Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I shall talk very briefly to this amendment. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, that it is a privilege to be part of this technical Bill. It is one where I suspect that I, among other lay Members of this Committee, have learned a lot. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, for introducing this amendment. He has explained a particular problem that is a big problem for a small number of charities. I understood that to be the problem that he outlined. The potential solution is not agreed between the Law Commission and certain specialist lawyers. Whether there is a way out of the problem through either dissolution or merger of the charity is something on which there is no overwhelming consensus.
I do not know what plans the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has for his amendment at either this or later stages of the Bill. I shall listen to the Minister’s response to the issues raised by the noble Lord and then take a view, depending on what he does at a later stage.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay) (Con)
My Lords, before responding to this group of amendments, I first extend my best wishes to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who has so ably chaired this Special Public Bill Committee so far. I hope he gets well soon and is back with us swiftly.
I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for tabling Amendments 1 and 2 to Clause 3 and for the way he set out not just the amendments but, helpfully, the background to the Bill’s importance to charities and the people it will affect. Of course, he has long-standing interest and experience in this important area.
On my noble friend’s Amendment 1, which would insert a new subsection (2A) at line 9 on page 3 of the Bill, we consider that new Section 280A can be used to replace all the stated governing document in its entirety, with Charity Commission consent in respect of the particular provisions that fall within Section 280A(8). We do not think that a legislative solution is necessary and, as has been noted, this view is supported by the Law Commission and the Charity Commission—we have discussed the issue with both of them. I am grateful to my noble friend for raising this point, as it has prompted us to consider ways in which we can make the position clearer, but I hope that, on that basis, he will feel able to withdraw his Amendment 1.
On Amendment 2, which would insert subsection (9A) at line 14 on page 4 of the Bill, although my noble friend again makes an important point, we can in fact already achieve what the amendment sets out to do under the clause as it stands. Under the Bill, the Charity Commission’s consent is required for an amendment that would alter any unincorporated charity’s purposes. That is equivalent to one category of regulated alterations for charitable incorporated organisations, which requires the consent of the Charity Commission. By way of comparison, the Charity Commission currently treats amendments to the purposes of charitable incorporated organisations of the same type referred to in the amendment as not being a regulated alteration and therefore not requiring Charity Commission consent. Given the similarity between the statutory provision concerning charitable incorporated organisations and the new Section 280A(8)(a), the same approach would be taken in relation to changes to unincorporated charities’ purposes. Therefore, Section 280A(8) as it stands already looks at substance over form, and an amendment to a governing document would require Charity Commission consent only if it makes a substantive change, not if it is a pure drafting change. I hope that provides reassurance to noble Lords. As with the previous amendment, this is a view supported by the Charity Commission and the Law Commission.
However, I thank my noble friend for keeping us on our toes and for rightly probing this issue. Of course we want the situation to be clear to everybody who will be affected by the new law, so we will consider whether the Explanatory Notes could be expanded on this point to make that clearer. I hope that, on the basis of that reassurance—not the third of the options that my noble friend outlined in his opening speech but looking again at the Explanatory Notes to make this clear to all concerned—he will feel able not to press his Amendment 2.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for their contributions. My noble friend the Minister has, of course, elegantly found a third way: it was not that the Charity Commission was wrong; it was not that we need to produce some new change to the Bill; there are powers within the Bill as it stands to find a way around the problem through Section 280A and ancillary provisions. I talked about getting barnacles off the boat, and this was certainly a barnacle. I will reflect on this, talk to the people from Spilsby, who are obviously at the front line of this to see if they have any comments. In the meantime, I beg to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for tabling this amendment and to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, for moving it in his absence. I had a very helpful conversation with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, yesterday and am grateful to him for his time.
By way of background, there are six financial thresholds in the Bill, which directly or indirectly ensure proper regulatory oversight of charities by the Charity Commission. These thresholds can be amended by secondary legislation to ensure that they remain at an appropriate level, based on how they are working in practice and on changes in inflation. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House recommended that any future amendment of these thresholds should be subject to the affirmative, rather than the negative, parliamentary procedure. This means that there would need to be a parliamentary debate any time the Government sought to amend these thresholds.
