in itself is not in the national interest. His colourful language may well make good sound bites, but it is pathetic in its paranoia”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/3/94; col. 616.]
Since then, Mr Cryer’s worries have proved to be absolutely sound. It is our duty today to put in place very belatedly these amendments that would ensure full accountability.