Charities Bill [HL]
Lord Phillips of Sudbury Excerpts(12 years, 8 months ago)
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Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, it is a strange feeling to be moving a group of amendments that comprise the totality of the amendments to this 250-page Bill. But this is a consolidation Bill. As one who has served on the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills, I know well enough that on consolidation one is not allowed to change substantive law. I emphasise that the amendments that I have tabled and the comments that I am about to make bear no ill reflection whatever on the Bill team or the parliamentary draftsman. Indeed, I have had the utmost co-operation from all of them.
However, with a Bill that affects the voluntary sector in particular, one must seek to make that measure as comprehensible as possible. I could not refrain from tabling a set of amendments to attempt to make the crucial definition clauses of the Bill fractionally more understandable to the lay reader. The last thing one wants in the world when legislating for the voluntary sector is to force it into the hands of lawyers who will do their best but who, I am afraid, are expensive beasts. I speak as one of 53 years duration. The amendments taken as a group effect no change but they see the definition of “charitable purpose” or “charitable purposes” brought into one clause, Clause 2, which will then enable Clause 11 to be removed from the Bill. In practical terms, that will be of considerable benefit.
Before explaining why, I should say to the Committee that I am aware that Section 73 of the Charities Act 2006 requires a review of the 2006 Act, which is about to commence, which will end with a report being placed before Parliament. Indeed, I was instrumental, with others, in getting that unusual provision written into the 2006 Act. But there is nothing in the Act to say that anything shall flow from the report. I produced this amendment determined that at least in the interim years—one could be talking about quite a few years, even an eternity, before any amendments are made to this Bill—the definition clause should be a little more understandable.
Why is it more understandable? I wish sometimes that one could annex to technical amendments such as this a copy of the clause they seek to amend, incorporating the amendments. The amendments seek to get rid of Clause 11, which defines “charitable purposes” or “charitable purpose” differently from the definition in Clause 2. Clause 1 defines “charity” in a way which is difficult to reconcile. It is reconcilable but only by dint of considerable legal subtlety. It is already difficult to reconcile Clause 1 with Clause 2. The last thing in the world one wants is for the unwary reader—that is to say he or she who does not plough all the way through the Bill—then to find that there is a different definition of “charitable purposes” in Clause 11. As I say, that in itself represents a significant practical improvement in the Bill because the definition of “charitable purpose” or “charitable purposes”—those two phrases are used in different places in the Bill—and the definition of “charity” itself are the linchpin definitions of the entire Bill.
I had hoped to simplify the Bill further. However, I received a communication from the Bill team which made clear that the extent of the use of the phrase “charitable purposes” or “charitable purpose” is unknown. The Committee may think it rather extraordinary that we have no place to which anyone, including the parliamentary draftsman, can go to be informed about all the uses of the phrase “charitable purposes” throughout our primary and secondary legislation. There is no such source of information. In the age of technical wizardry that defect could and should be resolved, not just for the benefit of the experts but for the many who will have to interpret this and many other statutory provisions in the future. As one of the letters that I received from the Bill team stated, there are what they call “known unknowns”—I like that phrase—which is another way of saying “We haven’t a clue”. The document continues:
“While we are able relatively easily to search the database of General Public Acts for references to ‘charitable purposes’, the same cannot be said of subordinate legislation (as defined for the purposes of clause 2), not all of which is stored in the available databases, or private Acts, hardly any of which are in the available databases”.
I have tabled my modest but, I think, significant amendment in the hope that the Government may say that they think it is an improvement but in the expectation that, given the complexity of the whole—I nearly used a Saxon word—business, they will need further time in order to clear the decks as regards simplifying these crucial clauses. I look forward to hearing what my noble friend has to say in replying to these amendments. I am grateful for the Committee’s patience.
Baroness Finlay of Llandaff
I rise briefly to support the spirit of what the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, has said because when people are setting up charities they often try to find ways around the complexity of registering a charity. There is an enormous number of charities and sometimes it is extremely difficult to be clear whether they truly are charities. I say that as a patron of several small charities from their outset. One often has a sense of when a “charitable purpose” really is a charitable purpose and when it is stretching the limits, but that has implications for donors and the Charity Commission. The reference to “known unknowns” is reasonable. In many aspects of life we know that new situations will arise but we do not know what they will be. The danger is that matters can be contested at a later stage. The noble Lord has thrown down a rather wonderful challenge to the Government. I look forward to hearing their response.
Baroness Verma
My Lords, I start by thanking all noble Lords who have taken part in this important but short debate. I welcome the opportunity to try to explain the Government’s position as clearly as I can.
I welcome the knowledge and expertise of my noble friend Lord Phillips in charity law and his assiduousness in scrutinising legislation that affects charities. I know that he has taken a very close interest in the consolidation Bill. Earlier this year he raised a number of points with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, the chairman of the Joint Committee on Consolidation Bills. He has also since then discussed various points with the Bill team in considerable detail. As a result, we have been able to make some important drafting improvements at the Joint Committee stage and we are extremely grateful to my noble friend for that.
The amendments tabled by my noble friend concern the relationship between Clauses 2 and 11. I know that my noble friend's object here is to make further drafting improvements. However, the discussions we have engaged in with him have indicated that his concerns go deeper than that. As a result, we have already undertaken to address the underlying problem that he has raised. This can be done only outside the consolidation process. I shall explain that in a little more detail in a moment but perhaps I may just set the context for this discussion. Clauses 2 and 11 reproduce the existing law as it has stood since the passing of the Charities Act 2006. We are not aware of anyone having expressed concerns about these provisions at the time of the passing of the 2006 Act. Furthermore, at no point in the consultation process on the present Bill has anyone expressed any concerns about the relationship between Clauses 2 and 11. The draft Bill was the subject of full public consultation in 2009 and has the support of the charities sector and the Charity Commission.
I should explain that Clauses 2 and 11 contain two subtly different definitions of “charitable purpose”, one of a very general application and the other of a much more limited application. Two types of suggestion have been made about the relationship between these clauses. The first involves changing the law; the second aims simply to improve the drafting of the Bill. The suggestion between Second Reading and the Joint Committee proceedings was of the first type. It was suggested that instead of the two subtly different meanings of “charitable purpose” applying in different contexts, there should be one definition of “charitable purpose” applying across the board. Unfortunately, substituting a single definition of “charitable purpose” cannot be achieved without changing the law. It is not permissible within the constraints of the consolidation process for the Bill to change the law. So no amendments were tabled at Joint Committee to Clauses 2 or 11, and the Joint Committee agreed to the clauses as drafted.
The amendments that my noble friend has now tabled aim to improve the drafting of the Bill without changing the law. However, we are not convinced that this is the right response to the real issue that my noble friend has raised. The fundamental issue—it is one that we recognise—is that it is awkward to have two definitions of “charitable purpose” applying in different contexts. The amendments that the noble Lord has tabled do not remove this awkwardness; they merely present it differently. We think that the right thing to do is not to make drafting changes to the Bill, but instead to seek to address the underlying issue.
We recognise that it could be a desirable simplification to substitute the two definitions applying in different contexts by a single definition applying across the board. However, it is clear that this cannot be done through this Bill. I have therefore already suggested to my noble friend that it can be considered as part of the forthcoming review of the Charities Act 2006. It appears that there is a case for simplification here, and we believe that the review is the right place to explore thoroughly the legal changes that would be required to achieve this simplification.
I return to the amendments before us. The drafting of the consolidation Bill is a very technical business and the provisions have already been very clearly considered and given a clean bill of health by the Joint Committee. However, my noble friend has tabled what amount to detailed drafting points so I will explain why we resist these amendments.
I will begin by saying that we think that the way in which the definitions of “charity” and “charitable purpose” are structured in the Bill is an improvement on the current legislation. In particular, putting the 1993 Act definitions in Part 1 of the Bill next to the 2006 Act definitions makes them more visible to the reader. In the Government's view, my noble friend’s amendments would not improve this drafting. First, we think that the amendments would damage the logical structure of Part 1 of the Bill by taking a definition that belongs in Chapter 2 and putting it into Chapter 1 where it does not belong. I will explain that in a little more detail. As is clear from its title, Part 1 of the Bill is concerned with the definitions of “charity” and “charitable purpose”. Chapter 1 of Part 1 deals with definitions that apply generally—that is, in legislation generally and in documents, and in England and Wales as well as, for certain purposes, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Chapter 2 of Part 1 deals with definitions that have a much more limited application—that is, they apply only in England and Wales, and only to provisions deriving from the Charities Act 1993. The different scope of the two chapters is signalled by the chapter titles. Chapter 1 is headed “General” and Chapter 2 is headed “Special provision for this Act”. It is not a drafting improvement to interfere with this structure.
Furthermore, we think it is undesirable to confuse the picture for readers in Scotland and Northern Ireland by injecting into Chapter 1 a definition that concerns the interpretation of provisions that relate only to England and Wales. Chapter 1 affects the law of Scotland and Northern Ireland for certain purposes relating loosely to fiscal matters.
Finally, in our view the amendments would be inconsistent in that they would leave two alternative definitions of “charity” in Chapters 1 and 2. If the two alternative definitions of “charitable purpose” are brought together in the way suggested, it would seem illogical to leave the two definitions of “charity” in separate places.
I am keen that progress on this Bill is not unduly delayed. I therefore ask the noble Lord to accept the assurances that I have offered him. Of course, he will have a further opportunity to debate this matter when the 2006 Act comes under review later in the year. I am sure that my noble friend’s expertise would be very welcome at any further deliberations on the matters of concern that he has raised in his amendments. We are willing to ensure that the underlying issue to which he has helpfully drawn attention is addressed in its proper forum. On that basis, I invite him to withdraw his drafting amendment.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for her careful response. I have to say that some of the refinements in her reply will bear a little more scrutiny of Hansard on my part. She made the point about Part 1 and Chapter 1 applying to England and Wales generally, although to Scotland and Northern Ireland to some extent. That point is not apparent at all from the way in which Clause 11 is currently drafted. While I will of course withdraw the amendment tonight, as I told her I would, I would like to engage in further discussion on this issue in the hope that something can be done to improve things before we get to Report. I will just tell the House—because it is another measure of what a nonsense we have got our affairs into—that last year the Finance Act created an entirely new definition of “charitable purposes” with a schedule extending that definition that runs to eight pages. I am afraid that our legal system has burgeoned out of all sense and has become counterproductive. With that vindictive spirit, I withdraw my amendment.
Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill
Lord Phillips of Sudbury Excerpts(12 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I rise to speak to the amendment tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Tonge. Like the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, I will abbreviate my remarks in view of the opening comments by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, with which I wholly concur. Indeed, my amendment differs from his and from that in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and my noble friends Lord Lester and Lady Tonge, in only one particular respect. The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, allows—indeed, requires—a justice of the peace to get the advice of the DPP on the advisability of granting a warrant. The amendment tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, and others would allow the court to receive advice from the DPP. I am adamant that any advice given with regard to these matters, which are intrinsically important, must be in open court. It is for the DPP to take the opportunity which is available under both those amendments, I think, to go to the court and argue the matter in open court, not by way of written private advice.
I think that the status quo is perfectly satisfactory and that meddling with citizens’ rights in the age of the overmighty state is extremely dangerous. Like the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, I drafted my amendment and put it down before I saw the evidence submitted by Justice, Liberty and the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It is worth putting on the record not only that the Joint Committee argued long, fully and with conviction that the arrangements in this Bill are wrong in principle and in practice and ended up, I am happy to say, taking exactly the line that the amendment tabled in my name takes. The same was true of Liberty. Justice simply wanted Clause 154 removed alltogether, leaving things entirely with the status quo.
At least my amendment will give further strength to the procedure if that is needed. I do not think that it is but I put it forward in a conciliatory way. As has been said, it is worth briefly repeating that we already have judicial oversight under existing law. It is already the practice to deal with these extremely difficult applications for warrant only before a district judge—who we used to call a stipendiary—who is not only a professional judge but also, because they are heard before the City of Westminster Bench, is a specialist in matters of this type. The district judges concerned deal, for example, with terrorism extradition cases. The judge, whoever he or she is, must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds that the offence has been committed and that there is admissible evidence which, if uncontradicted, could establish the elements of the offence.
There is also of course state immunity. State immunity was exercised in the case of General Mofaz in February 2004 when he was saved from the issue of a warrant on the grounds of state immunity. Let us not forget that the Attorney-General has the right to intervene and issue a nolle prosequi, which puts an end to it. The Attorney-General will do that on grounds of public interest. As I have said, this is a misguided provision. Perhaps I may quickly read the conclusion of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which is extremely clear in explaining the difference between the Bill and my amendment. It states that “The difference between notification” of the DPP “and consent” of the DPP,
“would be significant. On notification, even if the DPP applied the general prosecutorial test in determining whether to intervene in an application, the ultimate decision on whether to issue an arrest warrant would lie with the Magistrate on the test applied at the present. By contrast, if consent is a precursor, then the determinative decision will in practice be that of the DPP”.
Finally, it is relevant to say that, in the Gourier case, Lord Wilberforce said that the right of the private citizen to apply for a warrant and to take a prosecution is,
“a valuable corrective against the inertia or partiality on the part of authority”.
On another occasion, Lord Diplock made comparable remarks. For those reasons, it would be a retrograde step to approve the Bill as it stands.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
I shall speak to the amendment in the names of my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who cannot be here this evening, and myself. From the position of practitioners with hands-on experience of the criminal courts throughout our legal careers, we believe that the existing system works perfectly adequately. I concur with the views that have already been expressed in that way. Few applications are made and, of those that are, most are rejected by the magistrate who is the highly experienced person. Why then is there a need to move away from the current position? We are told that it is because there are people who feel that if they come to this country they may be subject to a private prosecution and to arrest.
Those who feel that way in foreign countries simply do not understand the practice and procedure of our courts. It is strange to amend our law not because of a real problem but because there are people abroad who believe that a problem exists when it does not. We are moving from the position that if the Government want to introduce the question of the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions, it should be made equally clear at the same time that the tests to be applied are those which would be applied in an ordinary criminal case in this country. No special tests will be needed for those from abroad and who face allegations of offences of universal jurisdiction.
We feel that the tests that are to be applied are those of the existing discretions of the Director of Public Prosecutions. I have been approached today by my noble friend Lord Carlile in his usual genial and understated way to point out that the tests applied by the DPP are in fact subject to change. The guidance has changed in some ways. My noble friend tells me that we are now on the seventh version of guidance issued to public prosecutors. If that is the case, it is perfectly simple to redraft on Report the amendment that we have put forward so that we put in a broader way that the same tests which apply to citizens of this country will also apply in the case of people who come to this country.
But there is a difference with private prosecutions. Let me say that no practising criminal lawyer has any time for private prosecutions. They generally fail, and generally they cause great harm and trouble to people. We feel that prosecution should be in the hands of people charged with those duties; namely, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Crown Prosecution Service, which acts under the director. The distinction is that the arrest warrant in a private prosecution leads to trial. When the police arrest someone, there is an arrest, and then there is a consideration of evidence that is obtained between arrest and charge. The charge is brought on the advice of the CPS only where there is sufficient evidence for the case to go forward. At that intermediate stage, the charge does not exist in private prosecutions, and therefore the issuing of an arrest warrant leads, as I have said, straight to trial. We believe that safeguards are needed.
We start from the basis that there is no need to amend the existing position.
Lord Pannick
I certainly agree that the DPP should apply the same standards in the sense that he asks whether there is a realistic prospect of conviction and whether the public interest justifies a prosecution. The application of those principles, though, will inevitably depend on all the facts and circumstances of the individual case. It would be unprecedented for Parliament to tell the DPP in detail how to apply his discretion, and there is nothing in what the DPP said to the Public Bill Committee that should cause concern to noble Lords about the manner in which he proposes to exercise this new power if he is given it.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I think it is fair that I ask the noble Lord this. He has said several times now that the consent of the Attorney-General to one of these prosecutions is required. My understanding, and I want to get this quite clear, is that the Attorney-General can issue a nolle prosequi that his consent is not required.
Lord Pannick
It amounts to the same thing. If the Attorney-General takes the view that it is inappropriate for a prosecution to continue, they will say so. The purpose of the provision of English law is to ensure that the Attorney-General is able, in this sensitive and important context, to take a view on whether it is appropriate.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, to pursue the point, there is a vast difference, with respect, between getting the consent of the Attorney-General as a prerequisite and the right of the Attorney-General to intervene by way of nolle prosequi. The noble Lord is mistaken in what he draws from that.
Lord Pannick
My understanding is that consent is required. In any event, with great respect, I do not see the practical difference. Other noble Lords will assist the Committee in that respect.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, made no reference to the advice given by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the noble and learned Baroness has made no such reference. Does that mean that she sets its advice at nought?
Baroness Scotland of Asthal
No, my Lords, certainly not. I was seeking to relieve the Committee of the burden of listening to me for more than was absolutely necessary, bearing in mind that we are now at 9.19 pm and the Government have yet to respond. Of course, it is for the Government to deal with these matters. I simply wanted to make plain that we on this side would support the analysis made by the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Pannick, and my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith. I thought that that would be the fastest way. I am sure that we can return to this on Report. If the Committee would love to hear from me on that basis, I am sure that I could entertain your Lordships for some considerable time. But, at this time of night, something told me that the Committee would not thank me. For that reason, I have curtailed my remarks. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, need have no such restraint.
Identity Documents Bill
Lord Phillips of Sudbury Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Morris of Aberavon
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made a powerful case on whether or not a right of property has been established. He made an equally powerful case on the last occasion that we debated the matter. I asked then whether advice had been sought by the Minister, particularly from the law officers, as that would have been helpful. I understood that we might be told before Third Reading that that advice had been sought. In the Bill there is a declaration that the legislation is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. Having heard the powerful arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is the Minister satisfied that that is the case?
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My name was on the amendment and I have listened carefully to what my noble friend the Minister said in opening the debate. Three issues need clarifying before we can safely push this matter forward. The first has been well aired—namely, whether this is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The noble Baroness will tell us very soon whether she has had clear advice from the law officers that it is compatible. I line up with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick: it is difficult to comprehend that this confiscatory measure can be consistent with the protocol. That is the first issue.
The second issue has also been well aired—my noble friend Lady Hamwee has just referred to it—namely, whether we can at this juncture pick a fight with the Commons on its reasons. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said and I would be the first to leap on to the barricades if I felt that the privileges of this House were being undermined, but we need clear advice on that. Perhaps the learned Clerk may have something to say. I am very disappointed to see him shake his bewigged head. My own sense, for what it is worth, is that the Commons have a case. The amendment is a specifically money amendment; it specifically commits the Exchequer to compensation at the rate of £30 per ID card surrendered.
Lord Howarth of Newport
Does the noble Lord agree that this is about expenditure and not about revenue raising? It is a relevant distinction.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My understanding of the conventions is that we have no right to impose expenditure on the Commons and this is an expenditure provision—an expenditure of £30 per card surrendered. However, that is another matter on which we must have absolutely clear advice. It would be folly for us to go ahead today—
Lord Low of Dalston
If we cannot contest the issue of financial privilege, why is it being raised at this stage when it was not raised when we debated the matter previously? If it is a matter of financial privilege, why was it permissible for this House to debate the matter previously and to pass the amendment that it did? Would it not have been appropriate to make the point that this was a matter of financial privilege and not open to the House at that stage?
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am obliged to the noble Lord for his intervention—of course, he is right—but I took some comfort on the day that we debated and passed the amendment from the fact that my noble friend the Minister made no reference to privilege. I took that, obviously fallaciously, as indicating a potential open-mindedness on the part of the coalition Government, my Government, to think again on this issue were we in this House to pass the amendment that we did. That is my third point: regardless of whether the two legal issues here are stoppers, I would have hoped—even at this stage, given that views across this House have been expressed with not a single voice in favour of what the Commons are proposing to do vis-à-vis the amendment—that my noble friend would be able with my other friends in government to do the right thing. The right thing is abundantly clear. My noble friend talked of effectiveness and efficiency. It is not effectiveness or efficiency that we are talking about here; it is fairness, which is the single most important claim made by my Government. I want to see them walk the talk.