The department rejected the committee’s recommendations because the powers are narrow in scope and the negative procedure would be consistent with similar amendment powers that already exist in the Charities Act 2011. However, we recognise the difference between the delegated powers in Clause 12 and the delegated powers in the other five clauses that were discussed in the report. The powers in Clause 12 vary the proportion of permanent endowment that may be borrowed and the period over which such borrowing must be repaid; the other delegated powers are concerned with amending monetary sums.
I can see how this amendment to change the parliamentary procedure from the negative to the affirmative for the thresholds in Clause 12 would work in principle, and I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord and the Committee as a whole for putting this suggestion forward. I thank noble Lords who have made the case for it again today and acknowledge the points they have made. I will take them away and consider them carefully, and I expect to return to this issue on Report but, for now, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, similarly, I will be reading out the comments that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has supplied me with on Amendment 4.
Section 115(5) of the 2011 Act provides that, if authorisation of the Charity Commission is required to take charity proceedings and it is refused, leave to take proceedings may be obtained from a judge of the Chancery Division of the High Court. There is a problem, however, with obtaining a timely decision of the Charity Commission one way or the other, as no application may be made to the Chancery Division for leave until the Charity Commission has made a decision to refuse authorisation. The result of delay by the Charity Commission in making a decision is that there may be a lengthy period of uncertainty and enforced inactivity.
This amendment addresses that problem by imposing on the Charity Commission a time limit of 60 days for refusal of authorisation. This is a typical time limit under the provisions of the 2011 Act, such as Sections 270 and 271 on a resolution to transfer all the property of a charity to take effect at the end of the period of 60 days, unless the Charity Commission notifies the charity before the expiry of the 60 days that it objects to the resolution, and Sections 277 and 278 on a resolution to modify the purposes of the charity to take effect at the end of the period of 60 days, unless the Charity Commission notifies the charity before the expiry of the 60 days that it objects to the resolution. Under Clause 11(3) of the Bill, where there is a resolution to spend the endowment fund of a charity under Section 282 of the 2011 Act, the commission is to state within 60 days whether it concurs with the resolution or not. If it fails to do so, the fund or relevant portion of it can be expended free of the restrictions that would otherwise apply. I beg to move.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his proposed amendment and again to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for speaking to it. It is important that we consider both the concern that the amendment seeks to address and the practicalities of implementing such a suggestion.
We are not currently aware of any particular issue with the amount of time taken by the Charity Commission to respond to applications to pursue charity proceedings. There was mention during the evidence sessions which the committee has heard of some perceived delays at the Charity Commission, but I do not think they were in relation to decisions under Section 115. If an issue were raised in relation to the time taken by the Charity Commission for these considerations, that could be looked at without the need for legislation, for example by looking at internal processes.
By way of background, requests for Section 115 charity proceedings are rare. The Charity Commission’s consideration of such requests is often complex, being different from that of other requests of the Charity Commission, which tend to be more transactional in nature. Charity proceedings relate to the internal or domestic affairs of a charity. There are a number of considerations in relation to such requests that the Charity Commission must resolve, as set out in its guidance. The Charity Commission has therefore raised concerns about the appropriateness of a statutory timescale.
To illustrate one such complexity, these applications do not always result in either a grant or refusal of consent. In order to protect charitable funds, the Charity Commission tries to see whether there are routes the charity can take to avoid going to court. This has previously led to the charity resolving the issue itself, or the Charity Commission using its powers, such as by making an order or providing an action plan to resolve the issue.
The need for Charity Commission permission is intended to protect charitable funds and the courts from claims that have no reasonable prospects of success or which could be addressed more appropriately in other ways. It is also important for the Charity Commission to be satisfied that it is in the best interests of the charity that the matter be adjudicated on by the court. For the most part, these cases relate to internal disputes. While these issues can be complex and involve a lot of information, they also typically relate to one charity and therefore have a low impact on the sector as a whole.
The issue with having a timescale imposed on the Charity Commission for a decision of this nature, when no equivalent timescales are imposed for other Charity Commission decisions, also means that resolving these requests may become a higher priority for the commission than other higher-risk or higher-impact work. This would not be conducive to the Charity Commission’s role as a regulator of the sector when taken in the round.
