Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Judge

Committee stage
Monday 7th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I keep hearing the words “democratic accountability” and then I look at the Bill and I cannot find any. We have listened as Clauses 4 to 21 have been debated in this Chamber. If we add those clauses together, we have a lamentable lack of democratic accountability. I expect it will be said, “Ah well, as always, the House of Commons can reject any regulations” and so on; and, “We have a long history of how there are 16 different ways in which the regulation-making powers can be exercised.” To that, I will say: but they have not exercised that power since 1979. This is not democratic accountability; this is quite extraordinary legislation, passing huge amounts of power into the hands of the Executive. Others have spoken. Clause 18 creates tertiary power—guidance—which is not quite a regulation of the sort we are talking about but can create matters that require compelling attention from those who have to abide by the guidance.

Let me just look at Clause 22(1), because it makes what has gone so far rather trivial. It states:

“Regulations under this Act may make any provision that could be made by an Act of Parliament (including provision modifying this Act).”


I then add the words “and any regulations made under it”, because that follows. What it means is that the Bill, having been successfully enacted, could be dismantled by the Government two weeks later. It could be dismantled by a Government three years from now or by a Government 10 years from now. It could restore the very thing that the Bill says it is trying to get rid of—all in the hands of a Minister making regulations under the Act. That is not Henry VIII. I have lost count; I have tried to add it up in different ways. Is it Henry VIII plus Henry VIII for Clauses 4 and 5? That comes to about Clause 79. It cannot be. Is it Henry LXIV, because it is Henry VIII squared? This is an extraordinary power when the Bill is already riddled with Henry VIII powers. I am not jesting about this. The Bill provides for its restoration at any time that the Government of the day choose, or any part of it, or some of it along with other legislation. That is not how we should legislate. Should we not be ashamed of ourselves?

Parliament gave Henry VIII the power to bastardise his first and second children, to say that he was the Pope in England and that he was God’s messenger on earth, to decide the succession, and to say that the monasteries should all come down—the widest act of criminal damage this country has ever seen. Then he produced a Bill giving him the power, by proclamations, to create new laws. I shall not read it all out. What did the successor to that Parliament do? It said no. There was a battle, but in the end that power had this proviso to it put in by the Commons:

“nor that, by any proclamation … any acts, common laws (standing at this present time in strength and force) nor yet any lawful or laudable customs of this realm … shall be infringed, broken or subverted, and specially all those acts standing this hour in force which have been made in the King’s Highness’s time”.

He was not allowed to modify an Act of Parliament by proclamation.

We do not have proclamations anymore; we have statutory instruments. We have regulation-making powers that amount to a modern form of proclamation. We must not agree to clauses of this kind in any Bill. Those that we have agreed to—shame on us. We must not agree to this one. We must insist on the determination and, in its case, the courage shown by the 1539 Parliament not to give the King the powers he wanted. We must not give the Government the power they want in this clause.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, as we go through this Committee, we are discussing clauses that confound constitutional principle in ever more astonishing ways. I entirely agree with what was just said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. It is quite extraordinary that we should be asked to approve a clause that would confer power on a Minister to make by regulations

“any provision … including provision modifying this Act”.

The Committee has heard a number of powerful speeches over its four days explaining why it is wasting parliamentary time in analysing the Bill when it is a sideshow to the need to resolve the dispute with the EU. Whatever view you take about that issue, what is a manifest waste of time is for this Committee, and for Parliament on Report, at Third Reading and in the House of Commons on ping-pong if it comes to that, to debate, amend and approve legislation after lengthy debate, only for Ministers to have the power to say, “I don’t care about that. Parliament might have agreed it, but I’m going to set it aside. I’m going to substitute something else.” What is the point of parliamentary debate if that is what a Minister can do?

Indeed, such is the breadth of this provision that a Minister would have a power to substitute in the Bill something that he or she approves of that has been specifically rejected by Parliament. Parliament might have passed an amendment against the views of the Government, yet, under this clause, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, two weeks or three years later the Minister can say, “That may be what Parliament has done, but I’m going to insert something different”. As the noble and learned Lord said, we really have to take a stand. This cannot be right in principle and it cannot be acceptable to Parliament.

