Charities Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Monday 10th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I echo the sentiments that have been expressed across the House. I particularly thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for chairing us so ably. I think that I am right in saying that all of us who participated in Committee had never done so for a Law Commission Bill before, so it was a learning experience for all of us. But the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, is undoubtedly an expert—some would say a leading expert—in this field, and the whole House has benefited from his expertise.

From the experience of my wife, who works in the charitable sector, I know just how lengthy and wide the consultation has been on this Bill over many years. While there are some loose ends, as expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, this is nevertheless a piece of legislation that the whole House can be proud of. I hope that the impact of the Bill will remain in place for many years to come.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am grateful to all the noble Lords for their comments. As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, charity law can be very complex—not just for legislators but for the charities and organisations that it affects, especially those that do not regularly have access to legal advice. There is a duty on legislators to make the law as accessible as possible, while probing the issues that we have. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, that the expert advisers who gave evidence to the committee have helped us to do that and that the Bill has been improved because of the work of the committee and your Lordships’ House.

The Bill leaves this House in very good shape. As I say, it will make a big difference to those who run charities and the many great causes that they support. So, with renewed thanks to all involved and repeating the noble and learned Lord’s thanks to the clerk of the Special Public Bill Committee, Alasdair Love, I beg to move that the Bill do now pass.

Charities Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Report stage
Tuesday 14th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay) (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 1 in my name. As this was a Law Commission Bill, scrutinised through the Special Public Bill process, I thank the noble Lords who sat on the Special Public Bill Committee which examined it, chaired ably by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. It consisted of my noble friends Lord Cruddas, Lord Bellingham, Baroness Fullbrook and Lord Sharpe of Epsom, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Goudie and Lady Barker, and was ably assisted by our clerk, Alasdair Love. I thank them and all those who gave evidence to the committee.



Amendment 1 responds to an amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, in Committee. I am grateful to him for his suggested amendment, and for the time that I have had to consider the policy behind it. The Government accept that the two thresholds in Clause 12—to vary the proportion of permanent endowment which may be borrowed, and the period over which such borrowing must be repaid—are of a different nature from the other financial thresholds contained in the Bill. Those other financial thresholds are concerned with monetary sums. They set the level at which it is appropriate for trustees to make their decision independently, or for the Charity Commission to oversee that decision. We maintain that in relation to the powers to vary those financial thresholds, and thus change where that balance is to be struck, the negative resolution procedure provides a proportionate level of parliamentary scrutiny.

However, Clause 12 does not indicate where regulatory intervention is required in the same way. It does not set out monetary sums. Instead, it places a percentage limit on how much a charity can borrow from its permanent endowment and specifies the period over which such borrowing must be repaid. Therefore, any variation of these thresholds has a slightly different implication. The financial thresholds elsewhere in the Bill can be adjusted to reflect changes in the value of money. By contrast, any amendment of the Clause 12 thresholds would not be about changes in the value of money.

We have carefully considered the various arguments regarding the right level of parliamentary scrutiny in relation to these powers, including the fifth report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House. We have been persuaded that it is appropriate for an additional level of parliamentary scrutiny to be put in place for any future changes made to the thresholds in Clause 12. Amendment 1 would therefore require any variation of the maximum proportion of permanent endowment from which a charity may borrow, and the period over which any such borrowing must be repaid, to be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure rather than the negative procedure. We consider that this amendment will help to maintain the balance between protecting donors’ funds and wishes and providing flexibility for trustees to make the best use of opportunities to fulfil their charitable purposes.

As a result of this change to Clause 12, it is also necessary to make consequential amendments to Clause 39 of the Bill. I will briefly explain these amendments. Amendment 1 inserts subsection (1)(d) into Section 348 of the Charities Act 2011 to confirm that any amendment to the delegated powers in Clause 12 is subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. Later in the Bill, Clause 39 makes other amendments to Section 348 of the Charities Act 2011. The Clause 12 amendment to Section 348 means that the wording in Clause 39 needs to be rearranged. Amendments 5, 6 and 7 are consequential amendments to change references to subsections in Section 348 to accommodate Amendment 1. I beg to move.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, we support these government amendments. The Minister has explained them very clearly. I have nothing to add. He is just following up on recommendations in the fifth report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, the view of the Labour Party, the official Opposition, is that we will abstain if this amendment is put to a Division.

I heard the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, at Second Reading, in Committee and on Report. He makes a very strong case, which he has made again today. As my noble friend Lord Rooker said, the traditional way that both Houses deal with Law Commission Bills is to essentially nod them through. That was, and is, the agreement between the usual channels regarding this Bill as well. However, the best that I can do for the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, is to abstain, because there is merit in the underlying preceding agreement which the usual channels have had. That is the reason I take a different view from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, who has expressed his support for the amendment.

We on these Benches will be abstaining. I will leave it to the Minister to make his own case.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for tabling this amendment and for outlining the case again. Before I respond to it, I certainly associate myself with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, that my noble friend should be congratulated on all his work in this field. The Bill we are debating tonight is in very large part the result of his long-standing interest and considerable work in reviewing charity law.

On this issue, we have from the outset been at odds: where my noble friend sees obduracy, I see consistency. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, is absolutely right: we can amend these Bills, even in the Law Commission procedure—we have just made some amendments in the previous group—but what is important is that we proceed on the basis of consensus and avoid areas of political disagreement. On this, the Government have been clear from the outset that we were not minded to accept the single recommendation from the Law Commission; and my noble friend has been equally consistent that he thought it was an important one. But we have made clear throughout the passage of the Bill our position on the role of the Attorney-General and the value placed on the Attorney-General’s oversight of references to the tribunal.

With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and his advice that I take this away: I have taken it away and discussed it with the Attorney-General and her office on numerous occasions through the passage of the Bill so far, and I have had some helpful discussions with my noble friend, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who is the chairman of the Special Public Bill Committee, and others, but our position remains as my noble friend Lord Hodgson knows it. Let me explain why that is.

Section 326 of the Charities Act 2011 provides the Attorney-General with the power to refer to the Charity Tribunal any question involving

“the operation of charity law in any respect, or … the application of charity law to a particular state of affairs.”

The Charity Commission has an equivalent power to make a reference to the tribunal where the question has arisen in connection with the exercise by the commission of any of its functions, but only with the consent of the Attorney-General under Section 325(3). These rights were considered by Parliament during the passage of the Charities Act 2006, which now appear in the consolidated 2011 Act, and it was agreed that this provision was necessary. The Attorney-General has an historic duty, on behalf of the Crown, to protect charitable interests in England and Wales. The Attorney-General’s consent for references to the charity tribunal is an important element in the system of checks and balances which should not be removed.

My noble friend says the Government have not made clear what specifically the Attorney-General’s role is. It is part of the Attorney-General’s role to assess whether a referral to the tribunal is in the interests of the public. This oversight also provides a second pair of eyes in ensuring that the costs associated with such a referral are not put on charities or on the public unnecessarily. So the Attorney-General works alongside the Charity Commission and provides a second opinion on referrals to the tribunal.

While this particular consent function is narrowly drawn, it is only one tool in a wider portfolio for performing her constitutional role as defender of charitable interests in the wider public interest. The Attorney-General’s wider role means that she has a unique perspective and is able to take into account considerations of societal issues and the wider repercussions for charities. In recent years, we have had Attorneys-General in both your Lordships’ House and another place. As such, the Attorney-General’s oversight reaches beyond charity law and regulation.

It should be remembered that the reference procedure is a unique declaratory power which enables the Charity Commission and the Attorney-General to seek rulings on what might be hypothetical questions. Outside this procedure, hypothetical questions are rarely entertained by the courts, for good reason. It is therefore right and proper that a public interest consideration is applied in the exercise of this unusual procedure. The value of the Attorney-General’s unique perspective has been recognised and commented on by the courts.

With this in mind, the Government oppose my noble friend’s Amendment 2, which would do away with the Attorney-General’s consent function altogether. We believe that by removing this mechanism completely, an important part of the Attorney-General’s oversight of charity law would be lost. So my noble friend will not be surprised to hear me say again that I am afraid we still disagree on this issue, as we did at the outset, and I would hope that he may yet withdraw his amendment.

It is important to note how rare these cases are. The Charity Commission and the Attorney-General have worked together on two references that the Attorney-General has made to the tribunal since the 2006 provisions were put in place, and there has been only one reference that the Charity Commission has sought the Attorney-General’s consent to pursue, which the Attorney-General, as my noble friend outlined, refused to give earlier this year. That is the context we find ourselves in for this debate.

