Lord Wallace of Tankerness
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The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)
I beg to move that this Bill be now further considered on Report. In moving this Motion, I am conscious that at earlier stages in the passage of the Bill, Members of your Lordships’ House have been anxious about the progress towards a legislative consent Motion. On Monday, I indicated that the Scotland Bill Committee would meet this week—I thought that it would be today but I understand that it was yesterday—to discuss the legislative consent Motion and the agreement reached between the Governments on the Scotland Bill.
I can advise the House that the committee met yesterday. It debated and agreed a short report, which was published earlier today, on the draft legislative consent Motion, which had been put forward by the Scottish Government. That report concludes with the following words:
“All of the Committee notes the contents of the Legislative Consent Memorandum and a majority recommends that the Parliament gives its consent to the legislative consent motion”.
Only the Green Party member of the committee has chosen not to make a recommendation.
It is now clear that we have agreement between the Governments on this Bill and a clear recommendation to the Scottish Parliament to vote in support of the Bill from both the Scottish Government and the committee established by the Scottish Parliament to review the Bill. That report having been published earlier today, I thought it was important to bring it to the attention of the House.
Lord McCluskey
I hope that the House will forgive me if I take 90 seconds to say something about my personal attendance, or non-attendance, for Part 4 of the Bill today. Each time I have come to the House, the proceedings of the Scotland Bill have been delayed—today, by more than three hours; on Monday by longer than that; and, at Second Reading, by even more. Unfortunately, that means that I, for personal and domestic reasons, am unable to remain until Part 4 is reached. It will be at a time when I have to go for personal reasons.
However, perhaps I may say that I am deeply indebted to the Advocate-General for the way in which he has responded to the amendments proposed in relation to the Supreme Court. The end result is something with which even I could agree to the extent of about 98 per cent. In due course, I shall write to him with a couple of technical points that are perhaps worthy of consideration. I hope that we can proceed on the basis that the Advocate-General is now advocating in Part 4. I am indebted to him and his staff for all the courtesy shown to me in the course of these proceedings. I thank your Lordships for allowing me this indulgence.
(a)”
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, as we come to the final group of amendments, we move from finance to law.
In the debate that we had in Committee on the roles of the Lord Advocate and the Supreme Court in criminal proceedings, I recognised that we had come a long way from some of the exchanges that took place last summer. Today, we are not considering whether the Supreme Court should have a role in relation to certain constitutional issues arising in Scottish criminal appeals, as it is agreed that this is, and ought to remain, within the current constitutional framework. The issues that remain to be discussed concern the nature and extent of the appeal rights to the Supreme Court in Scottish criminal proceedings and how those rights can operate effectively.
The amendments that I tabled in Committee took account of the views expressed by a number of bodies and people on these issues, including the expert group that I set up under the chairmanship of Sir David Edward, the review group led by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and indeed the representations made by the Lord Justice General and Lord President of the Court of Session, Lord Hamilton.
In Committee I agreed to consider a number of issues and said that, if persuaded, I would be willing to table amendments on Report. The amendments that I have tabled reflect some of the points made in this House in Committee and the agreement reached between the Government and the Scottish Government to ensure that a legislative consent Motion in support of the Bill is tabled in the Scottish Parliament.
There has been much discussion about the questions that should constitute a compatibility issue and those that should remain devolution issues. We have been seeking to ensure that the new appeal right is workable and that it does not result in argument about when the appeal right should and should not apply. Account also has to be taken of the important constitutional issues that can arise when considering the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the acts of Scottish Ministers.
Amendment 35 amends the definition of a compatibility issue to include questions raised in criminal proceedings as the compatibility of Acts of the Scottish Parliament with the Convention on Human Rights or European Union law. Other questions as to whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament is outwith the competence of the Scottish Parliament—for example, whether it is a reserved as opposed to a devolved matter—will remain devolution issues, even if they are raised in criminal proceedings. The effect of that will be that there will be a single route of appeal for all convention and EU law issues raised in criminal proceedings, regardless of whether the issue relates to an act of a public authority or the compatibility of an Act of the Scottish Parliament.
