Local Audit (Appointing Person) Regulations 2015

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Tuesday 27th January 2015 Grand Committee

[Lord McKenzie of Luton (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these two sets of regulations. As she will have gathered from the debate in the other place, although we have some questions of detail, we will not seek to oppose these regulations.

I agree with much of what the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and my noble friend Lord Beecham said, and I will come on to some of those points in a moment. However, on the issue of internal audit, I had no doubt that the noble Lord would raise it because he was very strong on this issue when we were discussing the Bill. My question is how under this regime the strength of internal audit is going to be reflected in the setting of fees. That was not clear from my reading of the regulations.

We are pleased that during the passage of the Local Audit and Accountability Bill, which is now an Act, the Government accepted the argument in favour of preserving some opportunity for ongoing collective procurement of audit services for those who wished to avail themselves of the opportunity, which is what these regulations cover. Although we were not supportive of retaining the Audit Commission with all its former powers, its precipitate demise forgoes the opportunity; we should have used it in some of the roles that are promulgated in these regulations. It is a pity that that decision was taken without thinking through the consequences.

The LGA has created Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd which is due to manage ongoing audit arrangements. Until April 2015, it is the responsibility of the Audit Commission. It will use staff transferred from the commission, so we are getting rid of the commission and transferring some of the staff into this new body to carry out some of the activities that it was already carrying out in managing those existing contracts. How many staff are to be transferred under these arrangements and what are the expected ongoing annual costs of the new entity through to 2017?

My noble friend Lord Beecham touched upon the best value profiles and the ability of individual authorities to benchmark themselves against others. I understand from what I have read that the profiles will not be preserved in their previous form and therefore will not be available under the new regime.

Both the appointing person regulations and the smaller authorities regulations provide for the Secretary of State to specify the person or persons to appoint a person to appoint a local auditor. For principal authorities and smaller authorities the Secretary of State can specify different persons in relation to different classes of authorities. Will the Minister say a little more about what the Government have in mind in terms of these appointments, whether they will seek to appoint for different classes of authority, what experience they will look for in the person they appoint, how they propose to monitor the performance of such persons and by reference to what criteria?

The noble Baroness referred to the LGA. I do not know whether it is proposed that the existing LGA entity will become involved, whether there will be a new entity, or whether that will be part of the provision. Is it the intention that Public Sector Audit Appointments Ltd will be an appointee? It is noted that no appointment can be made for a financial year before 1 April 2017, but does this imply that the existing contracts will not be extended beyond their current term? I think that they can be extended to 2020. What is the earliest date that the run-on of existing arrangements can be triggered? If there is a desire to run them on to 2020, what is the earliest date when the decision is needed in respect of that?

The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and my noble friend Lord Beecham touched on capacity. When outsourcing its audit contracts to the private sector the Audit Commission sought, although with limited success, some diversity of providers. My recollection is that most of the contracts went to the big four accounting firms. I think there were a few others, and Grant Thornton featured among them. I cannot remember how many other firms were sought, but there were precious few.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

Perhaps I may add that Grant Thornton did not mop up a large number of the contracts.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I think that it was the fifth firm. I cannot remember whether there were any beyond that, but there may have been changes in the interim.

What requirements, if any, will be placed upon appointed persons in this regard to seek to bring diversity of providers to the market? The regulations cover the obligation of appointing persons to oversee issues of independence. Generally, this should cover the independence of the auditor from the authority being audited as well as the independence of the auditor from the appointing person. As the Minister said, there has been extensive consultation around these proposals, but significant and authoritative concerns still appear to have been raised in some quarters. I refer first to comments made by the Audit Commission, which chime with those made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. How does the Minister respond to the comments made by the Audit Commission in its letter to all noble Lords written in September 2014? I refer to two paragraphs in particular. The first says:

“Currently all local authorities have their financial documents subjected to review by an external auditor. This is at no cost to most councils spending less than £25,000 a year and has a maximum cost to them of £100 a year. Under the current government’s proposals, external checks will not happen routinely for local authorities spending less than £25,000 a year. However these bodies will have to appoint an auditor for when local people wish to contact one with formal questions or objections. Additionally, these parishes and other bodies will have to publish specified information on their website or, if they don’t have one, on the website of the district council. This will inevitably cost more than the current arrangements”.

That is precisely the point the noble Lord made. The commission goes on to say:

“The regulations making provision for all procurement possibilities (exempt opted-out authorities, exempt opted-in authorities, non-exempt opted-in authorities, and non-exempt opted-out authorities) are close to impenetrable. Administering these complex new arrangements will also require any collective procurement body to hold and keep up to date large amounts of information about all 10,000 or so small bodies across the country. This will include contact details, whether they want to be part of the body or not, all the audit appointments the body has made, and all the bodies where auditors have used their statutory powers. This will add to its costs and therefore increase audit fees”.

How do the Government respond to that?

Moving on briefly to the position of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, I should declare my interest as a fellow of the institute, although it is a long time since I practised to earn a crust. A key part of the new arrangements will be the NAO’s proposed Code of Audit Practice. The Minister will be aware of the responses to the draft code as well as the smaller authorities regulations, in particular that of the ICAEW. Although broadly supportive of the code, the institute has expressed some reservations about smaller authority assurance arrangements. It expresses these in two paragraphs in particular, and as an aside I should say that it also refers to the issue of value for money in arrangements going forward:

“We have noted the statement in paragraph 3.6”—

of the consultation document—

“‘should evidence of poor value for money become apparent during the course of the audit, the auditor should consider the implications of this for their work.’ It would be helpful to clarify that this does not require auditors to search for evidence of poor value for money, but rather consider the underlying arrangements where a significant situation might arise which identifies that value for money is not being achieved”.

Is that right and are the Government happy that that is the position?

I now move on to small authority assurance engagements, to which the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, also referred. The institute states:

“As you know, ICAEW has had significant concerns about the government’s proposals in relation to smaller authority assurance engagements. In particular, our concerns have centred around the mis- understanding of the difference between ‘audit’ and ‘assurance’ engagements”.

It goes on to say:

“ICAEW would not be supportive of a change to the definition of audit as suggested by DCLG and we would strongly urge the NAO to also reject moves to create such confusion and to create a new definition. Indeed, as indicated in our response to government on the smaller bodies’ regulations … we would not recommend that any ICAEW member firm take this work on if significant changes to the regulations are not made and that the definitions of audit and limited assurance continue to be mis-interpreted”.

