(1 year, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government talk of the UK having military effect globally and of Britain being a global power, yet our Armed Forces have never been weaker or less credible. We have no discernible grand strategy on which to base our defence strategy, other than post-imperial pretensions drawn from a political slogan, “Global Britain”, a conceit our ailing economy cannot hope to fund.
The strategically confused integrated review was meant to bring order to our defence posture. Its failings were neatly summed up by Professor Paul Cornish of Exeter University, who called his essay on the subject Everything Everywhere All at Once. He emphasised that, given their size and capability shortcomings, the Armed Forces could not hope to do all the things being asked of them.
In his resignation letter, Mr Wallace implied that things were not as he hoped. He wrote:
“The Ministry of Defence is back on the path”—
I say again, “back on the path”—
“to being once again world class”.
He went on:
“I genuinely believe that over the next decade the world will get more insecure and more unstable”.
He is right.
Last year the MoD was given an additional £24 billion. Earlier this year it was allocated a further £5 billion over the next two years, followed by £2 billion per year over the subsequent three years—a total of an additional £11 billion. The House of Commons Library usefully informs us that, adjusted for inflation, this amounts in real terms to only an additional £1.1 billion. The nuclear enterprise AUKUS, together with the replenishment of stockpiles gifted to Ukraine, will consume all the additional money. Day-to-day spending is set to reduce by 6.1% or just over £2 billion over the four years of the current programme. The outcome will be a continuing decline in the size, effectiveness and morale of the Armed Forces.
I could talk of the tragedy of lives lost unnecessarily because of soldiers being sent to fight wars in insufficient numbers and with inadequate equipment. I could, I think, rightly bang the table and insist that, to avoid this, defence must get 2.5% of GDP now, but I am a realist. Given the huge pressures on the Exchequer, it is not going to happen—anyway, even 3% of our current GDP would be insufficient. No, the deduction is clear. It is a grand strategic imperative, not simply an economic one, to build a vigorous high-growth economy. This requirement must be placed ruthlessly at the heart of government policy. It is not just because this is the only way to afford the NHS or an ever-bigger welfare bill but for the sake of our security: 2% of the GDP of a booming economy will pay for the Armed Forces needed to protect our way of life, but 2% of a sluggish economy never will.
In the interim, it is vital that we cut our defence coat to our economic cloth. This country must stop deluding itself that it can have a global role. We are a medium-sized country with a faltering economy. The UK must focus ruthlessly on the Euro-Atlantic theatre, not state that this is our priority but then spread our efforts so thinly that we are strong nowhere. Our predecessors faced a similar moment in the 1960s. Denis Healey had the moral courage to devise a new strategy that saw the UK withdraw from east of Suez. He tailored the Armed Forces to their NATO obligations. With an open and inquiring mind, our new Defence Secretary, Mr Grant Shapps, has the opportunity and, I argue, the responsibility to be our generation’s Denis Healey. In so doing, the UK can become once again the second most important state and de facto European leader of the alliance, we can free up some American assets to allow the Americans better to confront the challenge of China on our collective behalf and, importantly, we will recover lost influence in Europe.
In sum, let our economy genuinely be at the heart of a much-needed post-Brexit grand strategy. The ends, ways and means of the associated defence strategy must be kept responsibly in balance throughout. This will mean focusing single-mindedly on NATO, where we will gain most strategically and have most tactical effect should deterrence fail, ensuring in the process, as the war in Ukraine signals daily, that mass as well as technology determines the size and shape of our Armed Forces.
(8 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood—and, I should say, fellow gunner officer, of which I am very proud—for giving the House this opportunity to debate a subject that is so important, perhaps deceptively so, to our nation’s ability to pursue its national interests in adversity. I also pay tribute to Policy Exchange, the London-based think tank, for putting so much wisdom and energy into this issue, and to my good friend the late Duke of Westminster in particular for backing the “Fog of War” project that resulted.
My ex-military assistant Tom Tugendhat and his colleague Johnny Mercer, both of whom sit in the other place, early on recognised the flaws in our nation’s stance and have done much to draw attention to them. For this is a much more important subject than, understandably, many outside the House might expect or wish it to be. If the defence of the realm is any Government’s most burdensome and important role—indeed, their first and primary duty—not understanding the constraints the law might apply on the execution of that role would be a grievous omission on Parliament’s part.
