Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

There is a strong case, and having heeded the representations, we took that particular route.

I was trying to explain that CMPs have been part of our legal system sometimes by agreement in civil cases and that is compatible with the interests of justice, so why bring forward the Bill? The reason is that the Supreme Court last year, in a case called Al Rawi, held that a court is not entitled to adopt a closed material procedure in ordinary civil claims for damages. The court held that it was for Parliament, not the courts, to decide where closed material procedures should be available. The consequence has been that we are no longer able to rely on the ability of the courts to find their own way through this difficult issue of disclosure.

Hence the provisions in Part 2 of the Bill, which seek to respond to this challenge in a proportionate and targeted manner. It makes CMPs available in narrow circumstances—namely, in civil proceedings in the High Court, Court of Appeal and Court of Session, where material is relevant to those proceedings, disclosure of which would damage the interests of national security. Importantly, it will be only after the Secretary of State has considered whether a claim for public interest immunity should be made. In line with a recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Part 2 also allows for the transfer of judicial reviews of exclusion, naturalisation and citizenship decisions to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, which has well established closed procedures.

Under the plans, where the Secretary of State applies for a CMP in civil cases, it will be for a judge to declare whether a CMP may be used. The judge will make this declaration on the basis only of national security considerations, not crime or international relations. Inquests, as we have indicated, have been excluded, and we were never intending to make CMPs available in the criminal courts.

Let me stress the safeguards that will apply. The Secretary of State will first have to consider whether the material can be dealt with by making a claim for public interest immunity. This will be a legally binding obligation and failure to comply can be judicially reviewed in the courts. The Secretary of State will then apply to a judge, and that judge will declare whether in principle a CMP may be used. That judge is the decision-maker. He or she must be satisfied that there was material relevant to the case, the disclosure of which would damage national security.

Once the judge has taken a decision in principle that a CMP may be used, a second exercise will take place in relation to the individual pieces of evidence which he decides are national security sensitive, following representations by a special advocate whose job is to act in the interests of the claimant. The judge will determine the treatment of each piece, whether redacting individual names or sentences would allow the evidence to be heard in open, or whether a summary of the evidence withheld must be made available to the other party and so on. The Bill does not upset the established position that it is for Ministers to decide whether to claim PII. Consequently, it should be the responsibility of the Secretary of State to apply for a declaration to the court that a closed material procedure may be used.

Some suggest that the Government may choose between claiming PII and applying for a closed material procedure opportunistically. Some say that the Government would apply for a closed material procedure where the material was helpful to the Government on the basis that the material could be considered by the court and that the Government would claim PII where the material was unhelpful so that, if successful, the PII claim would exclude that material from consideration.

It is not a realistic concern. The intention behind the closed material procedure proposals is precisely so that allegations made against the Government are investigated and scrutinised by the courts. The intention is that all relevant material—helpful or unhelpful—will be before the courts. It is hard to see that a judge assessing a PII claim would conclude that material should be excluded if the Government were seeking cynically to use PII to exclude material that undermined its case when a closed material procedure was available as an alternative.

The Bill makes absolutely clear that the court must act in accordance with the obligations under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights—the right to a fair trial. The overall effect will be that in practice all evidence currently heard in open court will in consequence of the CMP provisions continue to be heard in open court, including allegations against the state. In reality, claimants will receive as much information where there is a CMP as they would following a PII exercise.

A number of respondents to the consultation made the points that CMPs are a departure from the tried and tested fundamentals of open justice. I agree. No Government propose measures in this area lightly. However, as we have seen, CMPs are already used in our justice system, and have been endorsed by both domestic and international courts for the good reason that they provide a fairer outcome when the alternative is simply silence—no judgment at all and no questions answered.

Briefly, I move on to the final set of provisions in the Bill—namely, ensuring the protection of our intelligence-sharing relationships and our domestically generated intelligence through reform of an area of law that is known as the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction. The Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction grew up in the sphere of intellectual property law, where it is used to force a third party who—however innocently—is mixed up in suspected wrongdoing, to disclose information that a claimant feels may be relevant to a case that they are bringing elsewhere.

However, in 2008 a particularly innovative group of lawyers sought, in the case of Binyam Mohamed, to extend this jurisdiction to argue disclosure of sensitive intelligence information held by the British, including that provided in confidence by our allies. A specific right to the disclosure of intelligence services information has been ruled out by Parliament in the Freedom of Information Act and the Official Secrets Act. Yet, since Binyam Mohamed, there have been no fewer than nine attempts to use this jurisdiction in relation to sensitive information, including secret intelligence.

What is particularly troubling about this area of law is that, as the purpose of the proceedings is solely to gain disclosure of material, the Government do not have the option to withdraw from or settle the proceedings. If a judge orders disclosure, there is no option but for the Government to release the secret intelligence. Those who cannot keep secrets soon stop being told secrets. We expect our allies to protect intelligence material that we share with them from disclosure, and they expect the same from us. It is a regrettable fact that uncertainty about our ability to properly protect classified information provided by foreign Governments has undermined confidence among key allies, including the United States. In some cases, measures have already been put in place to regulate or restrict intelligence exchanges.

This is not just about material from overseas partners. We also need to protect from disclosure United Kingdom-generated sensitive material, which, if disclosed, could reveal the identity of United Kingdom officers or their sources and capabilities. To give but one example, not only could disclosure of sensitive intelligence derived from a UK human source jeopardise an ongoing intelligence dividend from that source, it could also blow the source’s cover, putting his or her life at risk. Our intelligence agencies cannot operate effectively if they cannot offer their sources protection. Norwich Pharmacal is the wrong tool for national security cases. The Government must regain the discretion to decide what the best way of assisting someone should be. Unless we address this situation robustly, the UK will continue to be seen as a soft touch by those wanting to get access to sensitive information. Our allies will—

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I am sorry that the noble and learned Lord is upset about this interruption—

[Lord McNally]

You of all people.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

Yes, me of all people, but I am entitled to seek information. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the Freedom of Information Act and people seeking access through that Act. Is it the case that someone living abroad can make an application under the Freedom of Information Act to information officers over here, including those in Parliament? I hope that I have been brief enough for the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I cannot give an immediate answer to that question, but I suspect that it may be the case. The important point in this context, as I have just indicated, is that Parliament has decided that, under the Freedom of Information Act, a specific right to the disclosure of intelligence services information has been ruled out, irrespective of where the applicant comes from.

That is why the Government intend to legislate to exempt from disclosures under a Norwich Pharmacal application material held by, originating from or relating to an intelligence service defined as including the intelligence agencies and those parts of Her Majesty’s Armed Forces or the Ministry of Defence that engage in intelligence activities, or if the Minister has certified that it would cause damage to national security or international relations if it were disclosed. I seek to reassure the House that these measures will have no impact on claims that the Government or the security and intelligence agencies have been directly involved in wrongdoing; nor do they prevent someone enforcing their convention rights, and nor do they exempt the agencies from their disclosure obligations in other civil cases. We are not seeking to abolish an ancient right. The Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction has existed only since the 1970s and it has been found to apply in national security cases only since 2008. Our reforms will affect the jurisdiction only in so far as it applies to national security and international relations.

In conclusion, the Bill seeks to reshape the way we scrutinise the actions of our security and intelligence agencies both inside and outside the courts. The Bill raises significant issues about how we can best achieve that scrutiny, and what should be the respective roles of Government, Parliament and the courts. As I have said, the Green Paper that preceded this Bill prompted much public debate. The Government listened carefully to that debate and have responded by amending their proposals, including taking up a number of suggestions made in a useful report published by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, a number of whose members I am sure will contribute to this debate. There has also been an important report from the Constitution Committee, to which we intend to respond soon.

I think that the provisions in this Bill are a measured and proportionate response to the challenges I described earlier. We need to ensure that the courts can secure that justice is done. We must maintain the rule of law and ensure that proceedings are fair for all parties to the case. We must protect information that is shared with us in confidence, particularly if it would inhibit the ability of our security and intelligence agencies to keep us all safe if there is a risk that it could be disclosed, and we must make sure that those we trust to oversee the work of the agencies on our behalf have the powers to do an effective job and are able to command public confidence.

I look forward to what I am sure will be a thorough and instructive debate both today and as we proceed into Committee on how we meet those challenges and seek to balance the age-old tension between liberty and security. I commend the Bill to the House and I beg to move.

Scotland Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I do not dispute that. It needs to be addressed. It is one of the key issues that those who advocate ultimate fiscal autonomy or independence must address. I do not think that the noble Lord is suggesting that it would be suitable for inclusion in the Bill, but it is an important issue that has to be properly and fully addressed in the debate that we will undoubtedly have on the independence referendum.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

For the sake of getting things on the record, I am very heartened to hear the Minister say that he is keen on having one question alone on the ballot paper. For the record, is that the policy of the Government or will there be a situation in which the Prime Minister may say something different?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, it is fair to say that in the consultation paper that we launched on 10 January it was made clear that a single question was the preferred position of the United Kingdom Government. I am happy to say that the responses that we have received to that consultation give great support to that position.

