(11 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise briefly to thank my noble friend for alluding to the research that he did and for his support on my previous amendment. I will look with great interest at the research to which he refers. He also gives me the opportunity to reflect on the Minister’s reply with regard to research in this area. I perhaps should have pointed out that the Loren Marks research was initially a criticism of a conclusion produced by the American Psychological Association two or three years previously. She wrote that particular paper from a critical point of view on its conclusion that all the research so far pointed to there being no problems with same-sex parenting. That was why she wrote that paper. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the American Psychological Association should come back and be very critical of her research, so I would not take the association’s damning criticism too much to heart. I think that Loren Marks is well worth reading and listening to.
I offer my sincerest congratulations to my noble friend on bringing forward this amendment at this late point in the Bill. From a man of faith representing one of the great religions, it is absolutely right that we should be hearing a very conservative point of view regarding the family. It is very important that there are these strong, conservative voices, deeply steeped in religion, to stand up against us modern people, who are much less rooted in tradition and more flexible. It is very important that people such as him stand up on these occasions and put a strongly conservative point of view, even at this late stage in the Bill. I wish that he had been here when we were discussing the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act and that we had heard his comments then on the removal of the assumption that it is in the best interests of children for fathers to be involved in their lives. Again, I recall the Good Childhood Inquiry report, produced by the Children’s Society and the Church of England a few years ago. It highlighted that, with increased rights and freedom of choice for adults in the 20th century, which so many of us welcome, the downside for children has often been that parents’ greater choice has meant that many more children grow up with their father no longer in their family. I think it is very helpful to have my noble friend’s voice here.
Finally, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for her very kind comments. I had forgotten that she made her maiden speech in my first debate, and I appreciated what she said.
My Lords, perhaps I may deal briefly with this in bullet form. The point that has just been made about parenting is totally irrelevant to what this Bill seeks to achieve, and it is certainly irrelevant in terms of the amendment before us, to which the noble Lord, Lord Singh, did not really speak. When he does, I think we would be interested to hear why, under subsection (9), on those who would vote in the referendum, he would exclude Members of your Lordships’ House.
We keep hearing about public opinion as if somehow it is divided—no, it is not. Every poll that has put the question in a neutral way has produced a very clear result. What is remarkable about opinion is not that it is divided but how consistent it has been. As Lewis Baston has written in the latest issue of Total Politics:
“A typical result for a neutrally worded question is support somewhere in the low- to mid-50 per cent range and opposition in the mid-30 per cent range”,
before concluding:
“While there may be some legislative twists and turns in the House of Lords, the battle for public opinion has been won by supporters of SSM”.
With that consistency, there is really no need to consult. The position is quite clear.
In terms of holding a referendum anyway, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, at the end of the previous Parliament the Constitution Committee produced a very thorough report on referendums, weighing the arguments for and against, and concluded that if they were going to be held, they should be not only on constitutional issues but fundamental constitutional issues. Not only is this not really a constitutional issue; it certainly does not qualify as a fundamental constitutional matter.
It is essentially a matter of social policy. Parliament has legislated on significant social policy before. This would be on a par with abortion and divorce, which, as I recall, were not manifesto commitments and not issues on which anybody was really suggesting that there should be referendums. So if we are going to start saying that we should have referendums on social issues, there are wider implications. We would need to consider it very thoroughly before we went down that route. There is absolutely no merit in the amendment before us and I hope that we do not pursue it.
My Lords, you have to hand it to the people who do not like this Bill. They really do not like this Bill and they are fighting it right to the very end, and that is what this is about. They are perfectly within their rights to do that, and I particularly enjoyed the heartfelt plea of the noble Lord, Lord Waddington, in this debate.
I am not going to repeat all the arguments that have been made. I simply refer your Lordships to the noble Lords, Lord Fowler, Lord Pannick and Lord Norton, my noble friend Lord Alli and my other noble friends who have spoken in this debate. They are absolutely right.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Martin, that actually the votes were free votes. This was not a question of the Government and the Labour Opposition. They were free votes. There were Members on all sides—
(11 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have sat here listening to every single speech yesterday and today. I sometimes think we should strike campaign medals.
The objections to the Bill have been on grounds of process—that it was not properly scrutinised in the other place and that it was in no party’s manifesto—and because of what the Bill seeks to achieve. The objections in regard to process can be dealt with briefly as they have been addressed by others. As the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, observed, we have frequently complained that Bills arrive here from the House of Commons not having been properly scrutinised. It is a novel doctrine to say that we should reject them, not least given that our principal purpose—although not our only purpose—is to engage in legislative scrutiny. The point about the Bill not being a manifesto commitment was dealt with most effectively by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard. Governments have a permissive mandate, not just a prescriptive one, and to reject this Bill because it was not a manifesto commitment would, again, inject a novel doctrine which would lead us to regularly reject a good number of Bills in each Parliament.