Today’s Armed Forces have never been smaller. The Royal Navy has fewer vessels than at virtually any time in its history. The Army last had so few people in its ranks in 1790. The RAF has never been smaller or possessed fewer combat aircraft. The wisdom of this situation in what is such a troubled and unstable world is a debate for another day, but limited numbers of people and platforms mean that the individuals on whom we depend in war must be particularly clear-eyed about their mission and fully committed to the often dangerous tasks with which they are charged. They must know that their country values them and, if things go wrong, that they and their families will be looked after. They must be confident in their superiors, right up the chain of command, including their political masters, and in their comrades. Erode this and at the very moment we most need them to act decisively and unselfishly, they will pause, with potentially deadly effect on them and those around them, and on the successful completion of their mission. Every single person, particularly in today’s very small Armed Forces, counts.
That is why I was so pleased that Prime Minister Cameron adopted the Armed Forces covenant. While many of the bureaucratic constraints on delivering the intent behind it need freeing up, much of real value has come from his initiative. I argue that a vital part of the covenant that reflects the moral contract between our country and its Armed Forces should be the issue under discussion in this House today. Our Armed Forces need to know that the Government will look after them should things go wrong in the heat of battle. The covenant is about more than ensuring the NHS gives due priority to our veterans or that councils provide housing for them when they return to their home towns. The certainty that government will protect them from being sued in the courts under inappropriate law is even more important, I promise noble Lords, than the morale of our fighting men and women.
What needs to be done? First, we must be prepared to derogate from the European Convention on Human Rights. I applaud the Government’s stated intention to do this, but I am keen to see the details of their strategy. Like other noble Lords, I wish to know when and in what circumstances it will apply. Is it automatic or dependent on a parliamentary consensus that may not be forthcoming on the day? Clarity on this issue is vital.
Secondly, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, proposes, the Government should reassert the primacy of the Geneva Convention in regulating and guiding the actions of our Armed Forces in conflict. This is also the view of the International Red Cross, which we should note. Have the Government any plans, where appropriate—I accept that there will be nuances—to adopt IHL over the ECHR?
Thirdly, notwithstanding the difficulties which I accept are involved in so doing, there is a crying need for retrospective action to lift the burden imposed on many hundreds of disciplined and loyal service men and women through flawed legal action taken against them under the ECHR for alleged crimes committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. This issue is critical to Armed Forces morale now and into the future. Beyond the injustice perpetrated on hundreds and probably thousands of fine people, action today as a sign of good intent is vital. Promises of jam tomorrow will not do. A failure to act retrospectively will lead to distrust and cynicism about how much confidence can be placed in future derogation plans. Do the Government intend to develop retrospective legislation to resolve this crucial issue? I would be most grateful if the Minister answered these questions.
(10 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, little did I anticipate back in 1971 when I joined the Army as an 18 year-old fresh out of school that one day I would be standing here in this historic place as a recently retired Chief of the Defence Staff making my maiden speech. I had no such expectations of myself nor, I promise you, did my friends. I joined the Army because my father and brother loved the life, and I thought that I would, too. This proved to be so, and it was with great pride that I spent the next 42 years among some of the finest people in this country.
I thank your Lordships for the great kindness that has without exception been shown towards me since I had the privilege of being introduced here by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Guthrie. This kindness has been matched by the reception and humour shown by the staff of this great institution. I am hugely grateful. I take this opportunity to thank the Minister for being such a supportive and wise partner during our time together in the Ministry of Defence.
In 500 BC, the great soldier philosopher, Sun Tzu, wrote:
“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat”.
Without a clear national strategy to guide decisions on what to do in places such as Syria and Iraq, it is hard to devise sound plans or detailed sub-strategies. It leads to a situation whereby we confront Iran in Syria, but seek to work with Iran in neighbouring Iraq. A reluctance to think strategically gets countries in these muddles. When people say that national strategies are outmoded and too easily overtaken by events, I retort with one word: Singapore. The reason that little nation is where she is today is that she had a clear national strategy which, while sensibly veering and hauling around its direction of travel, she has resolutely stuck to during the 45 years since that great statesman, Lee Kuan Yew, first introduced it.