Elections Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Judge

Report stage
Monday 25th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who has participated, including those Members of the House who do not agree with me. It is fun to listen to alternative arguments.

I have just a couple of points to make. The problem with these clauses is that they were inserted without any kind of discussion. When constitutional issues are being addressed, and when, in particular, the independence of the Electoral Commission and its performance are being addressed, surely, of all things, that is something for cross-party discussion, and it is for the cross-parties to make up their minds how to make the Electoral Commission do its job and perform its function better than it has. That is a matter for Parliament: I am not going to advance different solutions to this, but the problem is that nobody has asked anybody else. That is why I describe this proposal as “new minted”. It is “new minted”, and that is one of its problems.

The other problem is with the phrase “must have regard to”. I “must have regard” to everything the Minister says. I am going to listen to it; I am going to be influenced by it. I might not feel quite as strongly as I did against him—I do not know—but the point is that you have to have regard to the statement by the Minister of the Government’s strategies, priorities and guidance, and that would influence any body of people, however independent-minded they are and wish to be. That, surely, is the point of this legislation. The Government want the commission to be influenced by the strategy and priorities paper.

If the Electoral Commission says, “Well, we have seen what the Minister has to say. We have read the statement and we think it’s a load of rubbish”, what happens then? Apart from anything else, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, will be briefed on a judicial review by the Government that the Electoral Commission was not exercising its powers correctly, and he would probably win. As I have told noble Lords before, he never won a single case in front of me; and as I have also told noble Lords before, on every occasion when he appealed, he won.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I would just add, on a serious note, that the noble and learned Lord makes an absolutely correct point. If the Electoral Commission said, “We do not agree with this document and we are not going to follow it”, there would be a real danger of judicial review. There would be a real danger, in particular, because this document would have the approval of Parliament, it having been whipped through.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, on that happy note, I think we had better let the House make up its own mind. I seek the opinion of the House.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Judge

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

I am considering the proposed offence of carelessness. To be clear, my question is whether there are practical examples of sentencing courts sending people to prison for acts of carelessness. Maybe the noble and learned Lords, Lord Judge and Lord Hope, know the answer. I do not. I suggest it may be relevant.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

I would much rather the Minister answered that question.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Judge

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister and the Bill team for their very positive response to the concerns expressed around the House in Committee. I agree with all the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, and I support their amendments. I am particularly concerned about government Amendment 4 for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, indicated. It is expressly confined to the initiation of proceedings and does not in terms cover, as it must, the right to submit further paper documents and to receive paper documents if the litigant so elects. I very much look forward to the Minister confirming what the noble Lord, Lord Marks, indicated—that the Minister intends to address this point at Third Reading.

I much prefer the solutions offered in the various amendments to which the Minister and the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Beith, have spoken, to Amendment 7 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with all due respect to him. As I understand it, his amendment would allow for regulations, under which the party bringing proceedings could choose whether proceedings are under the Online Procedure Rules or the standard rules. I can see no justification, particularly if the other amendments are agreed, for allowing people to choose which rules apply, especially if paper documents can be fed in and received under the Online Procedure Rules. Such an amendment would, I fear, damage the whole purpose of the Bill. It would give litigants an option as to which rules apply and benefit no one other than those who wish to make a simple claim subject to a more complex and more expensive procedure as, for example, a negotiating tactic.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I shall say just a word or two in support of these amendments. Amendment 2, by adding the two words “providing for”, and Amendment 3, by removing the one word “technical”, would rather improve the clause. Amendment 5 improves government Amendment 4, which itself was an improvement. If I may, I will paraphrase how I understand Amendment 5 would work: if you are not digitally educated and you would prefer to use paper you may do so, and if you do your papers will be incorporated into the electronic system. The amendment would provide that you are entitled to continue to use your own paper and your own paper system because the electronic system would be perfectly well able to provide you with all the paper you need. There should be no difficulty about it at all.