In conclusion, I again acknowledge the benefit to the Bill of consideration and thorough scrutiny in your Lordships’ House, and not just in those areas where amendments have been made as a result of our debates. Through our debates we have explored many of the issues that we will continue to face as we move to the next important phase of implementing legislation. I echo the thanks not only to those who have taken part in the debates but to those who have supported me and my noble friend Lord Sassoon in them. While there have clearly and importantly been divisions—it would be very boring and impossible to achieve total consensus—it is not usual for a Bill to be supported by all three United Kingdom parties. However, there has been a note of consensus, which has been welcome. I also welcome the scrutiny. Whether noble Lords were supporters of devolution back in 1998 or support every clause here, I hope we recognise that we are stronger within a United Kingdom in which we devolve powers to the appropriate level and work together to pool resources and risks across the country for the benefit of all. That is what the Bill seeks to advance. It is part of developing and continuing support to maintain the United Kingdom, of which all noble Lords and I are very proud. I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

Scotland Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Tuesday 28th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Foulkes of Cumnock]

Well, he tried to get on television to talk about rugby, purporting to be an expert on it, and blamed the BBC for withdrawing his invitation. In fact, the BBC did not invite him; he invited himself and then the BBC said, “We don’t have a place for you, we’re afraid, because we’ve got people who actually know about rugby to talk about it”. It would be better to have someone who knows about rugby to manage the Scotland rugby team, but I have no doubt that the First Minister would think that he could do it.

I return to the amendment. When I was a Minister in the Department for International Development, I travelled the world, inevitably. It was part of my responsibility to go to the poorer countries of the world to see the problems and what we could do about them.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

Just for the sake of facts, I should point out that my noble friend travelled the world before he became a Minister. [Laughter.]

[Lord Maxton]

That is a bit unfair.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, that I was only kidding, so I hope he does not go after me following this debate. I remember when we, including the noble Lord, Lord Maxton, entered the other place when we were freshly elected. When the rest of us were having difficulty finding our way around this big Palace of Westminster with all its nooks and crannies, the noble Lord managed to get to the Falkland Islands at just about the same time as the commandos. Therefore, travel has been part of his parliamentary life.

I think that we have to be careful. I do not canvass any more because I am a Cross-Bencher but I am already hearing from reliable sources that people on the doorstep are getting concerned about what Alex Salmond is saying he wants for Scotland. For example, Faslane is in my previous constituency, in which I was mainly brought up. There are a lot of employees at Faslane from Springburn, the Robroyston area and Bishopbriggs, where I live at the moment, and they are expressing concern about the possible closure of that facility. Therefore, men and women are talking about the First Minister’s grand ideas. However, the worst thing we can do is to attack the First Minister or anyone else on a personal basis. I agree with Johann Lamont, who said, “I will share a platform with anyone who is willing to fight for the United Kingdom and support the Scottish Parliament”. That is the road that we should be going down.

I am glad that this amendment is going to be withdrawn by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes. We would be kidding ourselves if we expected the First Minister and the senior members of the Executive in a Scottish Parliament, who have certain rights that the United Kingdom Parliament gave them, to go almost cap in hand to a Minister of the Crown to get permission—I think the term is “consent” but the meaning is the same—to go abroad and speak to officials. We have to be realistic. We have all-party groups. There has been concern in both Houses that four or five people can gather under one roof and say that they are an all-party group. We have all-party groups covering subjects such as horse-racing, dog-racing and many other things, but many of them are linked with a country. That reminds me that I had better declare an interest as a member of the British-Italian group—something of which I am proud. It would be strange if the First Minister of Scotland had to get consent from a Minister of the Crown, yet the All-Party British-Italian Parliamentary Group could send a delegation to Italy or go to see the ambassador, who is the official representative of Italy’s Government in London.

It should also be remembered that there have been devolved Parliaments in Canada for many years. In fact, the constitution of Canada was held by both Houses only recently. However, no one would deny the right of the representatives of the Canadian provincial Governments—if that is the right description—or indeed the Speakers from those Governments to visit their opposite numbers here without going to Ottawa and saying to the Prime Minister or the appropriate Minister of the Crown, “We want to go to the United Kingdom”. They would not dream of doing that. The same would apply to Australia.

Therefore, although many of us disagree with what the First Minister is saying, there is a danger of us saying to Scottish Ministers that we are putting shackles on them before they can go anywhere abroad, yet any of our number in this House or the other House, or jointly, can go without asking anyone’s permission. There was a joke about a Member of Parliament who had a habit of travelling, and when the students were getting arrested in Tiananmen Square in front of the tanks, so did that Member of Parliament. His constituents did not say, “What was he doing in Tiananmen Square? He should have been here in Liverpool or in Westminster”. I make that point not to attack that Member of Parliament, who is dead—God rest his soul.

I make the point that if one person in this House or another place can take it upon himself to go to a country abroad and no one would say a word about them doing so, why are we going to put that pressure on the properly elected representatives in the Scottish Parliament? I hear parliamentarians saying that the Executive is too powerful. It rolls off the tongue. I know the amendment is going to be dropped, but if we bear in mind that this amendment belongs to the House, why is the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, saying he is going to drop it? It is the property of this House. If we pass this amendment, we would be giving an awesome power to Ministers of the Crown, who we often say have too much power as it is.

[Lord Maclennan of Rogart]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for moving this amendment because it has enabled there to be a discussion about the potential role of devolved government in the protection of interests in overseas discussions. I very much agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Liddell of Coatdyke, said. I cannot believe that it is helpful, in seeking agreement across borders on issues that might affect us, for British representatives to be unable to speak with one voice at the official negotiating level.

The proper time for those discussions is prior to the engagement in the international debate. It is not meant to put a ban on representation by individuals who have some democratic authority. The amendment may well be defective in that respect, as the noble Lord has recognised. However, let us consider the situation in reverse. If we, as a British Government, were under the impression that we had to deal not just with the Spanish Government on fisheries policy but with a Catalan Government as well, it would hugely complicate our negotiations. I am bound to say that so long as the nation state remains, we should be dealing internationally and not with devolved Governments.

The representation of points of view is quite a different matter. It would have been helpful—to answer the question that was thrown back at me—if there had been a full dialogue between the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government about the al-Megrahi case. I am not sure that there was not, in fact, such a dialogue; it as remained rather obscure, but it is certainly important to Britain’s position vis-à-vis some of our allies that we were not thought to be in complete ignorance of the Scottish Government’s position. It led to some deterioration of understanding between the United States and the United Kingdom that there was no absolute clarity about who was essentially to take responsibility for the release and return of al-Megrahi to his homeland.

UK: Union

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I agree with my noble friend that if the separatists were to have their way and Scotland were to vote to leave the United Kingdom, that should be determined by the people of Scotland. I also agree with him that the so-called devo-max proposal, as far as one can understand what it is—in our exchanges last week, noble Lords suggested that it was a product without a brand or a brand without a product; I cannot remember which way round it was—has implications for other parts of the UK, and we are certainly well seized of that fact.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

My Lords, as a Scot, I do not want separation. I feel strongly that there should be only one question in the referendum, and one question alone. I ask the Minister to give some advice to the Prime Minister: the best thing that he can do would be to stop appearing arrogant in his interventions. It does not help those of us who want to retain the United Kingdom.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Monday 16th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

My Lords, I support—along with everyone else—Amendment 20 and a new Clause 2. I put on record my thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and to Mr Mark Harper, the Minister in charge in the other place. We said in Committee that we would like to meet the Minister, and it was good of him to meet us. I also put on record the great work done by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. In these situations, there is always someone who has to do the phoning, the texting and the e-mails, and it was the noble Lord. I am very grateful to him for keeping me and my colleagues fully informed.

I am glad that the pressure has been taken away from the Speaker. Things have changed, and if the certificate has to be issued by the Speaker—unless we pass this amendment, it will have to be—there is the new dimension. When there was a majority Government, the Speaker would have to look at what the Prime Minister said. If the Prime Minister said, “I consider this vote on the Floor of the House to be a vote of confidence in me”, he would be one person alone that the Speaker would have to look to. However, where we have a coalition, the Speaker would have to look not only to the Prime Minister, but to the Deputy Prime Minister. If the Deputy Prime Minister said that he considered a forthcoming vote to be a vote of no confidence, the Speaker would have to look at that. I am glad that that pressure will be taken away because there is no doubt that things have changed as far as Speakers are concerned.

I had great affection for the late Edward Heath. He used to come and see me up in Speaker’s House. We would have tea and a chat about old times. He used to reminisce about when he was Chief Whip. I thought that I had better ask him about my situation. I said: “The government Chief Whip comes to see me on a weekly basis, as does the opposition Chief Whip, and every second week the Liberal party Chief Whip comes. Did you have that in your day?”. He said: “We didn’t bother the Speaker. The Speaker was too busy for those things”. That indicated that a change took place between the 1960s and today so that Whips now come to see the Speaker on a weekly basis. I can tell noble Lords that they were always moaning. They were never happy. They were like constituents at tenants’ association meetings. You always knew that they would have a complaint. At least, if the government Chief Whip was happy, you could bet your boots that there was something wrong with the opposition Chief Whip. All these pressures have been taken away by what we have before us, and I am very pleased about that.

