(6 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have not taken part in earlier discussions on this Bill for reasons outside my control, but it would be strange for me not to get on my feet to reinforce the points that have been so well made by noble Lords. This is an important matter as far as Wales is concerned. There needs to be clarity and co-operation, and that has to be on a proper basis. I suggest that these amendments would help facilitate that.
My Lords, while we support the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Wills, in view of the explanations he gave for them in Committee and today I shall not add to what he said on them, except for Amendment 119AA, to which I will turn. I should also add that we thoroughly support the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. We should all be mindful of his question, “Is this any way to run a union?” No, it is not, because there is a certain tactlessness, which is offensive and should be reversed, about the way the London Government sometimes regard devolution.
I will say a word or two about Amendment 104, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, although he has not yet spoken to it. I intervened on the principle of that amendment in Committee because it seemed to me then, as it does now, that the number of people killed or seriously injured in an incident is not and should not be the determining factor in whether it is a major incident. In Committee there was discussion about whether the Horizon scandal could be classified as a major incident because of the number of deaths and the serious harm that was caused, even though that harm may be psychological or emotional, and we questioned that. We also considered the Fishmongers’ Hall attack in which the significant number threshold was plainly not met, but the effect on the wider public of that event was traumatic, deep and widespread, I suggest, certainly enough to enable it to be properly classified as a major incident.
Since Committee, the noble Lord has narrowed his amendment significantly. It now seeks to permit the Secretary of State to classify as a major incident any incident where the circumstances indicate systemic failings of a public body and that such circumstances might recur, even where the significant number threshold is not met. I should have thought that the Government could have accepted and should accept that amendment. I will be very interested to hear whether the Minister considers that it is acceptable or whether he has some alternative; and, if not, why he considers that the number of dead and injured is a necessary condition for the appointment of public advocates.
Amendments 109 and 110 from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, concern considering the views of the victims before appointing an additional advocate and before terminating the appointment of advocates. Those amendments go some way, although a limited way, to ensuring the independence of advocates. That independence is an essential cornerstone of the scheme: independent advocates having the ability, the willingness and, indeed, the obligation to tell the truth as they see it, to argue for the truth as they see it and to criticise where they see the need. Otherwise, there is a danger that this scheme could prove a route to whitewashing the blunders of public bodies, which is something we all wish to avoid.
As to Amendment 119AA, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, on which we expect he may wish to divide the House, the decision on whether to hold an inquiry into a major incident lies at the heart of the scheme. I suggest that he has made a powerful case that the power to establish an alternative fact-finding inquiry is important, for all the reasons he has given. It is also self-evident that any fact-finding inquiry can be effective only with access to all the relevant evidence, which is set out in his amendment. The very fact that the Government are resisting this amendment suggests a lack of self-confidence to ensure a thorough and independent scrutiny of major incidents, and that is why we shall support the noble Lord, Lord Wills, if he divides the House.
My Lords, this group of amendments is concerned with the scope and role of the independent advocate. I open by paying tribute to the work that my noble friend Lord Wills has done on this role for many years now through a number of Private Members’ Bills. If he chooses to test the opinion of the House on his Amendment 119AA, we will support it.
I shall speak briefly to the amendments in my name in this group. Amendment 104 would enable the Secretary of State to designate incidents causing serious harm or death to a small number of individuals as major incidents where there was a significant public interest in doing so. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, gave the example of Fishmongers’ Hall, where there were few fatalities but nevertheless it was a serious incident that had a national impact. The noble Lord and I will listen with interest to the Government’s response to Amendment 104.
Amendment 107 would require the standing advocate to communicate the views of the victims of a major incident to the Secretary of State. Amendment 109 would require the Secretary of State to consider the views of victims of a major incident on whether to appoint an additional advocate and who to appoint. Amendment 110 would place a requirement on the Secretary of State to consider the views of the victims of a major incident before terminating the appointment of an advocate appointed in relation to that major incident.
Amendment 111 would require the Secretary of State to make guidance under Clause 38 publicly available. Amendment 112 would require the Secretary of State to consult the standing advocate before issuing, revising or withdrawing guidance in relation to matters to which advocates appointed in respect of major incidents must have regard. I look forward to the Minister’s response to all those amendments, none of which I intend to press—they are essentially probing amendments.
