(10 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Norton, for his amendment, which allows us to discuss a clause in the Bill that we have not touched on in our previous discussions. I should also say that this is an additional matter that was not covered in the Silk report. The noble Lord comes to this debate on Report with an enviable and well deserved reputation on constitutional issues. I listened very carefully to what he said.
The noble Lord touched on the 2009 report from the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which did indeed recommend that the practice of Members of the House of Commons holding a dual mandate with a devolved legislature should be brought to an end by 2015 at the latest. As my noble friend has set out, that has so far prompted action additionally in relation to Northern Ireland.
The committee questioned whether it was possible for someone sitting in two legislatures simultaneously to do justice to both roles. The Government share the committee’s concern, and listening to noble Lords across the Chamber, it seems that this is a widely shared concern. I very much agree with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, that this is not just about serving the needs of constituents, although, of course, that is important; it is also about the ground rules and the practicalities of what is going on in the institutions concerned.
No Assembly Member is currently an MP but, historically, a number have been so. Indeed, we have two distinguished ones here today who could probably speak to the difficulty—near impossibility, I think—of doing both roles, certainly on a sustained basis. In the Government’s 2012 Green Paper, Future Electoral Arrangements for the National Assembly for Wales, the Government consulted on whether the practice of having multiple mandates should be brought to an end. A large majority of respondents—this time a reliable sample, I think, and a very large majority of respondents—agreed that it should, including opposition parties in the Assembly and the Electoral Reform Society.
Although the Welsh Government did not consider legislation to be necessary, at the Bill’s Second Reading in the Commons the shadow Secretary of State agreed with the proposal, as my noble friend Lord Norton affirmed. Following consultation, in March 2013 the Government announced that we would introduce legislation to prohibit multiple mandates between the House of Commons and the National Assembly at the earliest opportunity. This clause provides that membership of the House of Commons automatically disqualifies someone from sitting in the Assembly, subject to specific exceptions.
If a sitting Member of Parliament is subsequently elected as an Assembly Member, they are given eight days’ grace in which to vacate their seat in the House of Commons, by requesting appointment to a disqualifying office such as the Crown Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds. The eight-day period also applies if parliamentary and Assembly elections are held in close proximity and a candidate is elected to both legislatures. This is to allow them to decide which post to take up. Similar provisions apply in Northern Ireland.
No grace period is given to an Assembly Member who is elected as an MP except where a scheduled Assembly election is expected to take place within a year, the maximum possible period actually being 372 days between parliamentary and Assembly elections. In this instance, an individual will be able to retain both seats for that limited period of time to avoid a costly Assembly by-election when a scheduled Assembly general election is relatively imminent. The draft Wales Bill allowed for a six-month grace period, but following pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Bill, the Welsh Affairs Committee recommended that the period be extended to one year, and the Government have accepted this recommendation. This clause does not apply to the House of Lords, where there are no constituency interests to represent.
This clause will ensure that an Assembly Member will be able to concentrate on representing the constituents and can contribute significantly to the institution. There was cross-party agreement on these proposals in the House of Commons, and I would therefore ask my noble friend Lord Norton to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, it is precisely because there was cross-party agreement that there is a valuable case for raising the issue. I am grateful to those who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, invites me to digress somewhat on to the proposal for a senate of the regions and nations—the words “back of an envelope” come to mind. In terms of the principle that would apply, it would be that which I have enunciated. He talked about caution, but I think that caution should apply to the very proposal for such a senate, rather than the method by which its members should be chosen.
On the points that have been raised, the principal argument deployed from both Front Benches against the amendment is, in essence, that being an MP is a full-time job. There are two problems with that. It was not accepted by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in its report, where the challenge was a conflict with the primary role, not an argument about its being a full-time job. It is also belied by the fact that the House of Commons is not unable to function because MPs are doing other jobs. It is quite possible for an MP to fulfil the functions of a Member of Parliament while being a Minister of the Crown, for example. I really do not see the argument that—
Perhaps I could remind the House that, after the Minister has spoken, it is only the mover of the amendment who can speak.
In that case, I will not be able to anticipate what my noble friend Lord Crickhowell may have been about to raise with me. My point is that the objection to what I am bringing forward is one of practice. I am challenging whether, in effect, one can really do that. Essentially, when your Lordships think about it, those who are making that case are saying: “We know best”. That is not an argument for restricting the freedom of electors. The task may be difficult. It may be close to impossible, which is the point being put forward, in which case it is open to those people not to stand and put themselves up to fulfil those dual roles and it would be open to the electors to make the decision not to elect them. As the Committee on Standards in Public Life made absolutely clear, there is at least transparency in this respect. You know what you are getting into, at least on whom you are electing, because of the positions that they hold, so I think that that principle holds.
The other argument put by the Committee on Standards in Public Life is that of a conflict of interest. However, I do not regard that as being persuasive either, because Members of Parliament have at times a conflict of interest between what their party wants and what they see as the interests of their constituencies. I suppose that the logic of that would be to ban MPs from being elected on a party label, which I think is not what the parties particularly want.
In response to the arguments put forward, there is a practical argument, but I do not think that it is sufficient to overcome what is a fundamental issue of principle. We are restricting the right of electors and it is important to get that on the record. That may not suffice today to prevent such rights from being restricted but I hope that it may help to give thought and prevent such incursions in the future. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.