Immigration (European Economic Area Nationals) (EU Exit) Order 2019

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Waverley]

My Lords, following on from the point made about stamps in passports, and as a procedural point, would the Minister confirm that all persons exiting the UK are now properly registered as having left the UK? There was a point in recent times when that was not the case. There were stamps for entry, but I understand not for exiting. Clarification at an appropriate time would be helpful.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

I would like to follow up that last point. It is what I have been talking about for years. We have totally inadequate means of knowing who has come in, when they have come in, when they should leave and whether they have left. The whole system is a shambles. This is an opportunity to get it right.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. My noble friend Lord Marlesford is correct; this is an opportunity to get it right.

It would probably be helpful to start by stating the purpose of this statutory instrument, and that, I hope, will go to some extent to my noble friend Lord Deben’s point. This statutory instrument is essentially a temporary arrangement in a no-deal situation, until free movement ends under the immigration Bill. In a no-deal scenario, we will end free movement as soon as possible after exit, subject to parliamentary approval of the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill. In a no-deal scenario, once free movement has ended, there would be a transitional period until the new skills-based immigration system is introduced in January 2021. This order ensures that during this period, we would minimise disruption at the border and provide initial continuity for EEA and Swiss citizens, and for businesses. The Government announced these transitional arrangements on 28 January. Regarding the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about seeming to favour EU nationals, the whole point of this is to provide that transitional certainty.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about how the three-month period would be enforced. Obviously these are transitional arrangements, to be put in place only in the event of no deal. We cannot switch things off and on overnight, so we need to ensure that the correct legislation and operational plans are in place. It will take some time to prepare for our new skills-based immigration system, but the Government have been clear that our intention is for it to be in place by 2021.

These arrangements lay the foundations for the future. We cannot control European immigration until all EEA and Swiss citizens here have a UK immigration status, which will take some time. In a no-deal scenario, those resident here by 29 March 2019 will have until the end of 2020 to apply to the EU settlements scheme. These arrangements enable us to move from a rights-based system of free movement to a UK system where everyone requires permission to be here. Accordingly, until the new system is introduced, a proportionate, light-touch enforcement approach will be taken in respect of EEA and Swiss citizens. The noble Lord asked me to define “light touch”—I assume that it means without too much bureaucratic involvement in form filling and other matters that make life very difficult.

If an EEA or Swiss citizen is found not to have appropriate status, we will encourage them to make the relevant application. I am absolutely clear on the importance of clear communications so that individuals understand their status. This is imperative for those resident in the UK before we leave the UK on 29 March, and those who arrive here afterwards. Our focus is on encouraging and supporting EEA and Swiss citizens to acquire an appropriate status and ensure that they have sufficient time to do so. We are committed to a fair immigration system which operates with integrity and which welcomes those who are here legally. But we are clear that compliance with UK immigration laws and rules is essential in supporting this.

For those who arrive after free movement ends, we will make it clear that they need to apply for European temporary leave to remain before their three months’ automatic leave expires. Where they have good reason for not doing so, we will encourage them to make this application, or to leave the UK voluntarily, but where there is abuse of the system, we will consider enforcement action.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked how long the application will take. Applications for 36-month temporary leave to remain will use the EU settlement scheme infrastructure, which allows them to be determined within a period of days. He also asked what will happen at the end of the three months to those who will have applied for 36 months’ leave. If a person applies for 36 months leave within three months, they can still stay lawfully in the UK until their application is decided.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked why the exemption from the immigration health surcharge is needed. The exemption in this order applies to those applying for leave under the EU settlements scheme, not those who obtained three months’ leave to enter under part 2 of the order. The noble Lord also asked if people could leave the UK, then return and obtain a further three months. The answer is yes.

The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about the three months’ automatic leave to enter. The order provides that in a no-deal scenario, three months’ leave to enter would be granted to EEA and Swiss citizens who required such leave once free movement has ended. It would be granted automatically upon arrival at the border, allowing them to work, study or visit for short periods as we transition towards the new skills-based immigration system, to be introduced from 2021.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about consultation on the order. These are transitional arrangements to ensure that the border remains fluid after the end of free movement, and until we move to the order arrangements, from 2021 onwards. These plans were set out in the Government’s White Paper, The UK’s Future Skills-Based Immigration System, and the Government intend a 12-month period of engagement on such plans. The noble Lord also asked about the exit checks on EU nationals now. They will be introduced when we leave.

