Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 27th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

That point seems to me to be covered by the general power of the assisted dying commissioner under Schedule 1 to do anything that is appropriate or necessary for carrying out his functions, so I do not think that is a reason for not using the word “sole” and giving some assurance to those of us who are concerned about creep.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I think we will have to disagree on that. It is the normal way for that to be dealt with in drafting, so I am content with it. I am sorry to disagree with the noble Lord, but that is my view.

Amendments 135 and 436 from the noble Lord, Lord Frost, would place a duty on the assisted dying commissioner to check that all the paperwork is in order. Again, I have thought very carefully about that. The role of the commissioner, as far as the panel is concerned, is to pass the two reports on to the panel once he has received them from the doctor, for the panel then to consider whether that case is in order and meets the criteria—is the panel satisfied that there is no coercion and is it satisfied on capacity? I think it is neither appropriate nor necessary to add yet a further safeguard in that respect, because that is why the panel is there. It would lead to overlap and unnecessary delay without, in practice, any additional safeguard. The noble Lord, Lord Evans of Rainow, supported that. For the same reasons, I would reject his amendment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, made a point about conflicts of interest. There would obviously be a conflict of interest if the assisted dying commissioner had a financial or commercial interest in any sort of provider of assisted dying services. That would be covered by the principles to which the noble Baroness, Lady Levitt, referred in relation to the way in which the appointment would go. I completely agree with the point by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, but I do not think there is a need to put anything into the Bill in relation to it.

A number of noble Lords have referred to the risk of mission creep—the idea that an enthusiast or proponent of assisted dying would operate in an inappropriately biased way. All that the assisted dying commissioner can do is act in accordance with the terms of the Bill. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, if for example the commissioner stuffed a panel with people he knew would take a biased view, he would be acting both improperly and illegally under the terms of the Bill. As the noble Lord said—and I agree with this—Schedule 1 opens the door to every sort of judicial review if that were the position and people became concerned about it. That goes to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, which would provide for complaints to be made to the Prime Minister. Of course you could make complaints to the Prime Minister, but you certainly would not need the Bill to make that possible; there would be political accountability for the conduct of the commissioner, because the Prime Minister has made the appointment. Equally, there would be legal accountability in the form to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will try to give the most reverend Primate confidence. First, decisions about treatment at the moment frequently have to be made in the context of what everybody in this Committee would think was inadequate palliative care. There is scope for coercion there with no safeguards. Secondly, people have the ability to go abroad to get an assisted death, and there is scope for coercion there. In both those situations, there are no safeguards whatever. The landscape in which those choices are made, whether about continuing other treatment or about going to Switzerland, has absolutely no protections whatever. This Bill provides five levels of protection. I am completely satisfied that this is a safer system than the current law, and I very much hope that gives the most reverend Primate confidence that the Bill is the right thing to do.

On the funding of palliative care, I very much hope that the Government and other people will provide more money for palliative care. The experience in many countries is that the introduction of an assisted dying Bill leads to an increase in the amount of palliative care, because people debate and think about how you die. I hope those things put the most reverend Primate’s mind at rest. The risk for coercion is already there, and this provides safeguards. I hope the introduction of the Bill will produce more money for palliative care, but unfortunately I cannot give the most reverend Primate any guarantees of that.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I shall be very brief. I am grateful to all the noble Lords who spoke in this short and valuable debate. I tabled these amendments in the first place to give the noble and learned Lord the opportunity to explain why this proposed service should be funded by the taxpayer—the unwilling taxpayer, it might be said, in the case of those who have a principled objection to it. I listened very carefully to what he said, and he gave one reason only: failure to make it available for free would contribute to an increase in health inequalities. That proposition rests entirely on the assumption that this is a health treatment. It is not; it is poisoning people. It is completely unpersuasive that this should be justified as contributing to health inequalities or otherwise. For that reason, I would certainly want to bring these amendments back on Report and invite the House to take the view that we should not fund this from public resources. In the meantime, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 6th February 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

This has exposed something that has never been mentioned in relation to the Bill before, or in the whole of our debate on terminal illness. It is a matter of crucial importance. I know the Minister wants to dodge it, but it seems that the Government’s interpretation of Clause 2(1) is very different from what it appears to say in plain language.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I pay tribute to the speeches of the noble Lords, Lord Farmer, Lord Shinkwin and Lord Shamash, all of whom referred to distressing personal circumstances. The Committee is grateful that people are willing to talk about these issues in this very difficult debate.