If after a certain time cases were automatically to proceed to court without the consent of the Charity Commission, we would be concerned about the potential for court time and costs being spent on unnecessary or meritless claims. There is also the issue of cases where the Charity Commission has not received enough information to make a decision, which often happens with such requests, and further information or advice may also be sought by the commission following legal referrals. We are therefore apprehensive about the implementation of the 60-day time limit proposed and would invite the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment too, but we have heard the points of concern which have been raised and will of course reflect further on them.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
I thank the Minister for responding to the points that I read out on behalf of the noble and learned Lord. The gist of his response, as far as I understood it, was that he was not aware of any particular issues, and internal processes could be adapted to meet this problem. I too have spoken to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, in the past couple of days. He said to me that he thought it was self-evident that there was a problem. He will no doubt read the Minister’s response with interest and the various reasons for which the Charity Commission is resisting this amendment. If more evidence is readily available, I am sure he will bring it to the Minister’s attention. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for that clarification. I understand her point: she does not want a “never-ending prevarication”, to use her words. I will draw her question to the attention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, so that he can respond to her.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts for tabling this amendment and the other noble Lords who put their names to it. As the Committee knows, when we responded to the Law Commission’s report in March the Government rejected the recommendation that the Charity Commission should be able to make a reference to the charity tribunal without first having to get consent from the Attorney-General.
Having noted the oral and written evidence taken by the Committee, we remain of the view that the Attorney-General’s consent function represents an important check in the system. As the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, noted, the evidence received by the Committee underlines the difference of opinion that exists among experts with regard to the Attorney-General’s consent requirement for references to the tribunal. This difference strengthened our conviction that the role of the Attorney-General as the constitutional protector of charities is important, and that this is a different role from the regulatory function of the Charity Commission. It is a mechanism that we feel must be protected.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston for her support for the Bill. Indeed, this is a Bill that she advocated during her time as chair of the Charity Commission. She is right to point to the excellent work it does in this important sector, but we see this mechanism as not an obstacle for the Charity Commission but rather a safeguard for it. The mechanism is already narrowly drawn, and a second opinion prior to the tribunal can help filter out claims that are not in the public interest before they burden the tribunal and, potentially, the charity in question if applicable to that case.
The Charity Commission may refer to the tribunal questions that have arisen in connection with the exercise of its functions which involve the operation of charity law or its application to a particular state of affairs. The requirement for the Attorney-General’s consent reinforces this approach.
The Charity Commission has an array of statutory functions, the vast majority of which it performs without the involvement of the Attorney-General. The two referrals that have been made to the tribunal followed close discussions between the Charity Commission and the Attorney-General, where both agreed that it was in the public interest to proceed. The Attorney-General’s consent function does not undermine the regulator’s role; rather, it supports and complements it by ensuring that referrals are made to the tribunal only where there is a clear public interest in doing so. That is why the Government cannot support the amendment and why I hope my noble friend will withdraw it.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for his Amendment 6, which proposes a time limit of 60 days for the Attorney-General to make a decision on applications for references to the tribunal. Imposing a 60-day time limit on that decision to give or withhold consent is a suggestion that requires due consideration.
The perceived delay in the most recent case, on the Royal Albert Hall, was due to the particularly complex nature of that case, which can often be the nature of such references. The Royal Albert Hall case was a matter for the Charity Commission and the Attorney-General. The Government support the role of the Attorney-General in making references, given that the Attorney-General values the importance of charity and her role as protector of charities. I recognise the amount of time taken to reach a decision in that case, but it was a very complex issue, illustrated perhaps by the length at which my noble friend set it out. I am glad that the case has now been concluded, and the Attorney-General continues to be grateful for the excellent work the Charity Commission does in regulating charities in England and Wales.
Baroness Barker (LD)
I am sorry, but this is getting a bit Jarndyce v Jarndyce. That case has not been concluded. There has been no clarification on that point of charity law. That is the problem.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
I am sorry, I should have said that I am glad that the long saga to which my noble friend referred has come to an end, but these are complex issues. We do not think we should give too much prominence to one case, long and complex though it may be. We do not think we should look to legislate to remove what is an important check and balance in the system on the basis of the evidence from that unique case, but I have heard the points of concern raised by noble Lords not just today but throughout our consideration of this Bill. We will certainly take away Amendment 6 from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, to consider it further ahead of Report, but I repeat that I hope my noble friend Lord Hodgson will withdraw Amendment 5.
