(2 weeks, 3 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the introduction of a commissioner. There seem to be three basic arguments that suggest it would be a good measure to take at this stage.
The first is the proven value and quality of work done by other independent commissioners, particularly the Children’s Commissioner, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner and the Victims’ Commissioner, as already mentioned. The second is the need for a commissioner to oversee the prolonged implementation of this Bill when it is enacted and the wide-ranging scope of work to be covered by the new legislation. Thirdly, a commissioner will enable standards of good practice to be maintained and raised. The existence of a dedicated commissioner should in fact remove, or at least reduce, the need for periodic statutory reviews of specific areas of work and functions in the field of mental health.
My Lords, I have attached my name to Amendment 47, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and I raised this issue at Second Reading.
A powerful case has already been made for a mental health commissioner, so I am just going to make one comparison here. At the same time as this Bill has been going forward, in the other Chamber I have been dealing with the Armed Forces Commissioner Bill. An Armed Forces ombudsman was created, which in some ways has parallels with the Chief Inspector of Mental Health and the CQC. It was found that that was not effective or strong enough, and now the Government themselves are going for the Armed Forces commissioner model.
There is another parallel. One of the reasons why it is felt so strongly that there needs to be an Armed Forces commissioner model is that members of our Armed Forces do not have the same rights. They have certain responsibilities laid on them and are treated differently from other members of society, which is why they need a special advocate. The parallel with people who are potentially subject to the Mental Health Bill is obvious.
In the health space, I have been heavily involved over the years with the Patient Safety Commissioner, which was initially resisted by the Conservative Government of the time. Eventually the fight was won, and it is now seen to be a huge success. This is a model that we can see working and that is seen to be necessary.
The Government have expressed a desire to get rid of arm’s-length bodies and make decisions themselves. The Government devolve decision-making to those so-called quangos—the arm’s-length bodies—but that is not the case with the Patient Safety Commissioner; there is no parallel here. They are a person who is there as an advocate and to have oversight; they are not making decisions. I do not think the Government can shelter under that umbrella.
(2 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall also speak briefly to the other amendments in this group. I warn those who are planning to speak after me that I will be brief, because this amendment is self-evident and set out in our papers. I begin by reflecting on the fact that I think there is universal welcome for the creation of the nominated person situation. This is a good step forward and widely welcomed. What your Lordships’ Committee is trying to do is perhaps to fulfil its traditional role to make sure that it is set up in as watertight, practical, useful and effective way as possible.
This amendment did not originate with me; it originated with the Law Society. It provides for a mental health First-tier Tribunal to overrule the power of the nominated person. I note that the next amendment in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Meston, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, suggests not the county court but the Court of Protection. I do not have any particular position on any of these things. It is useful for us in Committee to discuss this in detail. People far more expert than me will outline that, so I shall not go on at length.
I will note for the Committee’s understanding that my Amendment 71 was withdrawn, because it was doubled up with someone else’s but was put in a different place. It was just one of those technical juggles that happens. With that very brief introduction, I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 69, which would replace the reference in the Bill to the county court with reference to use of the Court of Protection to deal with applications to terminate appointments of nominated persons. The single reference to the county court, currently in Schedule 2, is the only place where the county court is given jurisdiction to do anything in this legislation, which I suggest makes it something of an anomaly as well as an anachronism.
The reference to the county court simply carries forward the use of the county court from the 1959 and 1983 Acts, which provided for that court to deal with applications to displace nearest relatives. When I was first appointed a judge, I well remember being presented with an urgent application to displace the nearest relative, of which I then had no experience and in which I had never had any training. In the days before judicial computers, I had no access to anything but out-of-date and very limited books in the small court, no longer in existence, where I was then sitting for a few weeks and without help from any legal representatives. Few learning curves have been more rapid.
Since then, I would like to think I developed some expertise, but my later experience of those applications has led me to question whether the modern equivalent in this Bill concerning nominated persons would be better dealt with elsewhere. Such applications can involve detailed understanding of psychiatric reports and of the family dynamics for the patient concerned, particularly if the nominated person is unco-operative or disengaged. At the time when the earlier legislation stipulated the use of the county court, there was neither a separate family court nor the Court of Protection, which was created by the Mental Capacity Act 2005.
Of course, I do not suggest that county court judges could not deal with these applications—my life with my present and former judicial colleagues would probably not be worth living if I did so. A judge has to be prepared to turn his or her hand to whatever comes their way. However, I do suggest that the Court of Protection is now better equipped to deal with these applications with its specialist expertise and specifically nominated judiciary.