I am quite clear that the prime determinant of a country’s foreign policy and its implementing strategies, including in particular its defence strategy, should be its vital national interests. Analysis based on this hard-nosed but rarely discussed calculation provides clear guidelines on when, for example, to intervene in the affairs of other nations while not, in a case such as the genocide in Rwanda, preventing intervention on moral grounds.
The biggest threat confronting the free world today is that posed by militant jihadism. All states are equally vulnerable, including many great Muslim nations. Rather than bickering, states should cohere to confront this threat through the adoption of a multidimensional strategy in which all, be it less or more, can play a constructive part. This struggle will be generational and our leaders must stop seeking short-term tactical solutions. The core of such an outcome would in the first instance be a containment strategy. Once the periphery was stabilised, one would work progressively to recover areas that had fallen under the jihadist yoke.
A key part of this containment strategy, and the biggest deduction for me from ISIL’s success in Iraq, should be a global determination to honour commitments made at the NATO summits in Lisbon and Chicago, and their non-military equivalent in Tokyo, to support the Afghan people after ISAF withdraws from the combat role at the end of this year. Eight million Afghans decisively rejected the Taliban when they courageously voted in Afghanistan’s recent elections. They, and the men and women of our Armed Forces, especially those killed or wounded in our service, deserve nothing less than that we do simply as we have promised. This is in order to prevent that country reverting to the lawless state from which—and, my goodness, our memories are as short as our wishful thinking is naive—those awful attacks on the twin towers were initially planned only 13 years ago.
Are our Armed Forces in a fit state to play their role in dealing with these and other risks to our way of life? The answer must be that their state is not good enough, but it is some consolation that it is better than that of any other allied nation’s forces except the United States. Future Force 2020, if fully funded, will ensure that our Armed Forces are effective and something of which we can be proud. However, to realise this potential, as the economy grows, routine defence spending post 2015 must increase as a minimum to 2% of GDP. If not, given the mathematics that seem stubbornly to govern defence expenditure, the size and effectiveness of the Armed Forces will inevitably deteriorate further, and this is without the need to fund new capability. We need, for example, maritime surveillance. While wishing that we had not bought two huge aircraft carriers with the opportunity costs involved, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord West, that having done so, it would be folly for us not to find the money needed to have one carrier permanently available—and, yes, we need more escorts, too.
Given the highly unstable world we live in, either the brave experiment with the Army Reserve must soon be proved to work or a new solution should be found. Any additional money spent on this must not be taken from other programmes, merely robbing Peter to pay Paul. We need constantly to improve the skills needed to defend and attack in the cyber domain if for no other reason than to ensure that we deter others from using such methods against us.
By design, we plan to go to war only with allies. It is vital that our allies start shouldering more of the burden of our collective security. It is unacceptable that the United States of America should pay so disproportionately. It is also time to re-examine our aloof attitude towards involvement in United Nations blue-helmet operations. Among other benefits, this would be a practical way to confront the scourge of violence against women in conflict, brought to our attention recently by the Foreign Secretary.
Finally, it is the quality of the people in them that distinguish our Army, Navy and Air Force from most others and allows them to achieve the great things that we expect of them. There is a societal consensus in the United Kingdom that joining the Armed Forces is a good thing, whether you are the child of a humble artisan or the heir to the throne. This will continue only if those in the Armed Forces feel properly looked after, and in this I very much include their families. The impact of getting this wrong is not properly understood in government circles. I travelled to many countries as CDS and I frequently saw fine ships tied up alongside jetties, aircraft idle in hangers and tanks sitting in sheds or good only for parades. Those nations are not able to recruit and retain the high-quality people whom we have historically succeeded in attracting to the British Armed Forces and who are in such demand around the world as role models and mentors. If we break that societal consensus by failing to look after our service men and women, we will have an Army, Navy and Air Force, but they will not be what you and I associate with this country and they will, one day, be found wanting.
Ultimately, military effectiveness, as Napoleon famously remarked, is determined by the morale of those in uniform. It is surely one of this Parliament’s principal duties to safeguard the high morale of our Armed Forces to ensure that they can rise to whatever challenge confronts them with the skill and courage that they historically always have.