Government Debt

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Wednesday 16th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to reduce the £110 billion annual interest bill for servicing Government debt.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Lord Pitt-Watson) (Lab)]

My Lords, this Question about the Government’s interest bill is a really good one: £1 in every £10 of government money is now spent paying interest. There are three elements causing this. One is the overall level of borrowing, and consistent, disciplined fiscal rules that are kept to are, we believe, the right answer. There is also the growth in global interest rates, for example following quantitative easing. We are also living in an extremely uncertain world, particularly in the Persian Gulf. The third element is the premium that the UK now pays over the G7 average—a premium that has been apparent since September 2022. Again, the best remedy for that is sustained fiscal discipline, including respecting the independence of the Bank of England in particular and, of course, the Office for Budget Responsibility.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, as most of us agreed in my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley’s debate last week, we need to be honest about the trade-offs that we face, given the sheer scale of our national debt and the moron premium on our gilts, which the Minister mentioned. I believe that the only way to avoid a financial crisis is to reduce spending. Does the Minister agree?

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

Overall fiscal discipline is the central question. Discipline is really important. The noble Baroness mentioned the moron premium. I do not know whether all noble Lords understand what that term refers to: it was a slight by an economist describing the behaviour of the team responsible for the September 2022 mini-Budget. To give a sense of the cost, it is £15 billion a year. I think we have learned lessons from that. When I spoke in the debate last week, speakers from across the House agreed that fiscal discipline, independent oversight and not moving the goalposts were critical. The balance of spending on tax might be something on which we disagree, but on fiscal discipline we agree entirely.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

3rd reading
Tuesday 15th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, as this is Third Reading, I want to start by extending my warm thanks to the Minister and his team for their work on the Bill. I welcome the movement that the Government have shown on several of the issues that we have raised during the passage of this 137-page Bill, which in general we support.

Chief among them is proportionality, which will continue to apply to the regulators in the exercise of their day-to-day functions. That change reflects concerns on all sides of the House; my hope is that it will help to reduce the burden on SMEs, so I thank the Minister for this. I also welcome the movement we have seen on the important issue of financial education and look forward to engaging on that. It is becoming ever more important, whether you are a pupil, a student applying for a loan, or an adult managing your finances or thinking about retirement.

However, there remain important issues which the Government have not yet addressed sufficiently. Among them are the Henry VIII powers in Clause 3 and Clause 50 and the first use of the extensive new powers in the Bill. I understand the Government intend to reintroduce Clause 3 at a later stage in the Bill’s passage with further detail, and that is welcome, but it does not detract from the fundamental point at issue. One of Parliament’s principal functions is to scrutinise government legislation, and we simply cannot do so properly when Bills confer broad powers without setting out clearly how they are to be used.

A digital asset strategy to support faster action to stop further loss of digital entrepreneurs and less aggressive use of Section 166 are two areas where we believe the Government should go further, because we have heard consistent concerns from industry.

Turning to the amendments, I deeply regret the amendments the Government are introducing today on climate change. This represents a serious U-turn by the Government. Their original proposal was to move these considerations into five-year strategies. The existing requirements they dispensed with are largely superfluous and burdensome. There is little evidence that today’s amendments to restore them make any meaningful contribution, either to reducing climate change or to protecting the environment. At a time when businesses are already facing considerable pressure, and when our wider economic circumstances demand an unrelenting focus on growth, competitiveness and investment, imposing further needless regulatory burdens is the wrong direction of travel.

I would also suggest that, for an economy as dependent as ours on international investment, these amendments send entirely the wrong signal. We should be demonstrating to investors overseas that the UK is a predictable and attractive market. Instead, they reinforce the perception that doing business here means ever more regulation, additional cost and greater complexity for no clear practical benefit. At Second Reading, the then-Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, who I am glad to see in his place, said that the purpose of the Bill was to

“modernise how the sector is regulated”

and

“enable it to grow”.—[Official Report, 8/6/26; col. 1146.]

These amendments seem to run directly contrary to that objective. I am deeply disappointed that the Government have abandoned that principle so quickly and with so little resistance. We on these Benches have been consistent in our opposition to this duty, which we have made clear in the House and in discussions with the Minister. I shall seek to divide the House when the amendments are called.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I think there is wide agreement that finance is essential for the running of our economy and that we want the British finance industry to be as successful as possible. I think that few of us would think that climate finance was not one of the most important areas to which the industry needs to contribute. I think all of us would feel proud that our country, particularly London, is rated as the number one centre of green finance in the world.

I understand the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, wanting to minimise regulation and thinking that this might be superfluous, but I note that climate is everywhere in the financial world. Why? It is because you are managing other people’s money. How does a fund manager, possibly with millions of people’s savings, think about appropriate investment? If you are responsible for the stewardship of a company, what is the sensible line to take in making sure it is as profitable as it can be but without risking the sustainability of the world? If you are an investment banker and somebody is issuing a bond, is it fair for it to be a green bond? Are you thinking about the reporting on the Stock Exchange? Should you have taken into account that the carbon assets you have will need to be written off and you will need to have a fund and tell your investors about that? Are you interested in impact investment? We were talking a lot about deforestation. How is it that we manage to get private money into deforestation? The noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, talked about insurance. Even in operations, look at the sort of thing that Bloomberg has done; all its electricity is now zero carbon. There is lots of stuff, and the UK is a leader. It is a growing area, and we should be proud of that.

Does regulation make a difference to this? That is a good question. If you were to look at the UK’s regulation on this and compare it with that of the United States—London versus New York—you would be in no doubt which was the better for promoting green finance. Frankly, I do not know of many financiers who would say that the United States now has more predictable regulation than we have in the United Kingdom. You could say that the regulator is already doing enough. Although I cannot respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, by having a national conversation, I did organise the FCA to do a drop-in to talk to noble Lords about what it was doing in this area. Every noble Lord I talked to afterwards thought that it would be a mistake to withdraw the “have regard” and that therefore this amendment was the right thing to do.

Whether noble Lords believe in the importance of climate and environmental issues or whether they want to be sure that Britain maintains its USP in this critical area of finance, I urge them to vote for these amendments.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Report stage
Wednesday 9th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, we have a lot to cover today, so I will be brief.

We do not believe that imposing additional reporting duties, transition plan requirements and regulatory processes on financial services firms is the right way to address the concerns that have been addressed in these amendments this evening. One of the merits of the Bill is the way it cuts out needless and repetitive operational requirements on financial services firms and regulators and instead introduces a more effective approach based on five-year strategies. As we heard on Monday, stakeholders’ views will be sought in the course of establishing those strategies. Of course, climate change and environmental objectives already remain an important statutory regulatory principle, intended to contribute to the UK’s net-zero target under the Climate Change Act and to the environmental targets established under the Environment Act.

However, requiring banks, other financial institutions and the regulators themselves to fill in forms, tick boxes and produce more and more reports about climate change will not have a meaningful effect on global temperatures; it will simply add costs. We need a regulatory environment which supports growth, enterprise and investment. That means cutting down on the red tape and extra requirements that are putting our international competitiveness at risk. These amendments would add a further layer of process and obligation without a sufficiently clear demonstration that the burdens would advance the environmental objectives being pursued.