Migrant Crossings

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Monday 7th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I want to assure my noble friend that this measure is not permanent. It is to deal with a sudden upsurge in the influx of people crossing the channel to come to this country. It is right to take cutters from elsewhere, but this operation is not by the UK alone. We are operating in cohort with our international partners but we do not want them here any longer than they need to be.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, I worry whether the Government have the political courage to face the realities of this situation. I note that the Home Secretary asked what must be a rhetorical question because the answer is so obvious: why are so many people choosing to cross the channel from France to the UK when France is a safe country? The answer is perfectly obvious. Are the Government not aware that the rate of migration across the Mediterranean started at a very small level, changing a great deal very rapidly and becoming quite unsustainable only when it was established as a safe method of moving, helped by the Royal Navy’s HMS “Albion”? Are the Government aware that this could happen next summer?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The Government are totally aware of the consequences of a small number of migrants coming across the channel in dinghies suddenly escalating into something much bigger, hence the swift action that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary had the political courage to take.

Future Immigration

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Wednesday 19th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The UK is a very attractive place for students to come and study. I mentioned earlier the rise in the number of students coming here. We have never capped student numbers and students continue to come in ever-increasing numbers. The system we have in place is certainly not putting off students. They will come here because we have some of the best universities in the world.

On the Home Secretary being pessimistic about the future, this House and the other place would rightly criticise him if he did not plan for all eventualities. Therefore, he is absolutely right to plan for a deal or no deal. If we had a deal, I am not sure how different the White Paper would look.

On taking back control, we will take back control of our borders when we leave the EU on 29 March, and this is the first step.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, I refer to Chapter 4 of the White Paper, on border control. First, I expect my noble friend will agree that one of the consequences of the new system will be a pretty crucial change to the common travel area with Ireland. Currently, people flying from Heathrow to Dublin have their passport checked. People flying from Dublin to the UK go straight to baggage collection and do not go through immigration at all. That will have to change; otherwise, it will not be possible to check those people in the plane who do not have the entitlement that the Irish and British people have.

Secondly, does she agree that when she refers to the American ESTA system, crucially, this is based on using biometrics and involves the matching of eyes and fingerprints? Will she therefore ask those in her department who so cavalierly dismissed on Monday my attempt to introduce a national identity number linked to biometrics as being against civil liberties to think again?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

One thing I have to admire my noble friend for is that he very cleverly weaves in some of his issues. I am not going to revisit the issues we discussed on Monday. Of course, the common travel area existed long before the EU did—that is the point I was making to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—and it will continue to exist after we leave the EU.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Monday 17th December 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marlesford]

34: After Clause 21, insert the following new Clause—
“Review: national identity numbers
(1) Within the period of 2 years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay a report before both Houses of Parliament reviewing the case for the introduction of national identity numbers to assist in countering terrorism and ensuring border security.(2) The review must consider whether unique national identity numbers should be linked to a secure and central database containing biometric data to assist with establishing and verifying the identity of possible terrorism suspects or those engaged in hostile state activity, accessible by the relevant national authorities.”

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, this is the second time I have brought my amendment to your Lordships’ House. It fits in very well with the discussion we have had today. There has been a lot of talk about the unease that much of the anti-terror legislation we have appears to discriminate against certain groups. I understand that unease. The legislation is necessary and the threat of Islamic terrorism is sadly growing. One must feel very apprehensive in view of what has suddenly bubbled up yet again in France with the murder of five people by a lone person, probably inspired by IS, in Strasbourg in the Christmas market. We have to be completely on our guard.

I am proposing something totally non-discriminatory. It is not particularly aimed at terrorism, but it is wholly relevant to terrorism and therefore relevant to this Bill. It is essential that any state with a well-ordered government knows who its citizens are. By citizen I mean the nationals and the people living in the state. This is needed for every sort of reason, because the Government are more and more involved with their citizens. We have highly sophisticated welfare systems, health systems, tax systems and many others—control over driving licences and all the rest.

I propose something very simple. I am not asking a lot because I recognise that the Home Office has difficulty with some of these modern concepts of electronics. I sympathise in a sense because my grandchildren are much better at it than I am, but I think I am rather better at it than the Home Office.

Basically, I am asking the Government to take two years to study the possibility of having a system of identification by number, not identity cards, so that everybody has a unique number. That number, in order to make sure that it relates to the person concerned, will be linked to the biometrics of that person. They would not be on a card. That is dangerous because a good criminal terrorist or somebody like that can fake a card, including the biometrics. The biometrics would be centrally held. What the biometrics are is another matter. I know that the Home Office has been very frightened of DNA. I cannot see the difference between DNA and fingerprints, or even a photograph. Biometrics are biometrics and there are many of them, and two or three are needed for certainty.

That is part of the study referred to in the second part of my amendment. The first part is to produce:

“Within the period of 2 years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed … a report before both Houses of Parliament reviewing the case for the introduction of national identity numbers to assist in countering terrorism and ensuring border security”.


