Scotland Bill
Debate between Lord McCluskey and Lord Wallace of Tankerness(8 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord McCluskey (CB)
My Lords, I accept that Amendments 1 and 2 could not be moved, and will not be moved by me or by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. However, in the light of the Minister’s statement, I make a brief comment. It sounds to me very like a Pepper v Hart type of statement, designed to guide a court, when a court sits down to decide on an ambiguity in the interpretation or application of the provision. I am not at all sure that it will work, but it is no doubt the best that the Minister could come up with, even with the assistance from behind him of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who is unfortunately unable to be here today. It does not solve the problem, but it is better than nothing.
The very fact of making the statement appears to be to concede the point that we were all making, that the provision in the clause is just a shibboleth, because Pepper and Hart statements have no locus at all unless in a court of law when a statement is invoked to assist the interpretation. However clear the statement is, it is not binding on the court, which has a duty to apply the words of the statute to determine what it means. However, I welcome it, while regretting that the Government did not pick up on the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, which would have solved the problem within the statute itself, and we would not have needed this. However, in the light of the Government’s attitude, we have to leave it there.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)
My Lords, following on from the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, it was with some considerable regret that I agreed not to move Amendment 2, part of which I shall come back to in a moment. I welcome the Minister’s statement as far as it goes, which is not very far. I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, that it is an attempt at a sort of Pepper v Hart statement, but I make two observations on that. First, for Pepper v Hart to come into play, there has to be an ambiguity that has to be resolved. If, in fact, there is no ambiguity—and I am not sure whether the absence of something that has been debated in Parliament and expressly rejected by the Government could amount to an ambiguity as they have made it very clear that they do not wish for Devolution Guidance Note 10 to be part of what is on the statute book—I am not sure that Pepper v Hart would come into play.
Lord McCluskey
The noble and learned Lord talked about the likelihood of litigation. Is he aware—I am sure he is—that the Human Rights Act itself is extremely productive of legislation at all levels of our courts in Scotland and elsewhere? Therefore, if the Government proceed with their intention to introduce a domestic human rights Act, and that has a direct effect upon the Scotland Act and the Human Rights Act in Scotland, then there is bound to be litigation that in turn will raise the question of the meaning of this so-called clause.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
As I said, these are not academic issues but very real ones. The Human Rights Act could certainly give rise to them as indeed could measures in the Trade Union Bill. They would not necessarily be issues between Governments; they could be issues that impacted on other public bodies in Scotland, for example. That is why it is regrettable that the Government have not been more forthcoming and willing to look at the proposals that we want to put on the statute book.
Scotland Bill
Debate between Lord McCluskey and Lord Wallace of Tankerness(8 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, amendments in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Stephen are in this group. Basically, the arguments are very similar to those just advanced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. The powers in Clause 68 are extremely wide. We are coming to the end of the Bill and people will think that these are technical amendments but in fact they are of profound constitutional importance. In its report on the Bill, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has already drawn the House’s attention to the extent of the powers conferred by Clause 68, and therefore it is important that the Government take these points seriously.
Our Amendment 79AA is very similar to the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, with one difference, which is that we allow the powers to apply in respect of Part 3 because of the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Paragraphs 24 to 28 of the committee’s 15th report of this Session deal with this clause.
The noble and learned Lord gave a number of reasons why he thought that this provision was exceptional but I think that he may have missed one out. He said that there was no limit to when these powers could be used but in fact there is no time limit on the legislation that it can apply to. Subsection (2) says:
“Regulations under this section may amend, repeal, revoke or otherwise modify any of the following (whenever passed or made)”.
I emphasise the last four words, which mean that future legislation could be affected by these powers. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee said in paragraph 25 of its report that the memorandum from the Government,
“acknowledges that the power to amend or repeal future enactments is exceptional. Reasons are given as to why this is needed in connection with Part 3 of the Bill which deals with welfare benefits: the commencement of Part 3 is expected to take place over a period of time and, because of the complexity of the area, it may be necessary to make changes to legislation enacted between the date on which the Bill is passed and the date on which the functions to which Part 3 applies are transferred to Scottish Ministers. We consider this provides a reasonable explanation for needing the power to amend future enactments in relation to Part 3 of the Bill”.