Amendment 39 would remove from the definition of a devolution issue any question raised in criminal proceedings relating to compatibility with the convention or EU law. As I said, this will ensure that questions about the compatibility of ASPs with the convention and EU law that are raised in criminal proceedings can be raised only as compatibility issues. Questions as to the compatibility of acts of the Scottish Ministers raised in criminal proceedings will be raised as compatibility issues, not devolution issues, by framing these as questions of whether the Scottish Ministers have acted, or propose to act in a way which is unlawful under Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Amendment 33 amends the definition of “compatibility issue” to make clear that such an issue can arise only in criminal proceedings—in other words, if there is an issue about an Act of the Scottish Parliament and its relationship to EU law that is not in the context of criminal proceedings, the normal devolution issues will apply.
Amendment 37 provides a procedure for the reference of compatibility issues. It allows the lower courts to refer a compatibility issue to the High Court before trial proceedings are concluded. The decision of the High Court on the compatibility issue can then be appealed to the Supreme Court. The amendment also allows the Advocate-General or the Lord Advocate to require the lower court to refer a compatibility issue to the High Court, acting as an appeal court, before trial proceedings are concluded. Where this power is exercised, the High Court can refer the issue to the Supreme Court or determine the issue itself. If the High Court determines the compatibility issue itself, this again can be appealed to the Supreme Court.
Where a compatibility issue arises in the High Court sitting as an appeal court, the amendment allows the High Court itself to refer the issue to the Supreme Court rather than determining the issue. However, if the compatibility issue is being considered by the High Court on a reference from the lower court of its own volition, the High Court must determine the issue and cannot refer it to the Supreme Court. The powers of the Supreme Court in determining a compatibility issue arising out of a reference will be the same as on an appeal of a compatibility issue, so the Supreme Court will determine the compatibility issue and remit proceedings to the High Court. We do not expect these reference powers to be used frequently but consider that there may be cases when these powers are beneficial and enable important issues to be dealt with quickly. It will still be possible for both the lower court and the High Court to hear cases expeditiously and there may be cases where this is more appropriate than the making of a reference.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and we acknowledge what he said earlier in our proceedings. I am grateful to him for the way in which he has engaged with officials on this issue. The amendments raise the question of whether the Lord Advocate and Advocate-General should be able to refer to a compatibility issue to the Supreme Court without the permission of the High Court. It is an issue that I will consider further. In particular, I wish to consider what the role of the High Court should be in a reference of a compatibility issue by the Law Officers to the Supreme Court. It is one that I want to discuss with the Lord Advocate. It may, therefore, be necessary to table further amendments at Third Reading to provide for such a further power of reference for the Lord Advocate and Advocate-General.
Perhaps the most controversial issue in this matter is the issue of certification. I have not been persuaded that it is necessary to provide a compatibility issue that can be appealed to the Supreme Court only if the High Court has certified that it raises a point of law of general public importance. However, as I said in Committee, I consider that the arguments in respect of this are finely balanced and I have considered very carefully the views expressed by the Lord Justice General and the review group of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey.
The amendments that I have tabled do not seek to introduce a certification requirement. However Amendment 52 makes provision for there to be a review arranged by the Secretary of State of the new compatibility issue procedure and of the introduction of time limits for devolution issue appeals to the Supreme Court in Scottish criminal proceedings. The review is to be carried out as soon as practicable after the provisions have been in force for three years. I consider three years to be an appropriate time to enable us to asses how the new procedure is working. Before the review takes place, there must be time for the new compatibility procedure to bed in, and having the review before a three-year period may not allow this to happen. Even allowing for the limited number of cases where permission to appeal a devolution or compatibility issue is likely to be sought, there should be sufficient evidence available after the provisions have been in force for three years for a review to take place. The review can be carried out earlier if the Secretary of State considers this appropriate—for example, if circumstances arise that suggest the need for an earlier review.
The review will be wide-ranging. It will look at all aspects of the provisions and consider whether changes should be made. In particular, it will consider whether compatibility issues should be appealable to the Supreme Court only if the High Court certifies that the issue raises a point of law of general public importance. The review will not be limited to considering whether certification, in the form used in England and Wales, should be introduced: it will be able to consider alternative forms of certification.