I shall comment briefly on the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, about the situation in Wales. I listened with interest to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said on the matter. I am not a lawyer, as I have said many times in this House, but the word used in the amendment is “concurrence”, not “consent”. I do not know whether that is a substantial difference but the whole of that mini-debate referred to the word “consent”, not the word used in the amendment. Nevertheless, the noble and learned Lord made an interesting and substantial point, and I look forward to the Minister’s response.
In conclusion, if my noble friend chooses to press Amendment 119AA, we will support him.
My Lords, this group concerns the victims’ code for major incidents. In speaking to Amendment 114, I am speaking to all the other amendments in this group as well.
We believe that this Bill represents a missed opportunity to extend entitlements of the victims’ code to victims of major incidents. Victims of major incidents will have suffered serious harm, often at the hands of state or corporate bodies. However, they do not receive the same recognition from government as victims of crime and so are not entitled to the same minimum level of support and services. Instead, they are often expected to navigate complex legal processes with little recognition of the harm they have suffered or the trauma they have faced. While the position of victims in the criminal justice system is far from perfect, as I have mentioned, organisations working with bereaved families have flagged a distinct lack of support for victims in the contexts of inquests and inquiries.
There is no principled reason to focus on improving the experience of victims in one context over another, while failing properly to recognise the needs and experiences of victims in a non-criminal context. It is also worth recalling that inquests and inquiries, particularly those relating to major incidents as defined by the Bill, often run concurrently with or prior to criminal investigations, allowing certain minimum entitlements in one process and not the other. This risks undermining the confidence of victims in both systems. There is little use in trying to ensure that individuals are supported through and engaged with the criminal process when they are at risk of being—or have already been—let down by a separate legal process addressing the same events. This provides an additional justification for affording victims in the inquests and inquiries contexts similar minimum entitlements to those in a criminal justice setting. Failing to do so is not only unfair but runs counter to the Government’s stated aim of ensuring that victims have confidence that they will be treated in a way they should rightly expect. I beg to move Amendment 114.
My Lords, I was pleased to add my name to Amendments 114 to 117, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, which I supported in Committee and support again.
To those of us on these Benches, there seems to be no justification for limiting the protection and support for the victims granted in this Bill by the requirements for a victims’ code to victims of crime. It is not a massively radical step to produce an additional victims’ code for victims of major incidents which would give similar protections to those provided by the victims’ code for victims of crime—but tailored to victims of major incidents.
Part 2 of the Bill establishes the important scheme that we have been discussing for advocates of victims of major incidents. What it does not do is provide the necessary signposting for victims of major incidents to the assistance that they need—assistance of all types wherever available. There are particular issues for victims of major incidents and their families that do not necessarily arise for victims of crime, to do with accessing medical, psychological, financial and social help, among other things, in the wake of such incidents. The issues may be similar, but they are not completely overlapping.
Dealing with issues of bereavement and support for families following injury, dealing with issues connected with investigating and establishing responsibility for major incidents—these issues are very different in some cases from those facing victims of crime. However, there is no material difference in the need or justification for a separate code for victims of major incidents. If this Bill is a victims Bill, it should cover victims of major incidents as well.
On these Benches, we cannot see why we do not take the opportunity with this Bill of laying the ground for a similar code for victims of major incidents. I look forward to hearing how the Minister justifies passing up that opportunity.
My Lords, I support both amendments in this group. On Amendment 118 from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, it is accepted that the whole question of publicly funded representation at inquests has been a grave injustice for many years. Amendment 118 seeks to correct that injustice, which involves a huge imbalance between the families of victims, public bodies and companies that are liable to be blamed for deaths. All those have representation that they can afford, whereas the families and bereaved do not. That injustice should be put right and this amendment seeks to achieve that.
For all the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Wills, I support his amendment on the post-mortem process and the code of practice designed to preserve the dignity of the deceased. But I would go a little further: the code of practice needs to look at the whole process that precedes the public part of the inquest.
In recent months, in two separate cases, I have helped the parents and the widow of victims of medical accidents. They have had real difficulties in getting at the truth and securing pathologists’ reports and post-mortem reports from the coroner’s office. Swift availability of such reports and swift disclosure to bereaved parents and families are of great importance. If this amendment were to see the light of day—I understand that it is only probing—I would suggest that the code of practice should go wider than simply preserving the dignity of the bodies to ensuring that bereaved families are not further hurt by avoidable delay, making that history.