But the report goes on to say that that,
“does not justify the extension of this power to the other Parts of the Bill. It may be that similar considerations apply, but because nothing is said about this in the memorandum it is impossible to know”.
In other words, the Government are not only trying to take these powers but they have given the appropriate committee of your Lordships’ House that is scrutinising the Bill no reason whatsoever for such wide powers, including the exceptional power to amend or repeal future enactments. They did provide an explanation in respect of Part 3, which the committee found to be a reasonable one, and that is why we have not sought to remove it. Amendment 79AB is consequential.
As was also picked up on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, Amendment 79BA refers to the provision that talks about,
“any other instrument or document”.
Our amendment would remove those words from subsection (2), as it is thought that it is extremely wide. Again, the 15th report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee commented on this at paragraph 27, noting its exceptionally wide effect without any compelling reason—that no justification has been given for a power to revoke any instrument or document, whenever made. Therefore, we believe that it should be removed from the Bill.
The other point is one touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. We deal with it in Amendment 79EA, which would remove references to Acts of the National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland legislation from this regulation-making power. Again, no substantive reason has been provided for extending the Secretary of State’s regulation-making power under Clause 68 to legislation made by either the National Assembly for Wales or the Northern Ireland Assembly. It seems very wide and raises the interesting question of whether legislative consent Motions were required in the Northern Ireland Assembly or the National Assembly for Wales before including these provisions in the Bill or whether, indeed, if these powers are ever wished to be used, doing so would require legislative consent Motions. Perhaps the Minister can enlighten us when he comes to reply.
Lord McCluskey
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, may I ask him a question on that point that I meant to ask my noble and learned friend Lord Hope? The particular measure in subsection (7) refers to, as the noble Lord said, Wales and Northern Ireland legislation. Is that within the Long Title of the Bill? The Long Title is:
“To amend the Scotland Act 1998 and make provision about the functions of the Scottish Ministers”,
not the Secretary of State, “and for connected purposes”. I am not very good at reading Long Titles, but when I read this I cannot see how the subsection objected to fits within it.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
The noble and learned Lord makes a very important and perceptive point, and I am glad it is not me who has to reply to it from the Dispatch Box. I certainly see his point that it is a very stark, simple Long Title. To actually extend the ambit of the Bill to Measures or Acts of the National Assembly for Wales or legislation of the Northern Ireland Assembly does seem a bit of a stretch. No doubt the Minister can enlighten us when he comes to reply.
The important point is that we do take seriously the report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. At the heart of it, these are extremely wide powers and, in some respects, exceptional powers. With the one exception relating to Part 3, no explanation or justification has been provided by the Government for taking these wide powers.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
On the important point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, about having to table amendments again to maintain the sequence, and, indeed, in relation to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, on the last group of amendments, perhaps the Minister will take this opportunity to clarify whether, when we come to Report, the order of consideration will be as in Committee; in other words, that Parts 2 and 3 will be taken at the end—I think next Monday is the day currently set down for that—and the other parts will be debated on Wednesday.
Scotland Bill
Debate between Lord McCluskey and Lord Wallace of Tankerness(12 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, the amendments that I tabled in Committee reflected some of the points made in Committee and the agreement that had been reached between the Government and the Scottish Government to ensure that a legislative consent Motion in support of the Bill was tabled in the Scottish Parliament. The amendments at that stage included provision for compatibility issues to be referred to the higher courts in certain circumstances to allow these issues to be dealt with quickly.
On Report, I said that I was still considering whether the law officers should be able to refer certain compatibility issues to the Supreme Court without the permission of the High Court, and what the role of the High Court should be. I also indicated that I would continue to discuss these matters with the Lord Advocate.
The amendments that I have tabled extend the powers of the law officers and allow certain compatibility issues to be ultimately considered by the Supreme Court where the law officers consider it appropriate to do so. The Lord Advocate is content with these amendments.
Clause 35 already makes provision for the law officers to require a lower court to refer a compatibility issue to the High Court. This can be done before the trial is concluded. On receiving the referral, the High Court can either decide the compatibility issue itself or refer it to the Supreme Court. We expect the High Court, in making this decision, to take account of the views of the law officers.