[Lord Dobbs]

My Lords, I rise with some trepidation after so many distinguished noble Lords. The first thing I want to do is to thank, like so many other noble Lords, my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness for his care, consideration and courtesy in dealing with various issues that I have raised with him. I have been able to support the Bill because of the two great principles of certainty and stability which it enshrines, but there is a third leg of that constitutional stool, which is simplicity, as my noble friend Lord Cormack, pointed out earlier.

As the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, explained, there is a problem with the 14-day cooling-off period. It is in danger of failing those three fundamental principles. Let me briefly take the example of 1977-79, which some of us remember so well. Those years showed the best and worst of our current system. The best was that it allowed sufficient flexibility for the formation of the Lib-Lab pact—before my noble friends begin to swoon in surprise, I emphasise that I do not hold the Lib-Lab pact as the best example of government, or even a good example of government, merely a flexible example.

How flexible our current system was became even clearer after that when the Liberals withdrew and everyone from Bill Brewer to Uncle Tom Cobbleigh got in on the act. That was the worst of the current system. Deals were done—not just with the Liberal Party, but with Ulster Unionists, Scottish nationalists, Welsh nationalists and even Irish republicans. Goodness’ knows what would have happened if UKIP had been present there. Offers and inducements were made, from extra parliamentary seats to expensive pipelines to promises on devolution—even, I understand, to the occasional odd bottle of Scotch. The only reason why some of us can smile about it is because it was so very long ago.

The country was rescued from that misery by a vote of no confidence. Every man and woman in the other place that night understood precisely what that vote entailed. If the Government lost, they would fall. The stakes were extraordinarily high: so high that some Members clambered from their sick beds to get into ambulances and make that long haul to New Palace Yard—simply in order to be nodded through. A few, I believe, put their lives on the line simply in order to do that duty. How could we countenance a system which, after such an effort and such a sacrifice, responded by saying, “Thank you, but now you have another 14 days to cool off, to change your mind”? Fourteen days of dodgy deals, 14 days of pipelines and parliamentary fixes, 14 days to deny the electorate their right to decide—and every bit of it enshrined in law. Far from the Prime Minister giving up his powers to Parliament—

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rennard]

My Lords, I set out in Committee three reasons why I felt strongly that a fixed-term Parliament of five years was more appropriate than one of four years. I shall not repeat those arguments at length. However, since I made the first argument there has been even more discussion about the principle of pre-legislative scrutiny, and there has been a considerable demand in this House and elsewhere for more pre-legislative scrutiny. A five-year fixed-term Parliament in many ways incentivises a Government to have more pre-legislative scrutiny than has previously been the case. If a Government feel that they may be in for only four years, and there was a four-year fixed-term Parliament, we would have rather less pre-legislative scrutiny than would happen if they knew they would last for five years.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Renton, who said earlier that there is a clear danger that a four-year Parliament would not provide much time in the first year for pre-legislative scrutiny, and we all know that in the last year of almost any Parliament there is perhaps more attention on campaigning than on legislating. This would mean that in a four-year fixed-term Parliament perhaps only two years would be devoted to serious legislative work. Many people believe that in the model of the United States, which has a four-year fixed-term, there are only two years of effective governing and two years of campaigning.

Secondly, I pointed out in Committee—I thought that perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Wills, would have said something about this—that there should be consistency in the way in which you conduct elections in terms of how you regulate constituency election expenditure. The previous Labour Government brought in rules that kick in four years and seven months after a general election and last for 60 months after the previous general election. In other words, the rules last to control expenditure at constituency level in general elections only for the final six months of a five-year Parliament. As we said in debates a year or two ago, it is not logical to have rules controlling constituency expenditure in that last six months of a five-year Parliament unless there is a five-year fixed-term Parliament.

My third argument relates to our recent debates of great controversy. However, we decided in legislation that reviews of parliamentary constituency boundaries would take place every five years. The principle of revising constituency boundaries to take into account shifting population is recognised by all parties. However, the frequency with which that takes place is the subject of some dispute. Revising constituency boundaries more frequently than every five years would have many disadvantages and would certainly be unpopular in another place. The reviews of constituency boundaries should be synchronised with general elections.

There is, however, an additional argument that points in favour of a five-year fixed term. The Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly are about to begin five-year terms, and this is likely to become the norm for future elections to the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly. There is no appetite at all in Scotland and Wales—

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I thank the noble Lord, but it is my understanding that the five years was a facility given by this Government so that there would be no clash with other elections. Four years was the norm. The five years was an accommodation that suited this Government.

[Lord Rennard]

In response to demand from the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly not to have a clash in 2015, the Government said that they would facilitate whatever was required to postpone the elections to the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly for a five-year, rather than a four-year, term. My understanding is that that will now become the norm in Scotland and Wales, and that people in Scotland and Wales have no desire for their parliamentary and Assembly elections to coincide with Westminster elections.

A year ago, in the general election campaign, both the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats said in manifestos that they wanted fixed-term Parliaments, but neither of them said for how long they should last. David Cameron said before the general election that he would seriously consider the principle of fixed-term Parliaments, but again did not say how long the period should be. So none of the three main parties specified a year ago during the general election campaign what period would be appropriate for fixed-term Parliaments.

For all the reasons I have given—the fact that there will be more pre-legislative scrutiny; we will tie in constituency election expenditure; we will tie in the boundary reviews; and we will tie in processes with the Scottish and Welsh Parliaments—I think that a fixed-term Parliament of five years is most appropriate.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

That is a situation in which I do not wish to find Parliament.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I have heard the Minister say on earlier amendments that if they were withdrawn, he would take them back and give serious consideration to the views that had been expressed. The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, are similar. Perhaps they can be taken back and considered seriously, considering what my noble friend Lady Boothroyd said and what I am about to say. I hope I can give some advice to this House.

This is not about Dr Jack the individual; it is about the Clerk of the House of Commons. I have experience of previous Clerks: Sir William McKay and Sir Roger Sands. They are all people of the highest calibre. I can give the House an insight into what would happen before the Clerk of the House delivered this advice. He would not just pluck these words out and put them on paper for anyone to consider; he would take soundings from constitutional experts, get someone to be devil’s advocate and put the contrary point of view, and Speaker’s Counsel would listen to the arguments. These people would give their point of view. Therefore, the words of Dr Jack would be the collective point of view of the constitutional experts we have in the House of Commons. The amendment is the property of this House, but I think it would be good idea for the Minister to take back what has been said tonight.

There is a tendency for courts to—I do not think the right word is interfere—look at matters which they would not have looked at 30 or 40 years ago. I am glad that the Court of Human Rights is there, but many Members who were disciplined in the other place said that they would like to take their case to the Court of Human Rights. Some officers of the House, while they did not encourage them or give any view, privately said that if their case went to the Court of Human Rights, with people’s civil liberties as they are at the moment, they might have won it because of the way in which our standards commissioner conducts his affairs without representation, with hearsay evidence and with people making accusations without substantiation. Although this has not been tested, some of the disciplinary measures that were taken in the other place could well have been taken to the Court of Human Rights, and who knows what would have happened?

Pressure is put on Speakers behind the scenes. I worry about the certificate. I recall a situation—forgive me, there might be some military Members in the Chamber—in which a battalion of Royal Marines was to be moved to Afghanistan in the early days of the Afghanistan problem. The Opposition tabled a Motion to put aside the business of the day to allow that matter to be debated. I felt that the Opposition had a case, and I allowed the Motion to be debated, as was the Speaker’s right. Behind the scenes, a government Whip came in—it was always a Whip who came in with the nasty news—and said, “You had no right to do that. You shouldn’t have done that”. This is the pressure that is put on Speakers. I said, “Excuse me a minute. Why shouldn’t I have done that?”. “Because those Marines weren’t going into combat”. The point I made was that if you are moving 500 highly trained members of an elite organisation into an area where they would come to no harm, they should not have been put there. They should have been back on leave in Catterick, Plymouth or wherever they were based. This was the type of abuse—complaining, if I can put it that way—that you got behind the scenes after the event. Before the event was even worse. So what is it going to be like when there is a vote of no confidence and it is down to the Speaker to decide whether a Government have to go to the country? There will be pressure from every side.

We talked about things changing with regard to the courts. Things have changed with regard to the pressure on Speakers. We have spoken about Ted Heath, his Government and how he had to go to the country. I had the honour of having Ted Heath come up as a friend to Speaker’s House to have a private chat with my wife Mary and me. I remember him telling me stories of when he was a Chief Whip. In passing, I asked him how often he came to see the Speaker, because at that time I had to see the government Chief Whip, the opposition Chief Whip and the Liberal Chief Whip on a weekly basis. He said, “I never bothered the Speaker. The Speaker was too busy to bother with the Chief Whip”. Since that time, things have changed, and terrible pressure is put on the Speaker, so I say with the best possible intentions that this is one of those amendments that get an airing in Committee and then the Minister takes the matter back and looks at it.