This group of amendments concerns the definition of terminal illness. As people have just identified, the definition of a person being terminally ill to satisfy the requirements of the Bill is that

“the person has an inevitably progressive illness or disease which cannot be reversed by treatment, and … the person’s death in consequence of that illness or disease can reasonably be expected within six months”.

I will pick up on four points that came out of the debate. First, to deal with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, the words “inevitably” and “progressive” plainly limit the words “illness or disease”, so the illness or disease has to be both inevitable and progressive.

Secondly, to deal with the very important point raised by the Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff, frailty is plainly not within that definition. Frailty, old age or something similar would not satisfy the requirements of

“an inevitably progressive illness or disease”.

That specific point was addressed in the Commons, where the initial draft of the Bill had the words

“inevitably progressive illness, disease or medical condition”.

The words “medical condition” were removed to deal with that specific point. The words

“inevitably progressive illness or disease which cannot be reversed by treatment”

deal with the sort of example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, and other noble Lords. There will be illnesses or diseases, such as type 1 diabetes or HIV/AIDS, where there is a traditional and accepted treatment which will effectively reverse the effect of the condition. It will not get rid of it completely. You still may have HIV or be a type 1 diabetic, but the effect of the condition is reversed. The intention behind putting in the word “reversed” was to deal with those.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I was addressing the wider issue, the one that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was talking about. But it goes to those ordinarily resident in Scotland, who come to England for their medical advice—and if the medical advice says, “Go back to Scotland if you want an assisted death”, would that be a crime? But I also wish to deal with the GP point. If you live in England but have a GP in Scotland, does it debar you from getting it here? I am more than happy to include that in the discussion.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Amendment 14 in this group seeks to expand eligibility for those of pensionable age who have retired from the UK and gone to live abroad. It is a probing amendment, of course; it is not my intention particularly to expand eligibility under the Bill. I am trying to raise a question of equity and fairness but also legal defensibility. I want to approach the issue from a slightly different angle. I endorse everything said by my noble friend Lord Lansley, the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, in raising practical issues, but I want to approach it on a slightly different basis.

The intention of the sponsor, I think it is fair to say, is that in creating this Act we do not turn England and Wales into a sort of international capital for quick assisted death. That would be an appalling thing to happen. So we try to put some borders and parameters around it and say that this service is here for the use domestically of people who are established here. One way of looking at that is to put the criteria in about having been here for 12 months and so forth, and being ordinarily resident, and all of that. As I say, I agree that those things raise very serious practical issues, but it seems to me—here I tread very carefully, because I am not lawyer—that they raise legal issues as well. Are we to some extent fooling ourselves into thinking that we, although we are the legislature, can create these boundaries and that they will remain firm?

I am thinking about what the Minister said in her reply to the debate on the first group today, in which she was very careful to draw noble Lords’ attention to the fact that certain amendments in that group might be challenged under human rights law or on the grounds of the Equality Act. She said that she could not give assurances that they would not be challenged; that was her being cautious and proper in expressing the Government’s view while being neutral about the Bill. But that raises a flag. How many of the limits that we are discussing now would actually withstand legal challenge? I chose my own example on precisely those grounds.

What if you have lived all your life in this country and paid all your taxes in this country and reached your pensionable age and decided to retire to Spain, say? Unfortunate developments lead you to want to come back and you qualify under the Act for an assisted death; you have a terminal illness and six-month prognosis, and you want to come back to the UK to take advantage of that, maybe because it is not available in Spain or because you want to be with other members of your family—who knows, but you want to come back to do that.

Under the Bill, as I understand it, you would be excluded from doing that. But would a court agree that that was a firm parameter; in other words, would a court agree that the criteria we have established are sufficiently rational that they have a sufficient basis in other legislation, in their understanding of human rights or in practical considerations? There might be all sorts of reasons why courts might say, “Yes, these are rational limitations”. But it could equally be the case that the court would say, “No, that is an injustice. This person has paid their taxes all their life. They’ve only been gone from this country for a few months. Of course, they should be allowed to come back and take advantage of it; it is irrational to exclude them”. That is the point I want to raise.

The noble and learned Lord the sponsor of the Bill has to put in place criteria which not only sufficiently exclude the possibility that we are going to become an international shop for assisted death—which we would all agree with him is something that we do not want to see happen—but are sufficiently rooted that they will be defensible and durable in a judicial context. That is the matter that most concerns me, apart from the practical considerations, about this whole eligibility debate.