Financial Services Bill Debate

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Department: HM Treasury
Tuesday 26th June 2012

(12 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Stewartby Portrait Lord Stewartby
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My Lords, I do not want at any length to add to what many noble Lords have said, except to record that this is one of the most incomprehensible Bills that I have had business with. Several times I started on what I thought was a trail of decisions, and at the end of it I could not work out who did what and how they knew what they should do.

I have one small technical question for my noble friend that is along those lines. I know that “macro” means “long” in Greek. I do not know what is meant by “micro”—which means small—so far as it is applicable to prudential regulation. Is the micro bit about the size of the body being investigated or about the scale of the activities of the regulator? I am not at all clear about this. Having come across these terms “macro” and “micro” regulation, I found myself unable to work out what quite a lot of these fundamental things mean.

Unfortunately, under the old regime there was a lack of clarity about who did what and who was responsible. However, I am not sure that we are getting away from that, as we ought to. It is a difficulty, and I hope that my noble friend can shed a little light on it. Many who have spoken in this short debate have pointed out that the Bill is not very easy to follow, to put it mildly. I would strongly welcome anything that would make it easier.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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My Lords, this is the most important Bill to have come from the coalition. We are expected to right the wrongs of the financial service and have that in place for the next 20, 30 or 40 years. This Bill has been tacked on to the Financial Services and Markets Act, which is why there is such complexity and why it is wrong. The Governor of the Bank of England himself said in June 2011:

“We are losing the simplicity and the ability to have a cleaner debate about the new framework. Certainly the Government rejected our”—

the Bank of England’s—

“request to have a new Bill and the argument that they gave, understandably, was that at the cost of some complexity we could ensure that all the provisions that were appropriate could be put into an amended FSMA and it would be a faster way of doing it”.

He went on, with some understatement:

“I think we have seen the complexity”.

If the comments of noble Lords today are anything to go by, we have not seen anything yet as a result of that. The governor went on:

“I am not quite sure whether we have avoided delay”.

Going back to the crisis of 2007 and 2008, the main issues were complexity, the question of who was in charge and transparency. We are making them worse, rather than better. We are moving from a tripartite system to a quadripartite system. When we ask exactly who is in charge—the deadly question that no one could answer at the time of the financial crisis—it will be equally hard to give a decent answer as a result of this Bill.

That is what is wrong with the Bill. It needs the utmost scrutiny in this Chamber. The other Chamber debated the Bill for 43 hours and 28 minutes. However, the Financial Services and Markets Act was debated for 89 hours and 59 minutes—more than double the time. As a result, the Treasury Committee says, in its frustration, in the first paragraph of its report, that it is now over to the House of Lords to change the Bill. Why does it say that? It says so because Clauses 80 to 103 and Schedules 17 to 21 were not debated due to a lack of time for the programme Motion. We need time for, and simplicity in, the Bill but we are getting complexity. That is the issue that has brought the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and me together. We are very clear: give us that simplicity, not complexity. The audience that is looking at this from outside may then understand that we have the best interests of the financial services and the country at heart, and we may get a decent Bill out of this.

Lord Peston Portrait Lord Peston
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My Lords, I told the Minister that I would ask him a question but I forgot to ask it. I hope I will be allowed to ask it before he replies. Its origin is in my getting lost in the Bill. I was in the Public Bill Office and pointed to something on the page—a number, a letter and another number—and said, “I cannot find it”. They flicked the pages over and said to me, “What you need is a Keeling schedule”. I had never heard of a Keeling schedule so I rang the Treasury and asked one of the noble Lord’s assistants what it was. I gather from talking to the Minister earlier that he now knows what it is. I should like him to tell your Lordships’ House what it is and where we can get one, since I gather that it will enable us to find things.

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Moved by
5: Clause 1, page 1, line 12, at end insert—
“(2A) Any person appointed under subsection (2)(a) shall be appointed with the consent of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons.”
Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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My Lords, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I am moving Amendment 5 and speaking to Amendment 10, which is consequential on Amendment 5.