This is a time when we should be seeking to streamline regulations and be careful about new requirements, however well-intentioned, because of the need to get the economic growth that we lack. These amendments risk taking us a step backwards, so we cannot support them and will be voting against them if noble Lords press them to a vote.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Lord Pitt-Watson) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for these amendments and for the wider debate on sustainable finance and adapting to climate change. These amendments address a number of important issues: climate transition planning, tackling deforestation, how the regulators consider climate risk and the products commonly known as green mortgages. As several noble Lords have argued today, both climate-related and nature-related risks can have significant implications for the economy, for financial markets and their ability to deliver for customers, and for long-term prosperity.

As many noble Lords may know, it is a topic close to my heart, including through my past chairing of the United Nations Environment Programme’s Finance Initiative at the Paris climate talks. UNEPFI is a voluntary organisation of more than 500 financial organisations from the North and the South, with funds of more than £100 trillion under management. It has established some of the world’s foremost sustainability frameworks for finance, including involvement with the REDD+ project, reducing emissions from deforestation in degradation, which I believe is now preserving many millions of square miles of forest.

I share the underlying objectives behind these amendments. The question before us is, therefore, not whether action is needed but how best to deliver that action in a way that is effective, proportionate and aligned with the wider framework we are putting in place.

Let me come to Amendments 34 and 55, which raise important points regarding how the regulators consider and report on climate and environment-related issues. I have spoken to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and members of Peers for the Planet throughout the week on this important issue. I also hosted a drop-in session for Peers with the FCA. During that session, I heard a number of concerns about the absence of climate and environmental targets have-regard operating at a day-to-day level, and I have, of course, heard the issues raised in this debate today.

While I still believe that there is significant value in streamlining the regulators’ have-regards, I appreciate that it is important that the regulators continue to focus on the vital issue of the sector’s contribution to climate change at a day-to-day level, and I appreciate the importance of regular reporting on this issue to aid parliamentary scrutiny. While I cannot do anything today, I am prepared to return to this issue at Third Reading and would be prepared and undertake to table amendments to Clause 17 that would require the PRA and FCA to continue to consider their existing climate change and environmental targets have-regard at a day-to-day level and to maintain appropriate notification and reporting requirements.

Amendments 34 and 55 introduce a new have-regard and reporting requirement on climate-related financial stability issues. I therefore ask the noble Baronesses, Lady Northover and Lady Hayman, not to press Amendments 34 and 55 on that basis, and I will return at Third Reading with the amendments I have described.

Amendment 65 concerns transition plan requirements. The Government remain committed to this area. We consulted in 2025 on options for implementing transition plan requirements and are considering responses alongside wider work on sustainability and corporate reporting reform. In February, we finalised the UK sustainability reporting standards for voluntary use. The FCA has also consulted on aligning listed company disclosure requirements with these standards. The FCA aims to publish final rules this autumn with requirements expected to take effect from January 2027. This amendment would place a statutory timetable on an area where policy development remains under active consideration across government. We believe in the importance of finalising this work before imposing an arbitrary road map.

On Amendments 90 and 97A, I recognise the strength of feeling on deforestation and agree that urgent action is needed. I am therefore pleased to report that this work is moving forward. As the noble Baroness, Lady Young, said, Defra has confirmed that they will consult later this year on Great Britain’s approach to tackling deforestation in domestic supply chains and the next steps for the forest risk commodities regime. My officials have spoken to Defra, which has confirmed that it plans to consult during the autumn and that legislation will be delivered in 2027. The responsibility for enforcing the regime will be determined by Defra when it designs the regulations.

We share the objective of progress being made as quickly as possible. However, a six-month statutory deadline risks prioritising speed over effectiveness. The Government believe the better approach is to ensure that any resulting regime is robust, proportionate and capable of decoupling supply chains from global deforestation. The Government have already committed, through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, to review the regulatory framework for tackling deforestation-linked finance within nine months of Defra’s legislation on domestic supply chains. Furthermore, the principle that I committed to reapply today to day-to-day activities also explicitly covers consideration of environmental targets in the Environment Act 2021, so this will remain part of the regulators’ day-to-day work.

On Amendment 91, the Government support high-quality green mortgage products that can help households to finance energy efficiency improvements and improve resilience to climate-related risks. However, the amendment risks duplicating efforts by regulators, departments and existing frameworks. FCA rules already require clear disclosure and the FCA is considering disclosure further through its mortgage rule review. The Green Home Finance Strategic Partnership also has a dedicated working group focused on consumer protection and standards. With over 90 green mortgage products now available compared with fewer than 10 in 2019, the Government consider that imposing a statutory timetable would be premature while policy and the market continue to develop. The current approach provides the flexibility to develop clear, proportionate standards while maintaining consumer protections.

In conclusion, the Government support the objectives that sit behind these amendments. We have listened to the House and will, at Third Reading, table amendments to Clause 17 requiring the PRA and FCA to continue to consider that their existing climate change and environmental targets have regard at a day-to-day level and to maintain appropriate notification and reporting requirements. More broadly, we support credible transition planning. We support action to address deforestation and forest risk commodities, and we support the development of high-quality green mortgages. The Government are already taking forward substantial work in these areas and will continue to do so in a co-ordinated and proportionate way. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, we welcome the Government’s decision to retain proportionality as an express statutory consideration for both the FCA and the PRA when they exercise their general functions. This responds to productive discussions in and outside Committee, for which I thank the Minister and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, who I am delighted to welcome back to the discussion of the Bill, and I thank him for his efforts to improve it. I also thank my noble friend Lady Noakes, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for their constructive and flexible approach to the substantial problems on these clauses.

Time and again, one of the concerns we hear from business is that regulation can be disproportionate to the risk it is intended to address. That is particularly true for the small and medium-sized firms that we rely on so heavily for competition, innovation and economic growth, right across this country. The proportionality changes help to address this and we will not therefore be pressing our Amendment 62 on SMEs to a vote—even though it is my favourite amendment and I have the support of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is right to focus on lending to small defence companies as well.

The requirement for the FCA and PRA to explain in their annual reports how they have taken these proportionality principles into account, alongside the requirements relating to consultation and parliamentary committees, creates an important mechanism through which Parliament can examine whether the principle is actually being applied in practice, with concrete examples, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, suggested. This is important because the ultimate test of these amendments will not simply be whether “proportionality” appears in statute. It will be whether firms see a genuine difference in the way regulation is developed and applied, particularly by the regulators. We hope that the Government’s amendments will prove to be a meaningful mechanism through which regulation can become easier to comply with, less costly and ultimately more successful in achieving the objectives that Parliament has set for the regulators—of course, the proof will be in their implementation.

The Government have listened to concerns raised during the passage of the Bill and we support the amendments that the Minister has tabled in response. This is good House of Lords practice. Like my noble friend Lady Noakes, I do not intend to pursue the other amendments today.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for this debate. I hope it demonstrates that the Government have listened carefully to the arguments made by noble Lords during Committee and recognise the strength of feeling and the logic around addressing Clause 17. In Committee, noble Lords made it clear that they had concerns with that clause, which removes the requirement to consider regulatory principles each time they exercise a general function in favour of considering them just at a strategic level. These points were made particularly strongly with regard to proportionality; in response, we have tabled Amendments 37 and 43 in my name. These amendments will ensure that the two proportionality regulatory principles will continue to apply to the regulators’ day-to-day actions.