Charities Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Thursday 18th November 2021 Other Business

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall talk very briefly to this amendment. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that it is a privilege to be part of this technical Bill. It is one where I suspect that I, among other lay Members of this Committee, have learned a lot. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, for introducing this amendment. He has explained a particular problem that is a big problem for a small number of charities. I understood that to be the problem that he outlined. The potential solution is not agreed between the Law Commission and certain specialist lawyers. Whether there is a way out of the problem through either dissolution or merger of the charity is something on which there is no overwhelming consensus.

I do not know what plans the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has for his amendment at either this or later stages of the Bill. I shall listen to the Minister’s response to the issues raised by the noble Lord and then take a view, depending on what he does at a later stage.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay) (Con)]

My Lords, before responding to this group of amendments, I first extend my best wishes to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who has so ably chaired this Special Public Bill Committee so far. I hope he gets well soon and is back with us swiftly.

I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for tabling Amendments 1 and 2 to Clause 3 and for the way he set out not just the amendments but, helpfully, the background to the Bill’s importance to charities and the people it will affect. Of course, he has long-standing interest and experience in this important area.

On my noble friend’s Amendment 1, which would insert a new subsection (2A) at line 9 on page 3 of the Bill, we consider that new Section 280A can be used to replace all the stated governing document in its entirety, with Charity Commission consent in respect of the particular provisions that fall within Section 280A(8). We do not think that a legislative solution is necessary and, as has been noted, this view is supported by the Law Commission and the Charity Commission—we have discussed the issue with both of them. I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this point, as it has prompted us to consider ways in which we can make the position clearer, but I hope that, on that basis, he will feel able to withdraw his Amendment 1.

On Amendment 2, which would insert subsection (9A) at line 14 on page 4 of the Bill, although my noble friend again makes an important point, we can in fact already achieve what the amendment sets out to do under the clause as it stands. Under the Bill, the Charity Commission’s consent is required for an amendment that would alter any unincorporated charity’s purposes. That is equivalent to one category of regulated alterations for charitable incorporated organisations, which requires the consent of the Charity Commission. By way of comparison, the Charity Commission currently treats amendments to the purposes of charitable incorporated organisations of the same type referred to in the amendment as not being a regulated alteration and therefore not requiring Charity Commission consent. Given the similarity between the statutory provision concerning charitable incorporated organisations and the new Section 280A(8)(a), the same approach would be taken in relation to changes to unincorporated charities’ purposes. Therefore, Section 280A(8) as it stands already looks at substance over form, and an amendment to a governing document would require Charity Commission consent only if it makes a substantive change, not if it is a pure drafting change. I hope that provides reassurance to noble Lords. As with the previous amendment, this is a view supported by the Charity Commission and the Law Commission.

However, I thank my noble friend for keeping us on our toes and for rightly probing this issue. Of course we want the situation to be clear to everybody who will be affected by the new law, so we will consider whether the Explanatory Notes could be expanded on this point to make that clearer. I hope that, on the basis of that reassurance—not the third of the options that my noble friend outlined in his opening speech but looking again at the Explanatory Notes to make this clear to all concerned—he will feel able not to press his Amendment 2.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

My Lords, similarly, I will be reading out the comments that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has supplied me with on Amendment 4.

Section 115(5) of the 2011 Act provides that, if authorisation of the Charity Commission is required to take charity proceedings and it is refused, leave to take proceedings may be obtained from a judge of the Chancery Division of the High Court. There is a problem, however, with obtaining a timely decision of the Charity Commission one way or the other, as no application may be made to the Chancery Division for leave until the Charity Commission has made a decision to refuse authorisation. The result of delay by the Charity Commission in making a decision is that there may be a lengthy period of uncertainty and enforced inactivity.

This amendment addresses that problem by imposing on the Charity Commission a time limit of 60 days for refusal of authorisation. This is a typical time limit under the provisions of the 2011 Act, such as Sections 270 and 271 on a resolution to transfer all the property of a charity to take effect at the end of the period of 60 days, unless the Charity Commission notifies the charity before the expiry of the 60 days that it objects to the resolution, and Sections 277 and 278 on a resolution to modify the purposes of the charity to take effect at the end of the period of 60 days, unless the Charity Commission notifies the charity before the expiry of the 60 days that it objects to the resolution. Under Clause 11(3) of the Bill, where there is a resolution to spend the endowment fund of a charity under Section 282 of the 2011 Act, the commission is to state within 60 days whether it concurs with the resolution or not. If it fails to do so, the fund or relevant portion of it can be expended free of the restrictions that would otherwise apply. I beg to move.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his proposed amendment and again to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for speaking to it. It is important that we consider both the concern that the amendment seeks to address and the practicalities of implementing such a suggestion.

We are not currently aware of any particular issue with the amount of time taken by the Charity Commission to respond to applications to pursue charity proceedings. There was mention during the evidence sessions which the committee has heard of some perceived delays at the Charity Commission, but I do not think they were in relation to decisions under Section 115. If an issue were raised in relation to the time taken by the Charity Commission for these considerations, that could be looked at without the need for legislation, for example by looking at internal processes.

By way of background, requests for Section 115 charity proceedings are rare. The Charity Commission’s consideration of such requests is often complex, being different from that of other requests of the Charity Commission, which tend to be more transactional in nature. Charity proceedings relate to the internal or domestic affairs of a charity. There are a number of considerations in relation to such requests that the Charity Commission must resolve, as set out in its guidance. The Charity Commission has therefore raised concerns about the appropriateness of a statutory timescale.

To illustrate one such complexity, these applications do not always result in either a grant or refusal of consent. In order to protect charitable funds, the Charity Commission tries to see whether there are routes the charity can take to avoid going to court. This has previously led to the charity resolving the issue itself, or the Charity Commission using its powers, such as by making an order or providing an action plan to resolve the issue.

The need for Charity Commission permission is intended to protect charitable funds and the courts from claims that have no reasonable prospects of success or which could be addressed more appropriately in other ways. It is also important for the Charity Commission to be satisfied that it is in the best interests of the charity that the matter be adjudicated on by the court. For the most part, these cases relate to internal disputes. While these issues can be complex and involve a lot of information, they also typically relate to one charity and therefore have a low impact on the sector as a whole.

The issue with having a timescale imposed on the Charity Commission for a decision of this nature, when no equivalent timescales are imposed for other Charity Commission decisions, also means that resolving these requests may become a higher priority for the commission than other higher-risk or higher-impact work. This would not be conducive to the Charity Commission’s role as a regulator of the sector when taken in the round.

If after a certain time cases were automatically to proceed to court without the consent of the Charity Commission, we would be concerned about the potential for court time and costs being spent on unnecessary or meritless claims. There is also the issue of cases where the Charity Commission has not received enough information to make a decision, which often happens with such requests, and further information or advice may also be sought by the commission following legal referrals. We are therefore apprehensive about the implementation of the 60-day time limit proposed and would invite the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment too, but we have heard the points of concern which have been raised and will of course reflect further on them.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for responding to the points that I read out on behalf of the noble and learned Lord. The gist of his response, as far as I understood it, was that he was not aware of any particular issues, and internal processes could be adapted to meet this problem. I too have spoken to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, in the past couple of days. He said to me that he thought it was self-evident that there was a problem. He will no doubt read the Minister’s response with interest and the various reasons for which the Charity Commission is resisting this amendment. If more evidence is readily available, I am sure he will bring it to the Minister’s attention. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that clarification. I understand her point: she does not want a “never-ending prevarication”, to use her words. I will draw her question to the attention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, so that he can respond to her.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for tabling this amendment and the other noble Lords who put their names to it. As the Committee knows, when we responded to the Law Commission’s report in March the Government rejected the recommendation that the Charity Commission should be able to make a reference to the charity tribunal without first having to get consent from the Attorney-General.

Having noted the oral and written evidence taken by the Committee, we remain of the view that the Attorney-General’s consent function represents an important check in the system. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, noted, the evidence received by the Committee underlines the difference of opinion that exists among experts with regard to the Attorney-General’s consent requirement for references to the tribunal. This difference strengthened our conviction that the role of the Attorney-General as the constitutional protector of charities is important, and that this is a different role from the regulatory function of the Charity Commission. It is a mechanism that we feel must be protected.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston for her support for the Bill. Indeed, this is a Bill that she advocated during her time as chair of the Charity Commission. She is right to point to the excellent work it does in this important sector, but we see this mechanism as not an obstacle for the Charity Commission but rather a safeguard for it. The mechanism is already narrowly drawn, and a second opinion prior to the tribunal can help filter out claims that are not in the public interest before they burden the tribunal and, potentially, the charity in question if applicable to that case.

