Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Smith of Finsbury

Committee stage
Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I take great pleasure in speaking immediately after the noble Lord, Lord Mann, and other noble Lords who have spoken on this topic. I am delighted that my Amendment 35 has been grouped with this interesting debate but I will be taking the discussion in a slightly different direction, which explains my hesitation at leaping in at this point. None the less, I am on my feet and will speak to Amendment 35 in my name, which is in this group.

At least some of us who were in Committee on Monday began to wonder how much this Bill would achieve by way of change, both culturally and in practice. I say that by way of introduction to my remarks on the amendment because I am coming to the question of how the Equality Act is interpreted in connection with the duty, which already exists under the 1986 Act, on universities to protect freedom of speech and freedom of expression. I remind the Committee that, under the Equality Act, all public bodies have a broad duty to

“eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act … advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it … foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it.”

The 1986 Act, as I say, has the obligation to protect and advance free speech but, in recent years, we have found that the Equality Act obligation is frequently being interpreted by universities as a reason to take steps to impose their views on equality, diversity and inclusion both on students and in public events. We have seen, for example, gender-critical feminists being turned away precisely because universities have interpreted their presence as contrary to their own public sector duty under the Equality Act.

Amendment 35 does not excuse universities from their public sector/public body duty under the Equality Act—they remain required to fulfil that broad duty. But it does insert a university-specific balancing requirement that requires universities also to have regard to free speech in interpreting this duty. This is a balancing amendment that ensures that potentially contradictory public law duties do not clash with one another. It is for that reason that I advance it but, to be honest, if we do not see something like this happening at various points in the Bill, it is hard to see how current practice and culture will change at all. With that in mind, I recommend Amendment 35; I hope that the Minister will be able to give wholehearted agreement.

[Lord Smith of Finsbury (Non-Afl)]

Might I ask a question of the noble Lord? He spoke about how he was anxious to have the duties under the Equality Act and the duties under freedom of speech promotion sitting alongside each other, but his amendment refers to having

“particular regard to the duty”

of freedom of speech. Does that mean that the duty of freedom of speech would overtake the duties under the Equality Act instead of sitting beside them?

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, that is not the intention. The use of “particular” arises because universities, both as universities and as public bodies more generally, have a range of obligations under the law. All the wording is intended to do here is to say that that particular obligation needs to be taken into account because this Bill relates to freedom of speech in academic bodies. It is not intended to give priority; it is intended to draw attention to, and have particular regard to, that matter.

In natural language—this is of course legalistic language, to some extent—one would say “to have regard particularly to that as among the other obligations that universities have”, but this is how it is expressed in legal language. I assure the noble Lord that the intention is not to trump one over the other but to require a balancing of these existing obligations and put that requirement in the Bill. At the moment, although it might be said that they both exist and it is for universities to balance them, universities are not balancing them in a way that satisfies the intentions of this Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Smith of Finsbury (Non-Afl)]

I think we are entering dangerous territory if we seek to argue that one bit of law is more important than another. Upholding the duties that are placed on a university generally is something that universities have to do. Giving universities the task of balancing the requirements placed on them under legislation is the way we ought to go.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

I think the noble Lord slightly missed the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. She was not suggesting that there are various legal duties and one is more important than another; she was making an ontological point about what a university is. Freedom of expression and freedom of speech are built into the DNA of a university. This is not simply a matter of balancing legal obligations. The point she was making is that privileging it is absolutely appropriate because that is what universities are for.

I want to make a further point, if I may. I hear this quite a lot from those who object to taking this forward. Do noble Lords recognise that there is a problem? The noble Lord will have his own experience of academic life, although I appreciate that he is speaking in a personal capacity. The free speech protection duty was last expressed in statute in 1986. The difficulty is that, whereas in 1986 the universities saw it innately as their duty to protect freedom of speech, the years have moved on, and now the university authorities themselves are oppressing free speech—not in every case, of course, but it is tending in that direction. So the circumstances have changed, and the need for some sort of balancing is apparent to many of us but seems not to be to those who speak, to some extent, even if in a personal capacity, on behalf of the academic community. That surprises us.

[Lord Smith of Finsbury (Non-Afl)]

I would not fundamentally disagree with either the noble Lord or the noble Baroness about the free exploration of ideas and knowledge being central to the purpose of a university; that is almost self-evident. However, we need to ensure when we are putting legislation through the House that we are not imposing impossibilities on the people who lead universities, making it very clear to universities, colleges and student unions that they have a responsibility to promote freedom of speech and a responsibility to promote respect for all students within their community, for example. That is a sensible approach to ensuring that the Bill achieves what we all might want it to achieve.

On Amendment 69, I have a lot of sympathy with clarifying the Prevent duty in the way that the amendment suggests. That might be a rather useful way of ensuring that Prevent becomes rather more sensible than perhaps it has tended to be over the last few years.