There was also a rich debate in Committee about the different facets of proportionality and the factors that regulators should consider. Here, again, the Government have listened. Amendment 44 makes changes to the existing principles to explicitly include that the regulators should recognise the differing abilities of firms to engage and comply with regulation owing to their size—a point raised by both the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. This means that regulators will need to consider the specific impact of their proposals on SMEs.

It was also clear that a number of noble Lords had concerns about the possible effects of Clause 17 on Parliament’s ability to effectively scrutinise the regulators. In response, Amendments 40 and 46 to 50 will ensure that existing reporting requirements on the proportionality regulatory principles will remain in place, including as part of the consultation on annual reports. The Government are therefore retaining the majority of existing transparency and reporting requirements, including through panel reports, consultation requirements and annual reports.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, this is an important and forward-looking group of amendments, covering open finance, digital market infrastructure and the future of digital assets. I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond for his amendments, and for explaining the scale of the digital tide and the AI wave and the lack of specific signals in the Bill on these opportunities.

I will focus my remarks on Amendment 88, standing in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Altrincham and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who I thank for her support. We debated these issues in Committee, but the central concern remains. Digital assets are becoming an accelerating part of our financial and economic landscape, yet policy is still developing too often issue by issue, product by product and regulator by regulator.

What is missing is a comprehensive strategy. This matters. Industry is telling us that the most basic building blocks of a comprehensive regulatory regime, such as legal definitions, do not exist. This uncertainty is translating into a lack of confidence, which is driving wealth creators away.

Amendment 88 asks the Treasury to step back and set out a coherent strategy for the regulation and development of digital assets and related financial market infrastructure in the UK. It asks the Treasury to establish its objectives, consult properly with industry and other interested parties, and explain how the different strands of policy fit together. This can build on the work of the Bank of England and of Chris Woolard, the new Wholesale Digital Markets Champion at the Treasury. We are most grateful for yesterday’s briefing, at which Chris set out his forthcoming plans for another report due to be published next year.

The opportunity for the UK is considerable. We have the legal system, deep capital markets and an extensive professional services ecosystem, but firms need to know which regulator is responsible for which part of the system, what rules will apply, how different regimes will interact, and how quickly decisions will be made. We are seeing the effects of current ambiguity in reports of firms wishing to offer digital asset products being debanked, a point to which my amendment refers.

Other financial centres are moving rapidly to establish their own frameworks for digital assets and tokenised markets, as my noble friend Lord Ranger explained from his position of great expertise. If businesses conclude that another jurisdiction offers greater regulatory certainty or a clearer strategic direction, they can quickly go elsewhere.

Amendment 88 therefore offers the Government an opportunity to bring those different strands together. The work of Chris Woolard is welcome, but our amendment encompasses a wider range of concerns raised with us. I hope the Government will engage with the amendment, but if I am not satisfied with the Minister’s response I will seek to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lady Kramer, and the noble Lords, Lord Altrincham and Lord Holmes, for their amendments relating to the adoption of technology in the financial services sector and for their contributions to this debate. Technological change is already having a significant impact on the sector and there are huge opportunities for the UK alongside risks to be managed.

Amendment 71 seeks to require the FCA to create and maintain a framework for open finance. However, the Government already have powers to create a framework for open finance under the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. Parliament has therefore already legislated here, and that legislation includes the power to require the FCA to regulate for open finance and includes appropriate safeguards and scrutiny. The Treasury also confirmed at Mansion House in July 2026 its commitment to open finance and said it will consult on open finance next year.

Amendments 88 and 89 are both focused on digitalisation. Amendment 88 seeks to support the UK’s approach to digital assets by requiring the Government to publish a digital assets strategy. It sets out a number of important issues that such a strategy should consider. Amendment 89 similarly seeks to support digitalisation by requiring the Government to make regulations establishing an issuer digitalisation council, composed of representatives from issuers, intermediaries, the FCA, the PRA, the Bank of England and the Treasury.

As noted in the debate in Committee, the Government strongly support digital assets and see them as a key strategic priority. As such, the Government have been very active on this agenda and have a comprehensive strategy to drive forward the digitalisation of wholesale markets through the wholesale financial markets digital strategy published in July 2025. The Government have been taking forward the actions of the strategy at speed. There has been progress even since this issue was debated in Committee.

Chris Woolard CBE published his first report as the Government’s Wholesale Digital Markets Champion in July, setting out a comprehensive cross-sector approach to digital assets. The Economic Secretary to the Treasury and I hosted a drop-in session with Mr Woolard here in Parliament just yesterday so that Members of your Lordships’ House could hear more about his agenda. I think those noble Lords who were there would agree that we should be impressed by the scope and comprehensiveness of the work he is doing.

Mr Woolard outlined not one workstream but nine taskforce action groups that are taking forward the industry road map, including an action group focused on the primary issuance of digital securities, and with an initial focus on delivering an end-to-end use case. These groups and the overarching orchestration group represent a huge amount of work, expertise and industry input that Chris is leading. They include the industry, a strategy and 50 companies, to be joined by the head of Europe from BlackRock and the London Stock Exchange. It is absolutely great work, as the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, said.

At that meeting, Chris Woolard was asked whether there was any need for further primary legislation. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, was at the meeting and can confirm that he said that right now, he did not think there was. He could also confirm that I said that, should there be that need, I and the Economic Secretary to the Treasury would be listening to that. There will be a real threat to UK competitiveness if we fail to act in this area, and a considerable opportunity if we get it right. I hope that the opportunity to engage Mr Woolard prior to this debate gave insight into the vast amount of constructive work that is already taking place to make sure that this happens.

There are many other actions being taken to support this work, such as the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority’s call for input on tokenisation, which closed in July. They intend to publish a further road map in the autumn. In noble Lords’ speeches, I heard that they want momentum and a strategy involving industry. That is what is happening right now. The Government also highlighted progress on the digital securities sandbox, the digital gilt instrument, in Committee.

The Government strongly believe in the need to digitalise financial markets, and I hope that the measures the Government are taking forward and the further updates that noble Lords received from Chris Woolard, as wholesale digital markets champion, show that the Government are working with the sector and the regulators to deliver a strategic approach to digitalisation—

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[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 98 would remove the consequential power contained in Clause 50. The Government understand the concern that delegated powers should be used appropriately and should not become a vehicle for making substantive policy changes without parliamentary scrutiny. Indeed, I think that, on Monday, in response to issues to do with Henry VIII powers, I gave some sympathy to that argument. However, the power in Clause 50 is not a power to introduce new policy, nor is it a power to revisit the policy that Parliament will have approved by passage of the Bill; it is a narrow, regulation-making power limited to dealing with matters that arise as a consequence of the provision that Parliament has already approved within the Bill.