Lord Howarth of Newport
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, suggested that we should resolve this matter by a vote. I am not entirely clear whether it is the position of the Minister that the House should not be entitled to vote because the Government are claiming financial privilege.
Baroness Anelay of St Johns
My Lords, it is customary, when one Peer in this House asks a question, that permission is granted for an answer to be given, if the Minister wishes to do so, before another Peer gets up. I merely ask that we might follow some of the usual courtesies today.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am grateful for the noble Baroness allowing me to respond to the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, on which, although he is my friend, I have to say I disagree. The points being made are not remotely trivial and I really believe that the House will be much clearer in its mind if we deal with this preliminary matter first, because, frankly, to go ahead and vote when a crucial, central and legal matter is unresolved seems to be the worst of all worlds. That is why I would favour an adjournment, as suggested by my noble friend Lord Dholakia.
Lord Davies of Stamford
My Lords, does this not go to the heart of parliamentary government as we know it and understand it in this country? The Minister gave a clear and solemn undertaking on a previous occasion that she would seek the law officers’ advice on a specific point. How can it possibly be “inappropriate”, to use her term, for her now to tell the House whether or not she fulfilled that solemn commitment? It is quite clear to me that if the Minister gives a solemn commitment and then refuses to say even whether that commitment has been fulfilled, and the House does nothing about it and simply goes away, we have abdicated our responsibilities as a Parliament.
Immigration: Home Office Procedures
Lord Phillips of Sudbury Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, I am afraid that I do not know. You will have to wait and see.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I express an interest as a lawyer whose firm does a lot of immigration and asylum work, and I preface my question by saying that what I have to ask has no effect on the numbers coming in. As my noble friend the Minister will know, the previous Government tried their best to simplify the procedure for those applying for immigration and asylum and to move to a points-based system. The situation now, however, is that the questionnaire that applicants have to fill in is 60 pages of technical, concentrated stuff. If they get any aspect of it wrong, they fail. Legal aid is being withdrawn for asylum. Will my noble friend at least review the questionnaire process in order to simplify and clarify it?
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, we should try to make these procedures as comprehensible, simple and clear as we can, consistent with having to acquire the correct information. We will see what we can do.
Identity Documents Bill
Lord Phillips of Sudbury Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, my name is on Amendment 2. I led the opposition from these benches to the Identity Cards Bill. I spent a good deal of one year of my life opposing it. I am therefore utterly delighted that this Bill is before the House. However, I have to say that, for me, it is slighted by the denial of reimbursement of the fee paid by 12,000 of our fellow citizens when they took out this card. Had they been told at the time they took out the card that they were in danger of losing the card and not being reimbursed, then that would be different. Had the coalition partners in their election manifestos said not merely that they would revoke the whole of the ID card scheme, but not compensate those who had taken cards in the interim, then that would be different. But neither of those circumstances prevails. I really do not think that it is remotely acceptable, for the reasons which the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, laid out in moving the amendment. It simply is not acceptable to say, “Ah, but they should have realised”, which is what it boils down to.
Governments must set an example of the standards they expect of private industry. Had private industry engaged in a tactic of this sort, noble Lords on all the Benches would have been up in arms, and rightly so. I feel probably more strongly than I ought to that there is a simple, basic issue of fairness in this. Since this coalition launched itself as a coalition on the basis of fairness, I felt compelled, contrary to the wishes of my Whips, to put my name to this amendment, and I have done so with some conviction.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I support noble Lords who have spoken. Will the noble Baroness tell the House whether she disputes that the card is property for the purposes of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights? Its cancellation is therefore a deprivation of property and compensation is payable. It would be most unfortunate if those whose cards are being taken away need to litigate this matter.
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, I said that I will indeed confirm the advice that we have received on the legal aspects.
I want to make one final point before concluding: I am not sure whether the concern which has been expressed in this House is entirely shared by the public. Much has been made of public attitudes but, against the background of 15,000 cards having been taken out, we in the Government have received a grand total of 297 letters on the subject, of which 122 included complaints about refunds. That is 122 against 15,000. We should bear in mind that that is against the background of sending letters to all individuals who had taken out a card when we came into office, so one cannot say that they were uninformed about what was going to happen—that they would not be receiving a refund, because that is what we told them. That letter is also in the Library. So—
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I regret interrupting the Minister again but it really is crucial, if I may say so, for her to draw a distinction between information given to people before they purchased their cards and information given to people after they purchased their cards. Therefore, I hope that she will not lay any stress at all on what she has just said.
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, I understand that difference. I am saying that all 15,000 cardholders were informed specifically and in terms that these cards would be withdrawn, that they would not be valid thereafter and that there would be no refund. We have had 122 letters of complaint, not necessarily all of them from actual cardholders. I do not think that that indicates a very high level of concern about £30. One has to take into account—
Baroness Neville-Jones
Perhaps I may just say that I have undertaken to take the point away. I have done so in good faith and noble Lords may rely on my good faith.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I say to the Minister that her good faith is not at issue at all. The issue is whether it is possible under the rules of the House to bring back at Third Reading an amendment that has been moved on Report. I would like advice from the Clerk because, with great respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, I do not think that that is within the rubric of the House.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
It is not me to give this advice, except in response to what my noble friend has asked. However, as I understand it, it is certainly within the rules of the House to bring back the matter at Third Reading if it has not been decided before that.
“Independent review
(1) The Secretary of State must, within 3 months of the coming into force of this Act, appoint an independent person to keep under review the arrangements for the time being maintained by the Secretary of State (and any person or authority to whom or to which he delegates any related function) for the purpose of his functions under this Act or any subordinate legislation made under it.
(2) The person so appointed shall report annually the findings of his review to the Secretary of State, with such report being made contemporaneously available to Parliament.”
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, this amendment was moved in Committee. I bring it back and I hope that what my noble friend may have to say in response to my moving it will assuage the concerns that exist in this House about the dismantling of this complex scheme. Let us make no bones about it, the national identity register and all that is therewith and the dismantling of the whole apparatus is no simple matter, hence a 12-page Bill. The object of the exercise is to ensure that there should be an independent review to satisfy this place and the other place that all has been done properly and well, particularly of some of the subcontractors in relation to the national identity register and the deletion in a safe way of the mass of information that they already hold.
Clause 51 of the Data Protection Act 1998 imposes a general duty on the Information Commissioner to promote the eight data protection principles. They are all very sensible principles and the network of those eight principles provides reassurance that use of data is not improper. However, that is a general duty. There is no specific obligation that one can point to arising from those eight principles in terms of the national information register that we are dealing with here.
Those who have added their names to the amendment and, at an earlier stage, Earl Erroll—
Earl Ferrers
My noble friend referred to Earl Erroll. Actually, he should have said the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, but if he was going to say Earl Erroll, he ought to have said the Earl of Erroll.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am thoroughly schooled, my Lords, and deeply grateful to—I scarcely dare address him now—the noble Earl Ferrers.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Oh my gosh. I shall go back to school.
This is a basic and simple matter. I shall be interested to hear what the Minister says in response to the amendment.
Lord Maxton
My Lords, the noble Lord who moved the amendment may be slightly surprised to know that I support it, but for reasons that are rather different from those that he put before the House. A friend of mine described the Bill as the King Canute Bill; in other words, it is doing away with something—identity cards—which, in a relatively short time, whatever Government are in power, will have to be reintroduced. That is almost inevitable. I would hope that an appointed independent person would give that recommendation to the Government of the day and say, “Sorry, we have got it wrong. It is time that we reintroduced ID cards”. I agree entirely with my friend’s view, except that poor old King Canute is the most maligned man in English history, because he never suggested that he could hold back the tide. What he said to his courtiers was, “I cannot hold back the tide”. I suppose that it is the first example of PR going badly wrong.
There will come a point where the need for smart card technology will become such that we will have to introduce an identity cards Bill. This amendment would at least allow an independent person to look at it and say, “Sorry, we’ve got it wrong. Let’s have another look. Let’s introduce ID cards”.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I thank the noble Lord for giving way. Before we forget, we need to remember that the ID system that we are abolishing was not obnoxious for the mere card; it was obnoxious for the national identity register which carried a mass of personal information and which Microsoft reckoned would become the greatest honey pot in the world for crime.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
I shall make two points about that. First, I fully understand the point that the noble Lord is raising. It is quite remarkable that we have reached a situation in which private sector companies such as Google are allowed to amass a massive amount of information and then use it for marketing purposes. Frankly, I have some concerns about that. I understand the noble Lord’s concerns.
Baroness Neville-Jones
Two separate issues seem to have been debated under this amendment. The first was whether one needs the extraordinary amount of information that would have been contained on the national identity register as a means of establishing ID cards, and whether that is the kind of thing that we want to see reintroduced, which I certainly do not believe to be the case. The second issue, which is the proper intention of the amendment, is about ensuring that information retained by the Government is properly governed and accountable. On that second point, I share absolutely the preoccupations of those who have proposed the amendment, but I have reservations about the method that they have chosen to achieve the end. In effect, the amendment establishes a new individual—some sort of passport commissioner—who would have the job of overseeing how the data were used and retained by the IPS. That would also be the case in connection with information received by third parties for the validation of passport applications.
In our view, the Information Commissioner has significant powers, and we would regard them as sufficient to examine and consider or scrutinise any of the data processed within the IPS. I think that the noble Lord has had a conversation with the Information Commissioner to that effect. My impression of the Information Commissioner is that he takes a considerable interest in the operation of the Act and has powers to serve the IPS with a notice to allow him, or his staff, to find out whether the IPS is complying with the Data Protection Act, which is the governing Act here. He is able to oblige the IPS to allow him or his staff to enter any premises and to show any of the specified documents or to see any of the information of the specified descriptions that he wishes to inspect.
Those are very considerable powers. I share the preoccupation of the House in ensuring that Government retain information only for the purposes for which it is genuinely needed and they are governed in ways which ensure that that is the case—that it is not used for purposes for which it was not specified and for which the Government are not entitled to use it. It is important for us to ensure that this is the case, and to talk to the Information Commissioner to ensure that he is able and willing to exercise his powers in this way, which I believe to be the case. I ask the noble Lord if on that basis, and with an assurance from the Government that we will take the intent of this amendment seriously, he is willing to withdraw his amendment?