Amendment 5 is consistent with Amendment 18 to Clause 7, which has the interest of those who require technical support to be protected. It also, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, effectively makes Amendment 7 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to Clause 3 redundant because the paper user would then not be at any disadvantage. For the reasons he has given, the idea of having two systems running side by side would, among other things, be a recipe for those who do not want justice to be done and who want to confuse and to avoid getting the system to court for a hearing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, the Government have come a long way and I am now addressing not only the amendments put forward by the Government but Amendments 22 and 23. I begin by thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for kindly listening to what we had to say and for acting on it, and the Bill team for helping him get the wording right. It means that the Government have come a long way towards understanding the implications of the constitutional changes in 2005, which changed the relationship between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice and placed on the Lord Chief Justice responsibilities that once attached to the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chief Justice now has personal responsibility for the arrangements by which litigation is conducted. To the extent that this relates to tribunals, the Senior President of Tribunals has the same responsibility. I welcome Amendment 12 and government Amendments 6, 8, 25, 26, 27 and 28, and shall welcome government Amendments 10 and 15 in the next group.

The difference between being consulted and requiring concurrence needs no emphasis. If you are consulted, what you say can be totally disregarded; concurrence means what it says. Despite all that I have said, I am sad to say that although the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, has taken his car a long way down the road of logic and constitutional sense, his vehicle has run out of fuel and failed to reach its logical conclusion.

The position can be summarised very briefly. Amendments 22 and 23 to Clauses 8 and 9, respectively, concern two clauses which, as drafted, give exceptionally wide powers to a Minister. Indeed, Clauses 8 and 9, I am afraid, are in the sadly standard form of donating, handing over or retaining power to the Executive which we now find in just about every Bill that comes before us.

The first six clauses, whatever other comments may be made about them, recognise that the government amendments in group three address the constitutional responsibilities. That is fine. Clause 7(3) gives the Minister an unconditional power to,

“allow or disallow Online Procedure Rules made by the Committee”,

provided that written reasons are given for doing so. In other words, he does not have to consult the Lord Chief Justice if he thinks that the rules put forward are not sensible or appropriate, or that they would cost too much money. That prevents the committee going off on a frolic of its own—or, indeed, putting forward rules with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice which, for example, involve unreasonable expenditure. That is very sensible. I do not cavil at the idea incorporated in Clause 7(3) and the individual responsibility of the Lord Chancellor in that regard.

However, taken together, Clauses 8 and 9 unbalance the relationship. The Lord Chief Justice falls out of Clause 8 altogether—he does not get a mention. He is reduced or left to the consultation process in Clause 9, which is entirely inconsistent with the provisions in the Bill that the Government amended to allow for concurrence rather than consultation. Under Clause 8, the Minister has power to direct that the rule committee shall include provisions to achieve the Minister’s purposes and that, when such a direction is given, the committee has no option but to comply within a reasonable time. It is that stark; the power is vested directly in the Minister.

It is one thing—and perfectly sensible—to protect the Lord Chancellor from some wild or absurd rule committee proposal. It is, with great respect, quite another for him to have an unconstrained power to give it directions: in effect, to tell it what to do. The Minister may, by Clause 9(2), also don the tarnished crown of King Henry VIII, who is not, of course, King Henry VIII to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen; I am not sure what he is to Scottish history—probably nothing. Would it not be wonderful to have a history in which Henry VIII counted for nothing? It would certainly be a convenience to this House if he did not count for very much.

So, if he wishes, the Minister may don this tarnished crown if he considers it necessary or desirable to facilitate the making of the rules. On closer examination, if you put these two clauses together, this arguably means that the Minister may overrule the very rules which were made with the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice or his predecessor.

The Bill should be logical. The Lord Chief Justice’s concurrence to the exercise of these powers is elementary. The Bill and the government amendments now recognise it; the Minister has his safeguards in Clause 7(3); Amendments 22 and 23 make similar safeguards available to the Lord Chief Justice. I invite the Minister to refuel his car and keep right on to the end of the road.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a practising barrister. I too thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, for the important amendments which he has tabled, which will ensure that the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice is required under Clauses 2 and 3. However, I have added my name to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—in particular, Amendments 22 and 23—similarly to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of the powers being conferred on the Minister under Clauses 8 and 9.