As the noble Lords, Lord O’Donnell and Lord Sharkey, said, this is about the concentration of power in and the accountability of the governor in the new financial system. In fact, Alistair Darling, when he appeared before the Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, called the governor the “Sun King”. I would suggest that we are giving the governor an impossible job. The MPC and FPC require an academic economist of the highest calibre, and we have that in the present governor. However, the Bank of England, as it is comprised now—with the PRA and the FCA and so on—is the equivalent of a multinational enterprise. It requires a chief executive and skills that are separate from those required on the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee. We make a mistake by not realising that particular point.

I have invited the governor to come here so that all Peers could listen to him, in the hope of understanding and inquiring how he sees the position. He will be departing in 2013, so we are legislating for the future in this respect. Perhaps I may give my own view on the debate taking place at the moment about deputy governors, and so on, as a former chairman of the Treasury Committee and someone who had an intimate association with the governor and others especially during the financial crisis. I believe that the words “deputy governor” relegate the authority of the position. We have a vertical accountability here but we do not have a horizontal accountability. That is what we should be looking at on this issue—how do we get that horizontal accountability?

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, was correct about the concept of culture and ethics. I raised the issue of culture and ethics when the Northern Rock problems arose and it was a foreign language to the financial services industry of the time. The people involved thought that we were talking about Moses bringing the tablets down from the hill. However, culture is about behaviour, and ethics is about how you resolve conflicts of interest. It is as simple as that. I was delighted to see that the FSA, after being pressed for many years, has taken on that view. In his last speech before departing, Hector Sants spoke exclusively about the issue of culture. The issue of culture and behaviour is extremely important. If we concentrate on titles, then we will miss the main point. That is the issue that I would like to get across now. We need checks and balances.

My experience with the financial crisis also showed that when the crisis hit, both the Treasury and the Bank of England were found wanting. The Treasury had diminished its financial expertise. I knew the people in the Treasury who had the financial expertise—two of them have left by now, but at the time there were three. That was the situation we were in. If we wanted a response to the financial crisis from the Government we could not get one because they did not have the skills and understanding. The Treasury therefore invited people in from the City to advise it, which is where the problem started in the first place. That is the paucity of the situation at the moment.

Parliament therefore has a very important role to play in terms of the checks and balances. It was acknowledged by the governor and others that the Treasury Committee played an important role in Northern Rock, particularly in the legislation that was put through on “lender of last resort” resolution regimes and so on.

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Lord Sassoon Portrait Lord Sassoon
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Even if it does not matter, I try. I do my best to answer these points, even if it causes more confusion. Sometimes the “a”s and the “the”s could be very important.

I move on to Amendment 6 tabled by my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft, on which, no surprise, I will not be much more accommodating, but it is an important point that should be discussed. As I said, it is vital that the post be filled by the best possible candidate and taken from candidates who have expertise and skills to fulfil the role effectively. The legislation as it stands does not prohibit the Chancellor consulting widely before recommending that a candidate be appointed as governor. In practice, the Treasury and the Bank work together closely to recruit for key Bank of England posts. I am sure that my right honourable friend the Chancellor of the Exchequer will engage with key individuals as appropriate during the process to identify the next Governor of the Bank of England. Indeed, well ahead of the formal process kicking off, the chairman of court, Sir David Lees, and the Chancellor are already in touch on this matter.

However, I suggest that we should keep in mind that the appointment is ultimately for the Queen to make on the advice of the Prime Minister and Chancellor. Many people may be consulted as part of the process to appoint a new governor, but it would be impractical to attempt to define them prescriptively in the Bill. By leaving the legislation broad in this way, the Chancellor will be able to consult whoever he or she feels will add value to the advice. The people consulted may well change depending on the circumstances of the appointment. I suggest that that is how to leave the legislation but I hope that I have given the Committee some perspective on how these things will be handled. I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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My Lords, the aim of the exercise is contained in the Treasury Committee report, which said that an amendment was tabled on Report in the other place but that because of “insufficient time” the Minister did not give an answer. This amendment is to elicit an answer. I suggest that the Minister should think again on this issue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said that there is a role for Parliament. If Parliament feels excluded, that does not augur well for the stability of the system. I understand that giving a veto to a parliamentary committee is a bold measure, so I understand the concerns being expressed. The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, made the point that the Treasury Committee could make a recommendation and the House could look at it. There has to be either a formal or an informal way of including Parliament in this. My noble friend Lord Peston said that if the Governor of the Bank of England left, he would leave the country.