The Charity Commission may refer to the tribunal questions that have arisen in connection with the exercise of its functions which involve the operation of charity law or its application to a particular state of affairs. The requirement for the Attorney-General’s consent reinforces this approach.

The Charity Commission has an array of statutory functions, the vast majority of which it performs without the involvement of the Attorney-General. The two referrals that have been made to the tribunal followed close discussions between the Charity Commission and the Attorney-General, where both agreed that it was in the public interest to proceed. The Attorney-General’s consent function does not undermine the regulator’s role; rather, it supports and complements it by ensuring that referrals are made to the tribunal only where there is a clear public interest in doing so. That is why the Government cannot support the amendment and why I hope my noble friend will withdraw it.

I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his Amendment 6, which proposes a time limit of 60 days for the Attorney-General to make a decision on applications for references to the tribunal. Imposing a 60-day time limit on that decision to give or withhold consent is a suggestion that requires due consideration.

The perceived delay in the most recent case, on the Royal Albert Hall, was due to the particularly complex nature of that case, which can often be the nature of such references. The Royal Albert Hall case was a matter for the Charity Commission and the Attorney-General. The Government support the role of the Attorney-General in making references, given that the Attorney-General values the importance of charity and her role as protector of charities. I recognise the amount of time taken to reach a decision in that case, but it was a very complex issue, illustrated perhaps by the length at which my noble friend set it out. I am glad that the case has now been concluded, and the Attorney-General continues to be grateful for the excellent work the Charity Commission does in regulating charities in England and Wales.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 27th April 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I too pay tribute to the tenacity of the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay of Llandaff and Lady McIntosh of Pickering. Although I have experience in the family courts and was aware of the child contact centres, I was not as well briefed on this issue as I am now, given the noble Baronesses’ backgrounds on this matter, particularly the legislative history of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh.

I should also pay fulsome tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, who is relatively new to our House. We met him a number of times; he has properly engaged on the issues and expressed scepticism, which is sometimes helpful to people moving amendments. He has come up with a solution. Although, as the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said, it may fall short of what we were hoping for, it nevertheless provides a road ahead for addressing the concerns that he expressed. He has potentially come up with a proper solution for the various loopholes in the child contact centre system, if I can put it like that.

As the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, said in his introduction, the Government’s problem was one of evidence. As we repeated in numerous meetings, it is very difficult to get evidence of contact centres that come and go, perhaps operating in particular communities and essentially functioning under the radar. I am glad that the Government appreciated that point to the extent that they are willing to take on the responsibility of seeing whether this is a real problem and whether appropriate measures can be put in place to protect children who go to these child contact centres.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked three good questions for the Minister to answer. The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, went on to quote Sir James Munby’s support for the earlier amendments. Sir James Munby has unequalled experience in these matters, so the Government should listen to what he says.

In conclusion, the noble Baroness, Lady Burt of Solihull, and I have sat on a lot of committees together over the last couple of years and she has always been sensible in her support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady McIntosh. As she said, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, accepts the Government’s amendments and that we continue to work together for the next couple of years to ensure that the Government follow through on their promise to review the existing provision.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, first, I thank and agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in paying tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and my noble friend Lady McIntosh for their tenacity in pursuing this issue in the interests of vulnerable children. We have all been mindful of that throughout these discussions and are grateful to them. I am also grateful to noble Lords for their tributes to my noble friend Lord Wolfson. I will pass on their thanks and appreciation, and I know that he would have liked to have been here to see the conclusion of this important matter. But I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, for saying that my noble friend went the extra mile. That has been the Government’s approach to the Bill throughout and, even those provisions that will not be in the Bill have launched some important work, which will continue to bear fruit and help victims of domestic abuse, whether legislatively or not.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asked three questions on which I hope I can provide reassurance. Her first was about whether contact centres mean the people who work in the place. Yes, we are going to review the way that a place is used, rather than a building, which may be empty. Her second was about the spirit of the amendment. Again, yes, we want to build an evidence base through the review that assesses the need for regulation, along the lines that the noble Baroness proposed. Her third was about promoting the judicial protocol. That protocol is being updated and will be communicated by the judiciary, not Her Majesty’s Government. That will provide an opportunity for its promotion but, as I am sure she and other noble Lords understand, that is a matter for the judiciary.

My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked some questions about the review. As I say, we want to establish a robust evidence base about the scale of the problem, so that we reach a fully informed decision about any further steps necessary. We would welcome her input and that of others into establishing the terms of the review. We will also be engaging the judiciary, among others, so the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, about Sir James Munby is well heard.

That has answered all the questions raised. Again, we are very grateful to all noble Lords for their engagement on this and hope that it is a sensible resolution. I hope that noble Lords support Motion A.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Consideration of Commons amendments
Thursday 25th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, at Second Reading, I made the point that it is very important that we restate the arguments for these draconian measures. I took the opportunity of talking to my son and others of his generation of young people in their early 20s about these measures which we take in our country. We had an interesting discussion about the proportionality of this and the right of a state to protect itself from potential terrorism. It is right that these arguments are revisited, as they are every year. It is a tribute to this House that many of the Peers who have taken part in these debates have a long-standing involvement in these issues—unlike me. It is, nevertheless, important that these arguments are remade, as they have been.

I too thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, for their engagement; it was an interesting process. They also made it possible for me and other noble Lords to meet some of the experts in the Home Office who are dealing with these issues on a day-to-day basis. It was certainly instructive to meet the psychiatrists and psychologists who are involved in the various programmes that take place in prison and look at how TPIMs are managed outside prisons.

I also acknowledge that the Minister has made a concession in time-limiting TPIMs to five years. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, put the point well—as she always does—about the principle of having a time limit rather than the issue running on indefinitely. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who was responsible for the introduction of the original control orders in 2005, has changed his view on this, in light of the change in circumstances and the growing learning of how to handle people who are potentially very dangerous. Although the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, proposed four years, we of course accept the Minister’s counterproposal of a five-year limit.

I conclude by paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. He has led us on this, in some ways, supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, who also has tremendous experience in this area. If I were to direct my son to read a speech, it would be the final one from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, which is a very good summary of the situation we have arrived at and the considerations we have made in reaching this compromise.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions to the debate today and, indeed, throughout the Bill’s passage through your Lordships’ House. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, said, we have had some very civilised debates about some very important issues of civil liberties, and we are grateful for the tone in which they have been conducted, as well as for the points that they have covered. Noble Lords asked a few questions which I shall cover briefly.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, while this may not be the time to open the debate about rehabilitation, asked about rehabilitative measures. We have seen, under the current two-year time limit, the problem of TPIM subjects riding out their maximum two years without changing their extremist mindset and with an unwillingness to engage with rehabilitative measures. This is an issue that has been reported on by a former independent reviewer. This change will, we think, create a genuine incentive for the subject to demonstrate that they have rehabilitated themselves and that extending the TPIM notice is not necessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, raised the latest annual report by the current independent reviewer, Jonathan Hall, and some of the points he has recommended. He is right that the response will be considered and published in full in the usual way, but let me address the points he raised. On reviewing the case for prosecution, we welcome Mr Hall’s recommendation that the case for prosecution should be kept under review. The Government have been clear throughout the passage of the Bill that prosecution is our preferred option and the best way to manage risk. As has been noted through our debates on the Bill, TPIMs are resource-intensive tools and often an option of last resort. Before a TPIM is imposed, Section 10 of the TPIM Act first requires that confirmation be provided by a senior police officer that there is insufficient evidence for a prosecution and, under Section 11, the Government “must keep under review” the necessity and proportionality of all TPIM notices. A key consideration at all TPIM review group meetings is whether there is sufficient evidence to support a prosecution for terrorism-related activity or the breach of a TPIM measure.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Report stage
Wednesday 17th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, for her commitment on this issue—a commitment that all speakers in the debate share. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, all Peers who have spoken have acknowledged the link between pornography and violence against women.

Of course, we strongly agree that there needs to be a mechanism to prevent children accessing pornographic material. We also believe that the Government have failed to show leadership on that matter and have dragged their feet. They should already have brought the online harms Bill forward.

As Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act was going through, we in the Labour Party criticised it as inadequate because it failed to focus on where some of the most serious harm was caused—for example, by not tackling social media sufficiently. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also made that point.

My understanding is that we now have a timeline for the online harms Bill, with pre-legislative scrutiny expected immediately after the Queen’s Speech—before the Summer Recess—and that Second Reading would be expected after the Summer Recess. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that my understanding of the timetable is correct.

We think that there are real inadequacies in Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act, and that the best way to deal with this matter is in full, and as a priority, in the online harms Bill. That will give time for the Commons to consider the amendments to this Bill that we have already sent back to it, including the supervision of dangerous perpetrators, ensuring that all women have access to life-saving services, and ensuring that child contact centres are regulated to protect our children.

I freely acknowledge that the decision we have taken to abstain on this matter has been a difficult one—but I think it would be wrong to give a misleading sense of certainty by passing this amendment, when that certainty is not merited by the Digital Economy Act. For that reason, we shall abstain on this vote.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, outlined on Monday when we began this debate, her Amendment 87A would require the Government to undertake an investigation of the impact of children’s access to online pornography on domestic abuse, and to review the commencement of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act 2017.

Her Majesty’s Government are committed to ensuring that the objectives of Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act will be delivered by the online harms framework. Children will be at the heart of our new online safety Bill, which will bring in a new era of accountability for online services. I am afraid I cannot comment on the timings that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, asked about, as announcements about the Queen’s Speech and other things have not yet been made. I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord on that.

We are confident that the online safety Bill will provide much greater protection for children than would have been the case with Part 3 of the 2017 Act. Unlike that Act, the online harms regime will capture both the most visited pornography sites and pornography on social media, thereby covering the vast majority of sites where children are most likely to be exposed to pornography.

One of the criticisms of the 2017 Act was that its scope did not cover social media companies, where a considerable quantity of pornographic material is available to children. Research by the British Board of Film Classification published last year found that across a group of children aged between 11 and 17, 44% intentionally accessed pornography via a social media site, compared to 43% for dedicated pornography websites and 53% via an image or video search engine.

Crucially, however, just 7% of children accessed pornography only through dedicated pornography sites. Most children intentionally accessing pornography were doing so across a number of sources, including social media, as well as video-sharing platforms, fora, and via image or video search engines, the majority of which would not fall within scope of the Digital Economy Act, but will fall within the scope of online harms legislation.

Implementing Part 3 of the 2017 Act would therefore leave a significant gap in meeting the Government’s objective of preventing children from accessing pornography —an objective that has also been raised by noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. Our online harms proposals will achieve a more comprehensive approach and allow us to address children’s access to pornography in the round, and avoid children moving from one, more regulated, area of the internet to another, less regulated, area to access pornography.

In addition, recent technological changes could render Part 3 of the 2017 Act ineffective in protecting children if it were introduced as an interim measure. One of the Act’s enforcement powers was the power to require internet service providers to block access to material on non-compliant services. Internet service providers themselves have made it clear that they are no longer the sole gatekeepers to the internet. Current and future developments in the way the architecture of the internet functions mean that they may not always be able to offer effective blocking functions, which might make this power obsolete. These potential enforcement challenges could make age-verification very difficult to enforce via the 2017 Act, even as an interim measure.

The most recent prominent change is the introduction of DNS over HTTPS—that is a bit of a mouthful; it is also known as DoH—which, in specific implementation models, could provide an alternative route to access online content that bypasses the current filtering function of internet service providers. Other proposed internet encryption standards may in future limit even further the ability of providers to filter. The Government are actively engaging with the industry to ensure that the spread of DoH and future internet encryption standards do not cause unintended consequences. For example, specific implementation models of DoH could circumnavigate the current filtering mechanisms of internet service providers, which are used to block access to child abuse content.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Belmont, raised the definition of internet service providers in the Digital Economy Act. A reference in legislation to internet service providers or similar is usually applied in the traditional sense, requiring the major internet service providers to block access to certain websites. The Secretary of State would have to prepare revised guidance to the regulator to implement Part 3 of the 2017 Act. As the noble Lord has said, this guidance, coupled with the broader terminology of an “internet access service”, as used in European Union legislation, might offer sufficient flexibility to extend the duty for internet service providers to cover other means of accessing the internet, where technically feasible. However, the key point that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford set out in her letter to the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, was that, given the evolving nature of how internet services are provided, this approach lacks the necessary certainty.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Report stage & Lords Hansard
Wednesday 3rd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Marks, set out his amendments clearly, and concentrated on the fact that the decision about a terrorist connection is made by a judge at the sentencing stage, not by the jury when they are assessing guilt or otherwise.

The noble Lord said that prior to the Bill, a limited number of offences were included. Those were serious offences, so his argument was that it did not make that much difference if there was a terrorist connection. He gave the example of ABH, for which the maximum sentence is seven years’ custody, although the penalty for low-level ABH may be some type of community order. His argument was that putting a terrorist connection on a wider range of lower-level offences would have a much larger effect on the likely sentence.

The noble Lord also spoke about activating notification requirements, and early release provisions. He prayed in aid the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, who previously raised the possibility of Newton hearings. I am much more sympathetic to that possibility than that laid out in the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which would mean that either somebody admitted in open court that there was a terrorist connection or there would be a trial of the issue.

Surely that determination should be made by the judge. A judge could make a determination that a Newton hearing was the right way forward. Perhaps the Bill should be amended to enable the judge to make a determination for a Newton hearing, or to take it on himself or herself to make a determination of whether there is a terrorist connection. For that reason, we will abstain on these amendments—but if, at a later stage, amendments along the line that I have just suggested, giving the judge discretion to order a Newton hearing, are tabled, we may well be in favour of those.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who spoke in this short debate. The amendment would require a trial of the issue as to whether there is a terrorist connection to an aggravated offence. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for the way in which he set out his amendment, but I am afraid we feel that it would represent a fundamental departure from existing processes—a significant divergence from practice within the wider criminal justice system—and it is therefore not an amendment that the Government consider necessary or appropriate.

It may be helpful if I first briefly recapitulate why the Government are making the changes that we propose in the Bill. The noble Lord, Lord McCrea, gave a good summary. Clause 1 will expressly require the courts, in cases where it appears that any non-terrorism offence with a maximum penalty of more than two years was committed in the course of an act of terrorism, or for the purposes of terrorism, actively to consider whether the offence was committed with a terrorist connection and should be aggravated as such. At present only specified offences can be so considered. Closing this loophole will make for more effective and flexible legislation, reflecting the fact that terrorist offending takes a wide variety of forms.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, gave some examples of offences that are and are not covered. It might be helpful to include further examples. Various offences under the Firearms Act 1968 are not currently covered, including possessing a firearm with an intent to endanger life; as are offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971, including destroying or damaging property with an intent to endanger life, and arson. There are many more, but I hope that provides an illustration of some of the offences that we think ought to be considered, if needed.

These changes will also ensure that the consequences of a terrorist connection are applied consistently to all offenders. The identification of a terrorist connection by the courts has a wide-ranging impact, as the noble Lord noted. It must be treated as an aggravating factor when sentencing, helping to ensure that terrorist offenders receive punishment befitting the severity of their offending and the risk that they pose to public safety. It will also result in offenders being subject to the registered terrorist offender notification requirements following their release from prison, which supports the police to manage their risk more effectively.

Finally, under the Bill, these offenders will be subject to a minimum of 12 months on licence following their release and will be eligible to have certain licence conditions imposed on them to assist in the effective management of their risk. I emphasise that both the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall QC, and the Crown Prosecution Service expressed their strong support for this change. In fact, Mr Hall stated in his oral evidence to the Public Bill Committee in another place that this change, out of all the measures in the Bill, would make the most substantial difference to public safety.

Having set out the background, I will address the substance of the noble Lord’s amendment, which proposes a significant change to the process by which the courts in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, determine a terrorist connection at the point of sentencing. This process is well-established, having been in successful operation for more than a decade since the provisions of the Criminal Damage Act 1971 came into force. It is also consistent with the wider criminal justice system.

Under the existing process, courts are required to apply the criminal standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—when determining whether an offence has a terrorist connection. The court will make this determination on the basis of the usual information before it for the purposes of sentencing—that is, the trial evidence or evidence heard at a Newton hearing, if necessary, following a guilty plea—and take into account any representations by the prosecution or defence, as well as any evidence heard.