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am grateful for what my noble friend the Minister has said. I am happy to withdraw the amendment, but would she keep us informed about the conversations she intends to have with the Information Commissioner? Could she assure us of that?
Identity Documents Bill
Lord Phillips of Sudbury Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee
I have Amendments 13 and 15 in this group, which also contains Amendments 14 and 16 in the name of my noble friend Lord Phillips. Amendment 13 is in my name and that of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, who has asked me to say that he is sorry that he cannot be here this afternoon and that he very much supports the amendment, which in a way is a little embarrassing for me, as this is only a probing amendment, as indeed are all my amendments this afternoon.
Amendment 13 would insert the words “knowingly and” before “without reasonable excuse” in Clause 6(1). On the first day of Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Brooke, took us into some Latin terminology and I suppose that I shall, too, in asking whether mens rea—a guilty mind—is included in Clause 6(1). It is not obvious that it is covered by the phrase “without reasonable excuse” but, as the clause creates an offence, the “knowingly” aspect may well be imported in any event.
Amendment 15 would remove paragraphs (e) and (f) from Clause 7(1). It enables me to ask the Minister whether offences already exist relating to the misuse of driving licences. It struck me as odd to think that such offences came into effect only with the 2006 Act, so I would be interested to hear why it is necessary to refer to them at this point. I beg to move.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, the other two amendments in this group, Amendments 14 and 16, are in my name. I reiterate what my noble friend said about the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, who has put his name to both my amendments.
The purpose of Amendment 14 is to get on record—this may help those who have to interpret the statute—an explanation of the difference between Clause 6(1)(a), which my amendment would delete, and Clause 4(1)(a). If the Minister could explain the intended difference between the offences laid out in those two paragraphs, that would be extremely helpful, as they are close in wording, albeit with different conditions. Amendment 14 is truly a probing amendment.
Amendment 16 relates to Clause 8, which is headed, “Meaning of ‘personal information’”. The phrase “personal information” is used in Clauses 4 and 5. My amendment seeks to clarify paragraph (l) of Clause 8(1). I ask the Committee to humour my error in framing the amendment. Its first word, “or”, is redundant and my amendment should therefore read,
“in relation to any identity documents”.
The paragraph, as it stands, refers only to “documents”, not “identity documents”, which my amendment does. The term “identity document” is defined in Clause 7, but I am concerned that the paragraph could refer to, for example, a rating return, a television licence or any one of many other documents which identify the person to whom they relate and which contain numbers allocated to person A. I should be grateful if the Minister could say whether I am right or wrong in seeking to confine the personal information defined in paragraph (l) to that which relates only to identity documents, as defined in Clause 7.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Neville-Jones)
My Lords, I am not sure as to whether I am lost. Let me try to explain the differences. One of the difficulties that noble Lords are having relates to whether there is a difference between Clauses 4 and 6, to which my noble friend Lord Phillips referred. Clause 4(1)(a) requires proof of improper intention and so requires proof that a person has used a document or has allowed it to be used by another person. On the other hand, Clause 6(1)(a) requires only proof of possession of such a document. There is a difference between having something in your hand and having it in your hand when someone else has knowingly permitted you to use it wrongly. These clauses are different in their purpose.
More generally, I confess that I am concerned about the amendments, which are intended to bring greater clarity to the offences that are being re-enacted. I remind noble Lords that these clauses are re-enacted from the Identity Cards Act 2006. We do not believe that the proposed amendments offer anything of substance and we are concerned that they may cause confusion at the level of investigation and enforcement. As I mentioned on Monday, the definitions of offences work well on a daily basis—there are more than 3,000 convictions a year for false applications and attempts to get false documents. That is clearly an important element in trying to prevent identity fraud. Therefore, we are anxious to keep the effectiveness of these provisions in the Act.
As we know, the Identity Cards Act is four years old and, as I mentioned previously, we want in the near future to review the existing offences under this Act, the Fraud Act 2006 and the 2001 legislation on fraud and counterfeiting. We want to ensure consistency between these pieces of legislation. The review will consider not only areas of overlap but what potential improvements can be made as part of the rationalisation work. As I mentioned in our discussion on Monday, we would welcome the views of noble Lords on that when the review work is completed. As things stand, we would like to transpose—the transposition would be direct and unaltered—the existing clauses in the previous Act. We do not want to start altering them now, because we will be carrying out a more extensive and substantive review in a short while.
The noble Lord also asked about the definition of “personal information”, which is relevant to the offences set out in Clauses 4 and 5. As drafted, included within the definition of personal information is information about numbers allocated to a person for identification purposes and information about documents to which the numbers relate. For example, this could include the number of a departmental pass or the fact that the number related to a pass issued by a particular department. If you suspect that someone is trying to assume another person’s identity, that kind of information would be helpful to them and they would be all the more likely to use a guise of that kind given their knowledge of the document to which it relates.
The link between the number and the document would be lost by the wording of the amendment because the amendment would bring within the definition of personal information,
“information in relation to any identity documents”.
We are not clear about what is intended or to what extent the amendment adds to the matters set out in paragraphs (a) to (k) in Clause 8(1).
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
The Minister mentioned that a departmental pass would be a document under this paragraph. What about a television licence or a rating demand, both of which have specific numbers and relate to a particular individual? Would they be documents within this paragraph? It may be unfair to ask the noble Baroness that on the hoof—in fact, it is unfair—and I would be content to hear the answer later. But, no, here comes an answer. This is Roy Rogers at his best.
Baroness Neville-Jones
The advice that I am getting is that that would not be the case because a TV licence or similar document does not identify the individual but relates to them. That is right. You get back a receipt for the money that you have paid but it does not verify in any way the identity of the person who has paid the bill.
Lord Maxton
Perhaps I may briefly clarify that. A TV licence does not relate to an individual; it relates to the property to which it applies.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
It would seem that I have given a bad example. Does it not have the name of the licence holder on it?
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Right. It therefore identifies that person and there is a number in relation to it.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Before the noble Baroness agonises over whether to withdraw the amendment, perhaps I may ask the Minister about the review. Will it be a departmental review or will it be a more public review? Can she say something about its timing?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, perhaps before the Minister answers, I could just ask her about what it says at the top of page 6 of the Bill, in Clause 10(3)(i). Following my noble friend’s intervention on qualifying the credit reference agency, I notice that there is an open-ended paragraph that says,
“any other person specified for the purposes of this section by an order made by the Secretary of State”.
It would be helpful if the Minister could let me know either now or in writing what sort of “any other person” might be mentioned. There was a concern about the credit reference agency, but I would actually have a rather wider concern about the open-ended nature of that provision.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
To follow on from what the noble Lord has just said, I think that is why he and I and the noble Lord, Lord Brett, had an amendment asking for some oversight of the process. This is a vulnerable clause which involves discretions, and it needs some sort of review process to ensure that what should be done is done.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
Can I respond to that, as we are in Committee? The noble Lord raises an important point. I have no objection whatever to the general principle behind Clause 10, which seems entirely sensible and in the public interest. It is simply a matter of ensuring that there is due process and accountability.
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, several questions have been raised. It is indeed the case that the contract with Experian was inserted in this Bill. We are transposing it, as it was negotiated by the previous Government. I do not think that it is contrary at all to the public interest, as it is a very reputable agency and, without doubt, it provides up-to-date and accurate information in a way that financial credit reference agencies are liable to have that information, which may be less up to date in departments of government or other organisations.
Other points were raised about the power of the Secretary of State or,
“any other person specified for the purposes of this section by an order made by the Secretary of State”.
That should be related to the question of how such orders can be made, under Clause 11, of which subsection (3) states that it has to be by affirmative order. So there would indeed be opportunity for debate. I do not think that this power could conceivably be exercised on an arbitrary or unaccountable basis.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
There is a difference in how the power is granted, and the Minister is quite right in saying that the affirmative order is protection enough. But there is the practical issue of how the order is implemented. That is where one needs to come back to this matter of some sort of independent review.
Baroness Neville-Jones
I take what the noble Lord says. We come back in all of this to the relationship between the Information Commissioner, the operation of these Acts and the assiduity with which the data protection provisions are applied. The Secretary of State is in discussion with the Information Commissioner about precisely these kinds of issues to ensure that there is proper internal accountability and that he is satisfied.
I was asked how we could be certain that these powers of retaining information could be properly held and used and about the power to exercise spot checks. The noble Lord, Lord Brett, also asked a question in relation to that. The other day, we debated the different powers that would be used for different parts of the operation of this Act. If I remember rightly, a procedure is laid out that applies particularly to the destruction of information that is not part of the register but connected to the applications that go to it. They are covered by a destruction process and that process would apply in this instance because it would be in connection with the application process.
The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, asked whether there could be judicial input. I understand that a requirement to attend a magistrates’ court on every occasion that a person is working for the IPS has suspicion—I am sorry, I cannot read this. What we appear to need to do is to ensure that there is operational capability to deal with suspected offenders. I am afraid that that is not an adequate answer and I will try to clarify it in a moment. I wonder whether any Members have any other comments that they want to make.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I think that the point of this is that, before the Secretary of State can start demanding verification information from people, there must be statutory authority and that Clause 10(3)(i) is a longstop provision in case some other category of potential informants is thought by the Secretary of State to be necessary for the verification process. It seems logical, I must confess.
Identity Documents Bill
Lord Phillips of Sudbury Excerpts(13 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Rosser
My Lords, I support both the amendments in my noble friend’s name in this group and the related Amendment 4, to which I am one of the signatories. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, for also being a signatory to Amendment 4. On Second Reading, we heard the noble Earl’s views on the sense and convenience of continuing to use ID cards as travel documents in Europe, and he has re-emphasised those points today. We on these Benches share that view and the annoyance and frustration of those cardholders who, under the Bill, would be prevented from continuing to use their cards in this way. The amendments before us would enable existing ID cards to continue to be used as travel documents in Europe.
On Second Reading, having asserted that maintaining full-life validity of the existing ID cards would probably cost an extra £60 million to £80 million, which she considered to be unacceptably high, the Minister inferred that the alternative proposition of a refund of £30 to existing holders of the ID cards was unacceptable not because it was too much but because it was so trifling, since it was,
“rather less than probably most people pay for a monthly subscription to Sky”.—[Official Report, 18/10/2010; col. 742.]