It is common and often necessary for legislation of this scale and complexity to require consequential adjustments elsewhere on the statute book, so that provisions operate as intended. Without such a power, relatively minor or technical changes would require further primary legislation, creating unnecessary delay and complexity. For these reasons, the Government do not believe that removing this clause would improve the Bill. I would also note that this was not a point raised by the Delegated Powers Committee about the Bill.

Finally, I assure the noble Baroness that parliamentary committees will of course be able to call the Government to appear in front of them and account for the use of consequential power or, indeed, any other power in the Bill. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw this amendment.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, the fact is that Clause 50 gives Ministers a broad and potentially permanent power to amend or appeal primary legislation, including devolved legislation, without the full scrutiny afforded to a Bill. Unlike other Bills, this is a Bill with many new, unspecified powers, so I seek to test the opinion of the House.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Report stage
Monday 7th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, we are concerned about the scale of fraud, and in particular by the continued growth of authorised push payment fraud and other forms of online economic crime. The Government and the banks have made progress, but the truth is that it is hard to keep up with the scammers, and the sums at stake are significant, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has explained. I therefore strongly welcome the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for an annual report.

My noble friend Lord Howard of Rising is right to be concerned about the future protection of commercially sensitive information as part of a competitive UK sector. I am glad he has brought his amendment back, and I hope the Minister will be able to provide an assurance that this will be addressed.

The amendments in this group raise important questions about transparency, monitoring and the practical steps that firms can take to identify scams earlier, warn consumers, share information more effectively and pay compensation where that is appropriate. Indeed, there has been considerable progress since the APP reimbursement regime was introduced in 2024. I always remember my card being used in Korea to buy £2,500 worth of Louis Vuitton luggage. That would not happen today, as banking procedures and scrutiny are so much better.

However, the proposal from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is a difficult one, as it is not clear what the technology companies could do to stop fraud systematically. They are not passing money on in the same way as the banks do. That may have been what the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, was getting at in Committee when he responded to this amendment at that stage. New regulations of this kind could also have a chilling effect on the supply of online services in the UK, so more analysis is needed before the FCA introduces new rules. We believe this is an area where the Government and the regulators should be prepared to make progress, but we also understand the constraints.

It is also important that people learn to avoid scams with simple procedures such as face ID, and to take care over what they buy online. This should be an important part of education, and indeed Ofcom, working with the FCA and the tech companies, should be able to make more progress here. I very much look forward to the Minister’s response on this important area and how he thinks we can best address this problem.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, before I respond, I must start with a correction. In the third debate, I said that commercial credit data-sharing schemes improve bank referrals and strengthen personal lending. However, the CCDS and the bank referral scheme are different schemes. To correct the record, I meant that the Government are improving competition and supply through enhancements to commercial credit data sharing in this Bill and working with industry to strengthen bank referral arrangements. Both these schemes help to improve lending to SMEs. I apologise for that; I was speed-reading my way through my responses. I will try to be more careful in future.

I am grateful to the noble Baronesses and noble Lords for tabling these amendments and to all noble Lords who have contributed to this debate. On Amendment 17, fraud causes profound financial and emotional harm. As noble Lords know, this Government take the issue of fraud very seriously and are dedicated to protecting UK citizens. As my noble friend Lord Stockwood explained in Committee, the Online Safety Act requires tech companies to take proactive steps to prevent fraudulent content. The Government remain committed to ensuring that Ofcom makes full use of its powers to undertake fast and decisive action against illegal online harms, including fraud. At the request of the Secretary of State, Ofcom will share an annual update on its enforcement strategy for online safety with Parliament.

In July, Ofcom published the fraudulent advertising code consultation, proposing more than 40 new measures to tackle online fraud on the UK’s biggest digital services. Among these measures, Ofcom proposes the mandatory verification of financial services advertisers. This will support legitimate financial promotions from FCA-authorised firms while cracking down on illegal financial promotions such as scam investments and crypto ads.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by paying tribute to my noble friend Lady Noakes, to the Financial Services Regulation Committee, including the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley for their persistent pursuit of a very simple but important principle. As regulators gain more power and their remit expands, so too should the scope and effectiveness of the oversight to which they are subject.

My noble friend Lady Noakes powerfully articulated the concern that the FSMA model has been stretched too far and that even our expert parliamentary committees are struggling with the volume and complexity of oversight. We need stronger, not weaker, democratic accountability, which is why we saw value in the office of regulatory evaluation and/or my noble friend Lord Bridges’s original model tabled in Committee. We also share his concern about the dismantling of the Bank of England’s IEO.

This is an area where the Opposition will continue to develop our thinking for future legislation and would welcome engagement. We are not comfortable with a system whose reaction seems to be to delegate every new or persistent problem to our regulators. We are very pleased that my noble friend Lady Noakes will continue to work with the Treasury and the regulators on improving parliamentary oversight through the relevant committees, and we look forward to working with her and others across the House, including the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. What she has proposed represents a practical compromise that would allow us to move on. However, a positive response to Amendment 93 on first use of the new powers would also be important.

One practical way in which the accountability gap could be narrowed a little—and, indeed, trust in the FCA improved—would be to strengthen the remit of the cost-benefit analysis panels, which already sit within the regulators. Their remit could extend beyond rule changes to include guidance and enforcement activity. They could be given the ability to request an assessment of changes that the regulator has judged to be immaterial. This would strengthen internal challenge, improve confidence in the regulatory process and provide Parliament with more useful and more independent information. I have not brought back yet another amendment on this proposal, but I hope the Minister can commit to looking seriously at it as a follow-up to this useful debate.

I welcome the Government’s amendment on competitiveness and growth. I am only sorry that the name of the Financial Services Regulation Committee does not seem to have made its way into the statute.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I will not take up too much time because I responded to many of the points at the beginning of the debate. On the Independent Evaluation Office at the Bank of England, the Bank is committed to independent evaluation. It is strengthening the independence of the reviews that it commissions by moving to a model where it commissions external independent experts to lead the reviews.

I echo the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, in thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I should add—because we have a commitment from the FCA. If you want to be cynical about it, it may not be as fulsome a commitment as we might want, but it says that accountability, scrutiny and proportionality are central and it wants to support effective parliamentary scrutiny, which I think is where we are all coming from. I thank the noble Baroness and her committee for picking up the baton on this because we must all—Parliament and regulators, with the help of the Government where we can help—work together to have a regulatory environment that is effective and proportionate.

With that in mind, the Government do not think that at this stage further legislative amendments are helpful. I beg to move Amendment 31.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Report stage
Monday 7th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and my noble friends Lord Holmes and Lord Mackinlay, for reminding us of the value of post offices and the importance of banking hubs, especially in this ever-expanding digital world. There are serious issues here across the country.

I will speak to my Amendment 10, which would do a very simple thing: remove Clause 3 from the Bill. My argument for it is equally simple: Clause 3 contains no detail about what the Government intend to do. Instead, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, explained, it grants Ministers extraordinarily broad powers, including the power to amend primary legislation on access to banking.