Lord Peston Portrait Lord Peston
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I meant fired.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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If he was fired, that would happen. I bring not an exact parallel to the Committee’s attention. A number of months ago, comments were made by members of the present Treasury Committee about the chief executive of the Financial Services Authority. They felt that he was responsible for the demise of the Royal Bank of Scotland. A few weeks later the chief executive, Hector Sands, left. I do not know whether there was a causal relationship. I pointed out to Members of the Committee that if the environment in the other place is charged, it can have unforeseen consequences. Parliament therefore has to be considered.

Lord Peston Portrait Lord Peston
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My Lords, perhaps I may interrupt as I misunderstood. In my judgment as an economist, the chairman of the Monetary Policy Committee is quite capable of doing some things via that committee that could destroy the whole economy of this country. However, as far as I can see, the rules are that he cannot be fired for that. He can be fired for going bankrupt and one or two other things, but there is no way he can be fired for making a mess of economic policy. I am pretty sure the Bank of England Act does not allow him to be fired for the reasons that my noble friend is raising. If we were asked if we could get him fired for a wrong policy, fine, but it is my understanding that the rules for firing a governor do not include a wrong policy. You may say that is a bit irrational but I am pretty sure that I am right.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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The rules do not include wrong policy and I never suggested that they did, but what I am saying is if there is a charged atmosphere in Parliament and there could be a scapegoat, perhaps the governor or a future governor would leave as a result of that. We must be mindful of that situation and I gave a parallel, if not an exact one, of what happened a few weeks ago on that particular issue. We also have the governor now being appointed for eight years. That was adopted after being suggested by the Treasury Committee and no one has commented on it in this Chamber. I think it is something which needs much more reflection from the Government.

The noble Lord, Lord Burns, spoke about the chairmanship of the court. I would suggest to the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, that this is a big challenge to the Bank of England, which at the moment is not perceived to have that challenge. That aspect of challenge is really important. I could give noble Lords an example from my time on the Treasury Committee. No names, but I was approached by the representatives of a number of non-executives during the financial crisis and asked if I would see them. They wanted to tell me about the situation on the board of their company and explain why no change was affected by them; my answer was, “Absolutely not. You’re on your own. If you’re a non-executive and you cannot challenge, you should not be on the board. You should leave the board as a result of that”. The aspect of challenge still resonates and we need that. It is the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, was pointing to and the Minister needs to reflect on it.

The noble Lord, Lord Flight—if I can wake him up, no, I do not think I can—made the point about Mervyn King and economics teaching. He made the distinction that it was the economics teaching that was bad and not the present governor’s teaching—

Lord Flight Portrait Lord Flight
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The former—

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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Yes, the former, exactly. Economics has lost its way on this issue. I would point the noble Lords to a good letter in the Financial Times yesterday that said economists are there for the well-being of society and that they forgot that. There needs to be a fundamental rethink of the economics curriculum. When Alan Greenspan appeared before the Senate, he said the intellectual edifice that was built up has now crumbled as a result of that.

Other noble Lords have made the point that Amendment 5 is going too far, but we need reflection on it and I can understand where people are coming from. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, raised the issue of Parliament’s involvement and pre-appointment consultation. I think the Government can do something in terms of pre-appointment consultation, whether it is overt or covert. I would suggest that if they do not want any further annoyance at the other end of this building, they should reflect on that issue and come back with something in terms of pre-appointment. It can be done, it is feasible.

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Baroness Wheatcroft Portrait Baroness Wheatcroft
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I thank my noble friend the Minister for his reply; I confess I found it disappointing and I thank those noble Lords who spoke in support of my amendment. I was trying to find a simple means of showing that the court was held in some esteem and had powers to exercise. I do not doubt that informal conversations go on but I am slightly reluctant to rely on informal arrangements when we are trying to strengthen the corporate governance of the Bank. Not just to strengthen the corporate governance but to strengthen the perception of that corporate governance. I would ask my noble friend to think about this matter and maybe other ways in which he might strengthen perceptions of the corporate governance of the Bank. However, I shall not move my amendment.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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With a request to think again, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Brougham and Vaux Portrait The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Brougham and Vaux)
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Is it your Lordships’ pleasure that the amendment be withdrawn?