The second part of the amendment is to,

“consider whether unique national identity numbers should be linked to a secure and central database containing biometric data”.

I emphasise that it is extremely secure. It is perfectly possible to be absolutely clear who can have access for whatever purpose. All that is simple stuff now. We live in a cyber world and the British Government in many respects are absolutely in advance. GCHQ is a world leader. I think my noble friend Lord Howe will answer this debate and I pay great tribute to him because he is fully aware of things from the point of view of the Ministry of Defence. I give great plaudits to the Ministry of Defence that it is totally up to speed on this. I am afraid the Home Office is not, but I hope it will at least consider this. It is not asking very much.

Many other areas will have side benefits from such a system, particularly national insurance numbers. I have asked PQs on this: there are tens or even hundreds of thousands of extinct national insurance numbers which are still potentially in use. They enable fraudulent use to be made of the various national insurance systems. As far as the National Health Service is concerned, we all have a national health number, but as well as for processing in hospitals it is intended to tell us who is entitled to the services.

We know that the National Health Service is desperately short of funds. Part of the reason is that a lot of people who are not entitled to receive its services are getting them. We have a wonderful reciprocal scheme with Europe whereby Brits going to Europe can be treated under its health service and the British Government pay the cost. That comes to about £500 million a year. The reciprocal is that people from Europe coming to Britain have the right to be treated here and we bill them. We pay £500 million, they pay £50 million. There is something wrong with the administration of the system. When it comes to non-EU citizens and non-UK citizens, the gap is £1 billion, before going on the GP service and primary healthcare where no attempt is made to stop people who are not entitled to use it.

My system, once established, would enable the Government throughout their whole range to see that the services are used by those entitled to them and not by others. At the moment, the service which is available to those who are entitled to it is diluted to a significant extent by its use by people who are not entitled to it.

As for the security side, which is the primary function of the Bill, I think everybody would agree that it is essential that we have a secure and certain system of knowing who the citizens of this country are. I hope my noble friend will say that the Home Office will at least consider this. I beg to move.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, Amendment 34 brings the attention of the House to an important issue that the noble Lord raised in Committee. I suspect from the response given then by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to that short debate that, unless there has been a major shift in government thinking, this amendment will make no further progress. That is not to say that the noble Lord has not raised an important issue and deserves a considered response from the Government, which I am sure he will get.

At the heart of the amendment is an attempt to protect fellow citizens and, using a review, to look beyond the introduction of national identity cards, which was my party’s policy when in government. We also looked at the advances in science. We learn on a regular basis how advances in science have brought criminals to justice, particularly those who committed the most heinous crimes many decades ago. They thought they had got away with it, but advances in science brought them to justice.

The issues raised by the noble Lord are for a wider debate on a future date on issues of science and technology and how they are used to keep us safe, while being fully aware that criminals also seek to use advances in science and technology to commit crimes, to murder people and to threaten our country and its values. I am clear that the noble Lord is asking for a review and nothing more than that. We must keep things under review. What should the state do to keep us safe? What is being done now and is it proportionate? I look forward to the Government’s response and thank the noble Lord for raising these issues.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Marlesford for once again setting out his arguments in favour of introducing national identity numbers backed up by a national identity register containing biometric data of everyone in the country, or at least the adult resident population. I recognise the constructive intentions behind this amendment. My noble friend will recall that in Committee I stated that the introduction of a national identity number and register would be prohibitively expensive and would represent a substantial erosion of civil liberties. I know that I will disappoint him by saying that this remains the Government’s position. In consequence, I remain unconvinced of the need to carry out a review to determine this.

Any measure of the kind my noble friend is proposing would have to be evidence-based. We have seen no evidence that a national identity number or biometric database would offer greater protection against terrorism or greater control at the border. As I said in Committee, although a number of European countries have national identity numbers, these have not been able to prevent terrorist atrocities from being carried out—a point well made by the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller. Indeed, even were we to imagine any of those countries having a biometric database alongside national identity numbers, it is hard to see how this would have made any difference to the ability of the police to forestall those attacks.

Resources need to be directed to where they can be relied upon to add tangible value. I am of a view that the investment we are making in security, counterterrorism, better use of intelligence and cybersecurity is a more effective use of resources to keep the country safe against the ongoing threat from terrorism and hostile state activity. I know my noble friend takes a more sanguine view than many noble Lords about the retention of biometric data, but let us think about the debates we have had during the passage of this Bill. During debate on Schedule 2, the Government have been quite properly probed by noble Lords as to whether we have got the balance right on the retention rules for fingerprints and DNA taken from persons arrested for, but not charged with, a terrorism offence. I am clear that the balance is right but the Government accept that, where someone has not been convicted of an offence, there need to be appropriate restrictions on the retention of biometric data. I believe that this view is shared by the overwhelming majority of Members of your Lordships’ House.