Once the Richard Lloyd review has concluded, the Government may legislate for whatever they subsequently decide is necessary. That could include anything on banking services, with huge implications for consumers, banks, other financial services and the high street. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said, the Government will have the power to amend any Act of Parliament. That is a huge power grab by the Treasury and a very significant delegation of power to ask Parliament to approve in advance. We do not know what problems these powers will ultimately be used to address, what regulations the Government envisage making, or which Acts of Parliament they wish to amend. Yet Parliament is nevertheless now being asked to hand over the power to do all these things.

We should be very cautious about giving any Government powers of this breadth on the basis that they will decide later, in good faith, how they wish to use them. Parliament should not be asked to give Ministers carte blanche, particularly where the powers include the ability to amend primary legislation with minimal parliamentary scrutiny. That would set a terrible precedent.

The right course is straightforward: Clause 3 should come out. Once the Government have completed the review of access to banking and know what they wish to do, they can return to Parliament with legislation setting out the policy, the powers required to deliver it and the appropriate safeguards.

I am very grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Altmann, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and my noble friends Lord Massey, Lord Mackinlay and Lady Lawlor for supporting this amendment. The Minister has a problem: we have a lot of concern across this House, not only among those engaged on the Bill. The amendment reflects the concerns of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, with its very expert membership. The committee has also advised that Clause 3 be removed; I say to the Minister that that is usually a killer argument. For these reasons, I do not believe that Clause 3 can remain in the Bill. When Amendment 10 is called, I intend to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I am hearing two arguments here: a strong consensus across the House for the need for access to banking and for the appropriate actions to be taken to make sure that that takes place; and a concern, also raised in Committee, about the breadth of the power, particularly its constitutional implications and the degree of scrutiny that Parliament would be able to exercise over any regulations made under it. These are serious points and the Government have considered them seriously, but they have concluded that Clause 3 is needed at this stage. Because the independent Lloyd review of access to banking has not yet concluded, we do not know whether it will recommend intervention, which consumers may be most affected, the nature of any detriment, and what form any intervention should take. Removing Clause 3 altogether, as Amendment 10 would do, would risk leaving the Government without a mechanism in the Bill to respond promptly if the review identifies a focused and time-sensitive need for intervention.

Amendment 9 would remove the ability to amend primary legislation through regulations made under Clause 3. If acting on the review’s findings required changes to an Act of Parliament, removing this ability would risk removing the mechanism to respond promptly to the review and could delay implementation. Amendment 7 would take a different approach by limiting the powers to matters arising directly from the review. I understand the intention behind that amendment and the review should clearly play the central role in shaping any future intervention. That is why the Bill already requires the Treasury to have regard to the review’s recommendations, but it would not be right to prevent Ministers from considering other relevant evidence alongside the review when deciding whether and how to act. The Government need to preserve the ability to respond proportionately to the full evidence that is available.

Amendment 8 is probably one on which we all agree. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, talked about the central part that post offices can play in making sure that banking access is available. I can confirm that the chair of the review into access to banking services has received representations from and has engaged with the Post Office and the National Federation of SubPostmasters and that officials will continue to engage as part of the development. As noble Lords know, the target is more than 350 full banking hubs, plus 10,500 post offices, involved in this, and I thoroughly commend the points that they have made.

I absolutely understand the concerns about the Henry VIII powers, which seem very broad. Clause 3 does not itself impose new obligations on firms, or any specific model of banking provision. Any regulations under the power would also be subject to the affirmative procedure. However, I assure noble Lords that the Government do not expect Clause 3 to remain in its current form. I forget how the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said her hopes would be fulfilled, but I think they would be fulfilled by amendments that were focused on the thing that we all agree on, which is the need for proper access to banking for older people, for younger people—for everyone.

The Government remain committed to keeping the scope of the power under review as the independent review completes its work. We expect to narrow this power after the review reports in October, when I expect the Bill will be in the Commons. Once the Lloyd review has concluded, the Government will be in a better position to consider the correct scope of this power. It would therefore be premature to narrow the power at this stage. For those reasons, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment, though perhaps more in hope than expectation.

Overseas Prudential Requirements Regime (Credit Institutions and Investment Firms) Regulations 2026

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Wednesday 2nd September 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for setting out the purpose and effect of these two instruments. Although both are technically dense, they share a common and quite straightforward purpose: they replace parts of the inherited or temporary post-EU framework with permanent UK arrangements. It gives us an opportunity to make the regime more proportionate and better suited to the UK market while preserving the prudential safeguards on which financial stability depends. We support both instruments in principle, but I have a few important, mainly technical, questions. I hope that the Minister will be able to answer them today; if not, perhaps he could write to the Committee by way of follow-up.

I turn first to the overseas prudential requirements regime regulations. The instrument carries across a substantial number of existing recognitions from the outset, for countries with sophisticated regulatory regimes, such as the US and Singapore, to some with newer and riskier ones. That is welcome because it should prevent a cliff edge for firms when the EU-derived framework is revoked. The separate treatment afforded to Gibraltar also reflects the particularly close relationship between our two financial systems.

It is important to be clear that designation does not make an exposure risk free, automatically give it a zero-risk weight or amount to a blanket finding that every aspect of an overseas regime is equivalent to our own. The Treasury can designate a jurisdiction for particular institutions or exposures and may attach conditions. The detailed prudential treatment will continue to depend on the PRA rulebook and the characteristics of the exposure concerned.

This, of course, places considerable responsibility on the Treasury when deciding which jurisdictions should be recognised and for what purpose. What evidence and methodology will the Treasury use when assessing an overseas regime? What formal role will the regulators play in this determination, and will the Treasury publish its assessment when making a new designation, so that Parliament and the market can understand the basis for the decision?

There is also the question of what happens after a designation has been made. Prudential standards, supervisory capacity and political circumstances can change. How will the Treasury monitor designated jurisdictions on an ongoing basis, and how frequently will their status be reviewed? If standards deteriorate, can a designation be suspended or withdrawn urgently during a period of financial stress, and how quickly could that decision take effect?

Future designation decisions will ordinarily be made under the negative procedure. Given that those decisions can affect the capital treatment of significant overseas exposures, will the Minister explain why that level of parliamentary scrutiny is considered sufficient? Will the Government at least commit to placing a clear assessment of the prudential case and the expected effect of each designation before Parliament?

Finally, on this instrument, Regulation 5 establishes a mechanism for recognising overseas eligible covered bonds, but the initial Schedule does not appear to designate any jurisdiction for that purpose. Can the Minister explain when the Treasury expects the power to be used?

I turn to the Over the Counter Derivatives (Intragroup Transactions) Regulations. These provide a permanent replacement for temporary post-Brexit arrangements, governing exemptions from the clearing and margin requirements in UK EMIR. This is targeted deregulation rather than the dismantling of the wider derivatives regime. It does not exempt ordinary transactions with unrelated third parties, and the FCA retains an important supervisory role. The hope is that the reforms will reduce duplication, release collateral and make it easier for international groups to manage risk centrally.

In considering this instrument, it would be helpful to know how things stand on derivative policy more generally. In particular, are the French still seeking to transfer valuable trade through protective EU regulation or have they seen sense, given the interests of their own companies and banks?