That is pretty strong language, and stronger than I have read in any representations that it has made before. The Minister said that the Government are still in discussion about that, but can she say something more about whether there is any movement or convergence of views on that with the institute? If the institute is advising its members not to engage, that is a very serious blow indeed. If these issues with the ICAEW have not been resolved, and the institute maintains its stance on discouraging member firms from taking on assignments, there is a major problem. Obviously, there is a little time before we get to 2017, but it would be good to know that there was some progress on that matter.

I have one or two further minor points for the Minister. An opted-in authority will not be required to have an auditor panel, but if it does, that panel must not be consulted on opted-in matters related to the audit or the auditor appointment. Why is that provision there? It is not apparent to me as it stands. For smaller authorities, the exercise of the public right to question and object must in future take place within the 30-day inspection period rather than in the period after it. What is the purpose of that change?

I have one final point. Under the transparency code for smaller authorities, there has to be an explanation of any differences between balances carried forward and total cash and short-term investments. How is that supposed to help? As it stands, it could be interpreted in myriad different ways. These regulations are exceptionally complex. We would not seek to stand in their way, and guidance will obviously help, but we hope that the complexity will not defer the opportunity to use this approach, which is an important strand of our discussions on the Bill.

Local Audit and Accountability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Monday 15th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, in moving the amendment, I will speak to the other amendments in this group as well. As noble Lords will doubtless recognise, Amendment 1 is a paving amendment and the substance is in Amendments 6 and 9. Amendment 9 is consequential on Amendment 6.

The proposition is straightforward, and we had understood there was consensus. Notwithstanding this, we have not seen a government amendment to give it effect. The amendments provide a route to securing a central procurement of auditors in the future. As we discussed on the first day in Committee, by the time the key provisions of this Bill come into force, it is expected that all the audit contracts with principal local bodies will be undertaken by private sector firms, under arrangements entered into with the Audit Commission. This will comprise some 800 principal authorities, including local authorities, NHS and police bodies, and so on.

The contracts—I think that there are 10 of them—run to March 2017, but can be extended for three years. When these contracts have run their course, the authorities will make their separate appointments, although there is flexibility for authorities to jointly procure, together with other bodies. It is generally accepted that the central procurement exercise undertaken by the Audit Commission has generated substantial savings for local bodies—some 40% reduction in fees—and had some, albeit limited, impact on broadening the diversification of provision in the audit market.

The Government’s own impact assessment has recognised that individual audit procurement is unlikely to match central procurement in generating reduced fee levels. Research shows that market concentration in audit services leads to higher audit fees, and while there is a credible argument that individual procurement will act against market concentration, major providers in the market are large, economically powerful entities with resources to invest in tackling the new opportunities.

One risk is that the larger authorities will fare well in this, because they will be more attractive clients to the big firms. In practice, smaller authorities will end up with less choice, being the junior partners in joint appointments and perhaps missing out on the services of the larger firms or being unable to afford them. The Government will doubtless remind us that authorities can group together. They can, but there is no clear framework to support this. Indeed, there is no explanation, for example, of what happens if there is joint provision when a conflict develops between one of the authorities and the firm involved.

The amendments, particularly Amendment 9, which is at the core of it, adopts the approach already included in the Bill for potential central procurement for smaller authorities. It enables regulations to specify a person to appoint auditors with relevant powers relating to fees, et cetera. It especially encompasses the prospect of authorities being able to opt either in or out of the arrangements, which we know is a key requirement of the Minister. The Minister has expressed an appetite for facilitating ongoing central procurement, provided that it is not mandatory, and a hope to be able to return on Report with some ideas. Perhaps we can now hear what they are. We know that the Minister and officials have been having discussions with the LGA, but we do not necessarily think that arrangements run by it are the only, or, indeed, the best approach. If we are to preserve central procurement, we need the legislative basis to do that. That is what the amendments provide. I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, in Committee, my noble friend said that the Government would commit to amend the legislation to create a framework to support a voluntary national procurement exercise. When she replies, I would appreciate it if she could put some meat on that earlier commitment.

Dealing with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, if one was always looking in terms of cost savings, which seemed to be the main thrust of his speech, we would have almost the demise of all local authorities. It would be a case of, “Let us have it all done nationally and then we would save some money”. We as a Government are committed to localisation. The idea that local authorities should be to a degree able to choose their auditor is part of that localisation. There was a feeling of despair in the noble Lord’s comment about how local authorities would be less hard negotiators than the Audit Commission. I doubt whether that will be the case. Many local authorities would be very hard negotiators on their own behalf in fixing the audit fees, the level of audit taking place and how it will dovetail with the internal audit systems of the local authority. A local authority that has a good local internal audit system can probably negotiate much harder with the external auditors, because of its knowledge of its internal audit system, than the Audit Commission has in the past.

I believe that the amendments are unnecessary, and I would welcome and wait for my noble friend’s comments on how the Government will keep the commitment that she made at an earlier stage of the Bill.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I will speak also to Amendment 3. The more we delve into this Bill, the clearer it becomes that the decision to close the Audit Commission was taken without a clue as to how some of its functions were to be carried out in the future or how some of the savings that it has driven could be maintained.

We have just discussed how a central procurement function might be preserved, and we will come on to discuss how the commission’s efforts to prevent and detect maladministration and error can be carried out in the future. Amendment 2 focuses on three specific areas, which are,

“the management of existing audit contracts … the maintenance and updating of Value for Money profiles; and … certification functions currently undertaken by the Audit Commission”.

It requires that robust processes are in place for these before the Audit Commission is closed. We have discussed these before and received assurance that the Government have these matters in their sights, but we are again sadly lacking in detail as to what is proposed.

As we discussed in Committee, the management of ongoing audit contracts is not a straightforward, passive matter. It requires the availability of certain powers that are currently available to the Audit Commission; for example, in relation to fee setting. Given the public interest in local public audit, any successor arrangements will need to ensure transparency in audit quality monitoring. The FRC is to monitor major audits and it is unclear what public reporting there will be on this. All other audits can be subject to cyclical monitoring by the supervisory bodies but there is no commitment yet to any public reporting on the results of this monitoring. Perhaps the Minister will tell us now what is proposed in this regard.

In Committee, the Minister told us that,

“we are giving consideration to the transfer of current Audit Commission tasks, including the value-for-money profiles”.—[Official Report, 17/6/13; cols. GC 25-26.]

Now is the chance for the Minister to be a little more specific. The value-for-money profiles are widely used; there were some 9,000 visitors to the commission’s website in the past financial year. They bring together data about the costs, performance and activity of local councils and fire authorities. The profiles show how organisations are spending resources, what services they perform and how these cost and performance levels compare between organisations and over time. The commission is enhancing the visibility of these profiles by presenting information about how spending and activity have changed over time, how councils’ performance differs, and factors affecting variation in activity and cost. Can we be very clear on this: are these profiles to be maintained and, if so, how?