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Moved by
11: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Retrospective reviews of Bank performance by the court of directors
(1) Section 2 of the Bank of England Act 1998 (functions of court of directors) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (5) insert—
“(6) The court shall conduct retrospective reviews of the performance of the Bank with respect to its functions and objectives.
(7) The court shall determine the particular matters to be reviewed under subsection (6).
(8) The court must publish a report on each review carried out under subsections (6) and (7) unless the court decides that all or part of such a report should not be published for reasons of confidentiality or because it would endanger financial stability.
(9) When all or part of a report of a review is not published under the provisions of subsection (8), the court must—
(a) publish as much as possible of the report,(b) send a copy of the full report to the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons or, in exceptional circumstances, inform the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the reasons for not sending it, and(c) publish the report or part of the report as soon as possible after the court decides that the considerations in subsection (8) no longer apply.””
Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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This amendment is about corporate governance and the best practices in corporate governance. The Treasury Committee has concluded that the corporate governance in the Bank of England is well short of that in the best public and private institutions. Given the concentration of the regulatory responsibility in the Bank of England, there need to be checks and balances.

The Treasury Committee has recommended a supervisory board, using the term “supervisory” rather than the term “court”. We had a debate about this earlier so I do not want to go over old ground, but this is not really about nomenclature but about powers and responsibilities. Frustration has been expressed over many years, by both parliamentarians and by people who have sat in the court, that the court is toothless. We need to make this an efficient body, so whether we call it an oversight committee or a supervisory committee is immaterial. It is about powers, accountability, best practice and corporate governance. That is the essence of the view in this amendment.

The supervisory court, as the Treasury Committee has recommended, should take an explicit view on the Bank of England’s budget, both in the level of changes to the allocation of resources and in prudential and monetary areas. The inclusion of experts on prudential policy, particularly for the chair of the board, is essential. The board currently comprises 12 members. It is a good suggestion to reduce that number to eight, because the best boards have smaller numbers, and 12 is rather unwieldy.

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Lord Sassoon Portrait Lord Sassoon
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My Lords, without wanting to endorse the conclusions of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, from the experience in 2007, yes, of course it would be possible and appropriate for the oversight committee to conduct or commission that kind of review. Without detaining the Committee for much longer, I will address a couple of other points.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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Could the Minister point to where his amendment says that that would be allowed? Looking at proposed new Section 3A(2), I can imagine a very sterile debate between the oversight committee and the Bank or the governor. The function of the oversight committee is to keep,

“under review the Bank’s performance in relation to … the Bank’s objectives”.

If it asked, “Did you stick by your objectives?”, the Bank answered, “Yes”, and the committee said, “We don’t think you did stick by your objectives”, where would it go on that issue? The committee could ask, “Did the Financial Policy Committee do its duty under Section 9C?”. The answer could be, “Yes, it has”, or, “No, it hasn’t”. The Minister needs to point to areas that would allow for the questions that my noble friend Lord Eatwell has asked.

Lord Sassoon Portrait Lord Sassoon
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My Lords, I think the critical point here is that the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, posited a situation in which this would be, in his words, a sterile debate with the governor. It goes perhaps to the heart of the question that I started with as to why the oversight committee is a committee of the non-executives. It means that it is the oversight committee without the governor or any of the executives of the Bank being members of that committee that takes the decision, under this provision in Amendment 13, to commission reports over a very wide area. So there is no question at the front end of a negotiation with the governor and the executive about whether they would commission a report in those circumstances. That is for the oversight committee to do. We have discussed the timing issue. The report is made and, subject to the issues that we have already discussed, the report is published. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord McFall, that there is no negotiation to be had at that front end. The non-executive oversight committee of the court of the Bank will have a very clear statutory function to take precisely what is proposed in new Section 3A, and it will be untrammelled by any possibility of the sort of sterile debate that the noble Lord suggests might happen. I hope that that reassures him.

I want to address a couple of other points, largely people issues of two kinds here. My noble friend Lord Tugendhat and the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, questioned the need for the governor to consent to the appointment of an internal reviewer. This is intended to be a perfectly straightforward and practical measure. In practical terms, if the person selected is on the verge of leaving the Bank for another post, going on sabbatical or maternity leave, or whatever, the non-executive directors on the court may not necessarily be aware of this, and it is a practical way of ensuring that the appointment works. It also provides the governor, as the person ultimately responsible for the staff who work for him or her, with the opportunity to determine whether the person selected has the capacity to undertake the review in the timescale envisaged without impacting their other responsibilities. There is no more to it than that.