My Lords, the amendment on the way that bodies are dealt with following a disaster is incredibly important. I remind the House of the “Marchioness” disaster back in 1989; there was an absolute outcry from the relatives about the way that some of those bodies were dealt with. The problem is that their grief is complicated when they hit different barriers and when they feel that the investigation and the post-mortem have been conducted inappropriately, particularly if they feel that things are being withheld from them.
To ensure that we provide support for these relatives, we need to make sure that there is a proper code of conduct and to improve the way that things are dealt with. I therefore think that this is an important probing amendment. I am glad that it is probing, because there are lots of things that could be altered and improved, but this work needs to be done and I hope the Minister will provide us with that assurance.
(8 months, 4 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this group of probing amendments, which have the aim of ensuring decent and necessary payments to all those bereaved in this disastrous scandal, has given the Committee the chance to consider the appalling plight of the victims of the infected blood scandal.
We welcome Clause 40, in particular Clause 40(3)(a), which says that:
“In exercising its functions, the body must … have regard to the need of applicants for speed of provision, simplicity of process, accessibility, involvement, proactive support, fairness and efficiency”.
It is only to be hoped that the Government live up to the promise of that clause in future, because they have signally failed to do so in the past.
If this Bill has taught us anything, it is that all victims of crime, major incidents and appalling and deeply shocking medical errors such as this, as well as other administrative disasters such as the Post Office Horizon scandal, have so many needs that resemble each other. We need early admissions of responsibility and culpability. We need government and administrative bodies to face facts. We need to ensure that victims have early access to the services and support they need and that such services and support are in practice provided in full and in good time.
Of course, one of the tragic aspects of this scandal is that the need for speed is particularly severe. It is worth reminding ourselves that, since Sir Brian Langstaff’s interim report of April 2023, more than 70 victims have died. The noble Lord, Lord Bichard, gave evidence to that inquiry, as did the noble Lord, Lord Owen. Both spoke eloquently of its conduct, and it is worth remembering the conclusion of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, that the state let people down and should accept responsibility. He spoke of defending the indefensible, and the noble Lord, Lord Horam, echoed his words. Delaying compensation is denying responsibility. As all noble Lords who have spoken have said, there is no reason at all to wait any longer—certainly not until the Government have digested at length the contents of Sir Brian’s final report. Any such delay would be a travesty of Sir Brian’s principal call, which was for urgency.
Sir Robert Francis’s recommendations, in his report in June 2022, on the way that compensation should be handled, along with Sir Brian’s report, now need urgent implementation. It is to be hoped that the work of the expert panel—established under the chairmanship of Jonathan Montgomery, who is the chair of Oxford University Hospitals NHS Trust, which was not a mile away from involvement in the crisis—does not delay or water down the recommendations of the two reports. It is right to say that the campaigners are deeply concerned, as the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, stressed.
In opening the debate, my noble friend Lady Brinton and the noble Lord, Lord Owen, pointed out the strength and determination of this very long campaign. We mourn Lord Cormack, whose involvement in the campaign was also extensive and long lasting.
The noble Lord, Lord Owen, spoke of the difficulties facing doctors, and the lack of political will needed to ensure self-sufficiency in blood products in this country. We can only hope that the noble Lord’s optimism in expecting the Government now to react quickly and finally, following the report due in May from Sir Brian Langstaff, is justified. My noble friend Lady Featherstone and the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, added their accounts of personal tragedy, and thereby movingly added to the demand for urgency.
We know that the Horizon case led to definitive action only following ITV’s television drama. It should not be the same with the infected blood scandal, but we understand that ITV has commissioned Peter Moffat to write such a drama, so perhaps public opinion will come to the rescue once again. The burden of my speech, and the speeches of all noble Lords who have spoken today, is that this should not be necessary in a civilised and compassionate democracy.