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Stowell and Lady Barker, for supporting my amendment and for their powerful interventions. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. He spoke on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, who was kind enough to speak to me over the weekend about his proposal.
Somebody said that the art of the diplomat is to create ladders down which people can climb. With respect to the noble and learned Lord, it seems to me that the law’s gain has been diplomacy’s loss, because a very elegant ladder has been presented to us here. The Attorney-General preserves his power but he accepts restrictions to it of the sort described by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby; namely, the 60-day limit—we will possibly need some clarification on that along the lines of what my noble friend Lady Stowell referred to—and on the comprehensive statement referred to in the second part of Amendment 6. When the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and I discussed this, we noted that it was very important that “not in the public interest” could not be an explanation, because that took us back to where we are now. If the Minister accepts this, we will certainly want to explore with him exactly what a comprehensive statement would mean and how it would work.
I understand and think this is a very elegant mid-way, but it is half a loaf and not full-fat milk, if I may change the analogy. It does not address the central problem of a divided command and the fact that the Charity Commission is beholden to the Attorney-General. The Minister slightly reminds me of one of those subalterns on the Western Front in the First World War. He is in a very desperate position and has sent a message back to the chateau behind the lines saying, “It is pretty tricky out here.” They say, “No, no. You stay there and hold the position to the last man.”
I will pick up just a couple of the things the Minister said, but I will not detain the Committee long. He said that the issue of the Attorney-General did not really affect many of the commission’s objectives. That is not true. The commission’s objectives concern: first, public confidence, which is affected here; secondly, public benefit, which relates to the public schools case; thirdly, compliance, which relates to the Royal Albert Hall case; and, fourthly and fifthly, charitable authorities and accountability. I would argue that in at least three—possibly three and a half—of those, the Attorney-General would take an active interest in points referred to as a result.
I understand the second point about the Royal Albert Hall case being particularly complex, but every one of these cases will be complex. Cases on public schools, religion and poverty will be extremely complex and complicated. None of the things that will rise to the top in respect of the Charity Commission’s position will be easy, because they are difficult moral questions affecting all sorts of views about public values and the way our society operates. I therefore do not accept that the Royal Albert Hall case was particularly complex.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said, four and a half years in, we do not have a decision. Is it a conflict to profit from the management of an organisation of which you are a trustee and so profit from the decisions you make? Should that be allowed? Since April 2017, the Charity Commission has been waiting to resolve that and the Royal Albert Hall is sailing on unaffected. Maybe that is right and reflects what the tribunal would find, but surely we need to get this resolved, in fairness to the Charity Commission and the sector.
I have gone on long enough today. This is an issue which remains thoroughly unsatisfactory in every way. We are a small group here today and I am not a member of the committee. I will withdraw the amendment, but I serve notice to the Minister that I reserve the right to bring it back when we come to the next stage of the Bill. I also look forward to hearing further about what the Government propose to do in response to the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly on this amendment. I am assuming I have understood it correctly—do not look at me like that, Lord Ponsonby! If I have, the amendment seeks to introduce a right of appeal to trustees, after they have arrived at a resolution on a decision. Under the proposals from the Law Commission, it requires that they go to the Charity Commission for formal approval or refusal. If I understand it, this amendment perpetuates the appeals process. That is in contrast to the Law Commission’s proposal, which is that, at the point that the approval is sought from the Charity Commission on a decision reached by the trustees, it is final. This introduces an extra level of appeal.
I offer a few thoughts on this because, quite often with smaller charities—we are talking about small amounts of money here—the underlying problem is a dispute between trustees. A lot of the commission’s time can be eaten up by disputes between trustees over quite small matters. The Law Commission was trying to remove that or force trustees, on these modest matters, to arrive at a decision on their own and take responsibility in the way they are required to and not, therefore, to allow an ongoing battle.