It is accepted that certification processes may diminish as grant funding streams are reformed and phased out but there will certainly be the need to deal with housing benefit funding before this is absorbed fully into universal credit. Can the Minister give us some assurance on just this one matter, if not the generality of the replaced certification regime?

We have so little hard information on these areas and the Bill is about to leave your Lordships’ House. We should remember that it is actually three years since the decision to close the commission was announced. In these circumstances, requiring these matters to have been satisfactorily dealt with before the Audit Commission is closed seems the very least that we can do.

The same applies to being satisfied as to how the new audit regime is to be co-ordinated across government and how accounting officers will be entitled to obtain assurances on the effectiveness of financial management arrangements. There will be no organisation to publish the outputs from the audits of over £200 billion of public money. Accounting officers will need to continue to have access to analyse the outcomes of local work, and individual government departments will need arrangements to receive the outcome of audits. We are entitled to be assured that this is all in place before the commission disappears.

That is all that this amendment seeks to achieve, but it is very important. I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, the purpose of Amendments 2 and 6 is clearly to try to improve the transitional arrangements. It seems to be felt that we need a certain overprotection for transitional arrangements, but when private corporate bodies change their auditors and way of management, some transitional arrangement always has to take place. It works in a natural way, without the Secretary of State being involved in every item.

Amendment 2 inserts three paragraphs. The first deals with,

“the management of existing audit contracts entered into with the Audit Commission”.

One of the main purposes of the Bill is to make the audits of the various local authorities much more the responsibility of the local authority. Its appointment of the auditor and dealings with the auditor, and the auditor’s dealings with the authority, will become a more localised matter. However, because there are a limited number of audit firms, there will be a consistency in the types of audit operated.

The main point that the noble Lord spoke about was,

“the maintenance and updating of Value for Money profiles”.

Value for money in the external audits of local authorities has been a very important and costly factor in terms of the time that the Audit Commission and private firms of auditors have spent on those activities and how much they have charged for them. Two or three years ago, the value-for-money audits carried out by external auditors were more limited. There was no large-scale review of the use of reserves, assets and finance. Under the current arrangements, external auditors do not have to carry out a prescribed list of value-for-money exercises.

Currently, before the Bill, that situation is very much localised. There is a virtue in that localisation. Different firms of auditors will possibly take a different view on what is needed within that particular local authority, and that view will have an effect on the fees charged to that authority and on how much work needs to be done. As the years progress, it will be interesting to see how different local authorities have their value-for-money details published. We hope that all local authorities will publish these, and there may need to be some national gathering of that information for comparison purposes. However, that does not necessarily need to be in the Bill. Although I understand where the noble Lord is coming from on this, I think that it amounts to a little too much control which is not needed.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

This is a return, briefly I expect, to a drafting point. Under Clause 4 there is a requirement that,

“a relevant authority … must be audited … in accordance with this Act and … by an auditor appointed by that authority in accordance with this Act”.

The second requirement cannot be met before 2017 at the earliest when the appointments made by the Audit Commission come to an end. It could be three years later if any of these contracts are extended.

The concern is how the general requirements for audit provided for in the Bill can operate before local appointments are operative. I believe that we see eye to eye with the Government on the issue. The Minister’s letter of 25 June states:

“Officials believe that when the provisions are commenced, we will be able to commence different provisions for different purposes and as a result, we will be able to avoid any of the unintended consequences you highlight”.

I accept that there is flexibility on commencement of provisions but remain unclear as to how this would operate in the circumstances highlighted. Is it being contended, for example, that Clause 4(1)(a) could be commenced before Clause 4(1)(b)? It would be good to have some clarity on this issue before the Bill leaves your Lordships’ House. I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, I would also welcome the Minister clarifying some issues, particularly if there is, indeed, a problem of a practical nature. At present, most local authorities are audited by a professional firm. A fairly small proportion is audited by the commission. Those audited by professional firms will be audited under the continuing contracts until 2017. The local authority will then have the ability to appoint a new auditor. This is what happens in the commercial world. One has an auditor, the auditor audits for a period—generally for the year, in this case for slightly longer—and then there is a new appointment. This is quite the natural way of things. I am not sure—and I hope that the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, will clarify this—why we need to have this because, in a practical sense of the word, auditors are there for a period, they finish their term of office and then they, or another auditor, are appointed. That is the natural way of things whatever we decide or do not decide in your Lordships’ House.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I thank the Minister for her reply and the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, for his contribution. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, that my point was not about auditors and succession of auditors but on quite a narrow drafting point. One of the requirements in Clause 4 is that the audit must be undertaken,

“in accordance with this Act … by an auditor appointed by that authority”.

Obviously, until 2017, the auditors will have been appointed by the Audit Commission, and the question is how the system works under those circumstances. I accept the broad point that matters can be introduced at different stages but I am still a little mystified as to how the new framework is to operate from 2015, so long as Clause 4(1)(b) is there—unless that is simply excluded from what is introduced in 2015. Perhaps I should read the record and we might have a further discussion on this in due course if necessary.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

Before the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, sits down, I will just comment on the point about the appointment of the auditor by the Audit Commission. In practical terms, the Audit Commission currently suggests who the auditor should be—for example PricewaterhouseCoopers, or Grant Thornton, which has a large number of these audits. The local authority is the one that appoints the auditor, under its own constitution, although it accepts in practice the auditor that has been put forward by the Audit Commission—whether it is the Audit Commission itself or a professional firm. I would have to go back to the constitution but, as I understand it, the local authority has a constitutional duty to appoint an auditor, which it currently does on “the instructions” of the Audit Commission. However, the appointment cannot be foisted on a local authority, because it is a legal body in itself.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, the noble Lord makes an interesting point but my understanding is that the contracts for the audits are with the Audit Commission not with the local authority. If the noble Lord is right, that in fact unlocks this particular conundrum: although it is not a contract organised by the Audit Commission, if it is nevertheless an appointment by the authority, then I think the problem goes away. With respect to the noble Lord, I do not think that is the position but we might just follow up on that. Having said all that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, the purpose of the amendment is to test the scope of the term “independence”, although it is written in terms of an audit committee rather than an audit panel. I regret not having been able to attend the meeting which the noble Baroness, Lady Hanham, kindly organised to consider these issues, but I am grateful for the note which was provided.

We have reflected on the proposition that all principal authorities must have an audit committee whose functions include those required of an audit panel, and we see some merit in the Government’s argument that this could be too restrictive. We consider that all principal authorities should have an audit committee to undertake the range of functions with which we are familiar. Given that the appointment of auditors is a new function, the audit committee would be a natural place to provide the appropriate scrutiny and oversight of the relationship with the external auditor.