My Lords, in arriving, as we now have, at Part 3 of the Bill, I should like to begin by thanking all noble Lords who have spoken so powerfully and movingly on a set of events which many regard as constituting the worst disaster in the history of the National Health Service. The story of those who received infected blood as part of their NHS care and treatment is one of unimaginable suffering and terrible tragedy over more than four decades. It is a story that is still not yet over. The victims’ suffering has been made even worse by an absence of full justice for those individuals and, alongside that, a failure to reach—as far as may be possible—a sense of closure.
The official public inquiry currently under way, under the chairmanship of Sir Brian Langstaff, is the start of delivering the justice that is needed. The inquiry has been informed by the expert work of Sir Robert Francis, and Sir Brian has so far published two interim reports on his findings, with his final report due on 20 May. Meanwhile, in the other place, Clause 40—as it is now—was added to the Bill to speed up the delivery process.
The Government accept the will of Parliament that arrangements should be put in place to ensure, as far as reasonably practicable, that the victims receive justice as quickly and efficiently as possible. Therefore, my desire—and, I trust, that of all noble Lords—is to see the Bill added to the statute book as soon as is reasonably practicable. The Government are well aware that every passing season sees more suffering, death and bereavement. We are therefore eager to avoid more needless delay.
Ministers have already taken action and given a number of undertakings. First, we have promised that within 25 sitting days of Sir Brian Langstaff’s final report being published, we will make a Statement to Parliament setting out the Government’s response. The period of 25 days is not a target but a deadline. We will issue our response as soon as we possibly can.
Secondly, in response to a recommendation from Sir Brian, we have made interim payments amounting to £440 million to infected individuals or bereaved partners registered with existing infected blood support schemes.
Thirdly, in readiness for Sir Brian’s final report, we have appointed Sir Jonathan Montgomery to chair an expert group whose remit is to advise the Government on some of the legal and technical aspects of delivering compensation. I realise that some have questioned Sir Jonathan’s appointment because of his former connection with Bayer. Noble Lords may wish to note that Sir Jonathan ceased to be a member of the Bayer bioethics council on 31 October 2023. The council was an independent advisory group which had no role in the day-to-day operations of the company. It has had no executive power in the operational business of Bayer.
I emphasise that nothing in the work of the expert group is intended to cut across the conclusions of the inquiry or the advice of Sir Robert Francis—quite the opposite, actually. The expert group is there to enable Ministers to understand certain technical issues and thus enable decisions to be taken more quickly.
On the amendment passed by the House of Commons, which we are now considering, noble Lords will understand that the provisions of any Bill need to be legally coherent and should not cut across the integrity of the statute book. There are two principal defects with Clause 40: first, its coverage does not extend to the whole of the United Kingdom. The Government are clear that infected blood is a UK-wide issue. For that very reason, the infected blood inquiry was set up on a UK-wide basis. In March 2021, we announced uplifts to achieve broad financial parity across the UK’s infected blood support schemes, increasing annual payments to beneficiaries across the country as a whole. Maintaining a commitment to parity across the UK is extremely important.
We also need to agree on a set of arrangements that are workable and, above all, work for victims. It is therefore essential for the UK Government to engage with all the devolved Administrations with those aims in view. That is what we are now doing. My right honourable friend the Minister for the Cabinet Office met counterparts from the Welsh Government, Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Executive earlier this month to discuss this matter; those discussions will continue.
The second principal defect of Clause 40 is that in proposing the establishment of an arm’s-length body, as Sir Brian recommended, it does not also propose any specific functions for that body. The Government’s intention, therefore, is to bring forward an amendment on Report which will correct these two deficiencies and add further standard provisions to ensure a more complete legal framework when setting up an ALB. I plan to engage with noble Lords in advance of Report to discuss the content of the government amendment once it has been drafted.
The Minister mentioned that there will be government amendments on Report to address the deficiencies in Clause 40 that he has identified. Does he envisage having the opportunity, between now and Report, to prepare amendments to address some of the other legal impediments—for example, to widening the cohorts—that he has identified? That could accelerate clarification and speed up the process.
I anticipate using every opportunity available to engage with noble Lords on not only what the amendments will comprise but what we intend to do thereafter. As the noble Lord will appreciate, there is a wealth of regulations in this space. I venture to say that quite a lot of the detail of the arrangements will be contained in regulations, which will be laid as soon as possible. To the extent that I can go into detail on what those regulations will contain, I shall be happy to do so, but I hope that the noble Lord will understand that I am not in a position to do so today.