Amendment 9 ensures that if the High Court decides to determine the compatibility issue itself, then the law officers will have a right to appeal the compatibility issue to the Supreme Court once it has been determined by the High Court. In these circumstances, the law officers will not need the permission of the High Court or the Supreme Court to appeal. This means that where one of the law officers refers a compatibility issue to the High Court then either law officer can ensure that the issue is ultimately considered by the Supreme Court, should the High Court decide to look at the issue itself.
In addition the Bill already allows the High Court to refer a compatibility issue to the Supreme Court, where the compatibility issue has not been referred to it by a lower court and the High Court is considering the issue on an appeal. Amendment 8 extends this power, by allowing the law officers to require the High Court to refer the compatibility issue to the Supreme Court. Law officers can only do this if the compatibility issue has not been referred to the High Court by a lower court, and the High Court is considering the issue on an appeal. Referring the issue will enable the Supreme Court to decide on it earlier, which will be helpful where the compatibility issue will have implications for other cases. These amendments improve the Bill and enable compatibility issues to reach the Supreme Court more quickly, where this is appropriate, while respecting the importance of the role of the High Court in relation to these issues.
As I said in our earlier debates, we have come a long way in reaching agreement on the role of the Supreme Court in Scottish criminal proceedings, and I am grateful for the contributions made to the debate, including those made by the expert group that I set up chaired by Sir David Edward, by the review group led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and by other members of your Lordships’ House. I trust that all who have been involved in this work consider that the provisions in the Bill will result in improvements to the way in which convention and European Union law issues are dealt with in Scottish criminal proceedings. I beg to move.
Lord McCluskey
My Lords, I welcome both Amendment 8 and Amendment 9, which, I understand, are being taken together. As for Amendment 8, I wrote to the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General for Scotland some time ago suggesting that this would be an appropriate power to be included in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. My view, which he has echoed, is that this power, used when thought necessary, could sometimes be useful to speed up cases going through the courts. It is clear that the two law officers, the Advocate-General and the Lord Advocate, can be trusted to use this power only in circumstances where it would serve the interests of justice, namely by preventing delay.
I believe I understand the purpose of this amendment and of Amendment 9, but could the noble and learned Lord explain one or two matters? The first is the exception made in the words that conclude Amendment 8,
“otherwise than on a reference” .
Could he explain precisely the purpose of those words? The second point relates to Amendment 9, to Clause 36. This disapplies subsection (5) to certain appeals taken by either of the two law officers. Why is this particular subsection disapplied? The answers will assist those practitioners who may have been confused by the considerable changes that have taken place, both in the Bill itself initially, and in the proceedings in this House to what is now Part 4 of the Bill.
Would the noble and learned Lord also explain under what circumstances and at whose instance a criminal case might be referred to the Supreme Court before the stage at which the facts of the case have finally been determined, and before the case itself has been finally determined by the court below? May I ask in particular, with regard to the commencement provisions in this Bill, when it is envisaged that Part 4 of the new Act will be brought into force? In asking that, I recognise that the Lord Justice-General—the Lord President—will have a considerable amount of work to do in preparing an act or acts of adjournal to cover the new matters. I have no doubt that he will have to consult widely on that; however, I hope that it could be done within months, rather than in any longer period. When is it envisaged that Part 4 will be brought into force?
I made an error in speaking to the Committee some time ago. I referred at that stage to the judges who had been consulted by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton, before he put in his written representations. I mentioned that one of them was the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers. In fact, the two judges referred to were the Lord Chief Justice of England, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, Sir Declan Morgan. I apologise to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Phillips, for that mistake.