That was an interesting phrase from the Minister, suggesting that Rupert Murdoch and his interests are never far from this Government’s thoughts.
ID cards were sold as documents that, among other things, would be valid as travel documents in Europe for 10 years. Those who bought the cards, planning to rely on them for future travel, will now have to spend additional money on obtaining a passport, or renewing it when it expires. Of the 12,000 to 13,000 individuals who bought ID cards, some did so because they only travel in Europe and never further afield, others because their passports were about to expire. Some bought ID cards because they were far more affordable than a full British passport. All these individuals have a right to feel cheated. They were sold a product—in this case, an identity card and its associated benefits—only to find, not that the terms of use are likely to be changed by the Government, but that the value and purpose of the document will be completely nullified without compensation. On the point of fairness, the Government's stance cannot be right. As the Minister, Mr Damian Green, eloquently put it in his impact assessment, there would be a reputational issue for the Government,
“in dealing with people who purchased a now-useless card in good faith”.
The Government's argument appears to be that because they said prior to the general election that they would scrap the ID card system, everyone should have known that, and it is their own fault if they bought one. However, the individuals concerned bought one from the Government.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Are we not now getting on to Amendment 3? The noble Lord seems to be talking entirely about compensation.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
In speaking to Amendment 3, I shall speak also to the other amendments in this group, Amendments 8 and 20. We come to a very important matter of principle—the Government’s decision to refuse to compensate cardholders for the scrapping of the scheme. My noble friend Lord Rosser already picked up some of the points when he spoke to the first group of amendments. I ask the Minister what the Government have to say to the thousands of individuals who have spent money buying cards in good faith. These cards were sold on the basis, and the purchasers were given the impression, that they would be valid for a wide range of purposes for 10 years. However, there has been a change of government, a change of policy, and seemingly no care for those left inconvenienced and out of pocket as a result. I wonder what the Government now have to say to those people. Why do the Government seem happy to penalise them?
We have been told that the cost of £360,000 to compensate all those who will be eligible for a refund under the terms of Amendment 3 is too much. However, that is the maximum figure. It is quite plausible that a certain percentage of those eligible to claim will choose not to do so. It would be possible to entertain a time limit, a date after which claims could no longer be made, which might lower the total compensation figure. However, the important factor is that compensation had been offered.
On Second Reading, the Minister said:
“We realise that some people who spent £30 for a card with a 10-year life expectancy will be disappointed that it will be cancelled later this year without any refund, but those who chose to buy a card”—
this is a remarkable statement—
“did so in the full knowledge of the unambiguous statements by the coalition parties that the scheme would be scrapped if we came to office. They cannot now expect taxpayers to bail them out”.—[Official Report, 18/10/10; col. 715.]
That is, to say the least, unsympathetic. To rely on the public having an in-depth knowledge of party manifestos or coalition agreements—documents that in most cases were published long after most cardholders had spent £30—is a touch unrealistic. The Government's continued reliance on their insistence that people knew well before the election what would happen if a Conservative Government were elected is an extraordinary decision.
I received an e-mail this morning from Mr Nicholas Hodder, who informed me that, since obtaining his ID card in May this year, he had presented it 30 times in order to enter or leave the Schengen area. I ask the Minister why someone like Mr Hodder, who in good faith purchased the ID card and has used it effectively, should suddenly be told, despite the fact that he bought it for a 10-year period, that it will be taken out of use very shortly and that he is not to receive compensation?
I pray in aid the impact assessment produced by the Minister’s department. The IA looked at five options. Under option 3, the return of cards is not required, but there will be a return of fees to current cardholders. The benefit of that option over the do-nothing option 1 is said to be:
“Reputational benefits for the government, in dealing with people who purchased a now-useless card in good faith”.
Is the Minister not concerned about the reputation of the Government? Does she not see that in not agreeing to refund £30, the Government are developing a new principle, which can only reduce trust in Governments generally? Why is it acceptable to compensate companies for termination of contracts? I refer her to the preferred option of the Government. As far as concerns funding, the cost of £22 million is contained in the summary of policy option 1 in the impact assessment. I will come on to whether it should be policy option 1. Option 1 refers to the costs of,
“termination of contracts with contractors”.
Why is it reasonable to pay the costs of terminating contracts with contractors but not with members of the public?
I refer again to the impact assessment. The preferred policy option—that of cancelling ID cards without refunds and with no requirement to return the cards—states that the £22 million includes the cost of the refund process. Clearly, at one point, the Government considered including refunds in the policy option that was being preferred; but presumably at some point they decided to drop this. None the less, it would appear that the £22 million must include the cost of refunding fees. Perhaps the Minister can clarify this point.
My confusion about the impact assessment of 26 May 2010 is that it refers to five options. Option 1, do nothing. Option 2, scrap ID cards, return of cards not required, no return of fees. Option 3, scrap ID cards, return of cards not required, return fees. Option 4, scrap ID cards, return of cards mandatory, no return of fees. Option 5, scrap ID cards, return of cards mandatory, return fees. On page 1 of the impact assessment, signed by the Minister, Damian Green, on 29 May 2010, it states:
“Option 2 is the preferred option”.
But when I turn to the analysis on page 2, this option is described in the heading as “Policy Option 1”. Can the Minister clarify exactly which option we are talking about?
That brings me to Amendment 8. This is a straightforward and, I believe, much needed addition to the Bill. Conservative Party Ministers, when in opposition, made claims about the current cost of the ID card scheme that ranged wildly from nearly £1 billion to up to £20 billion. However, the national identity service cost report of October 2009 stated that the projected forward cost of providing ID cards until 2019 was £835 million. Crucially, this figure does not equate to the savings to be made from scrapping the scheme. We know this because the impact assessment which accompanies the Bill states at the bottom of page 4 that:
“The October 2009 cost report indicated that cancellation of ID cards would avoid future costs of £835m up to October 2019. However, these costs were planned to have been recovered through future fees to ID card purchases. Therefore, there are no benefits to the taxpayer from Year 3 onwards”.
The tables set out in the impact assessment reveal that total savings from scrapping the scheme are £180 million, and the total cost of cancelling ID cards and the NIR are stated as £22 million.
What is clear from the apparent muddle is that the Government have been using rather dubious figures to claim savings on the scale that they would have liked to see. I believe that a definitive and preferably independent audited costs and savings report is urgently required to clarify this matter for all concerned. It would be useful if it were part of the duty of the Government to provide clarity in this area. Amendment 20 is consequential on Amendment 3. I beg to move.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I have added my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. To be honest, I am disappointed that we have to spend time on this issue. That is because on any normal sense of simple fairness, we would not hesitate to repay the £30 that individual citizens have laid out for one of these cards. I have also to express disappointment at the reasoning advanced for the refusal to do so. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, has already gone over this, and indeed it was referred to at length at Second Reading. I cannot resist quoting from the Statement on this made by the Home Secretary in June:
“We made it clear that we were opposed to identity cards … The Liberal Democrat party made it absolutely clear that it was opposed to identity cards. People knew well before the election what would happen if a Conservative Government were elected”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/6/10; col. 346.]
Frankly, it demonstrates an astonishing lack of reality vis-à-vis the great British public to believe that they read party manifestos. If I am allowed to do so, I would like to ask anyone in the Committee to raise their hand if they read all three party manifestos. I think we can say that the noble Lord, Lord Brett, was the sole person to have paid such attention to the detail.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath
My Lords, I did, too, but surely the point is that we are not really ordinary people in this context.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
No, but even if we are not, I am still fascinated to know how many of us did. I will be quite frank—I did not even read my own party’s manifesto. It was 115 pages long, for a start. However, even if we assume that people had read the party manifesto and knew that we were committed to a repeal of the scheme, there was nothing in any manifesto about repayment of the fee. Anybody reading it would, I suspect, have assumed that if the Government were going to do that, they would return the £30 that was laid out for the purchase. That is my first point.
Secondly, in the statement of the deputy director of policy of the Identity and Passport Service, which is annexed to the report of the Joint Committee on the Bill—it was a pre-scrutiny report published in the middle of October—it was made clear that, although all cardholders had been warned that the cards would be made null and void by the passage of the Bill, there was no reference to non-repayment of the fee. It is very simple: if you knew about all of this—and the vast majority of the public did not—there was still nothing about repayment of the fee.
Then we come to the argument which is to be found at page 20 of the Joint Committee report:
“Comment has been raised that the absence of a refund provision in the Bill is denying cardholders access to safeguards set out in consumer protection legislation. However, an ID card would not be considered as a consumer good. That is because the issue and the holding of an ID card are not considered to be in the nature of a consumer transaction and a sale of goods”.
That, again, comes from the deputy director of policy at the Identity and Passport Service. That is his view. As a lawyer, I am extremely dubious about the reasoning. It seems to me that there was a sale and purchase of goods; namely, a card. I do not see any reason why this should be taken out of the normal consumer protection legislation. Even if it is, surely it is bizarre for this Government, who are committed to fairness—and I am passionately committed to fairness—to resile from the general standard that prevails by law between consumers and suppliers, between purchasers and sellers, on the basis that there is no strictly narrow legal requirement under legislation to do so. Surely we should be a model and satisfy the spirit of all that consumer protection legislation.
I am sorry to have gone on but it strikes me that this is an own goal. It may be small in financial terms—£360,000 is scarcely a blink of the Treasury eyelid these days—but not in terms of the message that it sends out. I want this coalition Government to walk their talk and to act fair as well as talk fair.
Lord Brett
My previous confession about having read all three manifestos was somewhat of a wasted investment, given that after the weekend following the election, we had a coalition agreement. However, I recognised at Second Reading that one of the few things that appears in both the Liberal Democrat and the Conservative manifestos was the decision to scrap ID cards. I saw in neither manifesto a reference to a refund or non-refund. When I was, briefly, the Minister responsible for the launch of the scheme, I debated this with Mr Huhne of the Liberal Democrats on the radio, and while he talked about scrapping them, he was silent about the travel document. I was asked what would be the advantage of having one of these documents if the scheme were to be scrapped by the incoming party, and I said that at least they would have value for 10 years as a travel document. Mr Huhne chose not to contradict that and he certainly made no reference to refunds.