My Lords, in the absence of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, who is abroad at the moment, I move this amendment and will speak to the others in this group, save for Amendments 146A, 174 and 175 which stand in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Clause 44 enables the Secretary of State to refer a decision of the Parole Board to release what is known as a top-tier prisoner for a judicial decision either to affirm or to quash a decision of the Parole Board. Top-tier prisoners are those who have committed the most serious offences. The Bill identifies the Upper Tribunal as the court to which referrals will be made, save in cases where there is sensitive material, in which case the court is the High Court.
The principal amendment in this group, which would amend Clause 44, is to propose that all referrals go to the High Court; in particular, a
“Divisional Court of the King’s Bench Division”.
The other amendments that we propose make necessary changes elsewhere. The reason for proposing these amendments is to ensure that the judicial decision is made by a court whose members are well equipped by experience to make the necessary assessment of risk.
The background is that the cases will necessarily involve serious offending and be referred by the Secretary of State because of at least an unease about the decision of the Parole Board. That Parole Board will be made up of individuals with considerable experience in evaluating risk in the context of criminal offending. Any review or reconsideration should be conducted by a court that comprises judges with similar such experience. None of the chambers of the Upper Tribunal currently has members with that necessary experience, but the High Court does.
A Divisional Court of the King’s Bench Division deals with criminal cases in the High Court. It is almost always composed of judges who sit in the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal; that is, a Lord or Lady Justice and a High Court judge. Those judges have extensive criminal experience; in particular, when dealing with sentencing, either at first instance as trial judges or on appeal. They are used to making decisions which require them to evaluate risk and, in particular, whether an offender is a dangerous offender, which leads to a suite of different sentencing options. In those circumstances, they are well suited to the task which the Bill will empower the Secretary of State to require a court to undertake.
The Bill itself envisages that the High Court will perform this role in some cases. This amendment suggests that it would be more effective, and deliver the outcome that the Bill seeks, were the High Court always to be the destination for these referrals. I beg to move.
My Lords, I agree with every word uttered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon. I am sure that the same words, or words to similar effect, would have fallen from the lips of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. They echo the sentiments of a number of those who have briefed noble Lords on these issues relating to the Parole Board.
I will be brief. There is one overriding principle, which is that the Parole Board should be, in effect, an independent, quasi-judicial body. A number of concerns have been expressed about the prospect of the Secretary of State having the power to refer decisions of the Parole Board to another body. One reason for the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, to which I will turn shortly, is that concern.
The idea that this jurisdiction to consider referrals by the Secretary of State should be a matter for the Upper Tribunal, which is not a body involved with the prison system at all—it has, as the noble and learned Lord pointed out, no relevant chamber—and is not concerned with the sentencing, treatment or release of offenders, is an odd one. That decision should plainly be, we would suggest, the decision of a court used to dealing with criminal justice and with the sentencing and imprisonment of offenders. Loosely stipulating that it should be the High Court, without the division named, or the Upper Tribunal is wrong.
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support both amendments. I shall refer to a different group; the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned several incidents that would cause the amendments to kick in. However, there is another category, and that is victims of state wrongdoing. For example, the “spy cops” scandal shows what goes wrong when a police unit goes rogue and the state compounds the abuse of power by doing all it can to minimise and cover up. Those cover-ups leave victims powerless and alone and are the reason we need this victims’ code to apply to them as well.
There are famous cases such as Hillsborough and the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes. There is also a long history of Met police officers—those of us who were on the London Assembly or the London police authorities saw this many times—being accused of crimes and allowed quietly to retire early.
There is the emerging scandal of sexual and domestic abuse being systematically ignored within the police service when the accusations are directed at police officers by women who are their partners or even fellow officers. We heard this week of examples in Devon, with officers accused but still promoted to units specialising in domestic violence. These are not one-offs or rotten apples; this is a systemic failure to protect women and ensure that they get justice. The victims’ code would help to redress that.
Many such victims have to crowdfund if they are to have any hope of engaging with the legal process to find justice. I have worked with many victims seeking justice through inquests and public inquiries, and it is a very disorienting process for them. I very much hope that these two amendments will encompass that group: those who are victims of state wrongdoing.