Furthermore, in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, it is the standard approach for the judge, rather than the jury, to determine the presence of aggravating factors as part of the sentencing function. To provide one example, Section 66 of the Sentencing Act 2020 requires the court to aggravate a sentence for an offence if it was motivated by hostility based on certain protected characteristics, such as race or sexual orientation. The judge will determine such a finding as part of the sentencing. The terrorist connection provision works in exactly the same way. This very issue was debated by your Lordships’ House in 2008, when the terrorist connection provisions were first enacted. It was concluded then that the existing process is appropriate and the reasons that I will now outline still stand.

During the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, the then Government set out that, as part of their consultation on that Bill, they considered whether the determination of a terrorist connection should be made by the jury, rather than the judge at sentencing. That included discussing the option with experienced prosecutors in this area. It was concluded, however, that there were significant practical issues in taking that approach. For example, having to prove the terrorist connection as part of the trial would lead to lengthy diversions, were the defence to argue that the action of the suspect did not fall within the definition of terrorism. Such an approach would divert the prosecution from its primary aim to secure swift justice for the substantive offence—that is to say, securing a conviction or freeing the individual on trial—and would unnecessarily create significantly longer terrorism trials.

Alternatively, if the jury were to be responsible for determining whether there was a terrorist connection as part of a sentencing exercise after the trial, it would have to be summoned to make such a determination following a guilty plea. This would be entirely novel and run counter to well-established sentencing procedure. We therefore strongly believe that it would not be right to put it in the Bill. It was concluded then, as we maintain now, that sentencing is properly a function for the judge.

That is why the Government cannot accept the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks: it would impose unusual requirements on the finding of a terrorist connection, deviate significantly from well-established practice and, in doing so, put that process out of kilter with the courts’ considerations of other similar aggravating factors. The current system provides adequate safeguards against the erroneous finding of a terrorist connection. A judge who has determined that the offence was committed with a terrorist connection is required to state in open court that that is the case. That determination is capable of being appealed to the Court of Appeal. For the reasons outlined, despite the noble Lord being minded to do otherwise, I hope that he will see fit to withdraw his amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, this has been an extremely brief debate and quite a blunt one. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was very clear: during the passage of a previous Counter-Terrorism Act this House voted for a deadline and this current legislation is seeking to remove it. The Government commissioned an independent review back in January 2019, which has been repeatedly delayed and postponed, and the initial statutory deadline of 12 August 2020 will now be missed. The Government have said that they intend to have a report ready by summer 2021. Indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, he has been very generous by putting in his amendments a deadline of the end of this current calendar year.

In the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, to this short debate I noted a tone of exasperation, and I do not blame him or the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for using such a tone. I really do not see why the Government cannot reaffirm their commitment to a deadline and I will be very interested to hear the Minister’s response to both noble Lords.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would add a new statutory deadline of 31 December this year for the completion of the independent review of Prevent. I am happy to say once again that we share the noble Lord’s and noble Baroness’s commitment to a successful independent review and the opportunity that it provides to learn lessons from what is and is not working—as well as to listen to a wide range of voices about how best to safeguard those who may be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

The review restarted on 26 January, with the appointment of William Shawcross as the new independent reviewer. As I undertook to do in Committee, I am pleased to say that my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford has had a conversation with Mr Shawcross about the timescale for his review. He certainly agrees with the need to complete it as swiftly as possible, while affording it the consideration that it requires. He hopes to complete his work well before the end of 2021, and of course there will then need to be time for a government response to be prepared and laid before Parliament. However, it is out intention to set out the date of his report and, indeed, the Government’s response in the revised terms of reference, when they are published shortly.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, referred to the remarks of my right honourable friend James Brokenshire, made in his first stint as Security Minister, about government responses being swift and timely. I hope the greatest reassurance to the noble Lord is the fact that my right honourable friend is back in that important post, albeit currently recuperating from his operation, from which we all wish him a speedy recovery. I am sure his remarks then stand now, as they do for my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, who is covering while he recuperates.

We all agree that it is necessary to have a thorough, evidence-based review that engages communities and sees Prevent delivery in action and that has practical recommendations for improvement at the end of it. We fear that, at a time when fleetness of foot is vital, a statutory deadline could limit this. We referred in Committee to the ongoing pandemic; alas, it continues now we are on Report, and I hope noble Lords will all be mindful of the need for flexibility in light of it.

Mr Shawcross is keen to proceed at pace, as I say, but reintroducing a statutory deadline for the completion of his independent review would mean that, if he encountered a challenge to his timeline because of the pandemic, we would have to revisit the legislation or he might be forced to compromise in how he meets his objectives. Of course, we hope that there will not be any difficulties, but there remains a risk of further or ongoing restrictions, with all the unpredictabilities of the pandemic and the implications that that could have for Mr Shawcross, his team and those who wish to provide their input into the review. As such, we think that that remains sensible.

We believe that it is achievable for Mr Shawcross to complete his work quickly, while undertaking a thorough and robust piece of work—but it is important for the legislation to retain the flexibility for the reviewer, should he need it, to ensure that the valuable work of his review is not undermined. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will agree and, therefore, withdraw his amendment.

Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

I am relatively new to these debates, but I remember making the point at Second Reading about the importance of rehearsing these arguments each time we make these types of orders. These orders are some of the most intrusive that we have in our country. Young people listening to these debates need to be convinced regularly of how important these orders are and that they are proportionate and protect our liberties.

In her introduction, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, drew a parallel with the group; there are obvious parallels between the legal tests in the previous group and the length of the TPIMs that we have been discussing in this group. Interestingly, in responding to the previous group, the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, talked about a reduction in the measures within TPIMs as they progress in time. I hope that the noble Lord will be able to expand on that when he winds up the debate.

As I am now used to, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has given a balanced view. He has put forward another compromise, although I sense that the Liberal Democrats and perhaps my own party, the Labour Party, are less convinced by this type of compromise, but nevertheless he has set one out in his amendments. I thought that he put an interesting challenge to the Minister, who is a former special adviser in the Home Office. I do not think that it was a rhetorical challenge, but I would be interested to know the noble Lord’s response. Would he have felt comfortable about recommending a discharge to an indefinite TPIM when he was in that role? It would be a difficult thing for a Minister or a special adviser to do. If the orders had a natural time limit, that would not put people in such a difficult and invidious position.

The other point made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, was that excessive zeal can be counterproductive. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, also made the point when he drew an interesting parallel with the IPP regime and the importance of not taking away hope from people who are subject to orders, whether they be for imprisonment or a form of effectively indefinite house arrest. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, summed up these arrangements very well. He quoted the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who I remember well in the House, when he drew parallels with internment. In fact, I may have been here when he made that speech. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also quoted Jonathan Hall extensively when he said that there should at the very least be an upper limit to the time that a TPIM can be in place without a further court order.

For all these reasons, the amendments as put forward by the other speakers in this group are worthy of our support.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate on this group. Amendment 29, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would require the Home Secretary to secure the permission of the court before signing a TPIM extension notice. We do not think that that is a necessary amendment to the Bill. To demonstrate why, it might be helpful to the Committee if I explain first the process by which the Home Secretary considers whether a TPIM notice should be extended, a process that will remain in place after the removal of the time limit as proposed by the Bill. I hope that that provides some reassurance to the Committee both about the thorough consideration which goes into whether the continuation of a TPIM is necessary and about the robust judicial oversight that is already built into the process.

At this stage, I should say in response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which I was certainly hoping to treat as rhetorical but which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, rightly picked on, these are rightly not matters in which special advisers are involved. They are questions for the Secretary of State and Ministers.

When extending a TPIM, the Home Secretary will consider the Security Service’s assessment as to whether it remains necessary. It is true that significant weight is placed on the professionalism and expertise of the Security Service, but the process is not simply a tick box exercise. The Home Office routinely challenges the Security Service’s assessments to ensure that they are robust. The scrutiny is demonstrated by the public comments which have been made by successive former Independent Reviewers of Terrorism Legislation, who, for instance, have noted that through the quarterly TPIM review group meetings all TPIM notices in force are reassessed, including whether the measures imposed or the TPIM notice itself are necessary and proportionate, and what the exit strategy is for the notice.

If the Home Secretary considers that the extension of a TPIM notice is necessary, she will then consider whether the current measures remain necessary and proportionate to restrict the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, or whether any of them need varying. To address the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, this can be in the form of a removal, a relaxation, or further restrictions.