Clause 8 is an extraordinary clause. It would confer power on the Minister to require the committee to include a specified provision if the Minister thinks it is “expedient” to do so, and if the committee were to be so required, it would have a legal duty to comply. “Expedient” is the broadest possible word to define the scope of such a power. If Clause 8 is enacted as drafted, the requirement for the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice under Clauses 2 and 3, which we all agree is necessary, would be rendered pointless. The Minister could simply override the views of the Lord Chief Justice in relation to any relevant matter under Clauses 2 and 3. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, does not share that view, and I look forward to him explaining why there is a limitation on what appears to be, and indeed is, the broadest possible drafting in the language of Clause 8. It contains no express limitation, and it seems very difficult to argue that there is an implied limitation that would prevent the Minister rendering pointless what is in Clauses 2 and 3 when the very purpose of Clause 8 is to give the broadest possible discretion to the Minister to give directions to the committee with which it must comply. Since the Minister has rightly accepted that, in the context of provisions about access to justice—which is what we are talking about—it is necessary for the provisions to require the concurrence of both the Minister and the Lord Chief Justice, there can nevertheless be no justification for conferring on the Minister by Clause 8 a power to override the views of the Lord Chief Justice on these important matters.

Clause 9 confers, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, a broad Henry VIII power on the Lord Chancellor to amend, repeal and revoke other legislative provisions whenever the Lord Chancellor considers it “necessary or desirable” in consequence of the Online Procedure Rules or to facilitate the making of Online Procedure Rules. Again, these are exceptionally broad powers, touching centrally on access to justice. For the same reasons that require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of powers under Clauses 2 and 3, it is necessary to require the concurrence of the Lord Chief Justice for the exercise of powers under Clause 9.

Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Judge

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, it is very geeky to wonder whether secondary legislation amending a schedule should be affirmative or negative. It is rather like a storm in an egg-cup. But there is rather an important issue here. If I may for present purposes adopt what my noble and learned friend has recently said rather than repeat it, the issue that troubles me about this is in the Schedule itself. It makes very clear provision for the Lord Chief Justice to have various responsibilities. He may authorise a person to do this; he may do that; he may nominate the other, and so on. The whole Schedule contains a series of powers and responsibilities vested in the Lord Chief Justice.

The Schedule also includes a number of provisions which expressly say that the Lord Chancellor may not interfere in the exercise of these powers, for which, on page 11, new Section 67C provides a perfect example. I shall not burden the House by going through all the provisions. My concern is that it is not at all clear from the Bill that the Lord Chief Justice is to be consulted, let alone asked for his concurrence, with any of these proposed changes—and the proposed changes relate to issues over which the Lord Chancellor now has no statutory authority.

Since the changes—I shall use the word advisedly—in 2003, 2004 and 2005, the Lord Chancellor has ceased to be head of the judiciary. He no longer has any of the functions that former Lord Chancellors used to have. All those responsibilities are vested in the current Lord Chief Justice and, in relation to tribunals, the Senior President of Tribunals. Suddenly, there is a clear danger that, by exercising the powers given in Clause 3(3), the Lord Chancellor may seek at some stage in the future to transfer back to the Lord Chancellor powers that have been vested in the Lord Chief Justice.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, we are dealing here with a very sensitive subject: that of authorising court and tribunal staff to exercise judicial functions. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, emphasised that the question may well be the scope of the Clause 3(2) power to make consequential provision. I am still puzzled as to why the Minister says that it is a power only to amend subordinate legislation, because that is not what it says. It states:

“The Secretary of State or Lord Chancellor may, by regulations made by statutory instrument, make consequential … provision”—


that is the part that concerns me—

“in relation to the Schedule”.

I understand the Minister seeking to reassure the House, as he sought to reassure the Committee, that the power may be validly used only to amend subordinate legislation, but I would welcome an explanation as to why that is so.

Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Judge

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 10th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, one issue that arises is that, if we are to require more judicial training, it will have to be funded. The second point is that the Lord Chief Justice is responsible for the organisation of judicial training and a report from the Lord Chancellor—if I may say so, with respect—is completely unnecessary. These issues can be addressed by the Lord Chief Justice in his annual report.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

Can the Minister say whether he thinks that Clause 1 of the Bill will make any significant contribution to resolving what the Lord Chief Justice has described as the unsustainable recruitment crisis that is facing the Bench?

