Financial Services Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I am grateful to my noble friend, who has considerable experience of dealing with high-level legal matters. I believe that might be achieved, but in my view there needs to be the clearest statement of intent by the Government. My intention, as my noble friend implies, is that whoever carries out this special investigation should be invested with the powers of the Serious Fraud Office, which are considerable and important. That is why I suggested earlier that this should take place under the instructions of the director of the Serious Fraud Office, Mr David Green QC. However, I believe that the Serious Fraud Office is completely unresourced for this kind of investigation. I also believe that in public terms, if the Government made it clear that they would provide Mr Green with the resources immediately to appoint a special prosecutor, albeit under his umbrella, and that person was provided with a team, probably largely from outside the SFO, which has been recruiting a large number of staff recently and may not have the experience to deal with this inquiry at present, then we would have a quicker and better result.

I do not want to detain your Lordships’ House for too long. However, I want to make the point that we have not yet reached the situation in which the essential issue is being investigated properly—that is, the potential criminality of those whom we were entitled to trust.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I came to the City as a young lawyer in 1964 and am still there. Until last Christmas, I was a non-executive director of a well known City insurance entity. I agree wholly with the sentiments of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. However, the writing has been on the wall about the state of values in the City for very many years. The most recent shock—the LIBOR scandal as one might call it—is but one of many and there will be many more still to come, I am sad to say. It has been an open secret in the City that the culture has declined over the years to one of near amorality, where the law rather than normal moral instincts has been the arbiter of conduct. That in turn has declined, predictably, to a situation where too often if amorality is confronted with a significant loss of a good deal then there is little resistance left in the system and criminality occurs. Most of it is impossible to trace as it is in the form of market manipulation and oral conspiracies—whether within a firm or between different firms. It is a sad spectacle. To be fair, the vast majority of people in the City deeply regret where we have got to. Unfortunately, however, the culture of huge corporations tends to crush the moral life out of people in those entities. You get the occasional whistleblower who will stand out against the herd but one knows, I am afraid, what has happened recently to those few brave people.

The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is absolutely correct in his strategic overview of where we now are. We must, however, ponder this a little more than the space of this debate will allow. I am inclined towards giving serious thought to some sort of commission. It does not have to be a royal commission—a phrase which has attracted a good deal of adverse thought lately—but it is such a huge congregation of issues, not just confined to the City and certainly not confined to narrow misdeeds such as the LIBOR matter, that we may be better off with a royal commission that can look at the thing in the round, take its time, and let the criminal side of all this be separated and dealt with by the Serious Fraud Office or, conceivably, a special prosecutor.

My Amendment 109—to which my noble friend Lady Kramer and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, have added their names, and which we will probably get to next time—ironically achieves almost the identical effect to that of the first part of Amendment 110ZA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, so I am obviously in favour of that.

In closing, the other quick point I should like to make is to wonder whether there should not be a wider duty of integrity in the Bill than that which applies only to the FCA in proposed new Section 1D on page 17 of the Bill. The prudential authority should be subject to a similar integrity objective, and it might make sense to have such an objective for the whole financial regulatory sphere. That is all I wish to say beyond thanking the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, for raising this matter at this time.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Monday 16th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, my name is one of those that have been put to Amendment 30. I set no particular store by this amendment, save to say that it is one of the attempts to deal with the issue that has been eloquently described by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and by my noble friend Lord Faulks, with whom I agree entirely.

Looking around the Committee this afternoon, I see a dozen or so Members of your Lordships’ House who had to deal with constituency surgeries on a regular basis while in another place. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, who earlier spoke very eloquently, has had the same experience as me of dealing with constituency issues in quite a remote rural part of Wales. Clinical negligence relating to perinatal damage does not choose its location. It is just as likely to arise in rural Montgomeryshire or in rural Caernarvonshire. Indeed, I have certainly seen people in years gone by who have come to a constituency surgery devastated by what they believed had happened to their child while the child was being born in a neighbouring hospital. In the case of Montgomeryshire, this was almost always over the border in England, but that may be beside the point.

The people who come with these problems are often not only overwhelmed by the care of their children, but also by the future they face: the lifetime of having to look after a damaged child to whom of course they are generally entirely devoted and to whom they will give the whole of their life or the child’s life—whichever lasts longer. They are often, too, people from poor circumstances. In many cases, they have no experience of dealing with lawyers and are frightened of lawyers. They have read in the newspapers that the medical profession—and I hope I will not offend any of my many friends who are distinguished members of the medical profession—is chronically defensive in its approach to allegations. They will not be aware that the chair of the National Health Service Litigation Authority has made it clear that, in her view, legal aid for clinical negligence should continue because it is a way of ensuring that medical practice is carried out responsibly and with reasonable care.

It may be that in some big cities there are firms of solicitors who would take on cases of this kind pro bono, at least in the first stages, because they can afford to carry that excess. However, that does not apply in the small towns of rural Wales and the shire counties of England. People whose child has been damaged at birth may only know of, let alone know, one solicitor, who may be in a small practice somewhere in their neighbourhood. It is right that people in that situation be able to at least explore bringing legal action to see whether there is a course of action that may be effective in relation to the injury that has occurred to their child. In some cases, if disbursements can be expended on expert evidence, it will be shown that there is a strong case of negligence, and most of those strong cases will be settled in due course—often for very large sums of money.