Against the backdrop of those debates on Schedule 2, my noble friend’s proposition appears all the starker. He is advocating a national database containing the biometrics of the whole population with, presumably, the data being deleted only on the death of an individual. In considering such a proposition, it is instructive to remind ourselves what the Constitution Committee said about the then Identity Cards Bill in March 2005—that,

“the constitutional significance of the Bill is that it adjusts the fundamental relationship between the individual and the State … the Bill seeks to create an extensive scheme for enabling more information about the lives and characteristics of the entire adult population to be recorded in a single database than has ever been considered necessary or attempted previously in the United Kingdom, or indeed in other western countries. Such a scheme may have the benefits that are claimed for it, but the existence of this extensive new database in the hands of the State makes abuse of privacy possible”.

We do not believe the case against a national identity register has changed in the intervening years.

Having said that, I hope that I have been able to reassure my noble friend that the Government take the need to counter terrorism and maintain border security very seriously; indeed, we would not be debating the Bill today if this were not the case. Having again had the opportunity to debate the issue, and with the reassurance I have offered about the Government’s commitment to protect the public, I respectfully ask my noble friend if he would be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marlesford]

I thank my noble friend for his reply and the trouble he has taken with it, but I am not reassured at all. He started by talking about the enormous cost; I was only asking for a study. One of the things a study would reveal would be some indication of costs; that would be a criterion in knowing how to move forward. Then he produced the idea that countries which have identity systems have not been able to prevent terrorist attacks; certainly terrorist attacks have occurred in countries with those systems, but it is failing logic to say that that means they are of no use. We do not know which attacks were not successful as a result of having the system.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 17th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stunell]

My Lords, I support the amendment. We have rehearsed this issue at each stage of the Bill and I remind the House that a wide range of external organisations share the view that there should be a review. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and now from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that such a thing might add value. The Government have struggled to resist the reasoning put forward. The bottom line seems to be that the Government do not want a review and it is extremely difficult to penetrate why that might be when one looks at the advantages that flow from having one.

It is important to understand that activity is no guarantee of effectiveness. A lot of work goes on, but how effective is it? We heard evidence from the noble Lords, Lord West and Lord Harris, that it is not uniformly good. Certainly, the impression of those who believe themselves to be the targets of Prevent is that it is not uniformly good. The Minister needs to answer in detail what the Government’s reservations are about any sort of review along the lines of the amendment.

I noted carefully what the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, had to say about the Prevent oversight board. He said that it had not met often enough. Providentially for his case, it had met in the last week, but he did not disclose how long before that it last met. If the next meeting is in six months and he thinks that is soon enough, I presume the gap was quite extensive.

I notice that my supposition was, to some extent, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who said of last week’s meeting that he was glad the Prevent oversight board was at last showing some signs of life. I hope I am not putting words into his mouth; I think that is what he said. Bearing in mind the qualified support that has come for the Prevent oversight board’s activity and effectiveness, I wonder whether the Government are really satisfied it is the right vehicle for a review, a substitute for a review or gives all the answers that a review would. It seems likely that that is not the case.

Other specific concerns have come to light since our previous debate. I have been approached by an outside organisation that, until this year, was a provider of Prevent projects to those who had been referred. It pointed out to me that it has now been superseded, at short notice in its opinion, by a private provider. It alleges that there is no effective procurement policy for those programmes. Far too often, it appears to depend on the knowledge and contacts of a Prevent co-ordinator, rather than a rigorous management process. I hope the Minister will be able, at least in principle, to give some reassurance on that. To help her in giving that reassurance, could she say something about the proportion of projects that are delivered through NGOs, the proportion delivered through private companies and the proportion delivered through local authorities or other public services directly? Have those proportions changed over the last four or five years, as my informant alleges? If there has been a change, was it cost-driven or based on an evaluation of whether particular projects were the wrong part of the curate’s egg, and were therefore dropped, or were too expensive for the results?

All of this raises the question of what results and criteria are being used in allocating, renewing or discontinuing such contracts. Surely evaluation is a key part of that; therefore, review of the process seems all the more necessary. I hope, for all the reasons that have been rehearsed, not least that one, that the Minister is able to accept this amendment today.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, Prevent is an important part of the Government’s anti-terrorism strategy. We have heard about a number of problems relating to it, which have been there for a while. I am persuaded that it is therefore sensible to review the policy and see whether it should be changed, replaced or whatever.