As the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, said, it is a question of fairness. In the other place, the Minister of State accepted that there were people who, in these straitened times, would have the hardship of having spent the £30. He did not go on to follow his logic, which is that, if you believe in fairness, you should restore that £30 to the individual.
Leaving aside all aspects of ideology, policy and security, I believe that the reputation of this Government—and the reputation of any democratic Government of this country, irrespective of party—is worth a lot more than £360,000. I hope that the Minister will take that on board.
Baroness Neville-Jones
I appreciate the importance that the noble Lords who have spoken place on the matter of refunds, but it is not at all clear that their anxiety on this matter is widely shared elsewhere. Following Second Reading, I asked the Identity and Passport Service to inquire into exactly how much correspondence it had had about refunds. I would expect that to be the place where letters were sent on that subject. From May to September, it received a total of 297 letters about ID cards, of which 122 included complaints about refunds. We do not know whether all of those 122 letter writers were cardholders, among the 12,000 who have paid for the card, but I do not think that that is a significant indicator of widespread indignation on the part of the public.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Does the Minister agree that in September it was not clear that there would be no refund—no one had told them? Does she further agree that if the service were to write round now to tell everyone that there will be no refunds, the response to that would be likely to be very different?
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, I have just said that this survey of correspondence went on after the statement was made in the summer. These figures apply right up to the end of September. If there had been widespread anxiety about whether people would get their money back, we would have heard more from the holders.
Baroness Neville-Jones
People have been written to. I will come to that in a moment.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
With respect, I checked this; they have not yet been written to to say that they will not get refunds.
Baroness Neville-Jones
They have, however, been written to to say that the scheme will be cancelled. The key issue is not that of a refund to the individual but how much the taxpayer is expected to pay to end this wanton scheme. We have already seen that the previous Labour Government spent £292 million on the ID scheme and the associated biometric work. That is a staggering amount for a scheme that was predicted to be self-financing through the fees, and given that only 15,000 cards are in circulation in the first year of issue, 3,000 of which were given away free anyway. The amendment’s effect is that the 12,000 cards should be given away free of charge. We cannot go on spending taxpayers’ money in this fashion, particularly when the public have shown overwhelmingly—there is no ambiguity about this—that they do not want ID cards. At the previous election, they showed their unwillingness—
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I will speak to this quite briefly. Clause 3 is about the destruction of information recorded in the national register. It is of paramount importance that that be done without let or hindrance, so that at the end of the destruction process everyone is satisfied that there are no loose ends. This is a probing amendment, because I am not entirely sure that the wording of Clause 3 is comprehensive. Of course, I am not privy to the complex arrangements that are no doubt being considered about how the destruction process will proceed. However, we must be absolutely sure that all the data on the national information register are destroyed, including data that are stored or co-stored elsewhere, because, in the process of unrolling this massive scheme, a great deal of information went out to various contractors.
The amendment would add the words “or under its control” at the end of the sentence:
“The Secretary of State must ensure that all the information recorded in the National Identity Register”.
It is designed to catch any information that derives from the register and exists beyond its boundaries in order to ensure that it is wholly and irretrievably destroyed. I would be grateful if the Minister would confirm that such contracts as do exist ensure that the Government can, in pursuance of Clause 3, make sure that any information held elsewhere is destroyed, and that they have the right to check that that is the case. I beg to move.
The Countess of Mar
My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, as does the Joint Committee on Human Rights. On page 3 of its summary, the Joint Committee states:
“Clause 3 of the Bill requires the Secretary of State to destroy all information recorded in the NIR within two months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. We recommend that Clause 3 be amended to ensure that not only information held on the NIR but all other information collected in connection with the NIR be destroyed in line with the requirements of the Data Protection Act 1998, and without delay”.
I support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for giving us such a comprehensive description of the process that is now in train, and I am sure that it will reassure a lot of people. I must confess that I did not understand half of it, but when I get around to reading it for the seventh time, I might do so. However, what I could not quite gather from her reply is this. She did not say that she objects to my suggested additional words, and it seems that adding them would do no more than what is being done. Given that it is such an important process, I would have hoped that, on further consideration, the matter could be resolved by agreement before we reach the next stage. On that basis, I thank all those who have taken part in the discussion, particularly the noble Countess, Lady Mar, for repeating an appropriate extract from the response of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I am content to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
This group of amendments—Amendments 9, 10 and 11, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, as well as mine—is partly probing and certainly simplifying. When I read Clause 4, I found myself completely baffled by quite a bit of it, especially subsection (3). Being a bit of an old lawyer warhorse, I just kept at it. I read it and reread it and I concluded that anyone suffering from insomnia should put subsection (3) by the side of the bed for 2 o'clock in the morning. If you read subsection (3) six times, I almost guarantee sleep. I shall read it for the sake of Hansard. It states:
“In subsection (2)(b) the reference to P or anyone else does not include, in the case of a document within subsection (1)(c), the individual to whom it relates”.
I may be getting daft—I notice assenting groans from the noble Lord, Lord Bach—but I have tried in these amendments to clarify what that means. I am encouraged to do that because I am following Clause 4(2)(b) in the Identity Cards Act. I suspect that the parliamentary draftsman was trying to make things clearer by pulling out subsection (3) rather than allowing the sense of it to follow on from Clause 4(2)(b).
In Clause 4(2)(a) and (b), we have a definition of what is called improper intention. That definition is, I think—and I have consulted the very helpful Bill team, and they agree—exhaustive of what improper intention is for the purpose of this very important clause. I do not see that paragraphs (a) and (b) are exhaustive of improper intention sufficient to base a prosecution under Clause 4(1). I am anxious that there should not be events of dishonesty around identity documents—the holding of them or whatever else. I do not want there to be loopholes where some clever barrister can say, “This may have been a dishonest act by my client but it is not within Clause 4(2)”.
My Amendment 10 would add a further paragraph which reads as follows:
“the intention of using or allowing or inducing another to use a document for any dishonest purpose”—
for any dishonest purpose. I cannot see why that much broader subsection can be offensive to the purport of the clause. Indeed, it may be argued—the noble Baroness may shortly argue—that my subsection renders superfluous paragraphs (a) and (b). If so, we have knocked out two paragraphs for the sake of one. On my reckoning, that is good going.
In another life, I was for 26 years Jimmy Young's legal eagle, trying to explain to the baffled British public a little bit about the law of our land. If the amendments do anything to make it a bit clearer, I think that that is a job worth doing. I beg to move.
The Earl of Erroll
My Lords, I put my name to these amendments because I, too, had read the clause and got myself into complete confusion, so I thought that anything had to be better. I started trying to unravel this in my mind, and given that this challenge fell on a sleepless night, I thought that it might be quite interesting to try it.
What the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, has just said is true. The essence of it all is there is no point in having these laws if you cannot actually catch people. If we leave a loophole here, there is no point to a lot of the Bill. People will possess false identity documents and we will not be able to lock them up or punish them for it, and what is the point of the whole exercise if we cannot? It is critical that we get this clause right.
I read the amendment with interest. I thought that if I put some plain English in, that might help. I worked out that if person P, who is basically the crook, nicks my driving licence, which is covered by the wording Clause 4(1)(c),
“an identity document that relates to someone else”—
in other words, it relates to me—we then have to look at what he uses it for. On the question of “improper intention”, I was interested by the word “establishing”, and I would like an answer about that. Clause 4(2)(a) talks about,
“using the document for establishing personal information”.
Does that mean that, having grabbed my passport or driving licence, person P, in impersonating me, is trying to get information about himself on to the database so that he can establish and build up a false identity on the database that will take over my identity,? In other words, is he changing my address to his own, and things like that? If he sticks to driving licences, that is probably easier in the first instance because the checks are lower.
That is what the word “establishing” could mean, but equally it could be used in the other sense of person P ringing up to check that it is indeed my address. I do not know which way round “establishing” is meant. Is it active or passive? Is the crook pushing or pulling the information? That ambiguity could be dangerous. The word may be meant both ways, but lots of people are allowed to establish my personal details. A policeman, for example, needs to do so when he stops me and finds out whether mine is a genuine address. I do not know which way round the word is meant.
Then we come to the next bit, Clause 4(2)(b), which says that the crook can use the document to try to verify personal information about himself. Why would the crook want to verify personal information about himself? It is not personal information about the crook if he has established a new identity for me; it is actually personal information about a fictional person who appears to have my identity. I can see that we are going to have great fun about what is “personal information” with regard to a stolen identity.
So, we get into the little problem about verifying the personal identity of a person who does not exist, but then we come to Clause 4(3). I rewrote this myself to say that the actions detailed in subsection (2)(b) are not an improper use if my driving licence—the identity document mentioned in subsection (1)(c)—is used by the crook, person P, to verify my personal information, the person to whom it relates. In other words, it says that the crook can use that document to find out information about me. Okay, big deal. I do not see why that is so dodgy. That is the one exception that does not matter one way or the other. If that is not the case, I am not really sure what subsection (3) means and I would love to know, but that, after a lot of tortuous back and forth and rewriting, is what I arrived at.
The only other thing that occurred to me just now about improper intentions is that it is an improper intention,
“to have in P’s possession or under P’s control”.
This is where the matter becomes critical, because I know that the word “possession” has huge implications in law. You are in possession of a car if you have the car keys, from the point of view of drunk driving, whether you have an intention of using those car keys or not. If someone else has your shotgun but does not hold a certificate, and they drive 100 yards to get it back to your house because you have just fallen ill and have to go to hospital, they are in possession of that shotgun at that point without a proper certificate. So, if someone takes your driving licence off you in order to verify something about you, they are in possession of your driving licence at that point. I do not know if there are any issues around that, but as I was reading this I suddenly started thinking, “Hang on, we’ve got possession issues here as well”.
The whole thing is a ghastly muddle, and anything that could be done to sort it out would be better. Hence I back the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury.