However, given the importance to that scrutiny and oversight role of the independence requirements, we think these should be paramount. These independence requirements are not mirrored in audit committee arrangements, and the CIPFA guidance is more focused on the separation of engagements of executive and scrutiny members. That guidance does not require a minimum number of independent, non-councillor members. So if we insist on audit committees to carry out the auditor panel role, and on the independence requirements to be satisfied, it seems to be the case that many local authorities would have to substantially restructure their arrangements. We encourage them to do so, but to require them to do so where audit committees are currently functioning well is perhaps against the spirit of localism.

The suggestion that the auditor panel might be a small sub-committee of an existing audit committee almost gets the best of both worlds, and may at least provide a transitional solution. However, the primary purpose of the amendment was to address the definition of independence. For this purpose, the Bill requires members of the audit panel to be independent of the authority for which the auditor is to be appointed. In the Bill independence is defined in terms of individual positions; that is, membership and relationships—so parent or grandparent. It does not cover influential business relationships, for example. The amendment is intended to open up this possibility.

It seems from the briefing note received just last week that it is intended for these other matters to be covered through a combination of regulation and guidance. This is welcome, but we should at least ask when we might see a draft of this. When will it be ready for colleagues in the Commons to consider, if not for ourselves? The Bill has spelled out in some detail the membership and personal relationships components of a definition of independence, but we have little or no information on these other components. I would be grateful to hear further from the Minister. I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, the amendment of the noble Lords, Lord McKenzie and Lord Beecham, says that an individual will be ineligible if that individual has a disqualifying interest. Yet it seems, by all the purposes of any law there is, that if you have a disqualifying interest you are by nature ineligible. I listened to the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and I still struggle to see why one needs to clarify and why one needs the amendment, because if one has a disqualifying interest one would be ineligible. I raised this matter at early stages of the Bill. As for who should sit on these panels, yes, the members of the local authority who are qualified may sit on the panel, and there then seems to be a great emphasis on independent members.

At this stage I declare an interest, and I probably should have done so earlier in the course of this debate. I am currently a chairman of a local authority audit committee. I do not think that this disqualifies me, and perhaps it qualifies me particularly to comment on this. One of the interesting things which I hope the Minister will address in her answer is that it is currently quite the custom in many local authorities, including my own, for a member of that local authority who is of a different political party from the ruling party to be the chair of the audit committee. That very often provides a very independent chairman or chairwoman of that committee.

I am worried that if we change that and require an independent committee chair, will that chair be as independent as an opposition chair? By the nature and appointment of audit committees, when looking for people who will be independent, particularly in the case of chairs, there is in some cases a possibility that those appointing will look among people they know who may have political sympathy with the ruling administration. The current arrangements seem to give chairs greater independence. This is probably wider than the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, but it seems to me to follow on from what is a disqualifying interest. I think we are giving that too much concentration, rather than the actual and real independence of the person who chairs that committee.

Local Audit and Accountability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Wednesday 26th June 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, this amendment refers to Schedule 9, and in particular paragraph 8(2).

The power to conduct data-matching exercises is currently exercisable for the purpose of assisting in the prevention and detection of fraud. However, a relevant Minister, which is the Secretary of State or Minister for the Cabinet Office, can add a purpose for which such exercises can be used provided they fall within the specified purposes. These are currently the prevention and detection of crimes other than fraud, apprehension and prosecution of offenders and recovery of debt owing to public bodies. The amendment would add another purpose,

“the prevention and detection of maladministration and error”.

It should be stressed that neither the further purposes described nor the additional one arising from this amendment can be a proper purpose of data matching until introduced by regulation following wide consultation.

The data-matching powers currently exercised by the Audit Commission through the national fraud initiative have been a considerable success, having identified nearly £1 billion of fraud, errors and overpayments since 1996. It is important that the NFI is found an appropriate home in the new regime and we understand and accept that discussions are under way to make this happen. Probing this is not the purpose of the amendment although if the Minister has an update for us it would be good to hear.

The amendment has been prompted by the Audit Commission, which has expressed concern that some of the data-matching exercises that it undertakes at present under its audit powers would not be available to any new body as they would not fall within the additional purposes provided for in Clause 8(2). However, it has instanced a data-matching exercise to assist with identifying maladministration which it undertook concerning GP lists. This was done as part of the national duplicate registration initiative and sought to identify such matters as deceased persons registrations or duplicate registrations. The two most recent exercises led to more than a quarter of a million patient registrations being removed—saving some £16 million—and some 30,000 patient records ending up with current rather than previous GPs.

This work targets error rather than fraud so would not be covered by the Bill as it stands. There is quite properly a sensitivity about data matching and we support the safeguards which are included in Schedule 9 restricting the use of such exercises and protecting certain data. There is also the code of data-matching practice which has been drawn up by the Audit Commission, the maintenance of which will become the responsibility of a relevant Minister under the Bill. Clearly, data matching has, as a matter of fact, been undertaken under powers which will seemingly not be available in the future under the Bill. Where does this leave exercises such as the national duplicate registration initiative in the future? Will the initiative be conducted, at least in part, by data matching, by whom and under what powers? The NDRI is just one example. Perhaps I may ask the Minister whether there have been discussions with the Audit Commission about the demise of its audit powers in this regard and how matters will be handled in the future.

There is a further matter concerning the extent to which those fall within the mandatory provisions of data requirements. The Bill retains this requirement for those currently required to do so and now includes foundation trusts. The Bill also enables the adding-in of other public bodies subject to consultation and regulation. Has any consideration been given to adding in any further public bodies? What assessment has been undertaken of this possibility? One possibility raised with us has been adding in housing associations which currently participate only on a voluntary basis. Data matching has proved to be a powerful tool in helping bodies to detect potential tenancy fraud and we are advised that just one RSL which participated in 2010-11 recovered 12 properties from illegal occupation which were able to be reallocated to general tenants. There is a continuing imperative for local authorities and RSLs to manage their stock in the most effective way given the housing crisis which faces the country and punitive measures such as the bedroom tax.

We have a shared interest in targeting fraud but also—I hope—in the prevention and detection of maladministration and error. This is all the more important given the huge cuts in local authority budgets and of course the further dreadful announcements from the Chancellor just a few hours ago. Data matching has a role to play provided there are robust safeguards. At the very least the Government should justify any diminution in the opportunity to use these as a result of the demise of the Audit Commission. I beg to move.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, what worries me with this is the possibility of spreading the data protection rules and investigations even further than they are now. They are pretty strong already in the Bill and detection of maladministration and error is done by many local authorities—I am not sure about health authorities—in their internal and external audits. One of the main raisons d’être for that is to look for maladministration and error. As my noble friend will know, such audits are independent of the other departments of the local authority or health service.