The noble Lord, Lord Stunell, said he could not understand why the Government were resisting this idea. I can tell him exactly why. It is because the Home Office ploughs on regardless. Even when the tractor’s wheels are stuck in the mud, they go on spinning. That is why the Home Office needs constant help in knowing when things should be reviewed. I strongly suggest that my noble friend tears up the brief that says “Don’t review” and says, “Yes, we’ll look at it”.

[Baroness Warsi (Con)]

My Lords, with the leave of the House—and I have spoken to both our Front Bench and the clerk—I will refer slightly to the last amendment, which does actually refer to the current amendment. I was in the Chamber when this amendment was called.

I want to put a couple of things on record—first, my views on Prevent. I have written about this extensively. I will not plug the book, but it is available on Amazon. In that book, I talk about Prevent in detail. I talk about how, when the policy was started in 2003 and first published in this iteration in 2006, I supported it. It was effectively an upstream intervention into areas where we felt we could intervene, predominantly with young people and British Muslims at that time, although we are increasingly dealing with far-right extremism now. We were predominantly intervening with young people who may be attracted into terrorism. How could anybody disagree with that principle?

In my book—and this is the issue that I raised with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—I work through the various iterations of Prevent. It has changed from what it was in 2003 to what it is now in 2018. It started as a policy specifically designed to be run as an internal discussion within communities of what could be considered to be extremist views. It was supposed to be a genuine, non-criminalised safe space and a battle of ideas—something I fundamentally supported—but it became a policy that was done not by the community but to the community. This is an issue I have consistently raised: what the policy became and the way it was then implemented; the level and quality of training, the material being used, the way it was implemented in different schools and differently across different communities. All of this—with 100 pages of citations if that helps the noble Lord—is detailed in the book, because it was important to say clearly that a principle of policy that I supported has, over time, become fundamentally flawed in its implementation and lost the trust of the communities we were trying to influence.

As a British Muslim parent whose children are likely to be vulnerable and to be approached by those who want to lead them astray, whether into extremism, terrorism or elsewhere, I would be the first in line to say this policy needs to be supported. But I do not want a policy on our books, which has statutory basis, which is badly implemented.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 14th November 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marlesford]

61: After Clause 21, insert the following new Clause—
“Review: dual passports
(1) Within the period of 12 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay a report before both Houses of Parliament evaluating the case for requiring dual nationality British citizens to declare the nationality of their other passport or passports in order to assist with border security.(2) The review must consider whether information on dual or multiple passport holders should be made available to border security staff and other relevant national authorities via a centralised database.”

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, in this country we allow, quite rightly, UK passport holders to be in the possession of passports of other countries—not just one but two or three; whatever is needed. When someone applies for a UK passport, they are required to declare what other passports they hold. But, astonishingly, this information is not kept in any sort of central database and still less is it available to border officers whose responsibility it is to examine the passports of those entering or leaving the UK. This is why my noble friend the Minister had to tell me, in a Written Answer on 16 April this year, when I asked about a register of second passports:

“No statistical information is available showing whether British citizens hold another citizenship”.


About five years ago I was tipped off by a member of the Security Service that its operations were made much more difficult by the fact that UK citizens were using their UK passport to travel to one destination and then another passport to get up to mischief, perhaps, in third countries. This was and is particularly relevant to would-be jihadists who travel to Pakistan, for example, and then attend training camps or indeed join al-Qaeda, ISIS or some other terrorist organisation in other countries. I raised this point a couple of years ago with Cressida Dick, the present Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, who was at that time responsible for anti-terrorist operations. She expressed astonishment that border control officers were not automatically alerted to other passports held when a UK passport was electronically scrutinised at the point of entry.

My Amendment 61 is exceedingly modest. It asks merely that the Government require dual nationals to declare other passports and that this information,

“should be made available to border security staff and other relevant national authorities via a centralised database”.

In fact, it is even more modest because all I am asking them to do is to study whether this is a sensible idea. That is not asking very much.

This would be no more difficult or complicated than many other centralised databases, such as the DVLA for vehicle licences and all the rest of it, and the National Firearms Licensing Management System—the central firearms register—which I caused to be introduced under Section 29 of the Firearms (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1997, which finally came into operation in September 2007, and is working very well. I checked quite recently with my own county firearms officer.

The Government have previously used three arguments to oppose what I am proposing. The first is that it would be an infringement of civil liberties. My answer to that is that such a concept of civil liberties is wholly outdated in an age when we are all subject to intense and often intrusive surveillance by foreign powers such as Russia and, rather more efficiently, China. The second is that there could be no way of enforcing the declaration of other passports. That of course has a simple remedy, which is—if it is declared to be deliberate and pernicious—the forfeiture of a UK passport when that is discovered. Noble Lords in the Committee might have their own view on this but I am quite sure that the great majority of second passport holders would have not the slightest objection to this being known to the authorities. After all, we all have to put up with a lot of inconvenient baggage examination under existing counterterrorism operations.