The Treasury says that no significant impact is expected. That is rather disappointing for a deregulatory measure, and it has consequently not produced a full impact assessment. What estimate has it made of the clearing, collateral and administrative costs that firms will avoid and the scale of any hidden costs? How, in practical terms, will the new notification system reduce the time and compliance work involved, compared with the present arrangements? Has Dr Felix Martin of the Cost Benefit Analysis Panel been given a chance to take a view? These are both serious measures, which is why they are subject to affirmative resolution, and I would like some reassurance on the deregulatory impact.

The Government present these reforms as supporting the competitiveness of the UK financial services sector, which is obviously an objective that we support. How does our new framework compare with the treatment of intragroup derivatives in the European Union, the United States or other major financial centres? Will the United Kingdom become a more attractive location for the treasury and risk management operations of international groups? If so, what indicators will the Treasury use to assess whether that benefit is realised?

The FCA’s role will be central. Is the Minister satisfied that it will have the information, expertise and capacity needed to assess potentially complex international group structures within the 30-day period? Where an exemption concerns two overseas entities, how will supervisory responsibility be co-ordinated with the relevant overseas authorities?

Conditions can also change, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, explained. A jurisdiction may introduce capital controls, a local regulator may impose ring-fencing requirements or funds that once moved freely may become trapped during a crisis. What continuing obligation will firms have to notify the FCA of such changes? What power will the FCA have to suspend or withdraw an exemption? The central task in both cases is to ensure that greater flexibility and competitiveness are accompanied by robust supervision, continuing vigilance and appropriate parliamentary transparency. However, I am clear that these are important instruments and, subject to some sensible answers on these questions, we support them.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses for their comments, some of which go a little beyond what we are trying to address here with these statutory instruments. I understand the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, about the FSMA regime, how it works, parliamentary oversight and the rest of it, but not relitigating it when we are talking about statutory instruments would be a better use of everybody’s time.

On concerns about decisions passed by regulators, no new responsibility is being passed to Parliament. These will stay decisions for Ministers and Parliament, not regulators. I specifically mentioned that the recognition of covered bonds would need to be approved by Parliament. Essentially, we are moving from one regulatory regime to a UK regulatory regime. I understand the questions about whether the UK regulatory regime is right, but we should probably not relitigate that now.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked what criteria would apply to future designations. The Treasury will assess whether recognition of an overseas jurisdiction is compatible with the relevant policy outcomes, which includes protecting the stability of the UK financial system, protecting the safety and soundness of UK banks and investment firms, promoting effective competition in financial services and markets and/or supporting the international competitiveness and medium to long-term growth of the UK economy.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked about covered bonds issued by other jurisdictions and whether they could receive preferential treatment without further parliamentary scrutiny. The answer to that is no. A specific designation of an overseas jurisdiction in relation to covered bonds would require a subsequent statutory instrument and parliamentary approval. This instrument does not designate any jurisdiction or confer preferential treatment on any particular covered bond markets. There are no current plans to use the power, but it is important that we have it available. I should write to her on the question on the bets. That is well beyond my pay grade.

How does the UK approach compare with that of the EU? The EU removed the previous dependent on third-country equivalence decisions for intergroup treatment through EMIR 3. The EU now uses restrictions linked to specified high-risk or non-co-operative jurisdictions with scope for additional jurisdictions to be identified. The UK instrument likewise delinks intragroup eligibility from Article 13 equivalence but has detailed safeguards and processes designed for the UK framework.

Finally, on why a full impact assessment has not been made, the instrument is not expected to impose significant ongoing direct costs. It largely preserves existing treatment and does not include new designations. A de minimis impact assessment has been prepared. It identifies negligible familiarisation costs and no expected annual direct costs to business. Any material future costs or benefits associated with detailed prudential treatment would arise principally from PRA rules and be assessed by the PRA through cost-benefit analysis.

Today, the Committee has considered two statutory instruments. Although covering different aspects of financial regulation, both support the Government’s objective of maintaining a regulatory framework that is proportionate, effective and supportive of growth, while safeguarding financial stability. The overseas prudential requirements regime supports the Government’s wider programme of reforming assimilated EU financial services law. It brings together currently fragmented provisions within a clearer and more coherent statutory framework, while supporting the transition of assimilated law to the FSMA model of regulation. The second instrument, the Over the Counter Derivatives (Intragroup Transactions) Regulations, replaces a temporary regime that expires at the end of this year with a permanent framework for qualifying intragroup transactions. It gives firms certainty, supports efficient risk management across international groups and avoids unnecessary disruption when TIGER expires.

At the same time, it does not remove the underlying condition that firms must meet to benefit from these exemptions. The Financial Conduct Authority will retain oversight across border exemptions and the ability to object when those conditions are not met. The Government therefore believe that the reforms strike the right balance between reducing unnecessary burdens and maintaining appropriate safeguards. Taken together, these instruments provide certainty, support the competitiveness of the UK’s financial services sector and ensure that our regulatory framework continues to operate effectively.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I have just one question. The Minister gave a very helpful reply. He seems to be saying that the second instrument is essentially carrying things over—that both instruments are carrying over from previous EU law, rushed through after Brexit—and putting them on a permanent basis. My questions were about assessment and the FCA, which he answered well. What happens when we have a new designation? Will there be a process of assessment and an impact assessment for that? I can understand where we are just moving things across, but it would be helpful to know what the Treasury’s plan is.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

It would come to Parliament for approval, with an assessment.

Building Societies Act 1986 (Assimilation to Company Law and Changes to Funding Limit) Order 2026

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Wednesday 2nd September 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I thank noble Lords for their consideration of this order. I have listened carefully to the interventions made and will try to respond to them, if I can.

One was on the interest in common seals. Until I read this SI, I also had not realised that building societies were so constrained. There was then a series of questions about borrowing short and lending long, which is of course central to building society and bank operations; that is why you can have a run on a building society or a bank and why we have the Bank of England to deal with that and give confidence so that a run does not take place. Clearly, in the changes that are being made, which are relatively small changes associated with highly liquid instruments, deposits and dealings with the Bank of England, there is not a huge difference in the duration risk that we see today and the duration risk that we will see in future. The aim is to make building societies more equivalent and similar to banks so that they can be more competitive.

As regards what the effects of this will be, the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked a good question about greater mortgage lending. I did in fact go back and ask whether a calculation had been made on that. The answer I got, which I thought was quite a good one, was that the reduction in constraint does not immediately mean that a building society will change what it does because there are many other considerations in how it expands its balance sheet. Therefore, there is not a number on that one. I feel quite comfortable that there is not a number, but we create a level playing field. As for a review in five years’ time, I do not know what would be included in such a review; I think that it might be impacted by events from now and going forward.

In terms of the impact of interest rate volatility, as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, the changes have been designed to help with periods of market instability, including interest rate volatility. I did inquire about the additional mortgage lending. I did not get an answer, but I think that I did not get an answer for quite a good reason.