Finally, I express my thanks to the Advocate-General for Scotland for the very careful and considerate way in which he has dealt throughout with the Bill and all the representations he has received. Two groups made a considerable contribution to the shape of the Bill and I shall mention them in a moment. The Advocate-General said that he would listen, which he undoubtedly did. He also made judgments with which I am happy to say that I agree. The two bodies are those mentioned by him. The group led by Sir David Edward, known as the expert group, made a substantial contribution to analysing the problems. Secondly, there was the group of experts that I had the honour to chair. We could not call ourselves the expert group because that name had already been appropriated by Sir David Edward’s group, so we called ourselves “the Supremes”. However, we kept that name to ourselves for reasons of modesty and to avoid confusion with the pop group of the same name. Between us and with the help of others in your Lordships’ House, we now have in the Bill a scheme for appeals on human rights issues in criminal cases in Scotland in the Supreme Court, and for other compatibility issues, that is greatly superior to the one that somehow found its way unannounced into the Scotland Act 1998. Time will show whether I am right.
Lord McCluskey
Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, will he reflect on this debate and draw the attention of his colleagues in government to the fact that the considerable improvements that have been made to the criminal justice appeals system in Scotland were achieved in a Bill discussed in this House by unelected Members who made all the necessary changes, including those that he made? There is perhaps a lesson there for those who are considering what changes to make to the constitution and powers of this House.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
The noble and learned Lord is, I suspect, going slightly wider than the Bill, but I am sure there will be many lessons learnt from the way that the Bill has progressed—not least the way in which we have dealt with it. I pay tribute to those within your Lordships’ House who have contributed in debates and representations, as well as to others outside your Lordships’ House who have contributed too. What we have at the end is something worth while, given that some months ago we did not have the easiest circumstances. I obviously wish to confirm that although the group that I set up was referred to as the expert group, that in no way detracts from the expertise of the group chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey. I was very conscious that when he, along with Professor Sir Gerald Gordon and Sheriff Charles Stoddart, came to see me, I was in the presence of the two people who had taught me criminal law in the late 1970s. I certainly listened very carefully to what they and the noble and learned Lord said, and I am pleased that the position we have reached appears to command support across the House. I therefore commend the amendment.
Scotland Bill
Debate between Lord McCluskey and Lord Wallace of Tankerness(12 years, 3 months ago)
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The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
I beg to move that this Bill be now further considered on Report. In moving this Motion, I am conscious that at earlier stages in the passage of the Bill, Members of your Lordships’ House have been anxious about the progress towards a legislative consent Motion. On Monday, I indicated that the Scotland Bill Committee would meet this week—I thought that it would be today but I understand that it was yesterday—to discuss the legislative consent Motion and the agreement reached between the Governments on the Scotland Bill.
I can advise the House that the committee met yesterday. It debated and agreed a short report, which was published earlier today, on the draft legislative consent Motion, which had been put forward by the Scottish Government. That report concludes with the following words:
“All of the Committee notes the contents of the Legislative Consent Memorandum and a majority recommends that the Parliament gives its consent to the legislative consent motion”.
Only the Green Party member of the committee has chosen not to make a recommendation.
It is now clear that we have agreement between the Governments on this Bill and a clear recommendation to the Scottish Parliament to vote in support of the Bill from both the Scottish Government and the committee established by the Scottish Parliament to review the Bill. That report having been published earlier today, I thought it was important to bring it to the attention of the House.
Lord McCluskey
I hope that the House will forgive me if I take 90 seconds to say something about my personal attendance, or non-attendance, for Part 4 of the Bill today. Each time I have come to the House, the proceedings of the Scotland Bill have been delayed—today, by more than three hours; on Monday by longer than that; and, at Second Reading, by even more. Unfortunately, that means that I, for personal and domestic reasons, am unable to remain until Part 4 is reached. It will be at a time when I have to go for personal reasons.
However, perhaps I may say that I am deeply indebted to the Advocate-General for the way in which he has responded to the amendments proposed in relation to the Supreme Court. The end result is something with which even I could agree to the extent of about 98 per cent. In due course, I shall write to him with a couple of technical points that are perhaps worthy of consideration. I hope that we can proceed on the basis that the Advocate-General is now advocating in Part 4. I am indebted to him and his staff for all the courtesy shown to me in the course of these proceedings. I thank your Lordships for allowing me this indulgence.