Nor should we neglect the possibility of connivance by Home Office staff in committing terrorist or other serious criminal offences, whether in connection with passports or border control. The Minister will be well aware that in the last 12 years no fewer than 54 members of Home Office staff have been sent to prison, sometimes for long periods—nine or 11 years. In a recent case Shamsu Iqbal, an official in the immigration department of the Home Office, was sentenced in April to 15 years for misconduct in public office. Sometimes this connivance involves selling visas or trafficking in passports, assisting illegal immigration, forgery, bribery, money laundering and other serious matters. Only today the newspapers are carrying a report of a Mr Pellett, an officer in the Home Office Border Force, who has just been found guilty of assisting criminal gangs with smuggling in weapons and drugs at Dover. I suggest that the Home Office really cannot argue that we can rely on its existing standards of efficiency, let alone integrity, in the protection of our borders.

The third argument is that we should have confidence in the Home Office’s intelligence-led processes and not concern ourselves with these matters. I am sure that my noble friend does not feel this but I think that Home Office officials regard me as pretty impertinent to be talking about these matters. On that I would simply say: it is now 12 years since the noble Lord, Lord Reid, declared when he was Home Secretary that the Home Office was not fit for purpose, while only this month the House of Commons Select Committee concluded, in the matter of my right honourable friend Amber Rudd, that the Home Office had lost its grip. This simple and modest proposal is necessary for national security. I believe that it will improve the Bill and I hope that the Government will show that they have some inclination to get a grip by adopting it. I beg to move.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Marlesford for raising this matter and I acknowledge his long-standing interest in this issue. I share his aim of preventing those who may be of interest on the grounds of terrorism, serious crime or hostile activity from avoiding detection at the border. But before I reply substantively to him, I believe the Home Office to be blessed with many, many committed, honourable and very able civil servants. It is wrong for this Committee to gain the impression that it is somehow shot through with those who would seek to disobey the law. That is not my experience and it is certainly not the experience of my noble friend the Minister or, I dare say, any of your Lordships in this House who have had dealings with the Home Office.

Holding dual national status is perfectly lawful in the UK and it is not a barrier to acquiring British citizenship or obtaining a British passport. When making such applications, dual nationals are required to provide the Home Office with details of any foreign passports or other nationality held. Such information will assist in the assessment of the application, including, in the case of an application for naturalisation, the assessment of any grounds for refusal based upon conduct through past or present activities.

The request for dual national passport information is also necessary in understanding whether a person is using one name for all official purposes. The UK, through the Home Office, has also instituted a policy that a person must have one name for all official purposes and that this is reflected in biometric residence permits, naturalisation and registration documents and passports. This policy is in place not only for travel purposes but to frustrate the use of multiple names for access to goods and services. This, together with other measures in place, minimises the ability of a British citizen to manipulate travel documents to travel into and out of the UK and other countries undetected for terrorism, trafficking and other criminal activities.

--- Later in debate ---

I know this will come as a disappointment to my noble friend, but I hope he will nevertheless be content to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, I have great sympathy with my noble friend for having to read out a Home Office response that completely misses the point of my amendment. The point is that when people hold more than one passport, if their passport is scanned then the fact that they have another passport is automatically revealed. That would be very simple to do, and it is very necessary because that may well give the clue in certain cases—not many, but you do not need many cases for these things to be worth while—of the need for a follow-up. I will of course withdraw the amendment for the moment, but I must ask the Home Office to look at what I am actually proposing because a great deal of what my noble friend read out is wholly irrelevant to the point that I was trying to make. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 61 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marlesford]

67A: Schedule 3, page 39, line 41, at end insert—
“( ) give the examining officer on request a sample of P’s DNA.”

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, in putting down this amendment, I am not particularly concerned with what the power should be for stopping people, nor am I concerned with the way powers are used and the various matters that have been discussed about the retention of information. All I am concerned with is to make it more efficient than it appears to be under the Bill as drafted.

Paragraph 3(b) of Schedule 3 states that a person questioned under paragraph 1 or 2 must,

“give the examining officer on request either a valid passport which includes a photograph or another document which establishes P’s identity”.

It is an incredibly amateur way of doing things. Nowadays we have much better methods of establishing people’s identity. DNA is probably one of the best. It is now wholly unintrusive—you no longer have to take a blood sample or anything like that. You can simply take a swab. All I am suggesting is that the Bill should give those officers who feel it necessary to try to establish or record an identity the means of doing so in a much more certain way. This is a very limited proposal. I am merely suggesting that a tool should be included in this schedule.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, I hope I can reassure my noble friend Lord Marlesford at least in part. As he has explained, Amendment 67A would allow an examining officer, during the course of a Schedule 3 ports examination, to require a person to provide a DNA sample. This would be in addition to the powers available to these officers to request information and identity documents.