[The Earl of Onslow]

I was never Speaker but I am descended from three Speakers. I have never heard of a more awful choice having to be made. If the courts are allowed to interfere, that will have a catastrophic effect on the role of the Speaker. If they are not allowed to interfere, it will have a catastrophic role on the role of the Speaker. I cannot think of anything worse than that. I do not know whether to vote enthusiastically for the amendment or to vote enthusiastically against it. Whatever we do on this amendment will be nothing short of catastrophic.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I make it clear that my error is in no way intended to undermine him. He is the Parliamentary Secretary responsible for political and constitutional reform. It is his view that the Government appear to take in relation to these issues. It is a matter for this House as to whether it is guided more by the views of the two ex-Speakers or by the evidence of Mr Mark Harper. Speaking entirely for myself and having heard the two ex-Speakers, I found the evidence of Mr Harper wholly unconvincing. It suggests to me that not enough thought has been given to this provision.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

Mr Harper perhaps overlooks the fact that any Speaker always has at his or her side the Clerk of the House and takes their advice. I grant that it is advice and that, at the end of the day, it is the Speaker who has to make the decision. However, the Clerk of the House is always there. Here we have a situation where the Clerk of the House has taken the very serious step of giving written evidence that he is deeply concerned about this matter.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

I completely understand what the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn, is saying. My own view is that the courts would try to avoid getting involved, but the consequence of their not doing so is that the Speaker of the House of Commons—who, though I have never been a Member of the House of Commons, I understand should be above the party fray—would ultimately decide whether there would be a general election. Let us imagine the level of emotion that there might be in the House of Commons at that point. Is this not another illustration of the grave error in trying to prescribe in a Bill the working of a process that has previously worked by convention? I am very glad to see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, in his place. He has always said that constitutional conventions may be better in certain circumstances. My view in relation to this part of the Bill is that the more we talk about it and the more we try to provide artificial certainty or precision—treating it as if it were a statute where you could see whether you have registered your home properly or whether certain ticks are in the boxes—the more it becomes a wholly inappropriate way to deal with the issue of whether Parliament should be dissolved and there should be a general election.

The more we debate it, the more the best solution feels like a provision that simply says that where there is a vote of no confidence there may be a general election. I do not think that my noble friend Lord Howarth would say that his amendment gives 100 per cent protection from the court; it certainly does not give the Speaker any protection from getting involved in the fray, which is so significant to their independence. I anticipate that my noble friend will say that he has put down the amendment simply in order to test the proposition. I would urge the noble and learned Lord to go back to the drawing board and see how he can construct a provision that is intended not to be a tick-box provision but instead to be a much broader constitutional provision. That will make it clear that the courts are not to be involved. Equally, it will not draw the Speaker into a political fray that could be fatal to their standing either in the House of Commons or, more damagingly, with the public at large. This is another indication that the Bill requires a lot more thought.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It is for the purpose of making it legally certain that the circumstances have been met, that the conditions have been fulfilled, under which an early election could be called and that the next election should not be on the date on which it would otherwise be under the Bill. That is the purpose. If it is of a factual nature, that should not cause any problem or place pressure on the Speaker. I acknowledge that where the Speaker has to decide whether a matter is a vote of no confidence or not, other factors come into play, and we have certainly listened to what has been said.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I thank the Minister for being patient with me. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, was kind enough to say that proceedings shall not be challenged. It is important that the Minister goes away to consider this and perhaps consults the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, and myself on our experience. I am talking from memory, but the signing of a certificate is not necessarily regarded by the courts as a proceeding of Parliament. Decisions are proceedings of Parliament, but the signing of a certificate by the Speaker is different and is not necessarily regarded as a proceeding of Parliament. I throw that one in, and it is important that the Minister goes away to think about this.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I accept the offer of the noble Lord—and perhaps of the noble Baroness—to discuss this. I am more than willing to do so. However, as my noble friend Lord Tyler mentioned, certificates in relation to finance matters under the Parliament Act have never in 100 years been subject to challenge. The noble Lord, Lord Martin, says that they are different; they are certifications; they are certificates that are issued.

Regarding the other points made by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, that were alluded to by the noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, in the Anisminic case in the 1960s the courts were able to review determinations of the Foreign Compensation Commission, even though those determinations were, by statute, not to be called into question in any court of law. However, in those cases, the starting point was that, but for the ouster clause in the statute, the courts would have had jurisdiction. The courts were thus looking for clear words to exclude an otherwise existing jurisdiction.

The facts of this circumstance are different, because the courts do not have jurisdiction over internal parliamentary proceedings. The fact that the subject matter of the certificate relates to internal parliamentary proceedings that are off limits to the courts means that there will be no motivation for courts to interpret the provisions that provide that Speaker’s certificates are conclusive narrowly.

In the other case which the noble Lord mentioned, regarding Jackson v Attorney-General, two issues have perhaps been conflated. Perhaps that is where confusion has arisen. The issues were, first, whether courts can inquire into the validity of Acts of Parliament; and, secondly, whether courts can inquire into internal parliamentary proceedings. On that second issue, the House of Lords, in its judicial capacity, asserted a view that is complete orthodoxy: that the Commons Speaker had certified that the internal proceedings of Parliament leading to the Hunting Act being passed had been complied with. The House of Lords in its judicial capacity did not look behind the Speaker’s certificate and did not question the internal proceedings of Parliament. It indicated that it would not and could not look at the internal proceedings adopted in Parliament in enacting the Hunting Act 2004.

The noble Baroness, Lady Boothroyd, referred to the European position and mentioned the case involving Sinn Fein and Martin McGuinness. Interestingly, in the Northern Ireland High Court, it was held that the matter was not justiciable on the grounds that it fell within the exclusive cognisance of the House. It is accepted that Article 9 of the Bill of Rights does not apply to the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights. However, a case will be brought before such courts only where EU law or convention rights are engaged, respectively. The subject matter of the Bill is not in any way related to EU law. Likewise, the functions of the Commons Speaker under the Bill do not engage any convention rights. In support of this point, the Joint Committee on Human Rights has reported that the Bill did not need to be brought to the attention of either House on human rights grounds.

I should add that in the case of A v United Kingdom in 2003, the European Court of Human Rights held that Article 9 of the Bill of Rights did not violate the convention by preventing an applicant from taking defamation proceedings against an MP for words said in parliamentary proceedings. While noble Lords have raised a legitimate point, it leads to the view that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has expressed today and at Second Reading, that a Speaker’s certificate would not be challengeable in the courts. I agree with that analysis and it is no disrespect to the Clerk of the House to state that, although he advanced a different argument. The weight of evidence given to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee was such that it, too, thought that the weight of evidence was that it was highly unlikely that the certificates would be justiciable.

Important distinctions are to be made between that issue and the other concerns that have been expressed about bringing the Speaker into some political role. We have an opportunity to debate these matters further, but, in the light of my comments, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, who I once again thank for introducing this important debate, will withdraw his amendment.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord McAvoy]

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, has described better than I ever could the Alice in Wonderland nature of the debate. I can understand my noble friend Lord Howarth of Newport picking credible holes in the amendment brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and it is certainly easy for the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, to do so.

We are holding this debate against a background of a Bill which is unnatural and is opposed by an overwhelming majority of Members of this House. A party which lost seats in the previous general election is blackmailing its partners in a coalition to accept constitutional change. We shall all end up being twisted and contorted by trying to take part in a debate on a Bill which is utterly flawed and goes against the natural flow of political events in this country. It is easy to criticise, but we are taking part in a debate on a Bill which is a strange and unnatural beast in British politics.

The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, has tried within the context of that debate to play the constructive, revising role that people in this House look for and to make the Bill better. I do not think that he supports the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, but we have got it in front of us and it is what he is trying to improve.

Subsection (2) of the proposed new clause outlines the instances in which a vote of no confidence will be deemed to have been passed. They would amount to votes of confidence anyway. They are issues where, if a vote goes against the Government, Parliament is entitled to pass a vote of no confidence; that is the new world. Paragraph (b) states,

“denies a second or third reading to a Finance Bill”.

We all know that a Government need a Finance Bill to be passed. I take the point about a Prime Minister defining it, but that is his or her judgment as the Prime Minister of the country. Paragraphs (c) and (d) state,

“passes a motion of no confidence tabled by the leader of Her Majesty’s Opposition; or … defeats a motion of confidence tabled by the Prime Minister”.

The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, is using real life to bring forward instances which determine whether there is a general election in this country. I, too, was in another place at the time of Maastricht. It is not the first time that people have combined in quite such dishonourable—in some ways—alliances.

