Foetal Sentience Committee Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Moylan and Baroness Thornton

2nd reading
Friday 22nd March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer noble Lords across the House to the Companion at 4.18, where it states clearly that we address each other as “noble Lord”. We do not use the word “you”, and there is a good reason for that, which is that that actually makes us a politer House. Standing up, even in impassioned debates on subjects about which people feel strongly, and saying “you” will lead to people pointing, which is not acceptable, and there is a reason for this. I have been in this House for 26 years, and there are some things that are wise, and this is one of those.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I heartily endorse what the noble Baroness has just said about how we address each other. Does she think that stating quite clearly that those who disagree with you are either in receipt of “dark money” or are “innocent dupes” meets the standards of the House?

Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Baroness Thornton

Report stage
Wednesday 7th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 21, standing in my name. It dawned on me, as I said in Committee, that the purpose of some noble Lords was not to improve this legislation that has been passed by the Commons but to eviscerate it. The speech just given by the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, seems to illustrate exactly that.

One of the few things on which I agreed with my noble friend Lord Willetts in Committee was when he said that there were two powerful elements in this Bill that made a real change, one of which was Clause 4. That is why it is a crying shame that the Government have conceded so much in relation to Clause 4; they have effectively turned it into a shrivelled sausage when it could have been something that actually made a real difference. But even with that concession from the Front Bench, it does not seem to be enough for my noble friend Lord Willetts or the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, who are insisting that even that pathetic thing be removed and crushed altogether.

A principal argument in favour of Amendment 20, tabled by my noble friend on the Front Bench, is that the Government intend thereby to give the universities an opportunity to resolve the problem through mediation and a complaints system. The difficulty is that, in terms, university authorities have expressed repeatedly the fact that they do not consider that there is a problem: they consider it to be an invented problem, or a problem which, if it exists at all, is rare and egregious and can be handled by the universities. Plainly, there are those of us who feel that the universities have failed to handle it, and need to be brought to book.

If the universities genuinely want to give mediation a chance, Amendment 21, standing in my name, gives them the opportunity to demonstrate that. A similar amendment was tabled in Committee by my noble friend Lord Sandhurst, and it is retabled here—I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Strathcarron for adding their names to it. Amendment 21 would retain the substance of Clause 4 as originally proposed by the Government and approved by the other place, but would give to universities the opportunity in each case to ask the court to stay proceedings so as to allow mediation to take place. It would be at the discretion of the court whether to agree to that. I am sure that, if the court thought that there was a prospect of success in the mediations, it would agree.

This is modelled on legal practice in certain other areas where I understand, for example, that the provision and possibility exist—although noble Lords know that I make no claim to be a legal expert on pensions entitlements and so on. So the principle is a workable one: the university can say, “Please will you stay the proceedings while we exercise mediation”. It preserves the substance of the tort in Clause 4 and gives academics, in particular, an opportunity to make their representations in the way that the Government originally envisaged.

I will address the Government’s proposal, because the proposal being advanced by my noble friend Lord Willetts—who I understand may speak shortly—and endorsed by the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, is to delete the clause altogether. The Government’s proposal would allow those administering the complaints system to indulge in indefinite delay. There is no time limit by which a decision has to be reached in this amendment. My noble friend Lord Howe said something vague about how he thought that 12 months might be something that already existed and might therefore be applied or extended to this activity, but there is actually no time limit by which a complaint has to be resolved which would allow the complainant to trigger the tort. It would remove the possibility of seeking urgent injunctive relief, which is something that could be obtained through the courts. It would push complainants back to a choice between a financially ruinous application for judicial review—because it is financially ruinous for the individual —or continuing with a possibly endless complaints process in which, as has been said by others in this context, the punishment is the process. You are an academic with a career to pursue and you are probably not even in a properly tenured post, but to vindicate your rights you have to undertake a process, extending potentially over many months, which comes to consume your life and, ultimately, to damage your career. It is an unenviable choice, and the tort gave people some other option to allow, potentially, for more rapid relief.

Most of all, the Government’s amendment sends a signal to academics who feel oppressed, feel that they cannot express themselves and feel that they are required to conform to an ideology which they know in their heart they do not endorse that a Government who had said that they were on their side and were taking steps to protect them are no longer interested. That is a very bad signal indeed to be sending. I am sorry to say this, but I think that the Government are being feeble.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

That is true.

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

Now that was a heckle of some value.

To conclude, it might be nice if the Front Bench, which has shown itself capable of endorsing enthusiastically the very laudable Amendment 6, tabled by the Labour Front Bench, could reciprocate by accepting one from its supportive Back-Benchers. If so, I strongly recommend Amendment 21 in my name.

Health and Care Bill

Debate between Lord Moylan and Baroness Thornton

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 5th April 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lady Eaton. I listened very carefully to what my noble friend the Minister said about protections and safeguards offered by the NHS, and the system of abortion provision to young people. But it seemed to me that those safeguards related principally to pregnant children up to the age of 16. There is a gap here, because the age of 18 is important in this debate, and it does not seem to be covered. As the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, said, it was only last night that an opposition amendment said that, in the case of child refugees, the Government must give priority to the best interests of the child—and, as I recall, that amendment was passed and is now back in the Bill. But “child” was defined in the amendment as a person under the age of not 16 but 18. So the best interests of the refugee child must take priority but the best interests of the pregnant child are not even mentioned anywhere in the amendment.

If I recall correctly, only last week we were debating a Private Member’s Bill—but one which I believe had government support—which would raise the permitted age of marriage to 18. Marriage is a natural law right, and also arguably a convention right, because there is a right to a family life, but, correctly, we are allowed to moderate how that right is implemented and affected by putting age restrictions on it. We may decide that 16 is an appropriate age or that 18 is an appropriate age; these are all perfectly legitimate decisions to make. But if our movement is in the direction of saying that 18 is the age at which you should be allowed to marry, it seems to me that there is a huge gap in the amendment in Motion N, which my noble friend Lady Eaton is doing her best to correct.

I regret that my noble friend has said that she is not going to move to a vote, so I am left to ask my noble friend the Minister whether he can explain to me, when he replies, what it is that the Government see as being the means of safeguarding pregnant children between the ages of 16 and 18, who are regarded so carefully in relation to other types of protection that are debated in this House and command widespread cross-party support but seem to have fallen through the traps here.

[Baroness Thornton (Lab)]

I shall be very brief, because it is time we draw this ping-pong session to an end. First, I congratulate the Minister on his introduction to the tele-abortion amendment, and on the reassurance that he gave to the House and the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton. The issue has been expressed very eloquently by the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Barker, and I have no intention of going into detail.

The only other matter before us right now on which we need to take a decision is that of the amendment put by the noble Lord, Lord Crisp. From these Benches, I need to say that we absolutely support the noble Lord in his amendment, and we will vote with him, if he divides the House.