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Judge

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 15th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 1, which is in my name and that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, is provoked by the very wide discretion which Clause 1 confers on Ministers to make regulations when they think it “appropriate” to do so for defined purposes. It seeks to impose a degree of rigour and control by substituting a test of “reasonable need”.

I am very pleased that the Minister has tabled his own Amendment 9, to which I have added my name. That amendment recognises that apart from those cases where the United Kingdom has a UN or other international obligation, the Minister can make regulations only where he considers there are good reasons to do so and that the imposition of sanctions is a reasonable course of action to take. Amendment 9 would also require the Minister to lay a report before Parliament explaining his reasoning when making the regulations. I am satisfied that this will impose a real discipline on the Minister, backed up of course by the prospect of judicial review, for which I was delighted to see over the weekend that the Government have a new enthusiasm.

The distinction between the requirements in Amendment 9 and a test of reasonable need is more theoretical than practical. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I have had a number of productive meetings with the Minister and the Bill team since Committee on this and other issues. I thank them for their patience, courtesy and flexibility in responding to the issues that we raised in Committee and that are the subject of amendments today and on Wednesday.

This group includes Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Collins of Highbury, to which I have added my name. It identifies further purposes for which sanctions regulations may be made, particularly—and I think importantly—to promote respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. I hope the Minister can be persuaded by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, to accept Amendment 3. There is a reasonable need for it, or at the very least it is appropriate to include that provision in the Bill, if only for its symbolic value that these admirable goals should be recognised in the Bill. To do so would of course not commit Ministers to making any regulations; it would simply give them the power to do so. I look forward to hearing the noble Lord, Lord Collins, explaining the case for Amendment 3. If he decides to test the opinion of the House, he will have my support. I beg to move.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, speaks for me. I am afraid that if I spoke too much today I might have a party political conference problem, so I shall say no more.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Pannick and Lord Judge

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 21st November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and I are bringing forward Amendments 1 and 23 in relation to Clauses 1 and 7. I will get this out of the way. We are both members of the Constitution Committee. We do not speak for the committee, but we do highlight its recent report on the Bill and we shall rely heavily on it; perhaps we should invite the Committee to spend some time studying it closely.

The second preliminary matter is this. I acknowledge the letter sent by the Minister to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which was copied to me. I acknowledge his kind invitation to see if we could organise a meeting. Unfortunately, for personal family reasons I could not manage those dates, but I will begin by thanking him for his customary courtesy.

At Second Reading I described the Bill as a “bonanza of regulations”. In truth, on reading it again I can still find nothing of true substance in it except regulation-making powers. Clause 1 deals with regulations—and then on and on we go. Let me throw in, just casually, Clauses 14, 35 and 44. Good old Henry VIII comes stumbling in crush all the regulations that have been made and to make any others he wishes. We really should rechristen this Bill the “Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering (Regulation Bulk Buy) Bill”.

Everyone who spoke in the Second Reading debate acknowledged that the asserted objectives were desirable. Compliance with our treaty obligations with the United Nations and other countries is admirable. Arrangements currently exist in this field which at the moment are governed on the basis of EU law; they are part of our law but they have come through to us on the basis of the 1972 Act. No one has yet said that those powers are inadequate, yet the Bill is not simply bringing what I shall describe as EU law into domestic law and preserving it—rather, it goes much further. It vests more far-reaching powers in the Minister to rule by regulation on these issues and, beyond fulfilling our treaty obligations, it throws in powers to deal with terrorism. Terrorism is criminal activity that is already subject to vast tranches of primary legislation, so we are producing a Bill that is bung-full of regulations and nothing else in order to enable our international obligations to be fulfilled—but more so—while at the same time extending these powers to criminal activity that is already governed by statute.

I recognise that legislation by regulation is unavoidable, and that some regulation is inevitable and justifiable. However, in the context I have endeavoured to paint—I could have gone on for hours, but I will not—I remind your Lordships that the Constitution Committee said on this issue:

“Given that the purpose of the Bill is to address the need for domestic powers to impose, amend and revoke sanctions after Brexit, it is important to ensure that there are sufficient safeguards and there is adequate parliamentary scrutiny to make the delegated powers constitutionally acceptable”.


While I have page 4 open, I will draw attention to some of the phrases in different paragraphs, such as “constitutionally inappropriate for Ministers”. The committee recommends,

“this important limitation on ministers’ powers”.