I presume that the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, supported the 14-day provision. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack—I had better not call him my noble friend for the purpose of this debate—was paying me compliments in talking about black arts and sinister persuasions. That 14 days would allow all sorts of things to take place. There would definitely be no physical violence, but imagine the sheer pressure that you can generate by being able to say to somebody that you hold in your hand the power to determine whether, in my case, a Labour Government fall, or a Conservative Government, in the case of other people.

This is really nonsense, but we are all being forced to discuss it because we are being led by the nose—I hesitate to say anything that would upset or insult noble Lords on the Conservative Benches—by a comparatively small group of people, the Liberal group, who are hell bent on changing the constitution of this country. They are tinkering with it and coming up with all sorts of ill thought-out, ill advised and quite nonsensical proposals. In the likes of the noble Lords, Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Cormack, and my noble friend Lord Grocott, we have people here who are prepared to listen to ideas for change but to take the best of this place to keep it going. We are in an unnatural situation where we are all discussing something which we know is not right and not practical.

I was particularly struck by a phrase used by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which was that he was trying to get a comprehensible Bill. That sounds to me like common sense. As long as we are forced to discuss a Bill such as this, we will all come forward with positions that we do not really believe in or like in a vain attempt to make a better Bill. We know full well in our heart of hearts that a majority of people in this House know that the Bill is nonsense; but as long as we are prepared to discuss in an Alice in Wonderland way, we can pick holes in reasonable suggestions.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I am very interested in the amendment and agree a great deal with the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Armstrong, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe. A common argument put here is that we did not need a Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. I come from engineering. My foreman used to say, “Michael, if it works, do not fix it; do not touch it”. There is nothing to stop the present Administration, the alliance, going for five years if they want to; but, as others have said, we are past that point now. I remember when the Labour Party decided that it would have mandatory reselection of MPs and that was made part of its constitution. We were warned that if you kick a ball into the constitution park, it can roll in many ways. That is what we are seeing here, when we do not need a change. Now people are attempting to fix it by ensuring that the legislation is watertight.

On the idea of a Speaker signing a certificate, the fact is that every decision of the House of Commons is then put in the Journal of the House. There is a dedicated Clerk to the Journal who makes sure that the Journal records the decisions of the other place and of this place. Perhaps the legislation should have a mechanism whereby someone would be presented with the Journal, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, said, stated that a decision had been made by a two-thirds majority or that a vote of no confidence had been carried.

I think that it is on the steps of the Mansion House that someone comes out to say, “Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye”—there is going to be a general election. There is a delay while it goes up to Edinburgh because in the old days, someone went by horse and the announcement was made in Edinburgh a bit later—a lovely tradition. If I had my way, I would rather that that certificate did not have to be issued by the Speaker. It is different with Money Resolutions and other matters that the Speaker has to deal with.

I would rather that the provision be left out; if it is to be left in, I would rather that subsections (2)(a) and (b) be left out, because, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, what would happen if the gracious Speech was defeated and negated by a brand-new Government elected by the people? It would be hard for people to understand and very difficult for a Speaker to sign off a certificate in those circumstances. But what would happen if he or she denied the certificate? An element in the country would say, “Oh no, you have it in legislation. Sort that out”. I certainly would be uncomfortable. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that paragraph (b) is open to interpretation. For a Prime Minister to say, “Get this through or it is a vote of confidence in me”, is not the way things should go. However, a Speaker would be in a difficult position.

I mentioned earlier about the pressures on modern Speakers. I used to read some of the lovely stories in the beautiful books in Speaker’s House telling us what previous Speakers had to worry about. In one case, the Speaker had to worry about the price of coal being delivered to Speaker’s House. That was a big worry, and I wish I had had that worry. In the old days, perhaps in Edwardian times, the Speaker stayed in the big house, and would then go to his constituency or a place in the country. No one would bother him. Even if people wanted to apply pressure on him outside parliamentary hours, there was not the modern technology that we have just now. Nowadays, there is texting, e-mails and the mobile phone. As a result, I can envisage a situation in which, even if the period in which a Speaker had to sign this certificate was only 48 hours, he would be pursued and the pressures that would be put on him would be enormous. Forgive me, this applies also to lady Speakers.

The black arts of the Whip have been mentioned, and there are many black arts. There is the direct approach, when the Chief Whip comes in and gives the Speaker the rough edge of their tongue; or there is a more subtle way, when the pal of the Speaker is used. Bear in mind that the Speaker is elected from the ranks of the House of Commons, and he has friends. The pal is sent up and says, “You know, Michael, everyone in the Tea Room is worried”; but it is not everyone in the Tea Room who is worried—the Whips sent him. You get the friendly approach and then the Gypsy warnings, and so on.

There is another thing that we have to remember in these modern times—the 24/7 media. I mentioned the Edwardian Speaker who went away to the countryside. When I got to my home at weekends, if there was anything controversial going on, there were people at my door from the media, and they were not very nice at all. In fact, it is rule and convention of the House that the Speaker does not make statements anywhere other than in Parliament. A spokesman phoned me and said, “If you do not give a statement, this newspaper will doorstep you”. I said, “ I am bound by the rules of the House”. While I was speaking to that spokesman at 9 am on a Saturday, two reporters from a Sunday newspaper were outside in a car. The caller said, “I will phone the editor back and say that you are not going to speak”. One of the two reporters went to the side door of my home and the other went to the front door and battered it so hard. That is not a decent way to carry on. Had I or any of my family been in bed at the time, I would have thought that there was something very serious going on. I would have rushed to the door, opened it and been confronted by a newspaper editor.

I tell you that the pressures are tremendous. There is worry in every city about housebreaking. I even had a situation when a clown was outside my door—I describe him as a clown, although he called himself a journalist—from Sky TV, using big satellite television equipment. There he was, outside the house while I was in London. He said, “We cannot get him; the house is empty”. Anyone who is involved in security will tell you not to advertise that you are away from home, but here was somebody broadcasting live television, saying that my house was empty. That is the type of pressure I am talking about.

Something else must also be remembered. I was appalled when I heard that the Prime Minister of the day had a spin doctor whose only job—he had other spin doctors—was to put out negative stories about people in other parties and anyone else who was felt to be a danger to the Prime Minister. I do not wish to use the privilege of this House to mention his name. That person was sacked. It was public knowledge that he was putting out nasty, negative stories about members of the shadow Cabinet and their families. It absolutely horrifies me that the public purse was paying for this man and that the Prime Minister of the day was willing to employ him. Despite all my differences of agreement with Margaret Thatcher, I do not think she would have employed someone like that. Jim Callaghan would not have employed someone like that, and Ted Heath would certainly not have employed someone like that. That spin doctor was not the only one putting out negative stories, but he was paid by the Prime Minister of the day. If the Speaker of the House was going to do something that the Prime Minister was not happy about, there would be tough pressure on him with these people around.

We must also consider the public. We represent the people of this country. We must make sure that, if there is a vote of no confidence, the people understand what is happening. We are the anoraks of politics: we live and breathe politics; we look at politics in our spare time. However, there are other men and women who say, “We’ll leave that to the politicians”, although they want to know what is going on. They would not necessarily understand A and B.

[Lord Glentoran]

I have listened to the noble Lord with great care. He is somebody I have respected for a long time. However, I wonder where he is taking us in this debate, which is on an amendment to a very serious Bill. We have listened for 10 or 15 minutes to the experiences of a Speaker in the House of Commons. The evening is moving on and we have a lot of business to get through. Will the noble Lord, as an experienced former Member of Parliament, be good enough to tell us in a short sentence the point that he is trying to make?

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

If the House wants me to cease speaking I will do so. I am sorry—the noble Lord has put me off, but I think he will get my point in a moment. I will try not to take so long the next time I speak.

If a Speaker has to sign a certificate, it should be simple. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, that the public outside should know exactly what is being voted on in the House. It will be very clear if it is a vote of no confidence: a clear resolution or Motion will have been put down, saying, “We have no confidence in Her Majesty’s Government”. If that was voted on, at least the Speaker would be in the position of knowing what he or she was going to sign. A vote of no confidence will have been carried, the House will have made a decision, and the Speaker will be conveying the wishes of the House and putting that on a certificate. I hope that has helped the noble Lord.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I have added my name to the new clause as well. I will just begin by disagreeing with my noble friend Lord Tyler, because I do not agree that this new clause undermines the Bill—quite the reverse. The Bill as presently drafted requires the Speaker to certify whether a vote of no confidence has been passed. However, there is no definition in the Bill of what constitutes that. This new clause seeks to adumbrate what constitutes a vote of no confidence as presently understood. If the Speaker is required to determine a vote of no confidence, all he has to go on is present understandings; otherwise he has to devise a definition of his own, which would be a sure recipe for undermining, if not destroying, the office of the Speaker.

What constitutes a vote of no confidence is a serious concern, and one that has been acknowledged by Ministers. When the Deputy Prime Minister appeared before the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House to discuss the Government’s constitutional reform programme, he conceded,

“this is a really important area and it is a classic example of where we could perhaps work away at the Bill if necessary, to strengthen or clarify it”.