The United Kingdom and Scottish Governments have agreed that the review will be chaired by the Lord Justice General. It will seek a wide range of views, including those of the Lord Advocate, Scottish Ministers, the Scottish courts, the Supreme Court and representative bodies with an interest in the criminal justice system. The Lord Justice General is the appropriate person to chair the review as he—or she; a new Lord Justice General will be in post by then—will have the appropriate overview of criminal procedure. It is not necessary for the Bill to provide that the review should be chaired by the Lord Justice General. I hope that my statement to the House to that effect should be sufficient.
I will address two further issues. There was discussion about the role of the Supreme Court in relation to compatibility issues. This was considered by the review group of the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, and by the Scotland Bill Committee. In Committee in this House I tabled amendments to provide that when the Supreme Court considers a compatibility issue, its role is only to determine that issue and then remit the case back to the High Court for disposal.
The Supreme Court has the power under Section 40 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to consider any question that must be determined for the purpose of doing justice in an appeal to it, and can make rules governing its practice and procedure. New Section 288AA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, inserted by Clause 38, makes it clear that the powers of the Supreme Court in relation to compatibility issues are exercisable only for the purpose of determining such issues.
The general powers of the Supreme Court, as set out in provisions such as Sections 40 and 45 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, will be read subject to the specific provisions in new Section 288AA that limit the court’s powers in relation to compatibility issues. For the purpose of determining compatibility issues, the Supreme Court will have the power to make any change in the formulation of the compatibility issue that it considers necessary in the interests of justice. New Section 288AA also expressly provides that when the court has determined the compatibility issue, it must remit the proceedings to the High Court.
Rule 29 of the Supreme Court Rules 2009 makes provision on Supreme Court powers in relation to appeals. This was discussed with the chief executive of the UK Supreme Court. She confirmed that Rule 29 would be read in the light of any relevant changes to the primary legislation agreed as part of the Bill.
There are currently no time limits for appealing devolution issues in criminal proceedings to the Supreme Court. It is important that there is finality and certainty, not least for victims, in relation to criminal proceedings. Amendment 51 provides for time limits for appeals to the Supreme Court in relation to devolution issues that arise in criminal proceedings. The limits are the same as those that will apply in relation to compatibility issue appeals to the court. An application will have to be made to the High Court for permission to appeal within 28 days of determination of the appeal, or such longer period as the court considers equitable. If the High Court refuses permission, an application to the Supreme Court must be made within 28 days of the High Court’s refusal of permission. Again, the time limit can be extended if the court considers this equitable. This will strike an appropriate balance and reflect the need for finality in criminal proceedings, while taking account of circumstances when it might be appropriate for the time limit for appeals to be extended.
Finally, Amendment 38 amends Section 102 of the 1998 Act. It provides that if the Supreme Court, in considering a compatibility issue, decides that a provision of legislation is outwith legislative competence, it will be the High Court rather than the Supreme Court that will decide what retrospective or other orders might be made under Section 102 of the Scotland Act 1998. If the Supreme Court, in determining a compatibility issue, decides that an Act of the Scottish Parliament is outwith competence, the ASP will still not be law. Amendment 38 is about dealing with the consequences of the ASP not being law, and reflects the respective roles of the Supreme Court and the High Court.
Amendments 41 and 44 are technical drafting amendments. Amendments 53 and 54 are consequential amendments as a result of the provisions on the role of the Supreme Court in Scottish criminal proceedings being moved from Part 2 of the Bill to Part 4.
It is an important issue and I appreciate these amendments are technical. They raise a number of important issues, too. After much dialogue and discussion I believe that we have struck the right balance and I beg to move.
Lord Cameron of Lochbroom
My Lords, I pay tribute to the Minister for having listened so obviously to what has been said in all quarters—not least in your Lordships’ House—about these matters. The proposals in these amendments seem entirely reasonable and appropriate, particularly in the light of certain remarks that my noble and learned friend Lord Cullen and I made about the place of the Supreme Court in our judicial system.
Having listened to the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, I have sympathy with the view that he has expressed, and indeed the amendment proposed, that the review should be carried out after a longer period than that proposed in Amendment 52. It seems that this is an important review, although apparently not one that will be repeated; therefore, the importance of its conclusions must be based upon a sufficient period to give those conclusions some justifiable basis.