As I set out my opening speech, this order should make targeted and practical changes to the Building Societies Act, modernising requirements and specifying certain sources of funding to be exempt from the wholesale funding limit calculation. It should ensure that the legislative framework for building societies remains proportionate and aligned with wider company law and prudential regulation, while preserving their fundamental mutual model. I hope that I have answered the questions raised.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

That is very helpful and I am grateful to the Minister for answering the questions about likely changes in mortgages and investment. There are a couple of strands I would like to emphasise. One is that I am very concerned that we should help smaller building societies as well as bigger ones, which I hope he agrees with, and that competitiveness is an important factor. The one thing he perhaps could answer, either now or in a letter, is whether this is the end of the road or whether there are more changes coming in SIs on building societies.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

On both those questions, may I write to the noble Baroness? My understanding is that this is the end of the road for this set of legislation, but I cannot predict whether further legislation may come forward. On small and big building societies, might I simply write to the noble Baroness?

United Kingdom: Business Competitiveness

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Tuesday 1st September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord for that question. I have been trying to stay in the spirit of our new Prime Minister and to reach the greatest cross-party consensus that we can on this. What the Chancellor and the Prime Minister have said about being really careful about business costs, and making sure that business stays competitive, takes us some way in that direction. But every businessperson will tell you that you need to balance the books, and the comment from my Benches suggested that perhaps, three years ago, that was not taking place.

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, I also very much welcome the Minister to his new role, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, for his contribution in one of the more difficult Front-Bench jobs, as the Minister is discovering. I will focus on growth, which was the top priority when Labour was elected with a huge majority. Yet many of the measures introduced—higher taxes and an assault on business—have probably reduced growth and competitiveness. So what is the new Andy Burnham Government’s growth target, and when do they expect to achieve it?

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

One swallow does not make a summer, but the UK’s growth was number one among G7 countries in the first half of this year and the previous year had record productivity. Dismissing that and saying that growth is not taking place misses the evidence that we are beginning to see. What do we intend to do on this? We intend to follow the policies that have been working: the industrial policy, the planning reforms, the new sources of finance, being sensible about government accounting so that capital is not discouraged, fiscal credibility and good trade deals.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, our amendments in this group concern the future of the bank ring-fencing regime. I will start by setting out clearly the position that we have reached as the Official Opposition. Through our diagnostic work, we have found a consensus that the bank ring-fencing regime is no longer fit for purpose. It adds costs to banks and their customers and it has been superseded by other rules since its introduction. A regulatory regime should not be preserved simply because it exists. It must continue to justify itself against present-day risks, tools and costs. In our view, the ring-fencing regime no longer does so. The next Conservative Government would repeal the post-global financial crisis ring-fencing regime, bringing the United Kingdom more closely into line with other international jurisdictions. Amendment 160A reflects that policy.

It is worth reminding ourselves what ring-fencing is. The regime was created through the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, which amended FSMA 2000. The implementing regulations and orders came into effect in 2019, more than 10 years after the onset of the global financial crisis. At its core, ring-fencing is the structural separation of certain retail banking activities from activities normally conducted by international wholesale investment banks. In practice, that means a separate legal entity, with restrictions on what it can do and how it can interact with the rest of the banking group. Retail and small business deposit-taking is placed inside the ring-fence, while certain other activities must be conducted outside it.

The regime was introduced for serious reasons. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, convened after the financial crisis, identified three broad objectives: to make it easier to deal with failing banks without taxpayer-funded solvency support; to insulate vital banking services used by households and SMEs from problems elsewhere in the financial system; and to curtail implicit government guarantees, thereby reducing risks to public finances and incentives for excessive risk-taking.

Since ring-fencing was designed, the wider regulatory landscape has changed profoundly. We now have a much more developed resolution regime. We have recovery and resolution planning. We have operational continuity arrangements in resolution. We have stronger capital and liquidity requirements. We have the leverage ratio, the liquidity coverage ratio and the net stable funding ratio. The Bank of England, the PRA and the FPC have a broad toolkit for reducing the risk of bank failure and dealing with failure if it occurs. Moreover, we have sounder management of banks as a result of the senior management regime.

That is precisely the point that we wish to highlight in our amendment. The risks that ring-fencing was designed to address are now addressed through other more modern, more targeted and more internationally coherent tools. The 2022 Independent Panel on Ring-fencing and Proprietary Trading, chaired by Sir Keith Skeoch, reported that the regime has an annual cost to the UK banking sector of around £1.5 billion, which comes from running multiple separate legal entities, duplicating governance systems and raising the cost of capital and lending conducted by non-ring-fenced bodies. This is because large retail deposits inside the ring-fence cannot be used as sources of finance elsewhere in a group to support lending and investment. That review also found that the reduction in the implicit government guarantee and progress in ending “too big to fail” were not attributable to ring-fencing but instead to the development of the UK resolution regime. Ring-fencing is therefore a good example of a broader problem in financial services regulation: rules that are introduced in response to a crisis which then remain in place long after the conditions that justified the change.

We are now left with two regimes that are not aligned in the way that they aim to address “too big to fail”. That adds complexity, cost and burden. It also risks making the United Kingdom less competitive than jurisdictions that rely on resolution, prudential supervision and capital frameworks, rather than structural separation of this kind. Clauses 39 and 40 show that the Government recognise that there is a problem. They seek to make changes to the ring-fencing regime and give the PRA more flexibility over ring-fencing arrangements, but in our view these reforms do not go far enough.

Amendment 160A would repeal Part 9B of FSMA and the core statutory ring-fencing provisions introduced after the financial crisis. It would require the Treasury, the PRA, the FCA and the Bank of England to take the necessary steps to unwind the related rules and guidance. It would require an orderly transition, with attention paid to financial stability, continuity of core banking services and the competitiveness of the United Kingdom. Consumer savings would continue to be protected. Banks would continue to be subject to prudential supervision. Resolution planning would remain in place.

This reform matters for competitiveness. Other major financial centres do not operate a UK-style ring-fencing regime. If UK banks are required to carry costs and structural constraints that their international competitors do not face, that affects the cost and availability of finance. It affects the ability of banks to deploy capital efficiently and it affects the attractiveness of the UK as a place to operate and invest in. It also matters for customers. Regulations that increase costs without delivering commensurate benefit feed through into pricing, service innovation and lending capacity.

If the Government believe that ring-fencing remains necessary, will the Minister explain precisely what financial stability objective it now achieves that is not already achieved through the resolution regime and other prudential rules? Ring-fencing was created in response to a particular crisis at a particular moment for reasons that were understandable at the time. But regulation must evolve. It must be reviewed against current conditions. It must be removed when it no longer serves its intended purpose.

Finally, I would add that whatever changes are made, it is right to have a proper process of consultation with business and stakeholders and a follow-up report to Parliament. That is the purpose of my Amendments 159 and 174.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, if I may respond to that, I had thought until recently that what we were debating was a response to the Skeoch commission established by the last Government, but we have new amendments now, it seems—Amendment 160A and the abandonment of clauses—that are really throwing ring-fencing out. I guess that they are tabled in response to a speech by the leader of the Conservative Party, Kemi Badenoch—a speech underpinned by a policy document from her party. That speech, the policy document and this amendment are not asking to think things through further from the Skeoch report: they have made their minds up. Kemi Badenoch announced that a future Conservative Government will end ring-fencing—definitive end of discussion. That, I believe, would be a bad idea. So did the review by Keith Skeoch, who was commissioned by the Conservative Government to opine on this and whose recommendations we are now trying to take forward.