He went on:

“In a sense, we have provided the tramlines in this draft Bill, but at the same time, I clearly want to retain as much flexibility and autonomy as possible for the House to decide for itself how it then interprets that. That is exactly the kind of thing that now needs to come out in the scrutiny that the Bill will receive”.

The problem with the present provision is that it does not leave it to the House how it interprets a vote of confidence—it is left to the Speaker to determine what constitutes a vote of confidence. As we have heard, unlike with money Bills, there is no statutory definition to guide the Speaker and there is an obvious ambiguity with the current wording. Defeating a motion of confidence is not the same as passing a vote of no confidence. Last week, the Minister referred to the case of Germany, where he said the Government had engineered a vote of no confidence in order to trigger an election. I pointed out that they had not engineered a vote of no confidence; they had contrived to be defeated on a motion of confidence. What happens if the Government consider that a Division on a major issue of policy is one of confidence and the Speaker takes a contrary view? Worse, what if it is the other way round?

As we have already heard, the danger is that the Speaker will be dragged into political controversy. In the event of an expected close vote on the Second Reading of a major government Bill, the Speaker could, in effect, be holding the fate of the Government in his hands. The potential to damage the office of Speaker is immense, and it should be avoided. If we are to have a Speaker’s certificate—and I say “if”—then we need to define what constitutes a vote of no confidence in the Government. As we have heard, there is a statutory definition of a money Bill, and I believe a statutory definition is required of a vote of no confidence. My noble friend's amendment seeks to provide that.

Last week, the Minister mentioned that I had undertaken research of all votes of confidence. In fact, my research was of government defeats in the House of Commons in the 20th century and, as part of that research, I was able to determine what were deemed to be votes of confidence—and, equally, what were not. In essence, as has already been touched on, there are three types of vote in which the House of Commons expresses its lack of confidence in the Government. First, there are Motions that stipulate that the House has or does not have confidence in Her Majesty's Government. The House may carry a Motion of no confidence or negate one expressing confidence in Her Majesty's Government.

Second, there are Motions on measures that the Government consider so central to their programme that, if defeated, they cannot sensibly continue. Confidence has therefore attached to some Second Readings and on occasion particular provisions of Bills. I have previously cited—again, this has been touched on—the example of the Second Reading of the European Communities Bill in 1972, when the Prime Minister stated that, if defeated, the Parliament could not sensibly continue. As an aside, I would mention that, if one went down the route where the Speaker did not certify it as a vote of confidence, it would still be open to the Prime Minister to say that the Government could not sensibly continue.

The third category is that of implicit votes of confidence. A small number of issues are taken to be confidence votes even if not explicitly worded as such and without the Government having declared them to be so. This is essentially a residual category deriving from the Government’s need for supply—my noble friend Lord Forsyth touched upon it earlier. Failure to grant supply is regarded as the traditional means by which the House can demonstrate its lack of confidence in the ministry.

My noble friend’s amendment seeks to encapsulate these categories in his new clause. It provides the clarity I would regard as necessary for the Speaker. I have some sympathy for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. It may be that the definitions provided are such that no verification from the Speaker is required because, if a Government attempted to argue that a particular defeat, say, on an amendment to the gracious Speech, was not one of confidence, then it would be open as now for the leader of the Opposition to table an explicit vote of no confidence.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I am tempted to talk about the word “consensus”. I said on day one of the Committee that New Zealand had a three-year term of Parliament. When the cut in the number of UK seats was devised as a consensus between the two parts of the coalition, I think that one lot wanted to get rid of 60 seats and the other wanted 100 seats, so they went for a compromise of 50. On the basis of that, I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, that perhaps there could be a compromise here but it could be three years rather than four or five.

I turn more seriously to the question of four years. As the noble and learned Lord has reminded us, the Minister acknowledged at Second Reading that this was a judgment and there was no absolutely right or wrong answer. I feel that the Government have made the wrong judgment in going for five years rather than four.

There is a lot to quote from earlier debates. I have chosen the quote from Herbert Asquith that is in the report, partly because it was exactly 100 years and one month ago today when he said that we should be desirous of a House of Commons that is,

“always either fresh from the polls which gave it authority, or—and this is an equally effective check upon acting in defiance of the popular will—it is looking forward to the polls at which it will have to render an account of its stewardship”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/2/1911; col. 1749.]

More recently, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, said on 1 March:

“as the election comes up accountability is a very, very strong thing indeed”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 1045.]

For any MP, he went on to say, an election is very effective for accountability.

The Deputy Prime Minister, who has already been quoted, claimed that the Government’s ambitious programme would transfer power away from Parliament and empower people. So we have to ask why the Government want to diminish accountability by extending the life of the other place from four years to five. It cannot be about increasing accountability. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, has suggested, to think about two periods of five years—that is, 10 years —is what makes me think that the figure of five is wrong. Ten years seems to be too long. Someone just short of their 18th birthday might have to wait until they were 23 to vote, and they would be 28 before they could vote again. The period from 18 to 28 is the whole of the setting down of one’s life, but the Government are suggesting having only one vote during that time.

Similarly, imagine a Government with a small majority or indeed no overall control. It would be extremely hard to run the country like that, as I know, but the Government would be denied the right to go for a working majority, somewhat dreading every death or resignation and the resultant by-election—or maybe hoping for them so that they could then engineer a defeat on a confidence vote. Leaving it that way to call an election could mean that it would happen at the very worst of times: in the middle of a freezing winter, during school holidays, in a financial crisis or even at a time of national mourning, to say nothing of major international events or indeed the convenience of Her Majesty. Some of those questions are about the principle of a fixed-term Parliament, but they are far more likely to arise and be more acute with an over-lengthy five-year Parliament.

The question is particularly pertinent for a coalition. A coalition is new to the electorate and therefore needs a vote sooner on its performance than five years. Also, because its manifesto was never put to the electorate or endorsed at a general election, it seems right that it should not be run for a full five years. Although in general four years is right, it is even more acute either for a Government with a small majority or indeed for a new coalition that four years down the line rather than five is the right time to involve the electorate in whether they wish that Government to continue.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I agree with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, about the length of the period between elections in normal times. If it is agreed that five years will be written into legislation, over a period of 20 years the electorate will be denied an opportunity to go to the polls to decide what form the Government will take and which Government will be returned. We had an opportunity last week to hear the Minister on this matter. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, was good enough to talk about it. He said that the present system gave awesome power to the Prime Minister of the day. However, what seems to have happened in the room that was talked about in the story from the autobiography of Mr Laws is that awesome power was given to the people around that table. It strikes me that many of the people around that table, who may be very good at economics and other matters, were not experienced parliamentarians. If they had been experienced parliamentarians, they would have said what I am saying today: four years is far better than five.

I ask the Minister to consider four years for the sake of the House and how it operates. I know what he said last week, when we had a warm-up and were able to hear some of his thinking. That is good; we could then think about what he had to say and come back, as we have today. I think the Minister said that his case was that in the fifth year Members of Parliament decide that they want to be in their constituencies. That is not because they are lazy—far from it. They want to work on the hustings; they know an election is coming up and want to be in their constituency. The Minister’s case was that they would do that in the fourth year. However, they would not do that because the Government would not run out of legislation in the fourth year. Therefore, if Members of Parliament missed three-line Whips, it would be duly noted in their constituency. Constituents would say, “Why was he or she here on a Tuesday, missing a three-line Whip?”. That is an incentive to keep Members of Parliament here in the fourth year, rather than in the fifth.

I bolster the case about Governments running out of legislation in the fifth year. The House of Commons Library tells me that in 2009-10 Session, there was not one vote taken on the Floor of the House of Commons on a Thursday. They had topical debates on a Thursday. Some were on very important matters but they were debates. On Thursdays we turned the House of Commons into a debating society, which meant there was no record of whether anyone turned up to represent their constituents. I reiterate what I said the other week. Tam Dalyell, an excellent parliamentarian, told me as a young MP, “Michael, if they want you, tell them you will be available on a Saturday or a Friday night. Don’t take the sleeper up to Glasgow and then get back down for the vote. Tell them that your job is to be in the House of Commons”. However, the Executive of the House of Commons at that time were pleased to have topical debates with no votes so that everyone who wanted to could get away, which meant that more power was put into the hands of the Executive. That is contrary to what the Liberals have said on the Floor of the House of Commons and, indeed, here. They have said, “We don’t want the Executive to get more power”.