It states:

“Clause 11 raises constitutional concerns”.


Then, on page 5, the committee says that it is,

“concerned about the breadth of the power conferred”,

and,

“deeply concerned that the power in … may be used”.

This is not an emotional reaction by the Constitution Committee; it is simply an examination of the reality of the legislation and a short summary of where it leads us.

In that context, I will make a short point in relation to the proposed amendment: throughout the Bill, should we not proceed on the basis that the greater the apparent imperative to proceed by unconstrained regulation, the greater the corresponding imperative to provide for the fullest possible parliamentary scrutiny, always achieved by careful primary legislation?

Clauses 1 and 7 go to the heart of the Bill. In the remarkable context that I endeavoured to summarise a few minutes ago, I hope to identify the purpose of the amendment. It is utterly simple: I hope it will make these two clauses more attractive. The relevant word in these clauses is “appropriate”. I think we can assume that no Minister would try to make regulations that he or she did not think were appropriate; I think we can also agree that any regulations made consequent on the Act should be an exercise in what is appropriate. However, in this context in the Bill, “appropriate” is far too vague, easily dependent on ministerial discretion and subjective.

If we are to allow powers such as these to be exercised by regulation, the exercise should always be both appropriate and necessary. If it is necessary, it will almost always be simultaneously appropriate; however, if it is only appropriate, it will not always be necessary. Hence the amendment: by strengthening the language of a single word, we will impose a greater responsibility on the Minister—not our present Minister but the Minister to come and Ministers to follow for years yet—and he or she will be less likely to make an ill-judged, mistaken decision about the exercise of these extravagant powers, when simultaneously the opportunity to correct errors is significantly diminished. I beg to move.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I want to add some footnotes to the powerful speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. As your Lordships know, this is the first substantive Bill to be brought forward in this House to address the consequences of Brexit. As the Minister explained at Second Reading, domestic powers are needed to impose sanctions to replace the powers currently enjoyed under EU law. In relation to these amendments, it is important to say—as is repeatedly pointed out—that there is a disturbing irony when a Brexit that is said to be justified by a desire to restore to Parliament powers currently enjoyed in Brussels results in Ministers seeking to confer extensive powers on themselves.

That is a topic to which the House will no doubt return when the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill reaches us, but for today, these amendments seek to identify the unjustifiable breadth of the powers that Ministers seek to confer on themselves in the context of the Bill. I pose this question to the Minister: why should the Committee be satisfied that Ministers should take powers that are unnecessary? That is the question. It is not sufficient that the powers are appropriate; they need to be necessary, because a Minister in this context should not have a power that is unnecessary.

The noble and learned Lord mentioned the report of the Constitution Committee. I also draw attention to the report on the Bill published last Friday by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I draw the Committee’s attention to paragraph 18, which I will quote because it is so powerful. It says:

“As drafted, clause 1(1) allows the Minister to make sanctions regulations where the Minister considers that doing so is ‘appropriate’ to achieve one of the purposes listed in that clause. In the light of the width and significance of the powers, we take the view that the Minister should only have power to make sanctions regulations if doing so is considered ‘necessary’ to achieve the purpose for which they are made”.


I hope the Minister will reflect on that advice from that committee, as well as that of the Constitution Committee.

I expect the Minister will respond by seeking to placate the Committee—he is very good at that sort of thing—with reassurances about the Government’s benign intentions in this context. If I may get my retaliation in first, the answer to that contention is given again by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. It is in its report published on 28 September this year on the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, but it is a general point. At paragraph 10, the report says that the committee judges,

“powers on how they might be used and not just on how the Government indicate that they intend to use them”.

That must be right. That is the approach we should adopt in this Committee.

The noble Lord is, if I may say so, the acceptable face of ministerialism, but who knows the identity of the Minister who will perform this role in a year’s time or five years’ time? I say respectfully to those on the Government Benches that they ought to bear in mind that it may not be a Minister from their party performing this role in a year or five years’ time. It is important to adopt a non-partisan approach to this issue. It is not good enough that the Minister has benign intentions, as I know he has; we have to look at the extent of the powers being given. I strongly support the noble and learned Lord’s amendments.