Worse still, the evidence for Mrs Badenoch’s statement is based on really questionable claims, numbers and Mickey Mouse logic. For example, the claim was that the Skeoch report reckoned that the cost of ring-fencing was £1.5 billion. In fact, the report notes that that figure was presented to the review and that

“it has not been possible to draw a strong conclusion based on aggregating these costs”.

The report recognises that there are some costs to ring-fencing, but notes that that was expected and acknowledged by the Independent Commission on Banking, which said that that would not be a cost to the economy, but rather

“a consequence of returning risk to where it should be—with bank investors, not taxpayers—and so would reflect the aim of removing government support and risk to public finances”.

The policy paper has a Mickey Mouse logic that costs should be placed on the taxpayer, when they should be paid by the banks and the investors in the banks.

We should of course be in favour of reviewing the ring-fencing regime to be sure that it is properly doing its job. This is what Skeoch did and, now, if this Bill follows that report, I ask the Minister to ensure that we are careful with definitions in the implementation. For example, we should ensure that, within the growth allowance, the definitions are very carefully drawn up. We do not in future want the taxpayer subsidising proprietary trading—what many refer to as “casino capitalism”.

Badenoch suggests that her reforms would release £450 billion in capital—another number from nowhere. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, will not have a lot of time to sum up, but I would be grateful if she might write afterwards on how these numbers have been derived and what reduction in bank equity capital they assume. If these numbers do not stack up, that pulls the rug from under the policy document and the speech that was made by the leader of the Conservative Party.

The policy paper suggests that we should abandon the Financial Ombudsman Service. In this industry, which represents 8% of GDP but attracts 42% of corporate fines, Mrs Badenoch has decided that the front-line institution that protects consumers should be abolished. We could say that this does not matter and that Kemi Badenoch is unlikely any time soon to be Prime Minister, but it should matter to us. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has pointed out, there is considerable expertise in financial services across all parties in the House. Although we have differences, we are united, I hope, in trying to set a framework for the industry that allows it better to serve its purpose: to serve the outside world; to help get money from point A, where it is, to point B, where it is needed; to keep our money safe; to help us transact; and to help us share risk.

If the Opposition Benches feel mandated to follow the policy documented last month, we have a problem. I could not find a single reference in that document to any input from any consumer group anywhere. It felt like a lobbyist document from the City, but I have talked to at least one lobbyist who said “No, it goes way further than we would ever suggest”.

Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pitt-Watson and Baroness Neville-Rolfe

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, my amendment concerns the impact of prudential capital requirements on lending capacity, borrowing costs, competition and growth. Since my amendment was tabled, His Majesty’s Opposition have announced a new policy position in this area, which I shall speak to now.

Our new policy is straightforward. The statutory basis for post-financial crisis bank capital requirements should be amended so that UK regulators are required to take proper account of equivalent capital regimes in competitor jurisdictions, and to identify, justify and, where not justified, remove any UK-specific overcapitalisation relative to equivalent international regimes. We want to consider the position in competitor jurisdictions, to benchmark equivalent regimes, to publish detailed analysis and to explain clearly where the UK is imposing requirements above international standards or above those imposed by comparable financial centres. That seems a basic requirement of a serious competitiveness agenda, on which the UK is particularly reliant. The UK is the world’s largest net exporter of financial services, whereas comparable jurisdictions, such as the US, rely much more on their domestic markets. It is therefore imperative that we remain competitive on the world stage.

Capital requirements matter, but there is a cost. Capital held solely for statutory compliance is capital that cannot otherwise be used to support lending, investment, home ownership, business expansion or economic activity. The central question is therefore not whether banks should hold capital but whether the UK requires materially more capital than comparable jurisdictions without a clear and evidenced stability justification. If we do, we are placing the UK at a competitive disadvantage: we are constraining lending, increasing borrowing costs, making it harder for firms to access finance and weakening growth, and doing so in a way that may not be required by international standards or by the actual risk profile of the system.

The analysis behind our policy suggests that the UK capital framework may materially exceed international Basel III requirements and competitor regimes. It has been suggested that the resulting constraint on UK banks’ lending and financing capacity could amount to £250 billion across overlapping capital requirements and £200 billion across leverage ratio constraints. Of course, not every pound of capital released would automatically translate into new lending—we understand that. Some may be used for business investment, dividends, buybacks or balance-sheet strengthening. The key point remains that capital deployed productively in the economy is preferable to capital trapped by a regulatory framework that is more restrictive than it needs to be.

We appreciate that the Government recognise this issue and have moved a little on it already. They have made the bank resolution regime more flexible, allowing the Bank of England to reduce or remove MREL for some firms where the new FSCS recapitalisation mechanism can substitute for pre-positioned loss-absorbing resources. Our proposal is a step to unlocking a lot more capital. We already require the PRA, in some contexts, to have regard to the UK’s relative standing against competitor jurisdictions, but that duty is incomplete. It does not apply across the whole capital framework and, in particular, it does not fully capture Pillar 2A, the PRA buffer or systemic buffers. The FPC has produced useful comparative analysis, but there is not yet a binding requirement for regular, systematic benchmarking against competitor jurisdictions.

Our proposed review is also about transparency. If regulators believe that the UK should impose higher requirements than comparable regimes then Parliament, industry and the public should be able to see the analysis behind that decision. That is how we preserve independence while improving accountability.

The amendment is part of a wider argument. Prudential regulation must be understood not only through the lens of stability but through the lens of growth, lending, and competitiveness. A capital framework that is more demanding than necessary does not make the economy stronger. It may make it less dynamic, less competitive and less able to support households and businesses, especially SMEs and scale-ups. I speak from experience as a director at a responsible and careful challenger bank, where the UK capital rules were a significant constraint on what we could do. They also consumed a great deal of management and board time.

I would like the Government to accept that the UK should not impose capital requirements above equivalent international competitor regimes, especially if there is no financial stability justification for doing so. The first step is to undertake the necessary analysis. Ours is a serious and responsible policy. It preserves regulatory independence and protects financial stability but recognises that excessive or unjustified capital requirements carry real economic costs. If we want growth, competitiveness and banks to support businesses and homebuyers, then we need a capital framework that is robust but not overrestrictive. That is the balance that our policy seeks to strike. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Pitt-Watson (Lab)]

My Lords, both the amendment and the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, were sensible in terms of making us think about bank capital requirements and whether we have got them right. As she says, the first step is undertaking proper analysis to be able to work out whether that happens. I noticed she caveated everything that they may not be right. They may be right, but they may not.

My worry is that that is a sensible position to take but it did not sound like the position being taken by the Leader of the Opposition when she made her speech last week saying that she was going to reduce bank capital requirements to release £450 billion in capital. Where did the calculation that hundreds of billions are sitting idly on bank balance sheets come from? Where do those hundreds of billions come from? If we are going to release £450 billion, what is the calculation in the reduction of bank capital requirements that sits behind that calculation? While I feel quite supportive of the issues that the noble Baroness was raising, we need to be sure—I hope she will agree—that we do not jump the gun on this.