The proposals in the Bill run the risk of depriving parents in that situation of the remedy which they will discover only if they and their solicitors are allowed to spend the money to obtain expert reports as early as possible. There are amendments which suggest that there should be co-operation over expert reports and that other measures should be taken to limit the costs. I applaud those proposals. I suggest to the Minister that the Government include, in any concessions that in my judgment they will be bound to make in due course on this subject of perinatal injury to children, ways of ensuring that money is not wasted on a multiplicity of expert reports, but that the right reports are obtained as early as possible. In my judgment, the case for legal aid at the early stage of potential perinatal damage claims is absolutely unanswerable. The Government would be seen to have lost their human face if they refused to amend the legislation to reflect those concerns.

I say to the Minister, however, that perinatal negligence is not the only area in which were legal aid to be removed great injustice would be caused. One can think of endless examples of poor negligent treatment in hospital which result in devastating injuries: the loss of limbs, the loss of eyes, brain damage, and so on. They fall into the same broad category as the perhaps emotive example of perinatal injury. I therefore suggest to Ministers that they should consider permitting legal aid to continue in cases—I do not say that this formulation is perfect but it reflects the spirit of what I mean—where a severe injury has occurred in a clinical setting. If those involved in such cases were permitted to receive legal aid, the injustice envisaged in the amendments would be resolved.

ATE insurance and CFAs have their place, which may be in some of the types of cases I referred to—but not right at the beginning. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, said clearly, the cost of insurance premiums for even quite small cases is out of proportion to the claim. Potential claimants dealing with severe injuries that occurred in a clinical setting may not be able even to contemplate the prospect of whatever element of cost they might face through the insurance system. It does not provide an answer to all cases.

I urge my noble friend to answer sympathetically the huge burden of representations that have been made by those who have knowledge and experience of conducting these cases or experiencing their consequences directly. They make an overwhelming case.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, my name is on Amendment 30A, along with that of my noble friend Lord Faulks, who spoke clearly and persuasively to it, and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who apologises for his inability to be here today. He sent me a note in which he rather pithily justified the contents of the amendment—which, it has to be said, is more modest than the one so eloquently moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, at the start of the debate.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, made two points. He stated that,

“in many cases a report”,

from an expert,

“will be sufficient to produce a settlement … where this is not possible, its contents will enable solicitors to decide whether the case can or cannot be taken on a C.F.A.”.

These are two great virtues. Even those in this Committee who have had nothing to do with clinical negligence claims—I congratulate them because these cases are grisly affairs and perhaps the most unsatisfactory and anguish-making aspect of litigation—will know that the expert’s report is absolutely crucial to everything to do with the case. It currently determines whether you get legal aid, and, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, said, in future if the reform goes through it will determine whether you get effective coverage under a conditional fee agreement.

I will give the vivid example of a case notified to me by Emma Braithwaite, a solicitor with the National Health Service Wales Shared Services Partnership. Noble Lords may not know that Wales is way ahead of us in trying to find a via media between conflicting issues in clinical negligence cases. Amendment 99A attempts to address the general picture. This particular case was finalised by the payment of damages by the NHS of £4,500. The costs, which NHS Wales had to pay, were £95,897. Roughly half the amount—£44,000—went on legal fees. The case was conducted under the conditional fee system. The balance was mainly experts’ fees.

The case was always small; it was never a case in which large damages would ever be contemplated. The initial offer from the NHS was £3,000, which as I said, settled on £4,500. In a nutshell that explains why we will spend more time on clinical negligence than many who are not lawyers can readily understand. However, it makes it absolutely clear that we need to introduce effective, practical reforms that will make this whole area of litigation fairer, cheaper and speedier. That is why Amendment 30A is in this group.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Lord Phillips of Sudbury and Lord Carlile of Berriew

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, in this context, unlike my noble friends and other noble Lords who have spoken, I propose to speak in support of the Government and of the proposals in this part of the Bill. I hesitate to dice with a great historian on matters of history, but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Morgan, that he was a little selective in his expression of the historical context. First, in describing Regulation 18B, perhaps he should have told the House that it was of a completely different character. The way in which it was made meant that the victim or subject knew nothing at all of the reasons why the order was made. The so-called tribunal that heard Regulation 18B cases was completely lacking in transparency of any kind. The great dissenting judgment of that wonderful Welsh judge, Lord Atkin, in Liversidge v Anderson took decades to be accepted as the norm for judicial review. Although Churchill described Regulation 18B and its procedures as,

“in the highest degree odious”,

a phrase that has become celebrated, the fact remains that during Churchill’s prime ministership numerous people—indeed, hundreds of people—were imprisoned as a result of it, and he did not take steps to legislate in favour of that dissenting judgment. Indeed, it was long after he had ceased to be Prime Minister that that happened. I think that the lessons of history as described by the noble Lord are not terribly helpful.

One should also bear in mind that whether we are talking about control orders or the diluted version in TPIMs—admittedly only slightly diluted, apart from the matter that we are going to consider in the next group—they do not involve the incarceration of the individual. They involve some restrictions on the individual’s freedom which I understand most in this House regard as proportionate and reasonable given the requirements of national security.

My noble friend looks as though he wants to intervene, but then he always does. Does he want to?

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

He does. It seems to me that my noble friend’s historic account of Regulation 18B omits to mention that it was prevalent during wartime and that, as soon as that was over, it was repealed.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Which was one of the reasons why it was so unjust, because a very large number of people were made the subject of Regulation 18B and almost none of them had any evidence of any kind whatever against them. When we are dealing with TPIMs or control orders, we have individuals against whom there is very robust intelligence. I do not think my noble friend has had the opportunity to read that intelligence, but had he done so he would undoubtedly be so satisfied, being a reasonable person.