I therefore ask the Minister to say how this is or is not already covered at present. What worries me is the creep of adding more and more things all the time in order to look behind what is happening. I understand the motives for that but this is perhaps going a step too far.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

Will the noble Lord accept that the purpose of the amendment is not to spread anything further but to preserve what is there? The point that the Audit Commission has made is that it can use its audit powers to do this data matching to achieve the objective at the moment. Obviously, once the commission disappears, it will not have those powers. If those powers are to go somewhere else, that is fine. I accept entirely that internal audit would be one means of helping to address the issue but data matching across bodies has proved to be effective. This is not about seeking to extend what currently happens but preserving what the Audit Commission is able to do under its audit powers.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

Let me give an example. If one is looking into housing fraud, one does not, as a local authority, look only at the housing department and benefits claims. I know that local authorities such as mine look towards the UK Border Agency, with which they have a great relationship. When they look into possible fraud, administration error and all the other things that the noble Lord spoke about, the powers already exist. I am asking whether they need to be enshrined in the Bill.

Local Audit and Accountability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Wednesday 19th June 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

Since we are not sure which amendment it is, perhaps the Committee will forgive me if I say just a word, having come in late on this section. I hope it will. I want to pick up on what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said about close friends. I feel that whatever legislation these Houses of Parliament pass should not be capable of ridicule. That must surely be paramount in people’s minds. Can one imagine the situation in which people vehemently deny that they are a close friend: “I am not a close friend, let me on it.”? It is quite nonsense. The idea of having to justify not being a close friend is capable of being ridiculed.

We are not putting these words into the Bill; we are trying to say that the relationship of someone in this position should not be such that they could influence the person on the panel. Imagine a court trying to decide whether this person was a close friend when they were denying it. Mr Saatchi and his wife might have problems saying whether they were close friends, given that he put his hands around her throat—he has been cautioned, so I think I can say that. It really is a worry. As I say, I understand what the Bill is trying to do and it is absolutely right to do so. However, to pick up on what the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has said, the words are unfortunate.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to what was a wide-ranging debate in the event. I also thank the Minister for his reply, but I am bound to say that I do not feel reassured by it. There are two sorts of issues flowing through this debate. One is whether, as the amendment proposes, the audit committee could not take unto itself the role of the auditor panel. Then there is the separate but obviously related issue of composition, whether it is of the audit committee or the auditor panel, and whether that should be independent as defined, quite apart from the definition.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, asserted that 80% of local authorities have audit committees. I accept that. I know that it is not currently mandatory, but it is certainly encouraged and there has been a substantial development of them. Their role is not limited to internal audit, controls and processes. That is part of their role, but the CIPFA guidance makes clear that part of their role is reviewing the financial statements, the external auditor’s opinion, and reports to members, so they should already have an engagement with the external auditors and be able to take a view on how they should proceed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, in seeking that Clause 14 should not stand part of the Bill, I should say that this is a probing measure to seek government assurances about the appropriateness of facilitating the limitation of local auditor liability arrangements. The impact assessment and other documentation records that the Audit Commission currently provides an indemnity to audit firms for certain aspects of their work. This is, presumably, their statutory audit function. It also appears that it covers irrecoverable legal costs. We are told that the indemnity has been used only twice over the past five years and that auditors have faced legal action four times over a five-year period. Perhaps the Minister will let us know the amounts involved in the use of the indemnity and how much was paid.

What benefits ensue from limited liability arrangements which relieve auditors of liability in respect of negligence, default or breach of trust when conducting an audit? What are the benefits of that? The limitation of auditors’ liability has been permitted under the Companies Acts since 2008, although reports suggest that there has been little take-up. I am indebted in this regard to a Mr James Herbert, who is a corporate partner in a law firm who wrote an interesting article in Accountancy Age back in 2009. I took the opportunity of speaking to him to see whether the view he expressed then had changed. It had not.

Part of the reason for little take-up of those arrangements is attributed to issues with the SEC prohibiting UK companies registered with them from entering into those arrangements. Under the Companies Acts, any limitation must be fair and reasonable. A separate agreement is reached for each year and each agreement must be approved by shareholders. On the face of it, there is no reason why auditors should be protected from the consequences of their negligence or default in the public or private sectors. However, one of the public policy objectives was to enhance competition in the UK audit market and to address concerns about auditor concentration. As we have discussed before, the big four have deep pockets, are better able to bear the risks and have more clout with professional indemnity insurers. There are concerns that the smaller and mid-tier firms have been least able to benefit from the agreements.

Another reason for allowing such agreements might be its impact on the price of an audit. If the risk on the audit firm is less, the cost of the audit should go down. However, it is difficult to gauge whether there will be any real downward pressure on fees in the public sector, particularly given the infrequent calls on the commission’s indemnity. We can see some merit in allowing limitation of liability agreements if tightly regulated and if they can be demonstrated to help to open up the markets and put downward pressure on fees. However, we are sceptical that they will deliver that outcome. Perhaps the Minister can say when we might see a draft of the proposed regulations referred to in Clause 14 or what else might be provided in the key elements in the regulations. How do the Government propose to monitor and assess the effects of the clause?

I emphasise that in my discussions with that particular lawyer, it appeared that limitation of liability agreements have simply not taken off, certainly not in the private sector, so one wonders about the merits of introducing them to the public sector.

We might wish to return to the matter on Report, but it seems to me that, at the very least, there may be an argument for a sunset clause on the provisions, or at least a very clear process of assessment so that one can see whether what should be the benefits—downward pressure on audit fees and an opening up of the market to smaller firms—is actually achieved. We remain sceptical.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

We have already mentioned that the number of accountancy firms capable of carrying out these audits is quite small—five to seven, probably. The maximum would be 13, and most of those would probably not achieve those audits. All of those in the top echelon of firms of audits are now limited liability partnerships. The days of my times in practice when we were personally liable have, for the large firms that we are considering, long departed.

I ask my noble friend: if there is a liability, where should it rest? Should it rest at the end with the Government as a short-stop? Should we say, at the end of the day, if things go sour, the Government will pick up the liability? Bearing in mind that no partner of one of those firms would be personally liable, and that they are firms of great size with considerable power, I wonder whether they should not bear that liability.

We had the example within the corporate sector of Arthur Andersen, which messed up on an audit—not a local authority audit but a public audit—and that ended with the demise of that firm. Are we trying to say that, in terms of local or public health authorities, these firms should have this protection, or are we saying that these are the professionals and they must do their audits, work correctly and cover themselves? We are not talking about anyone being responsible for fraud or errors within local authorities or the health service; we are talking about them not having carried out their work properly to an extent where they can cover themselves. I ask the Minister to reconsider whether the liability should ultimately rest with the Government, or whether it should rest with these five to seven very large limited liability concerns.