Lastly, I go back to a point which I believe the noble Lord, Lord McFall of Alcluith, made at the beginning about the size of the court. It is not directly the subject of this amendment, but I think that it is worth answering that point. Given that there will be four executive members—the governor and three deputy governors—if the court were reduced to eight, it would not allow for a non-executive majority because we have four insiders on the court. More generally, if there were such a small number of non-executives, it would be difficult to have sufficient diversity of experience and views, which was a point that we discussed earlier and which I completely agree with. If we had a reduction in size, it would be impossible effectively to have a non-executive majority or indeed, as I say, sufficient diversity.

I hope that I have been able to deal with the very understandable and important questions and concerns on this issue so that the noble Lord, Lord McFall, might see his way to withdrawing his amendment and the Committee will support the Government’s amendments.

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Lord Phillips of Sudbury Portrait Lord Phillips of Sudbury
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I hope that my noble friend agrees that the noble Lord, Lord Burns, had quite a point. It harks back to earlier discussions about the complexity of drafting. It is the fact, as I hope my noble friend will confirm, that the definition of Court of Directors in Clause 1 of the Bill includes the four executive directors and “not more than 9” non-executive directors—which makes 13. The interplay of the phrase Court of Directors and the new body that is the subject of the government amendment makes for extraordinary complexity in understanding. One thing that my noble friend might consider for the next stage is that when the Bill and his amendment refer to non-executive directors they say non-executive directors, because there are four executive directors—the governor and three deputy governors. They are directors too.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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I thank noble Lords for their contributions. It has been a very interesting debate. I had more of an idea what things are about at the beginning of my speech than I did at the end and whether it is the oversight committee or the court. Perhaps the Minister could just clarify whether the chair of the court will chair the oversight committee and whether the oversight committee will be composed of non-executives, with no officer of the Bank on the oversight committee. I cannot see that detailed in the Bill.

I agree with noble Lords in asking why we need another committee. The reason why I asked the Minister questions earlier was that the Treasury Committee in another place is very firm that this proposal does not plug the gap. In the light of the debate, there needs to be a review from the Government and they need to come back to us on Report so that we can get some clarity when it goes back to the other House. The core of this is corporate governance. If we get good corporate governance on the court, there will be no need for the oversight committee at all.

The noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, had a very good suggestion. Why do we not combine my amendment with the Government’s amendment and then we can come back to this matter, look at it and, I hope, all agree? I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.
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Moved by
12: After Clause 1, insert the following new Clause—
“Publication of court minutes
(1) Section 2 of the Bank of England Act 1998 (functions of court of directors) is amended as follows.
(2) After subsection (5) insert—
“(6) After each meeting of the court, the Bank shall publish minutes of the meeting before the end of the period of two weeks beginning with the day of the meeting.
(7) Subsection (6) shall not apply to minutes of any proceedings where the court has decided that publication should be delayed for reasons of confidentiality or because publication would endanger financial stability.
(8) Where any part of the court’s minutes is not published under the provisions of subsection (7), the Chairman of the court shall inform the Chairman of the Treasury Committee of the House of Commons of the reasons.
(9) Any part of the minutes of a meeting of the court must be published as soon as the court has decided that the considerations in subsection (7) no longer apply.””
Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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My Lords, the MPC is obliged to publish minutes of its meetings, but the Financial Policy Committee has just been asked for a record. In the other place, Mark Hoban, the Minister, pointed out that,

“the FPC also produces what it calls a record of its meetings, which is a very full account of the debates that go on in the FPC, and we will expect a similar process to be undertaken for the court’s meetings”.

What is good for the MPC should be good for the FPC as well.

As a veteran of Labour Party constituency meetings during the 1970s and 1980s, I really know the difference between the record of a meeting and the minutes. There can be many battles behind the scenes on that. This is not as arcane debate as we think it is.

When the Minister replied in the other place during the passage of the Bill, Chris Leslie, the opposition spokesperson, said:

“I just want to be clear about what the Minister is saying. Is he saying that when the Bill comes before the other place for consideration he will accept retrospective reviews and publication of minutes or that he will simply consider it?”.

The Minister replied:

“We are clear that we want to see the court’s minutes published”.