This might be a good point to talk a little more about rehabilitation. To answer the question that the noble Baroness asked about whether somebody who has been subject to a TPIM could theoretically be subject to another, yes, they could, although that would have to rely on a separate national security case or evidence of terrorism-related activity. TPIMs are not designed as a tool of punishment; they are a tool of prevention and rehabilitation. Part of them involves encouraging subjects to attend what are known as desistence and disengagement programmes to assist with their rehabilitation and to turn them away from behaviour that leads them to be subjects of concern.

Decisions to extend a TPIM notice are not taken lightly but are based on detailed assessments by the Security Service and counterterrorism policing’s experience of managing the subject. The assessment that the Security Service provides will not only be based on the original national security case put forward for the imposition of the TPIM; it will also include the intelligence, both covert and overt, gathered over the course of the preceding 12 months. This could include evidence of further terrorism-related activity or non-compliance that does not reach the criminal threshold or which cannot be exhibited in open court. When extending a TPIM notice, the TPIM subject is invited to make representations before a decision is made. These are put before the Home Secretary.

As I outlined in our debate on the previous group, the 2011 Act established robust judicial oversight of the TPIM process. I will set out what that means. I hope to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on some of the existing safeguards. The court will consider at a permission hearing whether the Home Secretary’s initial decision to impose a TPIM was “obviously flawed” and will overturn a notice or its measures where that is the case. This is known as a Section 9 hearing. If I understand the amendment, this is a process that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord would like to see replicated when a notice is extended beyond a second year.

Section 16 of the TPIM Act provides an appeal route for TPIM subjects to challenge any refusal to vary their notice or to extend it, in addition to the Section 9 hearing. The in-built appeal route available through Section 16 makes it difficult to see in practice what the amendment would achieve in establishing an additional safeguard beyond that.

In addition to the Section 9 hearing and the Section 16 appeal process, the TPIM Act also requires the Home Secretary to keep under regular review the ongoing necessity of a TPIM notice under Section 11. This responsibility is also taken seriously. It is why the Home Office runs the quarterly TPIM review groups, where all TPIM subjects are discussed, including the notices to which they are subject and whether these remain proportionate and necessary.

I turn to Amendment 30, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I thank him for outlining it. His amendment would amend the 2011 Act so that a TPIM notice can be extended on “one or more” occasions if the conditions in Section 3 of that Act continue to be met. Currently, a TPIM notice can be extended only once and therefore has a maximum duration of two years. However, we respectfully disagree with the noble Lord on the need for his amendment. It would prevent a TPIM notice being renewed for as long as it is necessary for the purposes of public protection. Instead, it would set a new upper limit of four years. While we disagree with the noble Lord’s amendment, I should say at the outset that we support its principle in so far as it recognises that there are circumstances where it may be necessary to impose a TPIM beyond the current two-year limit, which the Government contend is too short.

There are several policy and operational justifications for Clause 38. First, experience has shown that there are TPIM subjects who pose an enduring risk beyond the two-year limit. This has meant that a new TPIM has had to be imposed after reaching the current limit and, as a consequence, a dangerous cliff edge has been created while the individual is at large in the community without the appropriate risk management tools in place before a new TPIM can be imposed. That has happened on more than one occasion. ACC Tim Jacques spoke to this risk when he gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee in another place.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, we have had two different debates in this group. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, moved that Clause 40 should not stand part of the Bill, and I can do no better than the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and his three questions, which I thought were very apposite and to the point. I will listen with interest to the Minister’s answers to those three questions.

My noble friends Lord Hunt and Lord Bach then spoke to their Amendment 31. As we have heard, the gist of the amendment is to formalise a relationship between the Secretary of State, PCCs and local chief constables to give more direct input by PCCs. In the words of my noble friend Lord Bach, PCCs are responsible for the “totality of policing” in their area. As we have heard, they are already involved in controversial matters such as stop and search and covert activities. Of course, I support my noble friends in trying to give the PCCs more formal involvement in TPIMs in their own areas.

I look forward to my noble friend Lord Bach playing a greater part in the proceedings of our House. He has for many years brought great insight into his many roles on the Front Bench, and occasionally on the Back Benches, but he will improve that even further when he comes back as a PCC. He may, of course, have to do extra time; we wait to see. I will listen with interest to what the Minister has to say, and I will support my noble friends.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. As some have remarked, Amendment 31 might have as easily sat in the previous group as this one. I turn first to that amendment, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Hunt of King’s Heath and Lord Bach. It aims to increase the oversight that local policing bodies, including police and crime commissioners, have of TPIM notices in their area. It would require the Home Secretary to notify the relevant local policing body when a TPIM notice is imposed in their area, and when a TPIM is withdrawn, ends or is relocated, so that it no longer falls within their area. It would also require the local policing body to provide six-monthly reports to the Home Secretary, which could include recommendations regarding variations to the TPIM and its continued necessity.

Because of the operational nature of the amendment and the impact that it would have on existing processes, officials at the Home Office have consulted colleagues in Counter Terrorism Policing Headquarters on it, and they support our view that it is not needed in the Bill. Engagement with police forces is already an integral part of the TPIM regime. The Home Office works very closely with CT policing, both nationally via CTPHQ and with regional CT units, before a TPIM is imposed and during its lifetime, including regular engagement at quarterly TPIM review group meetings chaired by the Home Office. This well-established process ensures that TPIMs are imposed only following engagement with, and ultimately the consent of, the relevant local police force. This existing practice also means that local community impact assessments are kept up to date, which supports the effective and efficient management of the TPIM subject by the Home Office and operational partners.

Given the current close working relationship that we have with operational partners in the ongoing management of a TPIM subject, there is no need for the local policing body to produce six-monthly reports; review meetings are already in any event held at more regular intervals than the amendment would require reports to be written, and those meetings already consider the types of issue that the amendment is seeking to ensure are included in any report. The amendment would also distort existing roles and responsibilities; it would be inappropriate for the relevant local policing body or police and crime commissioner to put recommendations for varying a TPIM or its continued necessity directly to the Home Secretary. Those judgments are, quite rightly, led by the Home Office in conjunction with the Security Service, which makes fully informed recommendations based on its expert assessment of national security risk. Like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I think the examples that noble Lords gave of stop and search and other decisions are in a different category from the imposition of a TPIM.

It is vital that TPIM oversight and management processes protect the highly classified information that flows through a TPIM regime, including the details of the TPIM subject and the underlying national security case against them. The Government, CTPHQ and the Security Service are concerned about how the amendment could work in practice with regard to sharing and disclosure of such highly sensitive information. The close working relationships already in place and well-tested processes on information-sharing between the Home Office, CT policing and the Security Service make it unnecessary.

I turn to Clause 40, which amends the existing overnight residence measure in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act to strengthen the ability of the Home Secretary to specify certain hours when a TPIM subject must remain at a specified residence. Taken literally, the amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, would remove Clause 40 from the Bill altogether and prevent several operational benefits from being realised. That is why the Government cannot support it.

Having a residence measure at our disposal is vital in managing an individual of national security concern and the risk that they pose to the public. That has long been the case, but our engagement with operational partners has established that the existing overnight measure could and should be improved to allow for greater flexibility in the way in which it can be imposed—specifically, by introducing a requirement for a TPIM subject to remain within his or her residence at specific times during the day, as well as overnight, when this is assessed as necessary and proportionate to manage the risk that they pose. The updated residence measure that Clause 40 introduces will allow the Home Secretary to specify a period that could be longer than overnight or spilt into varying segments throughout a 24-hour period, if considered necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I have nothing of substance to add to the comments of the previous two speakers, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I, too, was going to raise the point made by the noble Lord about the right to silence of someone who is subject to a TPIM, as they are not convicted of an offence. The noble Baroness adequately covered the other points, so I have nothing more to add.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions and brevity in this group so that we can make as much progress as possible. All these amendments are in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.

Clause 41 provides for the addition of a polygraph measure into Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011. Doing that will, in circumstances where it is assessed to be necessary and proportionate, help our operational partners to assess an individual’s compliance with his or her TPIM notice and support the decision-making on whether variations to the notice are required. That could include relaxations as well as restrictions.

As with all TPIM measures, polygraphs will not be mandatory for all TPIM subjects. I should like to reassure the Committee that we anticipate this measure being used sparingly, in a targeted and proportionate manner. Operational partners will consider its utility in relation to each TPIM subject on a case-by-case basis and make a recommendation to the Home Office for its imposition where appropriate.