My fear is that if this appeal process is brought in, it would lend itself to those trustees who will never ever give up. That is why I caution against the amendment. I understand the intention behind it and it is of course well-intentioned, but it brings with it a burden that it might not have meant to. I counsel against it.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, for tabling Amendment 7, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for moving it, and those who raised this issue in the written and oral evidence that the Committee heard. By way of background, new Section 280A will create a new power for unincorporated charities to amend any provision in their governing documents. This brings the amendment powers available for unincorporated charities more in line with those for incorporated charities, supporting the Bill’s policy to create greater consistency for different legal forms of charities. In a similar vein, charitable incorporated organisations and charitable companies both have the right to appeal a decision by the Charity Commission to give or withhold consent to a request to make a regulated alteration to their governing documents.
Lord Bellingham (Con)
The Minister talked about appeal to the Charity Commission. One of the matters the Committee looked at in some detail was the time it took for those appeals to get processed and transacted. He said that he would look at that matter and at some stage report back to the Committee on how he feels we could improve the whole process and speed it up.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
I will come to that point.
In addition, new Section 280A repeals and replaces some sections that already carry a right of appeal in respect of Charity Commission decisions, namely Sections 268 and 265. It is therefore clear why the suggestion to give a similar appeal right to unincorporated charities has been put forward in respect of new Section 280A. However, making provision for a right of appeal for Charity Commission decisions under new Section 280A would, first, give unincorporated charities greater appeal rights than companies and charitable incorporated organisations as there are more types of regulated amendment and, secondly, expand unincorporated charities’ existing appeal rights under Schedule 6. Therefore, this is not a simple amendment to agree to and requires further consideration.
A different policy consideration is required for new Section 67A, inserted by Clause 7. Under new Section 67A, trustees will now be able to apply funds from a failed or surplus fundraising appeal for new purposes without Charity Commission consent unless the funds exceed £1,000. This modernises the regime and changes the nature of the Charity Commission’s jurisdiction in failed or surplus fundraising appeal cases.
In cases where Charity Commission consent is required, under this amendment an appeal to the tribunal would be possible if the commission refuses consent. Under the current framework, the commission may be asked to make a scheme to apply fundraising money for similar purposes. A decision not to make a scheme is not currently appealable to the tribunal.
Although it is appropriate for the commission to have a level of regulatory oversight for failed or surplus fundraising appeals being spent on different purposes, the context is different compared with the changing of a charity’s purposes. The general regulatory experience of the Charity Commission demonstrates that fundraising appeal cases are often contentious areas but lower risk in relation to the issues seen in the sector.
Internal charity disputes might occur where there is a disagreement over how money from a failed or surplus fundraising appeal should be used. As is often the case with disagreements, any result decided by the Charity Commission on how those funds should be used might result in one disgruntled party. Making a decision of the commission in relation to a trustees’ resolution under new Section 67A appealable to the tribunal might therefore open the commission up to challenge, time and cost in a way not commensurate to the benefit or risks. The most appropriate avenue of challenge in respect of these Charity Commission decisions might therefore be judicial review, which would be the default position if no new appeal right was listed in Schedule 6.
I would therefore like to take Amendment 7, in relation to the expansion of Schedule 6 appeal rights to cover new Sections 67A and 280A, away to give some more thought to the policy behind these proposed changes and their potential implications. I hope that, while we do, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, will be willing to withdraw the amendment he moved on behalf of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton.
“(1) The Charities Act 2011 is amended as follows.(1A) In section 337 (other provisions as to orders of Commission)—”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential upon the amendment at page 28, line 31.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 8 to 12 in my name. I informed the Committee of these amendments at a private meeting on 20 October and wrote to the Committee following that meeting on 8 November. I will place a copy of that letter in the Library so that noble Lords who are not members of the Committee can see it.
I will speak first to Amendments 8 to 11, all of which are related. They make minor and technical changes to Sections 337 and 338 of the Charities Act 2011 to ensure that the policy intention of the Bill is achieved and that there is no misinterpretation of the law. Before this Committee started gathering evidence, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, met the Law Commission to discuss the Bill. During that meeting, he raised the issue that Amendments 8 to 11 address. We are grateful that he did so as it has enabled us to work with the Law Commission and the Charity Commission to bring forward these amendments to clarify the position.