Scotland Bill
Debate between Lord McCluskey and Lord Wallace of Tankerness(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord McCluskey
On a point of order, I understood from our grouping notice this morning that we were going to discuss not just clause 17 stand part but Amendments 71 and 72 by the Advocate-General and the amendments to those amendments standing in my name.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, if I can assist here, my understanding is the same as that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey. I think that I said when I opened my remarks setting out my amendments that I was seeking not to wind up the debate but, if anything, to open it. There are important issues to be discussed, if it is possible to rewind so that we can have a debate on the amendments. There is an agreement that clause stand part should not take place.
Lord McCluskey
My Lords, I am very grateful to the authorities and the noble Lord in the Chair in connection with this matter. I think we should deal with the amendments but I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General would like to deal with Amendment 71 before I deal with the amendments to that amendment. Would that not be the proper way to proceed?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, obviously, I am not formally moving the relevant amendments because we have not yet come to them but I think that I tried to deal with the content and the structure which we wished to achieve through the amendments. Although I cannot formally move them yet, I think that I have spoken to the substance of them and it might take the debate forward if the noble and learned Lord now makes his response.
Lord McCluskey
My Lords, I am perfectly happy to do that. Amendment 71A, which stands in my name, refers to line 11 of government Amendment 71 and proposes to insert the words,
“in the course of criminal proceedings”.
I want to emphasise that we are generally happy with the approach of Amendment 71: at least I am because I am happy that it deals with the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 rather than the 1998 Act—a point which I made earlier. However, the heading of the new clause, which is in bold on the Marshalled List, states:
“Convention rights and EU law: role of Advocate General in relation to criminal proceedings”.
First, I accept that we should deal with EU law as well as ECHR law, although our report did not find it necessary to go into that matter at all. This relates to criminal proceedings. The whole point is that Amendment 71 relates to the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, and we are making provisions in subsection (3) on:
“Right of Advocate General to take part in proceedings”.
I believe that that should read, “take part in criminal proceedings”, for a reason that I shall come to shortly. The provision states, in terms, that:
“The Advocate General … may take part as a party in criminal proceedings so far as they relate to a compatibility issue”.
The compatibility issue is defined here for the purposes of all the proposed new sections, including those that I am proposing.
Subsection (2) of proposed new Section 288ZA states:
“In this section ‘compatibility issue’ means a question whether a public authority has acted (or proposes to act)”
in the way specified in proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b). Again, we ought, for clarity to insert the words, “in the course of criminal proceedings”. They merely add something that is perfectly obvious, but they have a bearing on the important issue as to whether or not questions arising in criminal proceedings might be treated as vires issues in the way mentioned by the noble and learned Lord when he was speaking a moment ago.
Therefore, my next amendment proposes to insert after “whether”:
“an Act of the Scottish Parliament or any provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament is outside the legislative competence of the Parliament as being incompatible”.
This is an important issue because the Advocate-General has very properly decided that there should be an amendment to paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 to the 1998 Act. That change appears in the new clause proposed in Amendment 72. Subsection (3) states:
“In paragraph 1 of Schedule 6 …after sub-paragraph (f) insert—‘But a question arising in criminal proceedings in Scotland is not a devolution issue if it is a compatibility issue within the meaning of section 288ZA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act”.
When one looks at that provision in subsection (2) of the new section proposed in Amendment 71, we find that a compatibility issue includes,
“whether a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) … in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1)”.
I may be wrong about this, and I hope to hear the noble and learned Lord’s reply, but if a Member of the Scottish Parliament—particularly a Member of the Government—proposes a Bill in the Scottish Parliament that will breach a convention right, as specified in Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, that is unlawful. Therefore, under the proposed new clause in Amendment 72, from which I quoted a moment ago, a question arising in criminal proceedings is not a devolution issue, if it is a compatibility issue within that meaning. The result is, I think—although I may be wrong, because this is difficult to follow—that if, in the course of a criminal trial, assuming that the noble and learned Lord’s amendments on these matters are accepted, a person states, “The Act under which I have prosecuted or which has a bearing upon the prosecution is beyond the competence of the Parliament”, it will instantly become a compatibility issue that is not a devolution issue. Therefore, the alternative route of using the vires provisions under Schedule 6, to which the Advocate-General refers, will not be available to anyone. In other words, there is only one route to take, which is what I want to happen.