By way of example, the results of a polygraph test may indicate that a TPIM subject is meeting someone whom he or she is prohibited from seeing for national security reasons at a particular location. While any findings from the polygraph test will be considered in the round by operational partners—that is, without an overreliance on the test findings and considered against other available information—the findings could inform a recommendation for the TPIM measures to be varied to restrict the subject from frequenting that specific location. The results could also be used to inform an assessment of whether a subject’s engagement with rehabilitation programmes under the TPIM notice is genuine.

We recognise that the prospect of polygraph testing understandably creates questions about the way in which information gleaned from tests may be used. That is precisely why we have taken steps to ensure that the wording of the clause is clear on that issue. The polygraph testing should only be carried out with a view to monitoring the individual’s compliance with other specified TPIM measures and assessing whether any variation of their measures is necessary. We have also specified that such information cannot be used in evidence against the individual in any criminal proceedings.

To further reassure the Committee of the steps that we are taking to ensure that this addition is both proportionate and considered, the clause sets out that the new measure will not be used unless and until the Home Office introduces regulations to make provision for the conduct of the polygraph sessions. Those regulations are likely to include detail, for example, on the qualifications and experience needed by polygraph operators and how records of the polygraph sessions should be kept, thereby ensuring transparency on how this measure will be applied in practice. The regulations would be laid before Parliament for scrutiny in the usual manner.

As with all other measures contained in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, this measure will not be imposed unless the Home Secretary reasonably considers it necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. It is important that we harness available technology and provide our operational partners with the tools necessary to protect the public, and that is what the clause will do.

Turning our attention to Amendment 30C, as I have set out, Clause 41 adds the new polygraph measure to the list of available measures in Schedule 1 to the 2011 Act. Following Royal Assent, if the polygraph measures are imposed, a TPIM subject will be required to undertake a polygraph test. Failure to do so would, to answer the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, be a breach of the TPIM measure. We appreciate the spirit in which the amendment has been tabled, but we respectfully disagree about the necessity of it. Condition D in Section 3(4) of the TPIM Act 2011 requires,

“that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures to be imposed on the individual”

under a TPIM notice. In addition, Section 12(1)(c) of the TPIM Act requires,

“the Secretary of State reasonably considers that the variation is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.”

Therefore, all the measures imposed under a TPIM notice and any subsequent variation must be considered to be necessary for those purposes.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I have nothing to add to the points made by the previous two speakers.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, through Clause 42 we are adding a new measure to the list of available measures in Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act 2011. If it is imposed, a TPIM subject would be required to submit to a drug test and provide a relevant sample.

Operational experience has shown that, in certain circumstances, drug use can exacerbate the risk of a subject engaging in terrorism-related activity. This new measure will support operational partners to mitigate this risk by confirming suspected drug use through a mandatory drug test and, where necessary, mandating attendance at rehabilitation programmes. They will want to follow up the questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about where those drugs were obtained.

We consider this amendment unnecessary because the TPIM Act already contains robust safeguards regarding the imposition of all measures on TPIM subjects. Section 3 of the TPIM Act requires that at the point that a TPIM is first imposed the Home Secretary must reasonably consider that the TPIM notice and the measures specified within it are necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity. Section 12 of the TPIM Act also requires that variations of measures specified in an existing TPIM notice, which would include the imposition of a drug testing measure, cannot be made unless the Home Secretary reasonably considers that the variation is necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.

Given that existing requirement, the amendment proposed does not go further than the safeguards already in place. Furthermore, the existing requirements of the TPIM Act, to which I have just referred, apply to all measures rather than being confined solely to the drug testing measure as this amendment has it. For those reasons, we invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, both amendments in this group would add a new statutory deadline for the completion of the independent review of Prevent. I certainly share the Committee’s firm commitment to the success of that independent review. It was clear in this short but important debate that our common objective is for a thorough and effective review to take place—one that will help us to learn how best to safeguard those who are vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism.

However, we must allow the new reviewer sufficient time to conduct such a thorough and effective review. These amendments would limit his options for reasonable flexibility, shorten the timeframe that he is given and put at risk his ability to do his job properly.

As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, outlined, the review restarted two weeks ago, on 26 January, with the appointment of William Shawcross as the new independent reviewer. Our aim has been for the review to be completed by no later than August this year, but we will agree the precise timetable with Mr Shawcross shortly. We want to enable him to complete the review as swiftly as possible while affording him the consideration that his important task requires.

Of course, the uncertainties posed by the ongoing pandemic, such as the prospect of further ongoing restrictions on travel and face-to-face meetings, could, self-evidently, have implications for the reviewer, as well as for his team and all those who wish to provide input into the review. I am afraid that we therefore have to consider the potential impact of that on his ability to take evidence, including the vital work of engaging with different parts of the community. As the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Paddick, highlighted, that work is vital, as is, for example, the reviewer witnessing for himself Prevent delivery in action so that he can deliver the thorough and evidence-based review, with practical recommendations for improvement, that we would like.

The Government believe that August this year is achievable, but this is of course dependent on the views of the new reviewer. He is independent, so I cannot speak for him at the Dispatch Box. We therefore recommend that the legislation affords the reviewer flexibility, should he feel that he needs it, to ensure that the valuable work of this review is not undermined. But we certainly hear what all noble Lords have said about the urgency, and I hope that they can hear that we share that. For those reasons, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, for the rhetorical flourish at the end of his speech, when he said that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, had been asking, “Why?”, on many of the previous groups. In his speech today, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas asked, “When will we get the Prevent review deadline?”

The Minister gave his reasons for putting Mr Shawcross in place. He has been in place for only two weeks and I understand that the Government have had problems in getting this review off the ground. I will not take a partisan view. I do not think that the amendment in my name is better than the one in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but it is important to try to get a realisable date or timetable in the Bill so that the Government are held to that.

I will withdraw my amendment, but we might come back with a similar one at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, continues to prove himself doughty in the face of technological challenges, and I am happy to address the question he would have asked in the previous group. He makes a valid point about the much longer timeframe proposed in his amendment, which we debated in that group. As I said, however, because Mr Shawcross is an independent reviewer, I cannot speak for him at the Dispatch Box. We must speak to him and see what he feels is the timeframe he needs. If we are able to have that conversation and he feels able to give a view before Report stage, we will of course come back and report it, but it is for the independent reviewer to make his assessment of how long he needs to do the thorough job required, as I hope the noble Lord will understand.

Turning now to this group, Amendment 37 would require the Home Secretary to commission a new, judge-led review of the effectiveness of the Government’s strategy to deal with lone-actor terrorists. While I welcome the constructive spirit in which the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, tabled this amendment, I must respectfully disagree over the need to add it to the Bill.

I reassure the noble Lord that a great deal of work is already under way to combat the terrorist threat, including that posed by lone actors. My right honourable friend the Security Minister talked in some detail about this in a speech he gave at RUSI in November last year—particularly the term “lone actor” itself. If the noble Lord has not seen it, it is well worth reading. I would be very happy to provide noble Lords with a copy of that speech if they would like it.

The Government have been clear that we will not hesitate to act where necessary. Following the attacks at Fishmongers’ Hall and in Streatham, we brought forward legislation to address flaws in the way terrorist offenders were managed. The legislation we are now debating marks the largest overhaul of terrorist sentencing in decades. It follows on from the Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Act 2020, which came into force in February last year. That Act was, as noble Lords will remember, emergency legislation. One of its effects was to prevent around 50 terrorist prisoners being automatically released after serving only half their sentence, by amending their release point to at least two-thirds of their sentence and ensuring they are released only after an assessment by the Parole Board.

Following the attack at Fishmongers’ Hall in November 2019, the Lord Chancellor and the Home Secretary commissioned Jonathan Hall QC to carry out an independent review of the effectiveness of the Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements, or MAPPA, when it comes to the management of terrorism, terrorist connections and offenders of terrorism concern in the community. MAPPA is the process through which the police, the Prison Service and the probation service work together and with other agencies—including children’s services, adult social services, health trusts and authorities, and youth offending teams—to protect the public by managing the risks posed by violent and sexual offenders living in the community.

That review found that MAPPA is a well-established process, and Mr Hall did not conclude that wholesale change is necessary. He made a number of recommendations on how the management of terrorists can be improved. In response to the review, the Government will shortly be bringing forward policing and crime legislation implementing a number of his recommendations, including new powers of premises and personal search, and an urgent power of arrest for counterterrorism policing.