Section 337 of the Charities Act 2011 currently gives the Charity Commission a discretionary power to give public notice or require public notice to be given when it makes an order under the Act. The Bill expands that discretionary power so that the Charity Commission can give public notice or require public notice to be given when it provides written consent under certain provisions of the Act. For example, where the Charity Commission is required to consent to the amendment of a charity’s purposes under new Section 280A, the Charity Commission could require the charity to give notice of its proposed change and invite comments from the public. The policy intention is that this public notice requirement may occur before the Charity Commission gives its consent so that it can consider any comments from the public when making its decision.
In its current form, the Bill does not make this as clear as it could be. Amendments 8 to 11 would make sure that this is expressed as clearly as possible. It is important to note that these amendments do not represent any change in the policy of the Bill or the Charities Act 2011; they are simply minor and technical clarifications to remove any chance of misinterpretation in these provisions. Once again, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, and the Committee for bringing this to our attention.
Amendment 12 would insert a new provision in Schedule 2 to the Bill, making a consequential amendment to the Cathedrals Measure 2021. That consequential amendment is considered appropriate as a result of the provisions in Clauses 10 and 12. Clause 10 makes changes to Section 282 of the Charities Act 2011, which allows charities to release permanent endowment, while Clause 12 creates a new power at Section 284A of that Act to allow charities to borrow from their permanent endowment, with thresholds set on the amount that can borrowed and the timeframe for paying those funds back.
We have been made aware that these provisions may circumvent the intentions of the Cathedrals Measure 2021, which was passed in April this year. That measure provides financial controls in relation to Church of England cathedrals and the funds held by such organisations. It also provides for cathedrals to be jointly regulated by the Church Commissioners and the Charity Commission. After seeing the provisions in the Charities Bill allowing charities to use their permanent endowment more flexibly, the Church Commissioners approached the Government and asked to make an amendment to place an additional safeguard in these two clauses on the use of these powers by Church of England cathedrals to resolve the potential inconsistency that would otherwise arise between the frameworks established in the two pieces of legislation.
Amendment 12 therefore provides that Church of England cathedrals must also seek the consent of the Church Commissioners when seeking to use the powers in relation to Clauses 10 and 12 to make use of their permanent endowment. As such, this amendment is in line with the wider arrangements already in place for the regulation of Church of England cathedrals’ funds, which includes the oversight of both the Charity Commission and the Church Commissioners. The Church of England has made it clear that it considers there to be advantages in maintaining the financial safeguards that were put in place by the Cathedrals Measure 2021, which sets out a regulatory framework that protects the valuable assets of Church of England cathedrals. We do not wish for the Charities Bill to undermine those safeguards.
I hope noble Lords will agree that Amendment 12 is appropriate to ensure consistency between the framework established by the Cathedrals Measure and that of wider charity law, and to ensure appropriate continued oversight in the regulation of Church of England cathedrals. I beg to move.
“(a) after subsection (2) insert—“(2A) Where an application is made for an order under this Act or the Commission proposes to make such an order, the Commission—(a) may itself give such public notice as it thinks fit of the contents of the order applied for or proposed to be made, or(b) may require it to be given by—(i) any person making an application for the order, or(ii) any charity that would be affected by the order.”;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment makes provision for public notice of the contents of an order applied for or as proposed to be made, including provision enabling the Charity Commission to require another to give public notice.
“19A_ In section 24 of the Cathedrals Measure 2021 (No. 2) (investment powers, etc), after subsection (7) insert—“(7A) The members of the Chapter of a cathedral may not pass a resolution under—(a) section 282 of the Charities Act 2011 (resolution to spend larger fund), or(b) section 284A of that Act (power to borrow from permanent endowment),unless the Chapter has obtained the consent of the Church Commissioners.””Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment of the Cathedrals Measure 2021 relates to clauses 10 and 12 and requires a cathedral chapter to secure the consent of the Church Commissioners before resolving under section 282 to spend part of a larger endowment fund or under section 284A to borrow from permanent endowment, as a chapter must for similar matters under that Measure.