On 17 January, the Advocate-General said to me in a letter, and repeated today:
“I am not minded to accept the Lord Advocate’s suggestion”—
a suggestion made by the Lord Advocate before the committee at which I spoke—
“that the new appeal should extend to questions as to whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament is compatible with ECHR or EU law. The suggestion would mean that if someone wishes to argue that an ASP is incompatible with the ECHR and that it also relates to reserved matters they would need to use the new appeal route in relation to the ECHR issue as well as the existing devolution issues appeal route”.
I think that his amendments knocked out the devolution issue and have given us what we want, but I would be interested to hear his view on that and whether there has been some confusion on the matter.
The other amendment which I should mention in this context bears on proposed new Section 288ZA in Amendment 71, where I propose to add in subsection (2),
“references to the course of criminal proceedings are to the period beginning with the detention or arrest of a person for an offence and ending with the pronouncing of the final interlocutor”.
The reason for that highly technical amendment is that it is possible that, before a person is detained or arrested, there might be by a public authority—whether the police or the BBC, for example—an invasion of his human right to a fair trial by saying things about the accused even before he is detained. We may need to look at that separately, but the amendment draws attention to the fact that there ought to be a definition as to when criminal proceedings begin in the Act, so as to leave it in no doubt. There have been difficult questions in past cases about when a person is charged, when he is detained, et cetera. Those words themselves are not crystal clear, but I want to make it crystal clear when criminal proceedings begin and when, for the purposes of compatibility issues, they end. That matter is covered by my Amendments 71A to 71C, which draw attention to what I think are problems arising from the framing of Amendment 71, which proposes the new clause.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, first of all I thank all the noble Lords—noble and learned Lords—who have taken part. We may be small in number, but we have two former Lord Advocates, a former Solicitor-General and Senator of the College of Justice, and a former Lord Justice General. The experience that has been brought to bear on the issues has been quite considerable. We even have a member of the jury in my noble friend Lord Maclennan.
In retrospect it would have been easier if we could have had a more focused debate, but it is quite clear that we are going to return to this matter on Report and I certainly take on board the points that have been made. The grouping was intended to allow for a full discussion on this issue and all the different points in relation to it. I will certainly give consideration, through the usual channels, as to how we might group the amendments on Report so that we have some quite focused debate, particularly on the point of certification, which is possibly the most important point at issue.
I will come on to certification in a moment, but will briefly respond to some of the other points raised, particularly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey. He indicated that he had tabled Amendment 71A to insert the words,
“in the course of criminal proceedings”.
The amendment amends the proposed new Section 288ZA(2) to do this. We believe that our amendment inserting Section 288ZA(1) makes clear that the new appeal route only arises in the context of criminal proceedings, but I did listen to what the noble and learned Lord said. There may be some ambiguity or lack of sufficient clarity, and I will certainly want to look at this. I have looked at drafts at various times and I do accept that it is sometimes difficult when you are trying to import things into a different Act to make sure that it is right. I will look at the particular point that he raised there.
With regard to the noble and learned Lord’s point about defining “criminal proceedings”, the term “criminal proceedings” is already used in the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, and we are therefore content that no definition is required. Indeed, inserting a definition just in relation to these particular provisions may inadvertently cast doubt on the meaning of the term when it is applied to other provisions of the 1995 Act. Therefore, to ensure consistency throughout the Act, we felt that particular amendment would not be necessary.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, asked whether there would be a compatibility issue if an Act of the Scottish Parliament was introduced by an MSP in breach of Article 6. It is important to point out that introducing legislation in itself does not change the law and would not be incompatible with the convention. It is only when the Bill is passed that the issue of a possible breach of Section 29 of the Scotland Act would arise. At that point, a challenge to an Act of the Scottish Parliament would be a devolution issue. However, I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, indicated that we had made it clear—and the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, read out from the letter that I sent to him last month—and it is certainly clear that it is the Government’s intention that issues that arise in respect of Acts of the Scottish Parliament over whether they are compatible or within competence, under Section 29 of the Scotland Act, should be treated as devolution issues. They should use the procedures that currently exist for devolution issues and should not go down a route for compatibility issues. Indeed, my concern was that you could have some parts going down a devolution issue and some going down a compatibility issue. That is certainly our intention; I will look carefully at these amendments as drafted to make sure that proper effect is given to that intention and that an unintended ambiguity has not arisen.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, also raised the question of time limits. The reason for the exception here was not without precedent—and I think that there was agreement generally that the time limits should be there. Section 7(5) of the Human Rights Act 1998 provides that proceedings alleging that a public authority has acted unlawfully by virtue of Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act must be brought within a year of the alleged unlawful act. However, this time limit can be extended if the court or tribunal considers it equitable having regard to all the circumstances.