The chairman of the Treasury Committee, Andrew Tyrie, then asked a further question:

“when he says that he is committed to the publication of the court’s minutes, does he mean the publication of the full minutes or only a summary record of them, which it appears is what was proposed before”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/4/12; col. 766.]

That question has still to be answered. This amendment is put down for the sole purpose of eliciting that information.

Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town Portrait Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
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My Lords, I will speak to the amendment standing in the name of my noble friend Lord Eatwell and myself while supporting Amendment 12, moved by the noble Lord, Lord McFall. I am sorry to do so in his absence, but I particularly welcome Amendment 144, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, to which I very happily added my name. The Government responded speedily to a request for the FCA’s minutes to be published, following, I am sure, my intervention at Second Reading and for no other reason. I am pleased about that because it was as late as February that the Government saw the publication of board minutes as a matter for the FCA board rather than for legislation. However, we believe that publication is particularly important when considering the difficulty faced by those seeking to represent the long-term interest of consumers, be they savers, borrowers or debtors, as they follow every twist and turn of a regulator’s wide remit. The minutes are invaluable to lay out the narrative of the FCA’s focus.

The regular publication of minutes is undoubtedly a matter for public policy and therefore correctly in the Bill rather than being for the board itself to decide. After all, it is its work that will be scrutinised by this openness. I know that the Government’s move will be welcomed by Which? and the Financial Services Consumer Panel, as well as by the wholesale market players, for whom the FCA is of particular importance.

However, consumers’ interests go further than the FCA, important though that is. The vital work and the decisions undertaken by the Bank, the FPC and the governor can only benefit from greater debate by, and input from, a range of commentators, be they the press, academics, market participants, representative organisations, other regulators or indeed users. Publication both improves the internal thinking through the debate that it generates and has an important role in accountability. The Government have described the FPC as,

“a powerful new authority sitting at the apex of the regulatory architecture”.

It is therefore beholden on us to ensure that the mechanisms to ensure the FPC’s democratic accountability are commensurate with the strength of its powers. This starts with transparency and the beginning of a new culture of democratic dialogue.

The Treasury Select Committee report of 19 October is already familiar to us and will become more familiar. It argued for the need for clear transparency both in the publication of the remit and in the FPC’s responses. It said:

“There should be the presumption that ex-post reviews would be published, except where confidentiality needed to be maintained”,

in which case a redacted version could be published or publication delayed. It also said that,

“the Chairman of the Treasury Committee should be shown an unredacted version of the findings with an explanation of the reasons for non-publication”.

We endorse that recommendation. The committee also stressed that,

“The date of publication should then”—

in other words, if it has been withheld—

“be reviewed periodically until such a time as full publication would not endanger confidentiality or financial stability”.

I turn to the issues mentioned by my noble friend Lord McFall. Mark Hoban in the other place agreed that there was,

“a clear need for the Bank’s accountability arrangements to be strengthened through the publication of the court’s minutes”.

He agreed that the Government would consider this further when the Bill came to this House for its scrutiny. However, he made it clear that he wanted to see the court’s minutes published, as well as retrospective reviews,

“so that Parliament and stakeholders can hold the Bank to account for the way in which it has used its powers not just when it comes to the Financial Policy Committee”,—[Official Report, Commons, 23/4/12; col. 766-67.]

but more widely. We welcome those sentiments and hope that the Minister will now be able to signify his support for the amendments, which I think are in line with the recommendation of the Minister in the other House.

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Lord De Mauley Portrait Lord De Mauley
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I think I have an answer. The point is that the principle is as I outlined, whether it is an individual or the committee.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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I apologise to the House; I am away in another world. I still believe that there is quite a difference between a minute and a record. However, given that the Government have come forward with a number of proposals, I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.
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Moved by
21: Clause 3, page 3, line 14, leave out “4” and insert “6”
Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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My Lords, I beg to move this amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and myself. It is quite a simple amendment. The principle behind it is that the external members of both the Monetary Policy Committee and the Financial Policy Committee should be in the majority, to counter groupthink within the Bank itself. The Treasury Select Committee had taken evidence on this and was very clear on it, as was the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, which recommended that there should be a majority of non-executives on the MPC. Both the Government and the Bank of England disagreed. The Bank of England said very clearly,

“Decisions about the relative numbers of internal and external members of the MPC and FPC are ultimately for Parliament.”.