Although the matter of the chairmanship and membership of the review does not appear in the amendment, there is substance in what the noble Lord, Lord Browne, has said about both the chairmanship and the inclusion of one of the Justices of the Supreme Court. I therefore support what he has said in that regard. Otherwise, I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord for what he has achieved in bringing these amendments forward.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochbroom, for their general welcome for the position that we have reached with regard to these amendments and the role of the Supreme Court and issues of compatibility in criminal proceedings with European convention rights or European Union law.
I also pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Boyd of Duncansby, who not only has made a very constructive contribution to this and other debates on this Bill but was a member of the expert group I set up under the chairmanship of Sir David Edwards; he has been contributing to this debate from a very early stage. I also welcome the 98 per cent satisfaction rate that I seem to have achieved from the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey. I think that is a recognition of the amount of work that has been done by so many people in trying to bring this matter to a satisfactory outcome.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, is right to recognise that this is part of the agreement that we reached with the Scottish Government. He and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cameron, asked whether three years was sufficient. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, explained why we had resisted the idea of certification. The comparison with England and Wales was that certification was brought in under the Administration of Justice Act 1960 to stem a flood. If after three years, there have only been five or six cases, that would be a relevant factor to be taken into account; the flood has not happened. Without in any way prejudging any inquiry, the fact that there has not actually been a huge number of cases would have to weigh in to the consideration, if that is how it indeed turns out.
I do not believe that that the composition of the committee and its chairmanship is inappropriate. Many commissions are headed up by a judicial figure. I do not think that to head up a commission with the most senior judicial figure in Scotland is inappropriate, given that one can be assured that a figure of such stature will undoubtedly deploy the judicial qualities which have put him or her into that position. In moving the amendment, I indicated that there will be a number of views. We would expect bodies such as the Lord Advocate, Scottish Ministers, the Scottish courts and the Supreme Court and a number of representative bodies—and the bodies such as have responded to the consultations which I held, including, for example, the Scottish Human Rights Commission, Justice, the Law Society of Scotland and the Faculty of Advocates—to contribute.
We did not seek to put into statute that it should be the Lord Justice General, not least because—in answer to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Browne—of what would happen if a future Lord Justice General does not want to be involved. When the time comes for the review to be held, should the Lord Justice General at that time not consider that it would be appropriate for him or her to undertake the review, of course the United Kingdom and Scottish Governments would work together to agree an alternative chair for the review.
By the same token, I do not think that we would wish to be constrained by specifying, as the amendment proposes, a Justice of the Supreme Court. For example, a recently retired Justice of the Supreme Court might be an appropriate person—either one from Scotland or one from another part of the United Kingdom. I hear the fair point that someone having had that experience might well be an appropriate person to be a member of the review body but I do not think that it would be appropriate to put that into statute. As I have said, it might not be a currently serving Justice of the Supreme Court but one who nevertheless everyone agrees is an appropriate person to serve.
When the time comes for the review to be set up, I am sure that soundings will be taken as to who would be appropriate to serve on that commission. With these words, I hope that I can reassure the House that the review will properly look at all the issues, not just those of certification but at how time limits have worked. I have no doubt that the issues of certification will be properly aired before that commission as they have been before your Lordships’ House and in the wider legal and public debate.
As this is the last group of amendments, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debates on Report. I believe that in these two days of Report, and in Committee, this House has done what it is intended to do; namely, to give proper scrutiny to the measures brought forward in this Bill. I am very grateful to noble Lords, and to my noble friend Lord Sassoon for helping me in responding. I hope that colleagues in all parts of the House will enjoy and refresh themselves over the Easter Recess before returning to Third Reading.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Perhaps I may say how much we have appreciated the way in which the noble and learned Lord and the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, have handled this Bill. I do not think that, from all sides of the House, this has been a particularly easy time for them but we have certainly done our job and very much appreciate the way in which the Government have dealt with this.
(b) whether an Act of the Scottish Parliament or any provision of an Act of the Scottish Parliament is incompatible with any of the Convention rights or with EU law.”