Last week the Minister said what fantastic power we were giving to the Prime Minister by enabling him or her to call an election on a date of their choosing, when the polls looked good. The coalition comprises two parties that fought like cats and dogs in the House of Commons—I had to hold their jackets at times—because their policies were so different. However, the leaders of those parties said: “We are getting together to sort out the financial problems of this nation; that’s why we are together, but here’s the wee deal—that we get a five-year Parliament”. There are people with more knowledge of political history than I but I put it to the Committee that Ted Heath might have had the power to go to the country that the Minister talks about, but it did not work for him. Ted Heath said: “It’s me or the miners”, but the country did not re-elect him. He did not serve his full term. Therefore, the great power that he had did not work in his favour; nor did it work in Harold Wilson’s favour in 1970. I remember hearing as a young canvasser that Labour would win again, and the polls all said that. Harold Wilson was perceived as the winner, but during the 1970 election word came through that he would lose, and he did. The same happened with Jim Callaghan. Had Jim Callaghan gone to the country before the great winter of discontent, perhaps he would have won—who knows? The Prime Minister may have awesome power but it has been shown that that power does not always work in his favour.

The noble and gallant Lord spoke about disgruntled Ministers. I suggest that there will be a stack of disgruntled former Ministers. I can hear them now saying, when they were appointed, “Tony said I am the only one who can do this job”. Then they go on to Sky TV—the lovely thing about Sky TV is that if you cannot sleep in the middle of the night, you go on to Sky TV—and the same Minister says, “What a wonderful Prime Minister we have”. I do not know whether it was reported that one Minister said: “I would jump under a bus for the Prime Minister”. I would not jump under a bus for anybody. I do not know whether it was a moving bus or a stationary bus but it shows how much that Minister loved the Prime Minister. Then there is a reshuffle because the Prime Minister has a difficulty; he has to get fresh blood in because the Back-Benchers are saying, “They’ve had their turn at being Ministers; we want to be Ministers now”.

I do not want to mention names but it has been reported that the gentleman who wrote the book might get back into government. I say good luck and three cheers to him. However, there are too many Ministers on the Front Bench so somebody must fall off the end. The logic of that gentleman getting back into government is that someone else will lose their job and become a disgruntled former Minister. The lovely thing about that is that the same people, when they lose their jobs, do not say any more that the Prime Minister is a great person. They sidle up to you in the tea room and say, “He’s a rotter. He’s a bounder”. That gave me an opportunity to say, “But you were not saying that about him two years ago”. The media then make mischief because they have a pool of individuals who are willing to criticise the Government.

That then leads me to consider the people who matter—the electorate. They turn on their televisions, as do the politicians, and they say, “What is going on here? They are all fighting like cats and dogs”. They then think of the old saying in the Bible that a house divided against itself will surely fall, and they say to themselves, “We elected these people to be unified. They promised us unity and now they are fighting with one another”. That will happen in the fifth year. For the sake of running the House properly, four years is far better than this fixed five years.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am grateful for that clarification because I had interpreted his amendment as leaving 7 May 2015 to stand and that thereafter there would be four years. I am grateful to hear the noble and learned Lord say that that was not the intention, because that was going to be the answer that I gave to my noble friend Lord Cormack. I accept that it may well be an error in the drafting.

The point that I would make is that this Parliament was elected for a maximum of five years, so in moving to a fixed-term Parliament regime we are embodying that in the Bill—and then thereafter also to have five years. That is the point that I make to the noble Lord, Lord Butler. Of course it is right and it goes without saying that no Parliament can bind its successor. The noble Lord and others say that there is no need for this legislation, but what we are seeking to do is to have fixed-term Parliaments on into the future. Other Parliaments can repeal that, but obviously it would take primary legislation to repeal a system of fixed-term Parliaments. I would very much hope that, having established the principle of fixed-term Parliaments, in the same way as we have fixed terms for devolved Assemblies, for local government and for the European Parliament, fixed terms would become the norm.

I take the point made by my noble friends Lord Marks and Lord Rennard with regard to pre-legislative scrutiny. I have been at the receiving end of many complaints about the lack of such scrutiny. There is an issue about the first year of a Government, because when they come into office they want to get on and start dealing with things. One can readily imagine the criticism that would come from the Opposition if a Government were not doing anything. However, there has been a move over the years to having more pre-legislative scrutiny, which has the effect of increasing the workload on both Houses. It is not fanciful to imagine that, following the election in 2015, a Government of whatever colour will not be able to commence their first Session of legislation with more substantive Bills until there has been a considerable amount of pre-legislative scrutiny. So we are talking about the beginning of 2016 as the time when some key pieces of legislation are introduced, having properly been looked at beforehand.

The final year, whether the term is four years or five years, is always going to be one when those seeking re-election look to their constituencies. That would reduce by some way the effective time for legislation by a Government. My noble friend Lord Norton made the point in one of our debates on the first day in Committee that Governments might run out of steam in the fifth year. Allowing for pre-legislative scrutiny and knowing that there will be five years allows for the legislative programme to be planned more effectively. The fifth year, particularly if it is a full year, not one starting at the end of November with a wash-up in the middle of March, would then be used much more effectively.

I defer to the huge experience of the noble Lord, Lord Martin, as he was Speaker of the other place and has an understanding of the parliamentary process. However, the final year, be it the fifth or the fourth year, would inevitably be one when the shadow of the coming election loomed. I also point out that my understanding is—although I may be corrected—that now Thursday debates in the other place are very often chosen by a Back-Bench Committee and that the Government have given power to the Back-Bench Committee to determine the subject matter for debate. I would be interested to know how many Divisions there have been on Thursdays in the first Session of a Parliament, as the noble Lord made the point about how few there were in the fifth Session. That is another measure that this Government have taken to put more power in the hands of Parliament rather than the Executive.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I cannot speak for what is going on in the other place at the moment. However, if my memory serves me correctly, the Minister followed Jo Grimond into the House of Commons in 1983, so he will appreciate as a former Scottish Member that on a Thursday there were votes more often than not, because we had to take the sleeper home. The other thing is that the Minister has had more experience of four-year Parliaments than five-year ones. In the last Session of a five-year Parliament, there were no votes whatever on the Floor of the House of Commons on a Thursday. That is what happened in the last Session of Parliament before the general election—there were no votes at all. The Minister has never had the experience of when that was the case.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I agree that it was never my experience. One thing that I am glad that I do not have responsibility for is how Parliament under the last Government was arranged in its final year. The point that I was making was that I believe that, be the term four or five years, the final year will be taken forward under the looming election. If one goes to four years and one has pre-legislative scrutiny, that cuts down the effective time for the Government to introduce their measures, let alone for their measures to be judged.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Martin of Springburn Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

My Lords, I have a worry about the idea of a five-year Parliament. My experience of the other place was that when there was a four-year Parliament, although there were arguments between Back-Benchers and their own government leaders—the Executive—and between parties, at least the electorate had an opportunity to sort the matter out. They could decide who would be the next Government. Now we are proposing to have five years.

If my memory serves me correctly, during the time that I was in the House of Commons, there were two occasions when the Parliament went the full five years. The last Parliament went five years, and there are no two ways about it—in that last year, the electorate were not getting value for money, if that is the right way to put it. There was very little going through the House. Some may say that that was the fault of the Government for not finding legislation to put through the House, but it is a problem with the whole House. The electorate are entitled to better.

It is not the first time during my political lifetime that I have heard criticism of the great trade union barons, although there are none any more. The railway industry, which was traditionally the main industry in my area, employed 12,000 people in my constituency. You can imagine the numbers working for the railway industry throughout the country. The same went for the steel-working and engineering unions. Perhaps I should declare an interest: I am a card-carrying member of my engineering trade union. Maybe I am digressing, but this is a valid point: if any trade union leader had said, “By the way, I am going to have an extra year of office and I’m not going back to the membership about it”, there would be criticism on the Floor of this House and in the other place.

On the five-year term, we know that an arrangement has been made by the Conservatives and Liberals. I do not want to criticise that, but where arrangements are made there can be fall-outs. What kind of situation will we have if members of the coalition start falling out with one another? There are better scholars of history than me, but I got an opportunity to read some of our great country’s naval history. It turns out that Captain Bligh and Fletcher Christian were pals when they got on board but, after that long voyage, they fell out with one another. That could happen with the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives—they, too, could start to fall out with one another.

I have another point to make concerning the practicalities of a five-year Parliament. I noticed that on a Thursday in the House of Commons—noble Lords can check the records; they have no need to take my word for it—there were debates but no votes. The party managers arranged it that way. It was clear that after Prime Minister’s Questions Members of Parliament went back to their constituencies, where they were working hard. Perhaps they were a bit worried about the people in their constituencies who were attacking them. I remember Tam Dalyell, who was an excellent mentor. He would say to me, “Michael, you are elected to Westminster. You are elected by your constituents to be in Westminster and you shouldn’t be seen in the constituency while Parliament is sitting. You should be in Parliament. You are the only person in your constituency who can get to those green Benches, and you should do so”. However, that was not happening, and the five-year Parliament was part of the reason.