Furthermore, as my noble friend Lady Berridge noted, if we reject the Bill it becomes eligible next Session for passage under the Parliament Act. If the other place insists on the Bill, it can ensure that it is enacted in the form in which it left the Commons the first time—in other words, the Bill as is now before us. This House may delay it, but it would have no effect on the content.
I turn to the arguments that focus on the content of the Bill. Many have justified the Bill on grounds of equality; I approach it from a different perspective. For me it is a question of freedom: freedom for those faiths which wish to conduct same-sex marriages, and freedom for those who wish to marry. Given that there are grounds for taking this as an issue of freedom, there would need to be compelling grounds to deny such freedom. What, then, are the arguments? We have heard that we should not favour a small minority against the wishes of the majority. The problems with this are twofold: one factual and the other a basic issue of principle.
The Ipsos MORI polls from early this century demonstrate a clear shift of opinion in support of same-sex marriage. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, that I prefer survey data as being somewhat more reliable than anecdote and assertion. We should regard the letters we receive as political intelligence, not somehow a reflection of public opinion. As my noble friend Lady Noakes has noted, all recent opinion polls where the question has been a simple, straightforward one of being for or against same-sex marriage have shown majority support. The recent YouGov poll is especially revealing. Not only is same-sex marriage supported, overwhelmingly so by those aged under 40, but also by women, by a margin of about two to one. Opposition appears to come predominantly from older males.
I am inclined to say that you know who you are, my Lords.
Furthermore, in the poll the percentage strongly in support of same-sex marriage is notably higher than the percentage strongly opposed. As for those who claim that it will cost my party the next election, the poll shows that of those for whom it will be an important issue at the next election, more said that they would be more likely to vote for a party that supports same-sex marriage than those who said that they would be less likely to do so.
The issue of principle relates to writing off minorities because they are minorities, not least those which may not be popular with some sections of society. Homosexuals have been discriminated against and still are, appallingly so in many countries. To discriminate against a category of persons, to deny them freedoms accorded others because of the characteristics which they have not chosen but which set them apart, is fundamentally objectionable in a democratic society.
We are told that it is not up to Parliament to redefine marriage. This demonstrates ignorance of our constitutional arrangements and of our history. Parliament can redefine marriage and, as we have heard, Parliament has redefined marriage. It has done so frequently since the Marriage Act 1541, as illustrated by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Indeed, as we have heard, that is just as well, otherwise we should still be treating marriage as the transfer of the property of the woman from the father to the husband.
What are the grounds for saying that Parliament should not exercise its rights to extend the provision of marriage? It is claimed that permitting same-sex marriage devalues marriage. That is not an argument but rather an assertion of moral superiority. It rests in good measure on a rewriting of history—a point well made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, and indeed the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross—and on biblical text. The Bible has been used to justify all sorts of discrimination that we now regard as morally abhorrent. As the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Salisbury has noted, the text of the Bible has not changed, but our understanding has. In every sphere of life we are constantly learning, except, apparently, in this one respect, where we cling to a view held 4,000 years ago.
Much of the debate has been conducted as if we were the first nation contemplating the introduction of same-sex marriage. We can learn from what has happened elsewhere. Most of the nations that permit same-sex marriage are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights. Their churches have not been forced to do anything by the European Court of Human Rights that they do not wish to do. We have heard assertions in this debate that the introduction of same-sex marriage has led to a decline in heterosexual marriage. I have the figures here, which are readily available in the briefing paper produced by the House of Commons Library. Some countries have seen a decline in traditional marriage, notably Portugal and Spain, but in Portugal that was happening before the introduction of same-sex marriage. In Belgium the figures for traditional marriages went up, not down. A study of the Netherlands found that trends in marriage and divorce did not change. In nations where it has been introduced, support for same-sex marriage has increased, and none of the dire consequences predicted as a result of the passage of this Bill appear to have been experienced. Of course, if anyone can show otherwise, they can bring it up in Committee.
The noble Lord, Lord Brennan, said, “What next?” Well, nothing, unless we will it. Things will not happen unless Parliament decides that something should happen. That is a key point. Nothing is suddenly going to translate from this action unless Parliament wants any further action to be taken. It is in our gift.
I end with the words of Paul Parker of the Quakers in Britain:
“For us marriage is not a mere civil contract, but a religious act. While we don’t seek to impose this on anyone, for us this is an issue of religious freedom”.
The principled case for supporting the Bill is, to my mind, compelling.