“References of compatibility issues to the High Court or Supreme Court
In the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, after section 288ZA (inserted by section 37) insert—“288ZB References of compatibility issues to the High Court or Supreme Court
(1) Where a compatibility issue has arisen in criminal proceedings before a court, other than a court consisting of two or more judges of the High Court, the court may, instead of determining it, refer the issue to the High Court.
(2) The Lord Advocate or the Advocate General for Scotland, if a party to criminal proceedings before a court, other than a court consisting of two or more judges of the High Court, may require the court to refer to the High Court any compatibility issue which has arisen in the proceedings.
(3) The High Court may, instead of determining a compatibility issue referred to it under subsection (2), refer it to the Supreme Court.
(4) Where a compatibility issue has arisen in criminal proceedings before a court consisting of two or more judges of the High Court, otherwise than on a reference, the court may, instead of determining it, refer it to the Supreme Court.
(5) On a reference to the Supreme Court under this section—
(a) the powers of the Supreme Court are exercisable only for the purpose of determining the compatibility issue;(b) for that purpose the Court may make any change in the formulation of that issue that it thinks necessary in the interests of justice.(6) When it has determined a compatibility issue on a reference under this section, the Supreme Court must remit the proceedings to the High Court.
(7) An issue referred to the High Court or the Supreme Court under this section is referred to it for determination.
(8) In this section “compatibility issue” has the meaning given by section 288ZA.””
“( ) In section 102 (powers of courts or tribunals to vary retrospective decisions)—
(a) in subsection (4)(b) at the end insert “or to a compatibility issue,”;(b) after subsection (5) insert—“(5A) Where the decision mentioned in subsection (1) is a decision of the Supreme Court on a compatibility issue, the power to make an order under this section is exercisable by the High Court of Justiciary instead of the Supreme Court.”;
(c) in subsection (7) before the definition of “intimation” insert—““compatibility issue” has the meaning given by section 288ZA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995.””
“( ) after “purposes of” insert “a reference under section 288ZB or”;”
“Time limits for appeals on devolution issues in criminal proceedings
In Schedule 6 to the 1998 Act (devolution issues) after paragraph 13 insert—“13A In criminal proceedings, an application to the High Court for permission under paragraph 13 must be made—
(a) within 28 days of the date of the determination against which the appeal lies, or(b) within such longer period as the High Court considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances.13B In criminal proceedings, an application to the Supreme Court for permission under paragraph 13 must be made—
(a) within 28 days of the date on which the High Court refused permission under that paragraph, or(b) within such longer period as the Supreme Court considers equitable having regard to all the circumstances.””
“Review and power to amend sections 37 to (Time limits for appeals on devolution issues in criminal proceedings)
(1) The Secretary of State must arrange—
(a) for a review of the provision made by sections 37 to (Time limits for appeals on devolution issues in criminal proceedings),(b) for a report of the conclusions of the review to be made to the Secretary of State, and(c) for a copy of the report to be given to the Scottish Ministers.(2) The review must be carried out as soon as practicable after the end of 3 years beginning with the day on which section 38(5) comes into force, or earlier if the Secretary of State considers it appropriate.
(3) The review must—
(a) consider whether changes should be made to the provision made by sections 37 to (Time limits for appeals on devolution issues in criminal proceedings);(b) consider whether further provision should be made in relation to any matter dealt with by those sections; (c) consider (in particular) whether an appeal to the Supreme Court on a compatibility issue should lie only if the High Court of Justiciary certifies that the issue raises a point of law of general public importance.”(4) The Secretary of State may by order—
(a) amend the provision made by sections 37 to (Time limits for appeals on devolution issues in criminal proceedings);(b) make further provision in relation to any matter dealt with by those sections.(5) Provision made by order under subsection (4) may—
(a) amend, repeal or revoke an enactment passed or made before the order is made;(b) confer power on the Secretary of State or the Scottish Ministers to make an order or regulations;(c) include consequential, transitional or saving provision.(6) In this section “enactment” includes an enactment contained in subordinate legislation (within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978) and an enactment contained in, or in an instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament.
(7) In making the first order under subsection (4) the Secretary of State must take into account the report made in accordance with subsection (1)(b).
(8) No order under subsection (4) may be made unless the Secretary of State has consulted the Scottish Ministers.
(9) A statutory instrument containing an order under subsection (4) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”