Respect Orders and Anti-social Behaviour

Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Hate crime is pernicious and I would support the noble Baroness’s contention that hate crime, whether against the Jewish community or people who are legitimately protesting about Palestinian issues—not Hamas, Palestinian issues—is an important potential crime. If crimes are committed and the police wish to pursue those crimes at a local level, they can do so; there are powers in place to make arrests where criminal activity takes place in any form of protest.

The noble Baroness shakes her head, but there are powers now available for the police to arrest people on the basis of hate crime. If the police exercise that power, that is a matter for the police. The noble Baroness would not expect a Minister to undertake those arrests. The police make a judgment; they can make arrests and bring matters to court. Indeed, they have done on a range of crimes, particularly against the Jewish community in the current climate.

[Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (CB)]

My Lords, in order to qualify for a respect order, will behaviour have to be criminal? If not, what criteria will it have to satisfy?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for his question. I want to get to the exact wording correct. With the respect order particularly, it does not have to be criminal behaviour. It can be behaviour that potentially causes alarm, distress or harassment. Again, I say to the House that those matters will be tested as we go through Committee. There will be opportunities to clarify what that means and put down some legal guidelines during Committee in this House. The idea of the respect order is to tackle what I would term low-level anti-social behaviour. If criminal actions have been taken, criminal sanctions are available to police to make arrests accordingly. I hope we can reflect on that during Committee.

Criminal Finances Bill

Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 28th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

I am glad that I did not interrupt the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, because he and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, approach this matter from long knowledge of the law. I would like to consider the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in relation to the investigative process. UWOs are effectively a search warrant. That is the test, and that is not beyond reasonable doubt. You have a search warrant because you think something might be happening. When you have executed the search warrant, you know whether it has happened or not and at that point, you might charge someone with a criminal offence, for which the test would be “beyond reasonable doubt”. From an investigative point of view, that amendment would put at the front of the operation a test which is almost impossible to pass unless you issue the order and effectively use a search warrant on the individual’s bank balances.

[Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (CB)]

My Lords, I speak in harmony with the previous two speakers. I have some experience of this area, having wrestled in a judicial capacity with more than one appeal in relation to the Proceeds of Crime Act, and I have also recently taken the chair of the board which supervises more draconian legislation than the Bill for the confiscation of unexplained wealth in Mauritius. These unexplained wealth orders are designed to deal with the very real difficulty of proving facts which are likely to be in the exclusive knowledge of the holder of wealth. It would be simply contrary to the policy to impose the criminal rather than the civil burden of proof in respect of matters such as the value of property in which a person has an interest or the very question of whether he has an interest in that property at all.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 10, 13, 20 and 22 to 25 in this group, all of which are probing amendments. Amendment 10 modifies subsection (4) of the newly inserted Section 362B of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The subsection sets out one of the three conditions that must be satisfied before an unexplained wealth order may be made:

“The High Court must be satisfied that … the respondent is a politically exposed person, or …there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that … the respondent is, or has been (whether in a part of the United Kingdom or elsewhere), or … a person connected with the respondent is, or has been, so involved”.


As I read it, it means that simply being a politically exposed person satisfies the condition. That is enough for the High Court: it does not need,

“the reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in serious crime”,

to be satisfied as well. That seems unnecessarily and dangerously broad.

It is probably unnecessary to remind the Committee that we are all PEPs. So are our families and our close associates. As the Government have made clear, and as the FCA is about to say in guidelines, most Back-Benchers, their families and associates should not require additional due diligence. Given that, we or our equivalents abroad should not be exposed to a harsher, more extensive and more intrusive regime. By replacing “or” with “and”, and by qualifying the definition of PEPs by inserting,

“who merits additional due diligence according to Financial Conduct Authority guidelines”,

my amendment removes this harsh, special treatment of non-EEA PEPs. For the condition to be fulfilled, the amendment requires that the PEPs are not ordinary PEPs but merit this additional due diligence and that there should be reasonable grounds for suspecting involvement in serious crime.

Amendment 13 removes the exemption of UK and EEA PEPs from the conditions in subsection (4) of new Section 362B, in order to give the Minister the opportunity to explain why UK and EEA PEPs should not be treated exactly as all other PEPs.

Amendment 20 gives the Minister an opportunity to clear up an apparent anomaly. On page 5, subsection (2)(b) of the newly inserted Section 362E sets out the penalty for failure to respond properly to an unexplained wealth order. For summary conviction in England and Wales—and later, we see, in Scotland too—the penalty is imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months, or a fine, or both. However, on the very next page, in subsection (2)(c), the penalty on summary conviction in Northern Ireland for exactly the same offence is set at imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or a fine, or both. So in England and Wales and Scotland, you can go to prison for up to 12 months, but in Northern Ireland it is up to six months. Why? I would be grateful if the Minister could explain.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, this amendment is designed to strengthen the protection for whistleblowers but also to provide for mandatory compensation for them following the example of the United States in this area, most recently under Dodd-Frank. It also proposes an office of the whistleblower, both to enshrine the importance of whistleblowing and to provide the necessary oversight of the broader regime. It is a probing amendment and I hope that the Minister will not waste her time in discussing drafting issues, when the core issue of whistleblowing and how we support it is so critical to making the financial system clean and fair and to rebuilding public trust.