In a case reported last year, R (Cockburn) v the Secretary of State for Health, the court considered it equitable to extend the time limit under Section 7(5) because the claim raised a matter of public importance, and it was not suggested that the delay had not caused hardship to the defendant or to third parties or was detrimental to good administration. This is to give discretion to the courts when it may be that this is how justice can be done in circumstances where no one is necessarily at fault and permission was not sought in the time limit specified in the amendment.
The other point related to the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, about the Lord Advocate or Advocate-General being able to refer a matter to the Supreme Court. This is an issue which I have certainly given careful consideration to, and I readily accept that there are good arguments on both sides. There is the argument, as the noble and learned Lord indicated, that a lot of cases might be backing up when one decision is needed to resolve a whole host of cases. On the other hand, as I indicated when I spoke earlier, the advantage of the trial having been completed, and the Supreme Court having the advantage of the case having been given consideration by the High Court of Justiciary, is something that is of importance. However, I will reflect again on that. I have done so many times, and there are important issues here.
Lord McCluskey
I have not had a chance to check, but I have a recollection that the Attorney-General in England intervened to have a case taken to the Supreme Court earlier, but I am not sure about that. Perhaps the noble and learned Lord could deal with that on another occasion, if he is not able to do so today.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Indeed, I can confirm that the Lord Advocate has referred cases directly to the Supreme Court; the so-called “sons of Cadder” cases were on references by the Lord Advocate to the Supreme Court within the last 12 months. So it clearly has been done. Those were cases clearly where there was a wish to get clarity in some of the implications of the original Cadder judgment. So there are certainly good arguments as to why that should be there, and ones that I am certainly prepared to listen to further.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd, for that because there are arguments there and I will give further reflection to them.
A good number of issues have been aired on certification. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lords, Lord Cullen, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom and Lord Boyd of Duncansby, who indicated on certification that although there have been issues against it, in fact the case that the Government have sought to make against certification can be justified on a number of grounds. It is right, as a number of your Lordships have indicated, that we are not comparing like with like. As I indicated in my opening remarks, in England and Wales the whole criminal justice system of substantive criminal law and criminal procedure is the potential subject matter of appeals to the Supreme Court, whereas here we are dealing with what are essentially constitutional issues that arise in the context of a criminal case—namely, convention compliance or European Union laws.
Also, as I indicated before, the original justification for certification was very much administrative. It was an Administration of Justice Act in which it was introduced, to ensure that there was not a great flood of cases. I believe that it was brought in not for any reason of jurisprudence—as the quotes from the then Lord Chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, suggest—but as an administrative break. Again, not least because of the representations which we have received from the Lord Justice General, we will treat these matters very sensitively and seriously, giving proper weight to the arguments that have been advanced again. It would be fair to say that the arguments advanced in the course of your Lordships’ debate this evening have not really prompted me to change my mind on this, but no doubt these matters will be returned to.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, for giving us a focus for some of the debates which we have had, and I very much hope that on Report—
Lord McCluskey
I want to reiterate that I regret that because of the way the amendments were grouped, the debate was not able to take the coherent form which all of us wanted. Certainly, I am not satisfied with the manner in which I was able to present the individual arguments on the separable points. However, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord for indicating that one way or another we will be able, when we return to this matter more maturely on Report, to look at the remaining issues that will be outstanding—because they are not all going to be raised again—and deal with them coherently and finally at that stage.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
I concur with the noble and learned Lord and perhaps we will have a bigger attendance, although that should not in any way diminish the quality of the contributions we have had this evening, because these are important issues. With these words, perhaps we can confirm that Clause 17 will not stand part of the Bill.