Local Audit and Accountability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Monday 17th June 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

I wonder whether it is necessary to have that provision here. By virtue of all the Acts that deal with accounts, they all have to show a true and fair view. We seem to be dotting “i”s and crossing “t”s on this one. I am not sure that the amendment is necessary.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

Will the noble Lord consider Clauses 19 and 20? Clause 19 deals with “General duties of auditors” and Clause 20 with, “General duties of auditors of accounts of health service bodies”. The latter includes those words, saying,

“the accounts present a true and fair view, and comply with the requirements of the enactments that apply to them”.

That reference is missing from Clause 19 and is not referred to in the earlier clause at all, but somebody deemed it appropriate to put it in Clause 20. I am trying to get some consistency, or to understand why there should be a difference between the two.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, my only point is that the latter clauses deal with the general duties of auditors but the first deals with the accounts themselves. Whereas auditors must ensure that it is a “true and fair view”, in Clauses 19 and 20, it has always been an accepted belief that with accounts prepared and signed off by external auditors—it is the chairman of the audit committee in my authority who signs off the accounts, with the chief executive—it is always a “true and fair view”. I have no real problems with it being added, but I just wonder if it is necessary.

Local Government Finance Bill

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Monday 22nd October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

At this stage, we get down to essentials, as we did in the previous amendment. That amendment addressed the crux of the problem. I appreciated what the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, said about this being in the universal credit. That has come through from various noble Lords. However, we are where we are, as my noble friend Lord Tope said, and we must deal with that.

The important thing about the amendment is that it gives discretion to local authorities. That discretion is important. Speaking as a councillor in the London Borough of Barnet, I believe that that would help my council, although it would not help all councils. It is an extension of the localism which we debated previously. This amendment and the previous amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, support the poorest in society. That is why, contrary to my normal beliefs, I voted for the previous amendment and will certainly vote for this one.

My noble friend Lord True spoke about the difficulties that it would impose on local authorities to have the change at this late stage and asked how it would help. As I said, local authorities have discretion whether to do this or not, and that discretion does not have to be applied this year—it could be applied next year. Many local authorities may decide to use their part of the £100 million in transitional relief this year to ease the pain but, as I pointed out on Report, it will help only this year. By next year, the amendment, building on the review suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, will mean that local authorities can achieve my aim and, I hope, that of many noble Lords: to help the poorest in society.

My noble friend Lord True said that that was swallowing a spider to catch a fly. Without the amendment and the previous amendment, the Bill is a particularly dangerous fly and I think that it is worth swallowing the spider.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, let me start with a point of agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Tope, which is that the Government—his Government—have underfunded the requirement placed on local councils to introduce local council tax reduction schemes. That is the root cause of the problem that his amendment is intended to address.

It is now widely recognised that the cut in grant to support local schemes is more than 10%. For a start, the national control total is based on falling claimants, although the reverse is the case in a number of areas. That is to the disadvantage in particular of those areas which have been hardest hit by the extended recession. The IFS estimates that the grant for support—this is before the transitional grant—will cover only 81% of the costs of claimants nationally and that for one in 10, the figure will be less than 75%, a grim prospect indeed.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Tope, and his colleagues in particular, that they accept this position as an inevitability. It is not. We are in this position because they as part of the Government do not knock on the Chancellor’s door or lobby Ministers to get a different outcome. It is in their hands to do it. They can influence their coalition partners better than we ever can. If they could do that, it would be a much more effective way of dealing with what we agree is a very serious problem.

In moving the amendment, the noble Lord explained, and other noble Lords reiterated, that this amendment differs from the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Best in two respects: it gives discretion to local authorities to reduce the single person’s discount by up to 5% so that it cannot be lower than 20% and it does not allow local authorities to change the discount for pensioners, who are protected from any such change. However, as the noble Lord, Lord True, said, it does not address all the issues raised when we debated the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Best. This more restrictive proposal will still have the effect of increasing levels of council tax support, other things being equal, because it will increase council tax levels for some, pushing them into the scope of the benefit. The LGA argues that an average reduction of 5% in the single person’s discount for non-pensioner households coupled with the use of the discretion on empty properties and second homes would close the funding gap for most authorities. It is further argued that this would involve spreading the pain of the cuts so that more people would be contributing, but contributing a smaller amount, towards the shortfall. This may well be right, but it does not necessarily make the resultant distributive effect of the outcome acceptable.

We should also recognise the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, that not all councils have an equal ability to raise revenue from other freedoms in the Bill. Second homes, for example, are not evenly spread. One of the difficulties with the noble Lord’s proposal is that looking at aggregate in the position is all very well, but things are played out at individual local authority level. This is supposed to be the essence of localism, which the noble Lord supports. The IFS has done some modelling of the proposition, albeit with a 7.5% reduction in the single person’s discount, and I believe that the thrust of analysis holds good. One of its conclusions is, unsurprisingly, that changing the discount would produce more in relatively prosperous areas than in poorer areas. The prosperous areas, which are likely to have lower demands for council tax support and more income from second homes, would be able to retain a higher level of single person’s discount than poorer areas. It is all right for the rich; it is the poorer areas that will bear the consequences of this. Further—and, I grant you, with a 7.5% reduction in the single person’s discount—the IFS estimates that losers would include 20% of the poorest income decile group, 16% of the second poorest income decile group, 22% of the third poorest income decile group and 86% of lone parents in work. This is reinforcing the point that in many respects the proposition requires the poor to pay more to protect the very poor.

We well recognise that councils whose resources have been cut to the bone and are struggling to protect the most vulnerable see this as a lifeline, and I understand where my noble friend Lord Smith is coming from, but there has got to be a better way. Frankly, if the noble Lord is supporting an increase in the tax base by a change to the single person’s discount, it would be more logical for him to argue that there should be a mandatory change at national level and the additional resources should be reflected in the local government settlement with a redistribution in favour of poorer areas. That would be a better way to approach it, but that is not his position, nor is it ours. As we argued on Report, the answer is for the Government to provide proper levels of support. The Government have implicitly recognised this in providing the transitional grant but, as ever, that is too limited and time-limited. I suggest to the noble Lord that by pressing this amendment he is seeking to let his Government off the hook and asking poor people, among others, to pay the price. We cannot support the amendment.