The ability to establish a person’s identity is undoubtedly an important aspect of an examination to determine whether that individual is or has been engaged in a hostile activity. I therefore highlight to my noble friend that these powers already allow for the taking of fingerprints and samples to help to ascertain a person’s identity. Paragraphs 27 and 35 currently allow for the taking of fingerprints and samples where a person has been detained. This biometric information can also be taken from the detainee without their consent but only at a police station and if authorised by a superintendent who is satisfied that it is necessary in order to assist in determining whether the detainee is or has been engaged in a hostile activity, or to ascertain the detainee’s identity.

--- Later in debate ---

Given that, and on the basis that Schedule 3 already makes provision for the taking of fingerprints and DNA from persons detained under Schedule 3, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, the only difference with what I seek is that, if it is thought necessary to investigate someone—not necessarily to detain them—and establish their identity, it is sensible to have the power to take a sample that will help to do so. That is my point. Once again, I am not contradicting what the Minister says about the powers that already exist for the taking of samples from persons who have been detained. I am concerned that when, for whatever reason, it is regarded as desirable to establish someone’s identity, at the same time there should be the power to take the biometric samples required, which I am suggesting should be DNA because that is so much more certain and easy now than it ever used to be. I honestly do not quite see what the Minister’s argument is against that. Perhaps he could comment a little further on that before I withdraw the amendment.

[Earl Howe]

The argument is that the police and the authorities believe they have all the powers that they need already, and that those powers enable them to detain a person, if they think it is necessary and if that decision is confirmed in the way that I described, in order to assist in determining whether the detainee has been engaged in a hostile activity or, as relevant to my noble friend’s amendment, to ascertain the detainee’s identity. If a suspicion arose about the individual’s identity, the detention process could offer a way through to enable the DNA sample to be taken.

[Lord Marlesford]

I hoped that my noble friend would realise that what I am proposing is the use of the DNA capability in circumstances where it is not necessary—at that stage, at any rate—to detain people. This almost goes back to the point that I made on Monday on the need to have identity numbers with secure biometrics—I never envisaged that the establishment of identity should be able to be done only when someone was detained. Being detained is a much more serious matter than merely asking someone to give a method of establishing their identity. That is where I am sure that not my noble friend but perhaps the Home Office misunderstands what I am trying to say. I do not know whether my noble friend would like to say anything further.

[Earl Howe]

I am grateful to my noble friend. Possibly the answer is for me to write to him after this Committee sitting. My feeling would be that to require someone who was not detained to supply a DNA sample would cross a civil liberties line that many would find uncomfortable. In my judgment, it should therefore be only for those detained—obviously you are detained only for a good reason—to be required to supply such a sample.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I support the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. It is quite rare for me to agree with the noble Earl so I thought I would take this opportunity to do so. More importantly, there would be widespread condemnation of this particular move; it would be deeply unpopular. It would be hard enough getting ID card legislation through without a lot of resistance, and this idea would be even tougher.

[Lord Marlesford]

I have listened to what people have said. I think the Minister made the important point here: we still have a hang-up about DNA samples. I agree that perception is what matters, and it may be that I am slightly ahead of public perception, but I do not see any difference between being asked to give a DNA sample for identification and almost any other method of doing so. If it involved taking blood or something then that would be another matter, but nowadays DNA can be taken by a simple swab. It is self-evident that if you do not have matching DNA then that does not take you very far, but there would be many circumstances in which, having suspected someone, having their DNA might at some stage be useful. I do not accept the general point that there is something sinister about DNA that means we should not use it; I think it should be used a great deal more than it is. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 67A withdrawn.

Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th November 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Marlesford]

58: After Clause 20, insert the following new Clause—
“Review: national identity numbers
(1) Within the period of 2 years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must lay a report before both Houses of Parliament reviewing the case for the introduction of national identity numbers to assist in countering terrorism and ensuring border security.(2) The review must consider whether unique national identity numbers should be linked to a secure and central database containing biometric data to assist with establishing and verifying the identity of possible terrorism suspects or those engaged in hostile state activity, accessible by the relevant national authorities.”

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 58, which is a very simple and, I hope, practical amendment, I am not putting forward anything original or clever or anything like that. It is a purely practical proposal. In recent days we have all been talking about not just the horrors of war but the need to prevent war. Of course, terrorism is a form of war. I was very encouraged a few minutes ago when the Minister said that the Government will do anything they can to prevent terrorism. This amendment is a simple proposal to help prevent terrorism.