This ongoing work builds on the response to the 2017 attacks. Three of the attacks in 2017 were carried out by lone actors, as was the attack in Reading, as the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, reminds us, which we sadly saw more recently. In 2018, the Government published a strengthened counterterrorism strategy, known as Contest, following operational improvement reviews overseen by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. As part of that strategy we have piloted new multiagency approaches at the local level—in London, the West Midlands and Greater Manchester—to enable MI5 and counterterrorism policing to share more information with a broader range of partners, including government departments, the devolved Administrations and local authorities. This has enabled us to identify, mitigate and disrupt threats earlier. Our superb police, and security and intelligence agencies work around the clock to keep us safe: they have disrupted 27 terrorist plots since 2017.

There are now more than 20 government departments and agencies involved in the delivery of Contest, and we have worked to build strong relationships with the private sector, the third sector and the wider public. We will continue to invest in these relationships and drive greater integration, recognising that to reduce the risk of terrorism we need not only a whole-of-Government but a whole-of-society approach. In the context of the wide-ranging work already under way and recently completed, the Government do not consider that the noble Lord’s amendment is needed.

I turn now to Amendment 40. This proposed new clause would require the Secretary of State to lay a report within 12 months of the Bill being passed, defining which agencies are included within MAPPA for the purposes of managing terrorist offenders. The agencies included in MAPPA are already listed in Section 325 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. As has been mentioned already, these include criminal justice agencies such as the police and the probation service, as well as other agencies, including mental health services, social services and NHS England. These agencies are placed under a statutory obligation to work together to assess and manage the risk presented by serious offenders.

Moreover, agencies with a legal duty to co-operate with MAPPA must have regard to statutory guidance issued by the Ministry of Justice. This guidance, which also sets out which agencies must co-operate, is publicly available. Agencies that do not have a statutory duty to co-operate with MAPPA are not obliged to engage. There are, however, no barriers in place to prevent this engagement for the purposes of assessing and managing the risks presented by serious offenders. It is our belief that the right agencies already have a duty to co-operate in place, and, as such, they are listed publicly in the Criminal Justice Act.

I have already mentioned Jonathan Hall’s recent review of MAPPA. On the question of the identity of the agencies involved in MAPPA, he raised no issues. He did, however, raise questions about the way in which MAPPA agencies share information with each other, and the Government have confirmed in our response to his review that we will clarify the position in upcoming legislation to put the matter beyond doubt. We believe, therefore, that since this knowledge is already publicly available and enshrined in legislation, there is no need for this amendment. I hope the noble Lord agrees and that he will be willing to withdraw it.

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has spoken on this short group of amendments. The Minister offered to send the RUSI speech of his friend, which I would indeed be happy to read. The gist of his comments on Amendment 37 was that a judge-led review is not needed because there are other government reviews currently under way. I hear what he says, but I will reflect on the view he expresses.

On Amendment 40, he listed the statutory bodies that are required to co-operate with MAPPA, but I thought it was interesting that the list he read out was a much shorter list than the one I got from the probation officers, who said it was very important to go wider than the short list he mentioned and include, for example, local faith-based groups, education providers and third sector substance misuse agencies. Those sorts of agencies may well be very useful and informative for the MAPPA system. I hear what the noble Lord says about Jonathan Hall and the plan to help the different MAPPA agencies co-operate with each other, which must be the right way to proceed. I will reflect on what he said, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Debate between Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede and Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay

Committee stage & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 5th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 8th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I support both these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has had a long-standing interest in these matters, as he explained to the Committee, and he spoke with great authority, as he usually does. He also explained that he had had recent conversations with the Minister, Victoria Atkins, and I was pleased that he explained that she is taking this problem very seriously.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, gave a very sobering medical explanation of brain damage and brain injury. In my understanding, she said it is a difficult thing to assess, but it is a very real issue. I too got the review of the Disabilities Trust report on Drake Hall from 2016-18, and we have heard a number of the statistics from the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham.

One particular statistic that was not repeated, and which I thought was particularly revealing, was that 33% of women with a brain injury sustained their injury before committing their first offence. That shows that brain injury can, and often does, lead to life-changing behaviours, which can and do mean that, disproportion-ately, people with brain injuries end up in prison—both women and men.

The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, did not actually say that this was a probing amendment, but whether or not it is, I am happy to support it. I hope to hear from the Minister that the Government are taking these sources of injury and changes in behaviour very seriously within the prison estate.

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, for setting out the case for these amendments, which, as he explained, follow similar suggestions from Chris Bryant MP when the Bill was debated in another place. I am pleased that my honourable friend the Minister for Safeguarding was able to meet Mr Bryant and the noble Lord, and that their discussions were—as the noble Lord said—helpful.

Amendment 155 seeks to introduce screening for acquired brain injury for female victims of domestic abuse within two weeks of a domestic abuse charge being made, including those victims to be protected by a domestic abuse protection order. Amendment 156 seeks to introduce screening for brain injury for all female prisoners within two weeks of starting their sentence, with a subsequent assessment to take place if an injury is found.

I say from the outset that we want to make sure that we provide healthcare and support that meets the specific needs of all victims of domestic abuse, and female offenders too, including those with acquired brain injury. We have carefully considered these amendments, and while we appreciate their overarching intent, we feel that legislating would not be the appropriate course of action. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, set out clearly the clinical difficulties that would be involved if we were to put this in the Bill.

The National Health Service is there to provide appropriate care and treatment for everyone who needs it, based on clinical need. This key principle on which the NHS operates means that anyone who needs a certain diagnostic test based on clinical need should receive it. The healthcare needs of victims of domestic abuse will vary greatly based on their individual circumstances and experiences but, if they need urgent assessment or treatment, they will receive this from the National Health Service.

Moreover, as we have heard throughout the scrutiny of the Bill so far, domestic abuse can manifest itself in many ways, including—as in the group of amendments we have just discussed—through coercive control or financial abuse, and it would be inappropriate to invite victims of these forms of domestic abuse for brain injury screening. That is why we do not consider that testing all female victims of domestic abuse, as this amendment suggests, would be an effective use of NHS resources or provide the personalised care they need.

Nevertheless, we believe that improvements can be made to existing screening processes through non-legislative measures. I will provide some background to that. All people entering prison receive an early health assessment within the first 24 hours. This initial assessment is comprehensive so that their health needs can be identified and addressed at an early stage. It includes a standard requirement to undertake a screening questionnaire for head injury and loss of consciousness, which focuses on issues with memory or concentration. As noble Lords have said, these can be important signs.

We acknowledge that more could be done during this screening process to identify and address specific circumstances where head injury or loss of consciousness has resulted from domestic abuse. I am pleased to say that NHS England and NHS Improvement have confirmed that they would be happy to add further questions to the existing screening tool to ascertain, where an acquired brain injury has been identified, whether that acquired brain injury occurred as a result of physical injury related to domestic abuse, sexual violence or another form of abuse.

The national screening tool is reviewed and updated by NHS England and NHS Improvement on an annual basis to allow for any changes in NICE guidance or any recommendations arising from a coroner’s report to prevent future deaths. To amend the existing screening tool, NHS England and NHS Improvement will need to agree the precise questions to be asked and how these will be reported. I am pleased to say that the initial screening questions on domestic violence and the coding that is required have already been agreed and will be implemented by April this year.

Alongside this, NHS England and NHS Improvement are continuing to work with the Disabilities Trust on a training package for healthcare practitioners to increase effectiveness when supporting people with impaired neurological functioning, either as a result of domestic abuse or for other reasons, and also to support them by providing practical steps to those working with patients and self-help tools for the patients themselves to reduce and overcome the impact of any brain injury.

In so far as Amendment 155 seeks to link screening to the making of a domestic abuse protection order, it is important to recognise that, like other protective orders, these are designed to impose requirements on the perpetrator. They cannot impose requirements on the person to be protected by the order, such as requiring them to undertake a screening for an acquired brain injury.

We will, however, use the statutory guidance to the police to recommend that they refer victims to an independent domestic violence adviser, or another specialist advocate, who will be able to advise victims of their options on a whole range of issues, including healthcare. In addition, we will include information on where to go to seek medical attention in the advice materials provided to victims which we will be producing ready for the pilots of the orders.

I hope that these non-legislative measures reassure the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, that we are acting to support women with acquired brain injury and that putting this in the Bill is therefore not necessary. I am glad to repeat our thanks to him and to Mr Bryant for the discussions we have had on this important issue. I hope that the noble Lord will be willing to withdraw his amendment.