Local Government Finance Bill

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Thursday 19th July 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, this particular amendment finds me echoing the words of the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, that the Secretary of State is being required to get involved in minutiae. If one looks at the five regulations in paragraph 3(5), one almost finds that local authorities are being required to photocopy both sides of every piece of paper, put first-class stamps on everything and so on, and this is mollycoddling of the greatest degree. If we are talking about localism, the idea that the Secretary of State can suggest to any local authority that they should do things in this manner tends to assume that it is made up of idiots who cannot run anything. That really is the opposite of localism.

This is little more than a probing amendment, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin of Roding, said, but one that goes very much to the heart of localism and the Secretary of State’s tendency to get involved to a completely unnecessary degree.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, Amendments 84 and 87 stand in my name, but I shall first address the issues in Amendment 83ZA, which has just been spoken to. It goes without saying that I support Amendment 88 in the name of my noble friend Lady Sherlock.

As far as Amendment 83ZA is concerned, we are not enamoured of the Secretary of State having a raft of central powers, but we have to balance this against our concerns about a fragmented system. With the prospect of hundreds of different authorities adopting hundreds of different schemes, all with different criteria, some standardisation of approach has merit. For example, the form and content of documents to be produced raises the question of what distributional analysis should be included and what the requirements should be for a general impact assessment and indeed an equality impact assessment. Having some central guidance on these matters may help to head off problems of potential judicial review for some councils.

Amendments 84 and 87 continue the theme of the default scheme which, as we have discussed, has now been produced in all its glory—all 155 pages of it. Despite its lateness, it has moved us on. It has been difficult in the time available comprehensively to absorb its content and to read across the existing council tax benefit provisions, and we have an outstanding question to the Minister from our earlier amendment about where the default scheme has not been able to replicate existing arrangements. However, given that Amendment 84 is just a probing amendment, I am content to proceed on the basis that any discrepancies or differences are minimal, and that the first part of the amendment has been addressed.

That being so, we are seeking from the Government their view of the protection that their scheme provides to vulnerable people. What, on the basis of 155 pages of regulations, is included in the default scheme for vulnerable people and how does the default scheme address their needs? In this age of austerity, we presume that the Government would not sanction any scheme that provides superfluous or excessive relief, so we are simply asking them to spell out how they are providing for vulnerable people in the default scheme and which aspects of the scheme provide particular support for which groups. Given that the Government have made judgments about who should be protected by the default scheme, they should have a view about who should be considered under local schemes. The amendment does not require any local authority to follow the Government’s view on this; they can exercise their own judgments, but should be able to do so armed with the knowledge of why the Government have made certain decisions.

Local Government Finance Bill

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Thursday 5th July 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 47 and 48 and wholeheartedly support the proposition that has been argued by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin. There is nothing more to say on that matter.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, and I also have Amendment 49 in this group, which is a bit of a failsafe proposal. It says:

“Should any part of a balance on a levy account for any year remain undistributed after 3 years from the end of that year, the Secretary of State shall report to Parliament on the reasons therefore”.

If it is accumulating over that period, there is real cause for concern. This is an added protection and certainly does not displace the propositions in the earlier two amendments.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, has covered most of this but I wish to add a few words on Amendment 47. This ensures that the Secretary of State must consult on whether the remaining balance on the levy account is redistributed to local government or rolled over to the following year. I really feel that this amendment is trying to prevent this legislation from resembling the National Lottery, where if someone does not win a prize it is rolled over to the next round. Here, instead of there being a balance that is distributed to the people whence it came, we are suggesting that it is rolled over to the next lot of recipients in some lottery-type arrangement. All this amendment is trying to do is to limit the levy to the period to which it relates and to those who have contributed to the levy within that period.

Local Government Finance Bill

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Tuesday 3rd July 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, may I pick up on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, about reserves? I hope that when the Minister replies to that point, as she was asked to do, she will include within it how the strong reservations of the accountants’ organisation CIPFA about how much local authorities should hold in reserves will fit in with what the Secretary of State has apparently said. I hope that she will talk about specific reserves as well as unallocated reserves. It would be great if this could be clarified at some stage.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, before the Minister replies, perhaps I might return to the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, to London Councils. I accept entirely that London Councils has changed its position on deferment of the business rate component of this Bill—the briefing that we had a month ago certainly put us in a different slot—and I was not seeking to suggest otherwise. However, I was seeking to relay what is still its current view, as I understand it, which is that the scheme needs to be urgently revamped if it is to produce the radical shift in the structure of local government funding that the Bill proposes. I do not know what process the noble Lord might feel there is to achieve that if there is no deferment of the Bill. Are we going to follow up with an amendment Bill next year? How is it actually to come about? What is there within the Bill that would enable that radical restructuring that is apparently wanted? I do not know whether that is what the noble Lord supports.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendments 13 and 14. It appears that the effect of the central share is to allow the Government to reduce what would have been grants outside the formula grant—that is, paid for by general taxation—and thus allow the business rates to take up the slack. The Treasury could thus substitute business rates for other taxes. I would like to ask if the Minister agrees that there is a danger of improving central government’s fiscal position at local taxpayers’ expense. That is the crux of this very short amendment.

This would not have an immediate effect; the estimates have been made by various local government bodies that the effect could begin in 2016-17, but it could be a real effect.

The central share will come back to councils, as we have discussed, but not necessarily the same councils, in the form of grants. Other noble Lords have given an example of Westminster and have said that that is why there has to be a reallocation of these moneys. I understand and appreciate that, but the real problem is that one reallocates business rates to give an incentive to local authorities to improve businesses within their areas and improve the economy in those areas. Many of them need that incentive; the current system of business rates whereby you collect the money and keep none of it is not an incentive, which is why this is an improvement. If you take away and redistribute, you lose a lot of that incentive from the places where there could be a great improvement in the economy.

Mention has been made by other noble Lords as to the 50%. I could have come in at that stage, but I thought that I would include it in what I am saying now. There is one other aspect to a 50% share, which has not been broached by other noble Lords—that 50% for the Government and 50% for the local councils is a dangerous percentage. Local authorities will lose, as they have in other instances, the difference between the half-empty and the half-full bottle. You know exactly what it is when it is 50%, but it is more difficult when they start recalculating and the share is 51% and 49%, as has been my experience in local authorities. Measuring the value of local council housing, when the example given by CIPFA was 50:50, when the local authority came to use the calculation they took the wrong half, because it was never 50%—it was always something else. Someone in Whitehall may know how to do it; there is a rumour that that is the case. But there is a danger that when you have 50:50, you will end up with 51:49, which would mean that you would not know which was the Government’s share and which was the local authorities’. I would hope that the larger share would be for the local authorities.