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, Clause 4(3) excludes the scenario where a person uses another’s card to establish personal information about the other person. It would allow a carer, for example, to assist an elderly relative by using that person’s document to collect a parcel or avail themselves of a service on behalf of that person. In other words, that is a perfectly proper intention—what is intended to be excluded is improper intention. The term “establishing” could have two meanings, as suggested. It could mean proving certain facts, or finding out certain facts.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, the Minister has—I nearly said “dealt manfully”, but that would not be right—dealt with her usual sophisticated aplomb with this impossible matter. One wonders whether, for a provision in a Bill such as this, our methods are adequate. I suspect that if one could have a conversation, one might get further. In moving the amendment, I thought that I made it clear that Amendments 9 and 11 do not alter to the meaning of that provision, but just make clearer—
Baroness Neville-Jones
Indeed—I may not have spoken clearly. I did indeed say—at least I thought that I said—that we are in entire agreement that these two amendments do not change the sense of the provision.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am grateful for that, but I shall still come back to the point. The noble Baroness said that Clause 4 is a re-enactment of the provision in the Identity Cards Act 2006. This part of the clause diverges from the 2006 Act in a seriously unhelpful way. The changes mean that there has been a shift into subsection (3) of the language that is there. The noble Baroness did her best to explain it, but all I can do is to go back to the 2006 Act, which is better and clearer on the point. In withdrawing the amendment, I would ask the noble Baroness if she would think a little more about it before we come to the next stage.
I want to make one other point. The noble Baroness made the important point that my attempt to create in Amendment 10 through proposed new paragraph (c) a catch-all provision in terms of the definition of improper intention was unnecessary. However, she was less than categorical. I would be comforted if she and her advisers would put their thinking caps on and make sure that that is the case. I ask that because I am still worried that paragraphs (a) and (b), which provide the exhaustive definition of improper intention, would not catch circumstances where the Government would wish there to be an offence in terms of the possession of false identity documents. However, as I say, we are all reassured by the review that is to be undertaken in what is a very difficult field.
The Earl of Erroll
It may assist the Committee at the next of the stage of the Bill if I say that subsection (3), which the Government may look at again, is probably otiose. It is only an offence for person P, with improper intention, to have in P’s possession. The defence just stated was “not with improper intention”. A carer trying to collect a parcel has no improper intention. It means that either we have “improper intention” wrong or subsection (3) is otiose. I still believe that this should be taken back so that people can think about it.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
On that basis and with the prospect of some further conversation before Report, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Brett
My Lords, the contribution of the Minister in the previous debate has provided a purpose for putting down this probing amendment and, possibly, a small part of the answer. I do not think that anyone would argue the point that identity fraud is increasing. It is very troublesome for those who are victims of it, as well as for retailers and those in business who are misled into dealing with people who are not the genuine persons with whom they believed that they were dealing. The previous Government believed that the ID card was a valuable tool in that regard.
I was moved to put down this amendment by a case which shows that the identity card has great value; that is, for a person whose identity has been stolen. A colleague of mine moved flats. Someone collected the mail that was delivered later, stole the identity of the person concerned and purchased a cell phone or such like. The case was investigated, which took time and trouble, and it was resolved—except that the person was not caught. Time and again during the next two years, he or she continued to use that identity. On each occasion—whether a retailer or a utility company was involved—my colleague had great trouble going through all the rigmarole of proving her identity by supplying documentation from a number of sources. The identity card would have proved simply who she was for the benefit of anyone involved and for her own peace of mind.
We can argue the degree to which the ID card was of value in fraud detection, but I do not think that we can say that it would not have been of great help in this case of identity fraud. We know that the National Fraud Authority and our national intelligence bodies, under Home Office supervision, are looking at some form of national strategy. I presume—no doubt the Minister will correct me if I am wrong—that that is part of the review of which she spoke. This amendment seeks a commitment from the Government to tackle the growing crime of identity fraud; to evaluate, in the absence of having the identity card, what other measures need to be put in place; to learn the lessons; and to report to Parliament. That would provide, in time, a review that we can meaningfully look at in relation to what we know the identity card could have provided; and, more importantly, in its absence, to the alternatives.
It is always terrible to have your house broken into: you feel violated. It has happened again and again to this individual and it got to the stage where her health was really suffering. If nothing happened this week, her fear was that it would happen the next week. Each time it happened was that much worse. I believe that in this case, an ID card of the kind that we have in law would have helped the victim considerably. More importantly, as the Minister said, the central purpose of the legislation before us is to remove ID cards. I seek the assurances set out in this amendment, if not in the form in which they are written then at least in terms of the spirit and intention behind them.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, Amendment 19 is in my name and that of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. The provision is covered by Clauses 22 and 23 of the Identity Cards Act. The only difference is that that constitutes 60 lines of legislation, with 14 subsections, whereas my amendment is infinitely more modest. I would like to think that its modesty and open-textured nature is a plus and not a minus. I well appreciate that the dismantling of the identity card scheme is not the same as its creation. Some may think that this is superfluous and that it is enough to rely on the statements that the Minister has made about what the Government may do. I take a cautious view about that. With issues of citizens’ basic rights, it is incumbent on us as legislators to be cautious. I also have in mind the fact that the noble Baroness is here today but may be gone tomorrow.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
Of course, to higher and greater things. It is notorious in our system that Ministers remain in post for less than two years, and that one Minister does not feel bound by the statements of another. If anyone doubts that, I can give them half a dozen chapters and verses now. Therefore, the soft soap, even from the mouth of as distinguished a Minister as the noble Baroness, is not enough where one is dealing with issues of citizens’ basic rights. For this side of the House, and no less for Members opposite, the destruction of the national identity register is a crucial matter. If ever there was a situation where somebody beyond the Minister is needed to give reassurance that what has to be done has been properly done, this is it.
Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause requires the independent person appointed to review the arrangements to make an annual report of his or her findings not just to the Secretary of State but also contemporaneously to Parliament. That ensures that the absence of specifics in the proposed new clause is adequate, because any independent reviewer, because they know that they have to report to Parliament as well as to the Secretary of State, will be on their mettle.
I finish by saying that this deals in the Bill with a number of anxieties expressed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights when it reported in October. For example, it stated that,
“the Government should report to Parliament on the progress towards the destruction of this information and the decommissioning of the NIR”.
It says that “the Government” should report. However, as I have attempted to justify, it should go a step further. The committee made other recommendations, particularly with regard to Clause 10, which entitles the Secretary of State to require verification information from not only a long list of government bodies, but from others; and, in subsection (10), gives discretion to the Secretary of State to disapply subsections (8) and (9). Subsection (8) requires that information in relation to passports should be destroyed no later than 28 days after the passport is issued. Subsection (9) contains another provision related to that. The clause gives discretion to the Secretary of State to disapply those subsections where he or she thinks it is “desirable” for the purposes of preventing or detecting crime and so on. That is fair enough, provided there is an independent reviewer who can look at that and make sure that no slackness has entered the system, and that any use of the discretions in the clause has been sensible and justifiable.
Finally, the Joint Committee expressed concern about the proportionality of some of the rights given to the Secretary of State by the Bill. For those reasons, I commend Amendment 19, and the inclusion of an independent review in the Bill. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester)
I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, will forgive me. The Committee is considering Amendment 12, and Amendment 19 is grouped with it. I assume that what the noble Lord is doing is speaking to his amendment, not moving it.
The Earl of Erroll
I thought we had leapt ahead of ourselves for a moment; it was great. I also put my name down to Amendment 19 because it is always important to have independent scrutiny. It makes people feel much happier and much safer. I do not see that in this case it needs to be very expensive; you do not need a huge office, a huge outside body or anything like that. Public confidence can otherwise be destroyed. Sometimes things go wrong, so it feels much happier having external independent scrutiny. We forget that at our peril.
Having someone reporting up the same chain of command to the same boss is never quite the same as getting a report straight out to Parliament. On something like this, which potentially involves civil liberties and citizens’ rights, it is very important to have a direct report to Parliament, which is outside the normal chain of command, just in case. It is not that I mistrust any of the people in the system; they are trying to do a good job under difficult circumstances, particularly as the politics of it are shifting and changing on a monthly basis. There is no bad will on my part. Rather, we should always do this as a matter of principle, and it is dangerous to start not doing it.
Something the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, read out reminded me of the phrase in RIPA,
“for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime”.
That was the general-purpose provision that was slotted into RIPA. We were told that the Act would apply only to serious and organised crime but it ended up with local councils using it for other things. At that point, everyone realised that we had a political problem on our hands because uses can change. There could be similar issues buried within the Bill that I remember noticing when I first went through it but then forgot about.
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, we are discussing two akin but not entirely identical amendments. I shall deal with them separately. The substantive point that is being made concerns the importance of combating fraud and identity fraud. I say straight away to noble Lords that the Government take fraud and identity fraud extremely seriously. The noble Lord opposite quoted something that I said relatively recently in the House. That reflects the Government’s preoccupation with organised crime generally, and particularly with fraud and identity fraud. I assure the Committee that this is being pursued with purposive intent and as speedily as possible. We need to get a good strategy together but we are hoping to publish a cybercrime strategy that goes to the heart of these issues by the end of the year. Therefore, there is no lack of purpose and attention being given to what we entirely agree is a very important issue that poses a growing threat to the prosperity of this country if it is not tackled effectively. Of course, it also has national security implications. I think that the issue which divides us is the question of whether the Bill is the right way to tackle that. I cannot see that what is proposed would greatly add to our knowledge but it would certainly add to complexity and cost.
The purpose of Amendment 12 is to hold the Government to account for something that will no longer exist. It would require resources to be committed to determining, in effect, why ID cards were not successful. However, the offences relating to identity fraud are being re-enacted; we are not letting them drop. The impact of identity fraud will continue to be monitored through the crime statistics. We are pursuing the evil of identity fraud in government policy. We therefore consider that we are on the case, but we are against the setting up of yet a further quango to monitor it. There is nothing between us on the importance of the issue but we do not think that this is the right vehicle with which to pursue it; it would add complexity but not value.
On the other amendment, we are similarly concerned about the implications because again this proposal would add to the bureaucracy on how the Government report on offences within the existing passport process. The proposals would involve the creation of a new post to oversee arrangements for the use and retention of data in connection with passport applications. I have to say that we already have the Office of the Information Commissioner. The IPS, like any other organisation, is required to comply with data protection. It is also required to comply with the provisions of the Bill when it is enacted and is subject to the rigours of government audit procedures. This Government have undertaken to report in detail to Parliament on all the processes.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister’s flow. She has just made an important statement, which is that the Information Commissioner has a duty. The question is whether the duty of the Information Commissioner extends to the Government dismantling the national identity register. If it does, most of my concerns will go away. Can the Minister assure me of that?