I have seen MPs promoted to ministerial posts. They have been bubbly and full of enthusiasm, and they have taken to the Dispatch Box like a duck to water. Then the Prime Minister of the day would have a reshuffle, and the Minister who was so pleased to take a portfolio from the Prime Minister was not too pleased when he lost it. He would call the Prime Minister of the day every name under the sun. When I heard that, I would say, “He wasn’t too bad a man two years ago. You liked him then. I heard you say so, but you don’t like him now”. Therefore, the handing out of gifts went only one way so far as some Ministers were concerned—they felt that they should be given the portfolio but not have it taken away. That brought about what was known as the ex-Ministers club, and with a five-year Parliament it is going to have a lot of members. The reality is that the Prime Minister of the day has to get fresh blood in because, if he does not, there will be a gnashing of teeth in the ranks. Therefore, others have to be pushed out and return to the Back Benches.

I may have spoken for too long, as I know that we have other amendments to consider. Regarding the five-year Parliament, I can only say to my noble friends on the Liberal Democrat Benches that it is happy days for them now. Some of their colleagues have ministerial jobs and they are all as happy as Larry. However, I go back to Fletcher Christian and Captain Bligh: there will be fall-outs, and that five years may end up being a millstone round their necks.

[Lord Norton of Louth]

My Lords, I share the view of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I am motivated to follow the words of the noble Lord, Lord Martin. There is a great deal in what he has said. When you look at Parliaments that have lasted for five years, they tend to suggest that it is very difficult for a party to generate a coherent programme of public policy that is sustainable over a full five-year period. By the time you come to the fifth Session, the Government tend to have moved from being a Government to being an Administration. They tend to be very reactive; they are deskbound; they are not generating policy; and they are certainly not pursuing the programme that they placed before the electors at the general election. There will be certain dangers if a Parliament is dragged out artificially for a particular fixed term. Electors should be given the opportunity to have a say before then if the Government have clearly run out of steam. Therefore, there is merit in what the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is proposing, which is to inject an element of flexibility to take care of that very point.

[Lord Tyler]

We should be absolutely clear what precisely the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, would do. They would put back into the hands of the Prime Minister of the day, the leader of one of the political parties, the opportunity to pick a good moment to alter the general election date for party advantage. That is the precisely the way in which these amendments could fulfil their purpose. For that reason, they should be firmly opposed.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

Can I make the point that going beyond four years can be a double-edged sword for a Prime Minister? Margaret Thatcher was very shrewd in how she went after a strict four years, as was Tony Blair. We have seen what happened with five years, so it does not always work in a Prime Minister’s favour.

[Lord Cormack]

I make one brief point following the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Martin. Surely in a coalition Government the Prime Minister could not do what his partner, the Deputy Prime Minister, did not wish him to do. So why are we here?

--- Later in debate ---

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness)]

My Lords, again this amendment has stimulated an interesting debate, some of which goes into the general principles of fixed-terms Parliaments and some of which foreshadows the later debate we will have on the figure of four or five years. The amendment would omit the date of 7 May 2015 and provide instead that the next parliamentary general election should be held within a range of four to five years after the previous general election. In other words, we would be looking at an election held no earlier than 6 May 2014 and no later than 6 May 2015.

As my noble friend Lord Tyler very succinctly put it, that drives a coach and horses through the whole concept of a fixed-term Parliament because it would put back into the hands of the Prime Minister the option of choosing the date of the election which those of us who have supported the concept of fixed-term Parliaments want to move away from. I say to my noble friend Lord Cormack that it would quite easily be resolved because the Prime Minister could do so only if he had the agreement of the Deputy Prime Minister. It would be in the very circumstances where the Deputy Prime Minister and the Prime Minister fell out that the chances would be that the Prime Minister would want that option—the circumstances perhaps more graphically, from a literary perspective, expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Martin of Springburn. As my noble friend Lady Stowell said, the important point about fixed-term Parliaments is that the Government of the day have to face the electorate on a predetermined date regardless of the prevailing political circumstances.

Asquith was quoted. I have read this quote several times, and I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, did quote him because it gave us the benefit of the intervention by my noble friend Lord Brooke. We can have a quite legitimate debate about what Mr Asquith was saying on 21 February 1911. He said that reducing the Parliament from seven years, as it previously was, to five years would,

“probably amount in practice to an actual legislative working term of four years”.—[Official Report, Commons, 21/2/1911; col. 1749.]

He did not say that the term would be four years, but that legislative working term would be four years. That reflects the comments referred to by my noble friend Lady Stowell that were made by the noble Lord, Lord Armstrong of Ilminster, at Second Reading. I readily concede that he has misgivings about the idea of fixed-term Parliaments, but he said that if we have them, he prefers five years rather than four years because:

“Even with a term of five years, that shadow extends over the last year of the term and tends to reduce to no more than four years the period during which government policy-making and parliamentary debate can effectively be pursued without too much looking over the shoulder at electoral considerations”.—[Official Report, 1/3/11; col. 971.].

His concern is that if we have a four-year fixed term, it would kick in at the end of three years. Obviously, if we are going to have even more prelegislative scrutiny in the first year, that shrinks the time available to Governments to deliver their programme.

My noble friend Lord Norton, the noble Lord, Lord Martin, and others have indicated that our recent experience of Governments who have gone for a fifth year has not necessarily always been happy. In many ways, that almost makes the point. The only reason those Governments limped on during the fifth year was that it was not propitious or opportunistic for the Prime Minister of the day to call an election after four years because he thought he was going to lose. If you have a five-year fixed term, clearly Governments can plan for those five years. It may well be that they can do more prelegislative scrutiny in the first year. There will inevitably be an election looming at the end of the fifth year, but you are more likely to get proper planning for five years and a Government not having to go for the fifth year because they do not think it opportune to go at the end of four years.

[Lord Martin of Springburn]

I am at a loss to understand why the Government do not go for four years. Another feature about a fifth year is that everyone will be in the doldrums. Members of Parliament will not stay in the Chamber. They will be campaigning in their constituencies. That will be a problem in the fifth year. I know that some noble Lords are muttering and I do not want to go on for too long because I was accused on the radio of filibustering not so long ago, which was not true. My point is that, if there is legislation in the fourth year, Members of Parliament will stay because of their duty to vote, but if there is nothing doing in that final year, they will be campaigning in their constituencies.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, with all due respect, the noble Lord makes the mistake of trying to impose on a new situation of a five-year fixed-term Parliament the problems that have arisen under the existing system. Clearly, if a Government are elected for five years, and they know that it is a fixed term and that they will not have to make a calculation at the end of three and a half years or four years on whether they should go to the country, they can plan their legislation properly for the five years. Parliament’s committees can plan their programme of work for five years in terms of bringing the Government to account. It is wrong to take the experience of an existing system, which I would argue is one of the problems of the existing system. A Government might not think that they can cut and run after four years and will limp on into the fifth year. Where there is a fixed term for five years, the Government could plan for five years, subject only to overriding circumstances, which is why we have the escape-hatch mechanisms as set out in Clause 2.

I also take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which I would link to my answer to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott. He says that this Parliament should see its five years through and that it was elected for five years. As perhaps was suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Martin, we would not act like some trade union baron—he said that the trade union baron would not do it and that he would be criticised if he did—and try to get more time than we were elected for. This Parliament was elected for five years, as I indicated in an earlier debate. The next election could take place as late, I think, as 11 June 2015, so there is no question of this Parliament trying to take extra time unless there were overriding circumstances, whether it be two months for, say, a foot and mouth outbreak.

We are also proposing that future Parliaments should be for five years. Clearly, no Parliament can bind a successor, which is a position that we recognise. I would say to the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, I believe in fixed-term Parliaments. Who would predict the result of the next election this far out? There is no guarantee that the Government will involve my party or the Conservative Party. It may well be a Government of the Labour Party. I am prepared to say that, yes, I believe in the fixed-term Parliament. If it was a Government of the Labour Party that was to last five years, that would be the right thing to do. Having believed in the concept of fixed-term Parliaments, I am prepared to accept that that could be a consequence. I hope that the noble Lord will take that in the good faith in which it is offered.

I cannot accept that this is a fix for this coalition Government, because we will not necessarily be the Government after 2015. Clearly, we will want to fight our case as best we can. The Conservative Party will undoubtedly want to get as many seats as it can. We as Liberal Democrats will want to get as many seats as we can. Who knows what the outcome will be? At this stage, who knows what electoral system the election might be fought on? It would be impossible to predict. The principle of supporting the fixed-term Parliament means that what is sauce for the goose must also be sauce for the gander and I readily accept that.

I believe that to adopt the amendment as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, would completely undermine the whole principle of having a fixed-term Parliament. It would reintroduce the opportunity for the Government of the day in that final year to choose the most opportune moment to go to the country. My noble friend Lord Lawson in his book, The View from No.11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, said about the then Prime Minister, now the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher:

“Her view was that a Government should always wait until the final year of the quinquennium, but once there should go as soon as it is confident it will win”.

Clearly, the judgments of the noble Baroness, Lady Thatcher, in 1983 and 1987 were absolutely right as far as the Conservative Party interest was concerned, but it underlines the fact that it was a question of going when it was politically opportune to do so. That is what this amendment takes away from the Prime Minister of the day and that is why I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.