The amendment makes the point that the Treasury will be able to switch grants that have been paid for by general taxation into the rates system and in effect raid local businesses to assist the Exchequer. All this will, of course, be in addition to the cut of £500 million, in terms of the legislation overall. Amendments 10, 13 and 14 seek to protect local councils and central government from that usual thing of temptation, because it is not easy to resist temptation. As Oscar Wilde said, “I can resist anything except temptation”. I do not think that we should put too much temptation in the way of central government. I beg to move.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, we have Amendments 11 and 24 in this group. Amendment 11 is a very straightforward probing amendment; it refers to paragraph 2(5) on page 20 and is to do with payments to local government in England. Presently it reads:

“The reference in sub-paragraph (3) to use for the purposes of local government in England includes the making of payments under an Act or an instrument made under an Act (whenever passed or made) to”—

then it gives a range of authorities.

Localism Bill

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Monday 12th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, has indicated, we are pleased to put our name to these amendments. We thank the Government for responding to at least one of the amendments, which means that the noble Lord will not have to introduce that one. The issues, as the noble Lord has explained, seem to be extremely straightforward and clear-cut. The consultation simply seeks for London boroughs parity with what happens to the London Assembly and for them not to have to go through the indirect route for the reasons that the noble Lord has explained and to make sure that there is fair representation. The Government have recognised that there should be representation for the boroughs on MDC boards. It seems a natural and reasonable extension to that that there should be representation on committees and sub-committees. Having said that, I fully support the amendments tabled by the noble Lord.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, as regards the mayoral development areas, reference is made to consultation with a number of bodies, including the Greater London Authority or local councils. But consultation is different in the minds of different people. In local government, we have seen many consultations, the results of which have been ignored. It worries one that a London borough may be only one part of the decision-making process and may only be consulted.

In particular, the government amendment refers to local borough councils having a “relevant” interest if the mayoral development area in any way impinges on the area of that local borough. The boundaries of London boroughs do not fit neatly into developments. For example, the Brent Cross development, which was built more than 30 years ago, is expanding, with which I agree. It is right on the borders of the boroughs of Barnet, Camden, Brent and Harrow. It seems to me that when this situation arises in the future, “relevant” local authorities should be those that have an interest and are affected by the proposed mayoral development areas, and not only those where the mayoral development area would be situated within that local borough. I invite the Minister to consider whether the word “relevant” is correct in this case and whether adjoining local boroughs should also be in some way incorporated in this Bill.

Localism Bill

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Monday 5th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her detailed reply both in writing and verbally. She has not misunderstood anything but she lives, as perhaps we all do, in this utopia where all landlords are good. I am afraid that in the world in which I live not all landlords are good, and I believe that there are a modest number who will use ground 8. I hope that only a modest number will do that, but there will be some who will. There should be nothing in legislation that removes the discretion of the court to do what is right. The matter of when the bailiffs move in was raised. Those who have had experience of the courts know that that is a varied situation because it often depends on whether the landlord has set the thing in motion to get early occupation of the property.

That is particularly important at this moment. The noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, talked about when benefits—universal benefits and the like—are paid. Those of us who have been local councillors—I have been a councillor for 25 years and still am—know that local authorities and social landlords use IT systems to deal with housing benefits. For years, my local authority used Pericles, which went dreadfully wrong. It is not an indictment of any landlord that they should use a system that goes wrong, because IT systems often do, but the fact is that, with the changeover to universal benefits, which has already been mentioned in this debate, there is a great probability that housing benefits arrears will be built up unintentionally because of a changeover in computer systems. In that case, there would be the danger of ground 8 evicting people without the courts having a chance even to postpone eviction. I would ask that my noble friend the Minister looks again at how many such cases there have been and whether there is a need to tweak this in the legislation.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

Does the noble Lord agree that the issue is compounded because there will be a split of housing support, which is going via the universal credit, and council tax benefit, which is staying with local authorities? The noble Lord from his experience would know that often those systems run together and are contracted out jointly, although I do not know whether in this particular instance that is the case. Therefore, having to unpick those two systems, as well as having to build the universal credit, adds a particular dimension to the issue that he has raised.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

I thank the noble Lord for emphasising that point. In my view, during this volatile period there is a great danger of more notional housing arrears arising that would pose the danger of eviction. Good landlords, as my noble friend the Minister said, will be able to deal with it, and that is why I concurred with what she said. But can any noble Lord doubt that there will be some bad landlords? Some bad landlords may seek to use ground 8 knowing that the courts have no power to protect the tenant. Perhaps between now and Third Reading the Minister could look at that. Having said that, at this stage, which is always a mixture of Committee and Report stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Localism Bill

Debate between Lord Palmer of Childs Hill and Lord McKenzie of Luton

Thursday 23rd June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, we have sympathy with these amendments and look forward to the Minister's reply about why there should be this proposed three-year wait. The noble Lord, Lord Tope, talked with some affection about the committee structure. I was leader of Luton Borough Council at the time when we went from a committee structure to a leader and executive structure. My experience was that when you are in control, the leader and executive arrangement is particularly helpful. In 2003, we ended up with a hung council and, although we were the largest party, there was a Lib Dem-Conservative coalition which appointed Lib Dems to the executive. Being on the receiving end of that, we were somewhat less enthusiastic, but I still remain committed to it. I think that the best route is to have a leader and an executive.

One thing that was lost with the committee structure was the opportunity for new councillors, particularly younger councillors, to get involved with the cut and thrust of political debate because the structure and role of scrutiny committees are different. I think an opportunity to learn through that route and to have that debate was missed. We support the right for councils to choose and to revert to a committee structure, if that is what they want. On that basis, it seems that there is no great justification in waiting three years, but the Minister may be able to convince us. Subject to that, we support the amendments.

[Lord Palmer of Childs Hill]

My Lords, speaking as yet another dinosaur who remembers the old system and who was a councillor and is still a councillor in the London Borough of Barnet, I think that the proposal to allow local authorities to choose whether they return to the committee system is very welcome. The only thing I disagree with, and my noble friend Lord Tope obviously disagrees with, is that one has to wait three years before a local authority can make that decision. I cannot see the logic of that.

I have had the benefit of being a cabinet member, as they are called, in a joint administration in the London Borough of Barnet and I am currently an opposition member in that borough. When I was a cabinet member, one of 10 people exercising full executive power in the London Borough of Barnet, I enjoyed the power wonderfully. I used to give little speeches saying that democracy was not being exercised as 10 people had executive power but 53 people in the ruling parties and in the opposition had no real role to play and roles were found for them rather than their playing a constructive part, as they did under the committee system. Therefore, I have experience of being in power and in opposition and I still believe that the committee system is the right one. Under the system we are discussing, back-bench members in the ruling parties and in the opposition feel that they do not have much of a role to play.