If those decisions are for Parliament and there is a cross-party consensus on that, Parliament’s will should be observed in this case. The Bank made the point that,

“diluting internal membership to the point where the Committees could not be presented as distinctively Bank Committees would undermine the Government's purpose of asking the Bank to undertake these activities in the first place”.

If the Government feel, as they have said, that increasing the number of external members on the Monetary Policy Committee would make it unwieldy, given that that would take the number to 11, there is a simpler way of doing that. That is to ensure that there are two fewer members of the internal executive on the committee, which would result in the MPC’s internal members numbering four and its external members numbering five. When we talk about external members, I am very much aware of the experience that I had and that you can get groupthink with external members as well.

The concept of diversity is really important and, as was mentioned in other debates in the Chamber today, we should be ensuring that there is representation of women on the committee. The MPC and the FPC have exclusively all-male boards. There are women who were at senior level at the Financial Services Authority and who have now left—for example, Margaret Cole, who was the managing director of its conduct business unit. She made a great contribution in ensuring that the industry listened to the Financial Services Authority, and she made a lot of real improvements on insider dealing. Sally Dewar left the authority too. These women have left, so that needs to be taken into consideration here as well.

One concept that has not been addressed in the financial services industry overall has been the consumer. I battled for years to get a consumer representative on the Financial Services Authority, and we eventually got one on it. Let us think on a wider front and keep in mind the words of the former Monetary Policy Committee member Professor Charles Goodhart, who said, as someone echoed today, that if you are excluding 50% of the population then you do not have the best talent pool. Let us have external members, eliminate groupthink and let the will of Parliament prevail.

Lord Flight Portrait Lord Flight
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My Lords, my two amendments follow those in the name of the noble Lord, Lord McFall, and are essentially probing. They up the stakes from having six members appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer to having eight and require that all members of the FPC are,

“sufficiently independent of the Bank of England”.

To me, the issue is this: the FPC will be crucial. Its job is to detect things going wrong in the financial system and to direct institutions to put things right if they are in trouble. My view is that if the FPC is just part of the Bank of England, it runs the risk of being overdominated by what I will call the Bank of England establishment. It is important that FPC members are independent and, if they can be persuaded, may be people with central bank experience from other economies, who are the sort of people who will be good at the job for which they are chosen.

That gives rise to another issue which I have only just appreciated. The wording is slightly ambiguous. The implication is that members of the FPC must be directors of the Bank of England, members of the court. That seems to be slightly questionable. I am not sure that all members of the Monetary Policy Committee are members of the court. The FPC is parallel to the MPC in its role, and it would not be satisfactory if the Court of the Bank of England got to such a size that it was unwieldy. I question, therefore, and think it might be worth considering, whether there should be the requirement that FPC members are directors of the Bank of England. That does not seem to add anything.

However, the main point is to achieve a body of people that delivers the job it is there to do. It is not directly relevant, but I am mindful that the one banking system that entirely escaped all the troubles of 2007-09 was that of the Lebanon. The governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon, who is a very wise old bird and has seen many things before, spotted the trouble coming in terms of mortgage instruments and kept the banks of the Lebanon out of it all in good time. We want an FPC that, whatever the next problem is that faces us, will be capable of steering in that sort of direction. The wider the experience it has, the better.

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Lord Sassoon Portrait Lord Sassoon
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The three deputy governors are to be members—I count that up as a six to five ratio. It is not correct that the Bank has seven insiders. The Financial Conduct Authority is an independent regulator, which is emphatically not one of the Bank members. I doubted whether I could count to six at this hour, but it is six. However, I am grateful to my noble friend for getting that clarification.

Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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Would the Minister expand on that clarification? At present, the MPC contains two deputy governors, Charlie Bean and Paul Tucker, and there will be a third one, who will take the membership up to six. However, there are only four external members of the MPC at the moment: Ben Broadbent, David Miles, Adam Posen and Martin Weale.

Lord Sassoon Portrait Lord Sassoon
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My Lords, no change is being proposed to the membership of the MPC, which will remain with five internal and four external members. The third—the new deputy governor—will not join the membership of the MPC. Let me press on.

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Lord McFall of Alcluith Portrait Lord McFall of Alcluith
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It may please the House to hear that I withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 21 withdrawn.