Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill

Lord Norton of Louth Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Norton of Louth (Con)]

My Lords, I start with two general observations about the Bill. The first concerns process and the second concerns construction.

The Bill is the product of the “something must be done” response to a particular problem. There is a problem, not least in terms of public perception of illicit or unethical lobbying of policy-makers, but that problem requires a considered response, one that both addresses the problem and is seen to do so. This Bill, as I shall argue, fails on both grounds. My principal point here, following other noble Lords, is that the measure has been rushed. I share the concerns expressed by the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House in its report on the Bill. As it noted, the Government had announced that there would be a White Paper and a draft Bill. There has been neither. As has been said, this places a particular responsibility on your Lordships’ House in scrutinising the measure.

In terms of construction, this is a Christmas tree Bill. The previous Labour Government brought in Bills that were essentially two Bills in one and sometimes three Bills in one. This Government have continued the practice. The title of the Bill is something of a giveaway. The relationship between the three parts is tenuous, to say the least. This practice places particular strains on the other place in terms of detailed examination in Committee. This House can adapt its examination to the discrete parts of the Bill somewhat more effectively, but it is none the less a practice to be deprecated.

I turn to the substance of the Bill. Like my noble friend Lord Lang, I shall focus on Part 1. Much that I say will reinforce the points that he made. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, said, there is general acceptance that there should be more transparency in lobbying. This Bill, though, is too narrowly drawn to correct the mischief that has motivated its introduction. The Bill is concerned to identify those who engage in lobbying on a commercial basis, and do so as free-standing entities. I am not sure what that adds to our knowledge. The more one reads the exclusions in the Bill, the more one recognises the limitations of the exercise. It excludes small-scale commercial lobbyists, those for whom lobbying is not the principal purpose of their business and in-house lobbyists. Some companies have sizable lobbying teams. One suspects that their activities may at times be as much a concern to the public as are the activities of dedicated lobbying firms. Will the Minister tell us why the Government differentiate between lobbying of Ministers on, say, the duty on cigarettes by in-house lobbyists of tobacco companies and lobbying by commercial lobbyists bought in by tobacco companies for the purpose of lobbying Ministers? From the perspective of the exercise of lobbying, and how it is perceived by the public, what is the salient distinction?

That brings me to another crucial limitation of the Bill. The focus is one of status and, as I have explained, a rather narrow one. It is not directed at the actual activity, other than indirectly. It seeks to influence behaviour through making public who engages in commercial lobbying. There is no statutory code of conduct and no stipulation of principles that should govern the behaviour. In so far as the Bill influences behaviour, it may be to encourage lobbyists to avoid making representations in a way that brings them within the scope of the Bill but, as most are not presently caught within the ambit of the Bill, it will not make that much difference anyway. All that the Bill does is to introduce a new layer of regulation for no obvious public benefit. It tells us, at some cost, what is largely already known.

The Bill, in short, is fundamentally flawed. The point has been well made in the other place by Members on both sides that it is based on a lack of understanding of how lobbying actually works. It was expressed especially well by a former student of mine, Tracey Crouch, who spent several years as a lobbyist. As she pointed out, the lobbying industry today provides a very different service and is a very different industry from what it was 10 or 15 years ago. Consultant lobbyists are more likely to advise clients on how to undertake lobbying of government rather than undertake it themselves, and if they do undertake it, they are not likely to be lobbying Permanent Secretaries. The Government appear not to understand the industry as it now is, most of which will not be caught by the provisions of the Bill.

The Bill is neither one thing nor the other. Either it should go the whole way and introduce a comprehensive register of lobbyists or it should be abandoned and the Government should instead address the problem from a very different, and I believe more effective, perspective. The case for a comprehensive register has been made by others. I am not persuaded of the need for a register, comprehensive or otherwise; it may prove counterproductive with lobbyists using registration as a seal of approval. More importantly, I do not believe that it would assuage public concerns about the lobbying of government.

The other approach, which I commend to the House, is to shift the emphasis entirely and build on existing practice. In opening the debate, my noble friend Lord Younger made the point that there is now more transparency about policy-making meetings, with a quarterly publication on those meetings. My noble friend Lord Lang also referred to that. Why not build on that? When Select Committees produce reports, they publish the names of those who have given evidence, that is, who made representations to them. It is normal practice to publish the material submitted to them. Why not require Ministers, when making policy announcements or publishing Bills or draft Bills, to list the names of all those who have made representations to the department on the issue? Listing all those who have lobbied on the subject would be transparent and comprehensive. It would not matter whether it was an in-house lobbyist, a paid or unpaid lobbyist, or simply individuals writing in. It avoids the need to define lobbying, and we would know who had made representations.

There may be a case, building on existing practice, for publishing the notes of meetings and written representations, similar to the evidence volumes published by Select Committees. If this was routine practice, drawing material together on a particular measure, it would properly address the problem. There may also be a case for extending it to non-decision-making: that is, when a Minister decides not to pursue a particular policy under consideration. I appreciate that there may be, indeed no doubt are, flaws in this alternative proposal, but I have yet to find any that render it a less desirable approach than that embodied in the Bill. Perhaps the Minister can explain why my proposal is not to be preferred over that advanced by the Government. If he cannot, the Government may wish to reflect on the wisdom of continuing with a flawed Bill.