Being realistic, so much money swirls though the financial system that the potential for ill-gotten gains from misbehaviour is huge. My amendment mentions fraud, tax evasion, money laundering and mis-selling, but ingenuity in this area is boundless, as evidenced by the fixing of the LIBOR benchmark rate, which involved many banks over several years distorting billions of dollars of transactions, for which very few have paid the price, and those who have are primarily junior staff. With money on this scale, no regulator or enforcement agency can begin to tackle these issues without inside information. That means a positive culture of whistleblowing, which in itself then becomes a deterrent.

We do this notoriously badly. The recent RBS GRG scandal is an example. I have spoken to only two of the whistleblowers but they have both been treated atrociously by RBS and the regulators and face an end to their careers and personal disaster. This is despite endless warm words from the banking industry, individual banks, the regulators and the Government on how important the whistleblower is and promises of protection. It is why I am calling on the Government in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause to act much more directly to stop retaliatory action.

I was a member of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. Among our work, we looked at the whistleblowing regime and recommended some enhancements. To be fair, those have, for the most part, been adopted, but they were modest changes: for deposit takers, PRA-designated firms and insurers a non-executive director or senior manager is required to be named as responsible for whistleblowing under the senior managers regime; a system to protect employees is required to be in place in each institution; the rules are to be disseminated; and employment tribunals are meant to provide protection. The banking industry is very satisfied with this approach. Indeed, it has always been satisfied with its approach and, in the evidence and testament we took, it was very satisfied with the prior approach, even though rarely was whistleblowing taking place even under the most egregious circumstances, and whistleblowers were receiving little, if any, protection. It is clear the industry was shocked that, with all of its whistleblowing measures in place, no one came forward to tell the authorities about money laundering, LIBOR or mis-selling.

The revised system appears to be fraught with problems. In an email from the charity WhistleblowersUK, I heard that a few days ago a staff member called to speak to the whistleblowing champion at a major bank only to be told that they did not exist. When the caller persisted by providing the name from a letter, the bank told them that that person did not exist. Whistleblowers themselves complain that the regulators provide them with advice and then renege, and that they have no comeback against the regulators, whom no one can compel to respond to FOIs or subject data access requests.

In March this year the Financial Conduct Authority confirmed that the number of whistleblowing reports has fallen for the second year in a row, down to 866, of which just over 100 were of “significant value”. That is not a successful system. In the United States, by contrast, whistleblowers are far more appreciated. They are a core tool for exposing wrongdoing, whereas in the UK they are merely incidental. The key difference is reflected in compensation, which underscores the complete cultural difference in the attitude towards whistleblowers. In my amendment I have essentially lifted the simple principles of compensation available under Dodd-Frank and drafted them into UK law. Compensation is mandatory for those providing original information leading to a sanction, and the compensation is a hefty 10% to 30% of the sanction paid. This is a recognition that for most people whistleblowing puts a career, lifestyle and family at risk.

Let me quote the evidence of Erika Kelton, a US lawyer dealing with whistleblowing cases, describing the impact of US whistleblowing incentives schemes to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. She said:

“Tens of billions of dollars otherwise lost to illegal practices that cheat the public fisc have been recovered as a direct result of whistleblower information. But the impact and importance of whistleblower matters goes far beyond the large dollar amounts recovered for US taxpayers. Whistleblowers have exposed grave wrongdoing, leading to changes that promote integrity and transparency in financial markets. Whistleblowers have helped stop massive mortgage frauds, gross mischarging practices, commodity price manipulation, and sophisticated money laundering schemes, among other misdeeds”.


She argued that,

“meaningful, non-discretionary financial incentives are critical to establishing robust and successful whistleblower programs”.

In the UK, the objection of the regulator to such incentives is one of “moral hazard”—that whistleblowing is simply somebody doing his or her job and deserves no special reward. I simply look at the lack of whistleblowing and the situation for whistleblowers in the UK and disagree. The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards directly called on the FCA to research the impact of financial incentives in the US in encouraging whistleblowing. I have yet to hear any substantive report on that issue; perhaps somehow I have missed it and the Minister has seen it.

I fully accept that issues around whistleblowing extend beyond financial services and impact many other business sectors and areas of our lives. But we could start here with financial services. We need action that is game-changing, not tinkering around the edges. It is vital that we use every reasonable tool to increase our chances of keeping the financial sector clean, protect the public and restore trust in an industry that is key to the functioning of our economy. I beg to move.

[Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I suggest that whistleblowers need to be both protected and rewarded in order to encourage them. The Mauritian legislation of which I spoke earlier makes provision for rewards to be paid to whistleblowers whose information leads to the confiscation of unexplained wealth. Indeed, the board that I chair has the function of making such awards. In my view this is a salutary provision as one of the weapons in the fight against crime and corruption. Therefore, I support in principle this amendment, but as a starting point because I suggest that it is a principle that should be applied much more widely in the case of action taken that leads to the recovery of the proceeds of crime.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am sure the whole House shares the concern that the noble Baroness has expressed about whistleblowing and its importance generally. However, I respectfully submit that this amendment is a pretty substantial response to that. It seeks to set up a whole department—the office of the whistleblower. I accept that this is something of a probing amendment and therefore bears the standard for what the noble Baroness may hope to come, but it is little short of a job-creation scheme. The proposed functions of the office of the whistleblower are extensive and it would have powers. Of course, if an office is created, those who are given that office will appoint others to work for them and powers will be exercised. If they are not exercised it would be suggested that they were not doing their job. Before we know where we are, we will have a substantial bureaucracy that runs the risk of having the same problems that exist in other areas of bureaucratic supervision of financial institutions.

The question of incentives is interesting. I accept that that they have had some success in the United States and, as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, in Mauritius too. But as to the question of “retaliatory action against whistleblowers”, a whistleblower has remedies in civil law in any event. When she comes to respond to the Minister, will the noble Baroness give us some idea what is meant by the provision with regard to “retaliatory action against whistleblowers”? The criminal law exists and civil remedies exist for employees and I wonder whether that is not inviting something rather too much. Of course, she rightly acknowledges that whistleblowers are not entirely based in the financial institutions; they exist in the NHS and have recently been considered by Sir Robert Francis and in all other government departments.

The real question is whether the establishment of this no doubt expensive bureaucracy will deter and whether it will result in the detection of what would otherwise not have been detected. While I applaud the general thrust of the amendment, I wonder whether it is something of an overreaction.

Immigration Bill

Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers Excerpts

Wednesday 9th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, in relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, as against the clause as introduced, the virtue of the clause as amended by the government amendment is that the prosecutor would have to prove that the person in question knew or had reasonable cause to believe that he was disqualified, whereas in Amendment 46, which was proposed by the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, the onus would be the other way: in other words, the defence would have to prove that the matter was done without reasonable cause. I think that that is the nature of the law in this matter. So in a sense the government amendment has greater protection for the person alleged to have committed the offence than Amendment 46 would have done.

[Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (CB)]

On that point, my Lords, I have had occasion under another statute to consider the phrase “without reasonable excuse” in a judicial capacity, and I found it impossibly imprecise.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 52, which would leave out Clause 32. I shall make one specific and one general point.

I am grateful to the Minister for his collection of letters. I am not sure that it is quite a limited edition, and I have visions of him scurrying around late at night delivering them. I have found it helpful because of course I had mislaid the letter of 28 January, in which he clarified that the offence of legal working will apply to asylum seekers who are not permitted to work but also to those who have been granted permission but take a job that is not on the shortage occupation list. Whatever one thinks of the clause itself, and I am opposed to it, surely it is unfair that it is applied to people who have a clear legal right to be in the country at that point. This has been presented as a clause that applies to people who have no legitimate right to be in the country, but those who are still seeking asylum have that right. I was concerned about that because it seems unfair.

My more general point is that, like other noble Lords, I fear that despite the government amendment the clause will serve to encourage exploitation. I was disturbed to read in yesterday’s Independent a report of a study of young migrant men carried out by the University of Manchester as part of a European Commission study, which found that these young men felt that they are constantly having to justify their status and made to feel that they are on the wrong side of the law even when they have done nothing wrong. I am not arguing that there is a clear cause and effect, but when we have government policies like the previous Immigration Act, this Bill and particularly this clause, which deliberately try to create a hostile environment for undocumented migrants, unfortunately they can create a hostile environment for those who have every right to be here. That impedes their ability to integrate into British society, which can be in nobody’s interests.

Calais: Border Management

Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers Excerpts

Wednesday 24th June 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I am very happy to give that assurance. Reaching 0.7% was one of the great achievements of the previous Government and certainly something that we are committed to maintaining. We are providing the second-largest amount of money, in absolute terms, to Syria—some £800 million. We talk about committing £12 million to the work at the juxtaposed borders, but £800 million is going towards helping the people fleeing the awful situation in Syria. That is absolutely the right balance in trying to move this problem forward and tackle it at source.

[Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers (CB)]

My Lords, I was one of those trapped in a car just outside the terminal at Calais yesterday, together with a very large number of lorries and their drivers. The road was thick with would-be migrants to this country. I did not feel at all threatened by them—they seemed to be relatively benevolent. But I had great sympathy for the lorry drivers, who were faced with attempts to break into their lorries. I also had great sympathy for this large army of would-be migrants. What steps are being taken to find a permanent solution for their plight?

[Lord Bates]

The juxtaposed controls were introduced in response to the situation at the Sangatte camp. Some interesting things are going on at an international and even a European level—for example, the idea of trying to create secure areas within north Africa where people could be safely returned to and where their applications, if they were genuine, could be processed and tested. We should certainly look more closely at an idea of that kind.