I start with the basic assumption that the state needs to be able to identify its citizens with certainty. I define citizens for this purpose as UK passport holders and those permanently resident in the United Kingdom. Over the years, there has been much discussion about identity cards. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, who is in his place, has often talked about them. I was in favour of identity cards at one time, but I will explain why I am not now and why what I want now is something different.

The two big changes over a long period of years are the emergence of new technologies of identification. In the old days, 100 or more years ago, there were just the photograph and the fingerprint, and then more sophisticated things such as blood groups, DNA and all that. The second change is the extent to which we can record all this data electronically and access it electronically in real time, which is not particularly new either.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has made a very pertinent point in this context. I am not capable of debating that particular terrorist atrocity because I do not know all the circumstances surrounding it. One of the shortcomings I do know of was a distinct lack of process in admitting passengers on to planes in New York, which might still have been the case even if a DNA register had been in operation in the United States. So we can try to particularise this argument, but I have yet to see evidence that the terrorist attacks we have seen recently on these shores, or indeed in France and Belgium, could have been prevented by a system such as the one proposed by my noble friend. So, against that background, I hope that, having again aired this issue, my noble friend will be content, at least at this stage, to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Marlesford]

The answer is that at this stage I will withdraw the amendment. It is, I believe, a totally valid point. I know that the Home Office is opposed to it. I know that it does not like these things. I just go back to the example of the 10 years it took to get the firearm thing. This will come. It is inevitable. As the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, says, basically no legitimate person is frightened of having their identity known. We do not live in a dictatorship. We cannot behave as though apparatus that would be useful for a dictatorship should not be provided in case we have a dictatorship. We are fighting a battle against terrorism. We are fighting on many fronts and this is something that could be useful. I find it extraordinary that the Home Office will not even look at it. However, as I said, for the moment I will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 58 withdrawn.

Stop and Search Powers

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Monday 12th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I apologise; I did not deliberately leave it out. The noble Lord is right to make that point. We are acutely aware of it, as is the Home Secretary. Recent stories in the papers have not made for good reading. There are several reasons why knife crime is on the increase, not least the link to drugs, I am afraid. Through the Offensive Weapons Bill and the strategy that we have recently produced, we are absolutely determined to tackle it.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, knife crime normally involves carrying a knife, knives are normally made of metal, and metal is very easy to detect. Why do the police not ensure—not in a discriminatory way, but for everybody in particular areas—that people are subjected to the same system as is used in airports? Mobile arches could be set up outside Underground stations where everybody passes through—in St James’s Street as well as in Peckham. Search everyone; you would at least make it much more difficult to carry a knife around London. Why not have a go?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the notion of searching everybody who goes through an Underground station would, I am afraid, be unfeasible. In addition to knives, there are other metal things that people might carry in their pockets. I can foresee that system as being entirely unworkable. I go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser: intelligence-led stop and search is the most effective way to deal with some of the problems we are seeing.

Immigration: Appeals

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble and learned Lord makes a good point. My response to the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, threw up a slightly different but substantial reason for things being delayed and appeals being upheld—that is, documentation coming forward at the last minute, making it too late for the Home Office to withdraw the appeal and sort out the issue. The noble and learned Lord is absolutely right: for many, it can be a very confusing and distressing time. However, we are making huge efforts to improve the process—for example, by withdrawing cases at the 20-week point to make sure that they are looked at again and that we do not have the problem that noble Lords are referring to.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords—

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, we have not yet heard from the Conservative Benches.

[Lord Marlesford]

My Lords, is not a fundamental and long-standing problem the quality of management in the Home Office? If the Home Office were any sort of private sector outfit, the management would have been changed long ago. When there is a failure of management, the owners, whether they be the Government or the shareholders, insist on a change. It seems to me that until there is really good management at Civil Service level, there will not be an improvement.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I know that my noble friend takes a rather dim view of some of the people who work in the Home Office, but he points to absolutely the right issue. We are now identifying and reviewing cases, and improving technical capability in the Home Office to help UKVI decisions, but we are also trying to ensure consistency in casework to prevent the occurrence of some of the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

Immigration

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, I have one question for my noble friend. In the Statement a crucial sentence states that,

“the provision of DNA evidence must be entirely voluntary”.

Why is that? Is DNA evidence not used for paternity cases and for other medical reasons? Is it not used in criminal investigations? What is the difference in principle between DNA and fingerprints or eye recognition? Surely, any means, when the country needs to know who somebody is, is perfectly legitimate.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank my noble friend for that question. I am referring, and the Statement referred, purely to the immigration system. He is absolutely right that biometrics cover a number of areas, as he said, including fingerprints and iris recognition—but in this context DNA presentation should be entirely voluntary.