Baroness Neville-Jones
The Information Commissioner needs to be satisfied that the destruction process has been proper, thorough and complete. That is why we are in touch with the Information Commissioner. We really do not see the need for yet another layer of oversight that could get in the way of the exercise of his functions. In fact, it would duplicate what he is already charged to do—effectively, I would hope.
I would also say that the Government are committed to transparency in this process. We have nothing to hide and we are absolutely committed to the citizen’s rights in the matter. While I realise that I might not last for ever—the thought of being translated to a higher place is rather worrying—nevertheless, I will say with absolute confidence that this Government, whether I am in your Lordships’ House or not, are committed to ensuring that this process is carried out properly and that there is no doubt about its integrity and thoroughness. I hope that, in the light of my comments, the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Identity Documents Bill
Lord Phillips of Sudbury Excerpts(13 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, citizens have to be aware of what is going on around them. It was clear that this scheme would have a risky future ahead of it. I shall deal in a moment with one or two of the other points that were implicit in the noble Lord’s question.
Another idea that was advanced in Committee in the other place was to allow existing cards to remain valid until expiry. That would have required maintaining the infrastructure for the next 10 years or so—another problem. The cost of so doing would have been in the estimated region of between £60 million and £80 million, and we do not consider that spending at that level is justified.
My final point on refunds relates to the statutory basis for the issue of ID cards. There is no contract here; an identity card has been provided in the context of a statutory framework and is not available for the remedies that might be forthcoming where an agreement is governed by contract or consumer law.
The 2006 Act makes no provision for a refund policy, either in the case of early cancellation of the scheme or withdrawal of the card by the issuing authority, or by the individual who simply wishes to get out of the ID card scheme. There has been no provision in the law.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
I am most grateful to my noble friend for giving way. Will she give sympathetic consideration to the possibility of refunding those who took out their ID cards before the manifestos were published? They seem to me to be innocent citizens, if I can put it that way, and I am sure that it would please a lot of people if it were possible to do that.
Baroness Neville-Jones
My Lords, the opposition of both coalition parties to ID cards was well known well before we incorporated that in our manifestos. This was not a surprise to the world. I am afraid that I cannot hold out any prospect of acceding to the noble Lord’s suggestion.
I turn to one other aspect of the 2006 Act that affects the integrity and security of the British passport. The UK passport is a highly secure and well respected document, both nationally and internationally, and it complies fully with international standards. The recent design changes announced on 5 October this year further enhanced the security of the document. It is essential that we ensure that there are sufficient powers available to help prevent and detect fraud. That is why we have proposed to retain the offences set out in the 2006 Act that deal with fraudulent access to, and use of, identity documents other than identity cards. They result in about 3,000 prosecutions each year for an offence with potentially very serious implications for both national security and, indeed, for crime prevention.
The second issue relates to the decision of the coalition Government to halt the introduction of the second biometric indicator in passports. The second biometric would of course have been fingerprints, in addition to the existing facial imaging. We do not believe that adding the second biometric indicator increases the security of the document, which is already at a very high level. By halting plans to introduce a second biometric, we are saving the taxpayer a further £134 million. Furthermore, we do not consider that the holding of a database of fingerprints of some 80 per cent of the British population—all those who make passport applications—is a proportionate response to the level of risk. National security and public protection are of paramount importance to the coalition Government, and we will not allow them to be compromised or endangered. We keep such issues under continuous review, but as things stand we do not consider that a second biometric is required to enhance the existing very high security levels of a British passport, or, indeed, to enhance its acceptance by border agencies around the world.
EU countries subject to the relevant provisions of Schengen will require their citizens to provide fingerprints, but we also know of other countries that will not be making this requirement. A country as border-conscious as the United States does not, nor do Canada, Australia and New Zealand. They have no current plans to use fingerprints in passports but are instead focusing, as we are, on the enhanced use of biographic and facial imaging based on identity authentication techniques: so we do not consider that a convincing case for having fingerprints in the passport has been made.
The Identity Documents Bill is about getting rid of an expensive and intrusive scheme that placed unnecessary and disproportionate requirements on the individual to provide information to the state. The Bill is a major step along the route of returning power to the citizen. At the same time, we have been careful to retain existing powers to tackle those who choose to commit, or attempt to commit, identity fraud. We have tabled a government amendment to Clause 10 in the other place to increase the safeguards for the individual in relation to the acquisition and retention of data in connection with passport applications. So while we add necessary precautions, the core function of the Bill is to remove from the statute book the costly, unsuccessful and invasive card scheme, to the benefit of the taxpayer and the freedom of the individual. On that basis, I am pleased to present the Bill for your Lordships’ consideration, and I beg to move that the Bill be now read a second time.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
My Lords, I admire the noble Lord, Lord Maxton, for sticking to the old guns, as you might say. It may be worth while in this Second Reading debate reviewing where we have come from because I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Bach, was not accurate in what he said. The principal issue that exercised this House back in 2005-06, to such an extraordinary degree that we threw that Bill back to the Commons three times, was the issue of compulsion. It is wrong of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, to start his speech by saying that the previous Government introduced a Bill for a voluntary card. Indeed they did according to their manifesto, but when the Bill came out it was compulsory. That is the rock upon which the opposition in this House was built and that opposition then grew across all Benches. It is as well to remember that.
I pay tribute to Mr Willcock. I do not suppose that many in the Chamber remember dear old Mr Willcock who, when asked by a policeman in 1952, refused to produce his identity card. He said, “I am not going to produce my identity card. The identity card was to stop the Germans, not to help you on some piffling nonsense”. The High Court upheld the good gentleman’s refusal and the identity card legislation was swiftly repealed. The point of that was to show that identity cards tend to have what you might call usage creep. The state cannot resist the opportunity to use the card for more and more things in more and more situations.
Again, one aspect of the Bill of 2005 that this House objected to profoundly was the right of the Secretary of State to add to the circumstances in which the identity card could be used and, in particular, to add to the category of information that could be on the national identity register. Let us not forget that the national identity register was to be unique in the world in terms of the amount of information that it would collect on each citizen. Microsoft licked its lips and referred to the register as the great honey-pot because it was to be the greatest source of information on earth.
The noble Lord, Lord Maxton, objects to what we are doing now because of the commercialisation that he says afflicts disadvantaged youths who want to establish their identity. I would be totally sympathetic to that if I felt that he was correct. However, he omits to remember not only that the ID cards that the Bill will abolish would have been compulsory if this House had not intervened three times but—this could never have been taken away—the huge cost of the scheme, which the LSE working group established would be more than £20 billion over the first 10 years and which was to be recouped by selling the ID cards to the great retailing outlets. These would have readers which, if you spent more than £15 at XYZ store, would read the purchase into the national identity register. Every time that happened, the store would have paid a small sum of money, and—how many of us remember this?—the national identity register would have recorded every occasion on which the card was used. The noble Lord, Lord Maxton, looks quizzical, but I assure him that that is so. That is why people objected to the sort of information build-up to which the card would lead.
Lord Brett
We are having a Second Reading debate on a Bill that will repeal an Act. Will the noble Lord say where in the Act the facts that he is putting forward appear? In the Act that was passed in this House and in the other place, there is no reference to that.
Lord Phillips of Sudbury
It is a bit much to ask me to refer to a point of detail in the Act. I shall tell the noble Lord afterwards, but he need only read Hansard. I assure him that the Government did not deny that they would pay for a substantial part of the cost by commercial use and that every use of the card would register on the NIR. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Maxton, will agree with that.
Let me quickly pay tribute to NO2ID and Liberty for the huge help that they gave this House in respect of that Bill. I also repeat what the noble Countess said about Lord Northesk, whom we all miss and who was of great use to the House in the course of the passage of that Bill, as was the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, who is not in her place now.
To come to the Bill, those of us who fought and fought the previous Bill welcome this one with huge enthusiasm. I believe that the Identity Cards Act 2006 would have affected fundamentally the relationship between the citizen and the state. It is as well to think of “citizen” rather than “subject”, because in some respects that Act would have had a deleterious effect on that vital relationship. However, I say to my noble friend, who confirmed in opening the debate that there will be no repayment of the £30, that I think that that is a serious mistake. It seems unfair to say that people should have kept an eye on what we do in this House and should have carried in their heads the fact that the Liberal Democrats and the Conservative Party had made clear statements in the course of that Bill’s passage that they would repeal it if they came to power. Simple fairness should lead Government to repay those sums of £30—whether to old women or to rich hedge fund managers, I do not mind. It is not fair to abolish ID cards and not to repay that money. It is a modest sum in relation to the total costs already incurred.
I am sad that the Bill is as complex as it is. I do not know how many noble Lords have tried to read through the Bill, but it is a nightmare, even for an old lawyer like me. In Committee, I shall table a lot of amendments to attempt to make its provisions clearer. I draw attention to just a couple of clauses. In Clause 4, “Possession of false identity documents etc with improper intention”, the definition of improper intention in the second subsection does not say whether it is exhaustive. In addition, the reference to “false identity documents” is not true to the clause because it covers situations in which the documents are not false. The language of the clause is also extremely complex; I hope that we will be able to simplify it as we go along. Clause 6(1)(a) provides for an offence of possessing without reasonable excuse,
“an identity document that is false”.
That does not seem to be reconcilable with an almost exactly parallel offence in Clause 4(2)(a). I hope that that is not too detailed a point for a Second Reading debate.
Clause 10 desperately needs rewording, because it allows the Secretary of State to require various authorities to provide him or her with what is called “verifying information”. At the end, there is a nasty little subsection that states that the Secretary of State may specify by order,
“any other person … for the purposes of this section”.
That could take us right into the realms of private businesses, and we will need to look at that.
I welcome the Bill with great enthusiasm, as have my noble friend Lady Hamwee and others. I would like to think that, by the time it leaves us, the Bill will be really fit for purpose as well as fit in intent.