My Lords, these are probing amendments, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, explained, and they would substantially increase the range of the Bill in relation to major incidents. That is all to the good. Part 1 of the Bill, as we know, is concerned with victims of criminal conduct and, because of the provisions concerning the new code, is relatively comprehensive. However, Part 2, in connection with victims of major incidents, is not.
Part 2 as presently drafted is concerned entirely with advocates for victims of major incidents. The introduction of the scheme for the appointment of standing advocates and other advocates is a welcome reform, but there are many other areas where victims of major incidents need more support than they currently receive. My noble friend Lady Brinton gave a number of examples. We heard of a further example last Wednesday: the argument about permitting victims’ relatives to register the death of those victims. That is an important issue—one which has received far too little attention before—but is only one of a very large number of issues facing victims of incidents that the Bill simply does not cover.
There are issues concerning the operation and impact of the coronial system more generally, for example, or the availability, establishment, conduct and reporting of public inquiries, as well as representation at those inquiries. There is also the implementation of recommendations of inquiries and investigations, and the monitoring of that implementation; the provision of information to victims and their families; the provision of practical and financial support to victims after major incidents; comprehensive signposting, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Hamwee; and ensuring that at times of disaster there is a dedicated support system available to victims and their families.
Much of this has been called for by Victim Support and others over some years. The Government’s response has been helpful in providing for local resilience forums. These work well in some areas, but the evidence we have seen shows that they work far less well in others. Victim Support and other charities of course do a great deal to co-ordinate and supply support services, but they are charities and limited by funding restraints in what they can do.
Victim Support recommended in 2020 that local resilience forums should be under a duty to produce civil contingency plans to a minimum standard. I suggest that a new, separate code for victims of major incidents would be a sensible and practical way to achieve a number of worthwhile ends. Primarily, it would set out the services and responses that victims of major incidents would be entitled to expect from public authorities and others. Secondly, it would give victims comprehensive information on how to access the services they need. Thirdly, it would enable local resilience forums to understand what services they needed to provide and so ensure more comparability across the piece. Fourthly, it would establish a standard of good practice, to enable local resilience forums and all responders to know what is needed and expected. A feature of the code I would applaud is that it could be regularly updated to reflect best practice to ensure that unnecessary shortcomings in some areas could be addressed.
These are, as we have said, probing amendments and it is not for now to attempt to draft what should go into such a code. What is needed is a commitment to devote resources to drafting such a code, thinking carefully about it and to consulting on what is needed, with a view to such a code being ultimately incorporated in statute in the same way as we seek to incorporate the victims’ code in this Bill.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for Amendment 122. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to prepare and issue a new code of practice for victims of major incidents. I will focus my response on the content of Amendment 122, as Amendment 123 is consequential on the former. While I understand the intentions of the amendments, I do not believe they are necessary, because existing codes and related commitments are already in place to achieve their aims.
First, the purpose of establishing an independent public advocate is exactly as the noble Baroness has outlined. It is to ensure that victims understand the processes and actions of public authorities and how their views may be taken into account; to provide information concerning other sources of support and advice; and to communicate with public authorities on behalf of victims in relation to the incident, especially in situations where the victims have raised concerns. Through the advocate’s ability to act as a conduit between victims and the Government, victims will have the opportunity to make their views known and have their voices heard to effect change in real time.
Secondly, it is likely that in most circumstances in which a major incident is declared and an advocate is appointed the victims will have been a victim of a crime. In such instances, they are already covered under the victims’ code, which sets out the services and support that victims of crime can expect to receive from criminal justice agencies. An additional code for victims of a major incident may therefore be duplicative, and as such may be counterproductive.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Brinton, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, have argued powerfully that non-criminal major incidents may need to be addressed. Victims of non-criminal major incidents will have an advocate appointed to help them access support services, navigate the processes—
As I have already said, I believe that most victims will be victims of crime; most major incidents will involve criminal behaviour of some description, or a criminal investigation. We believe it is a subset, but nevertheless a very important subset, of victims who need to have their needs addressed. We completely agree with that.
The Minister has accepted that there is a subset and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has demonstrated, it is a very important subset of victims who are not victims of crime but of tragic accidents or incidents. I am not sure that his answers so far and his speech so far have taken in the real difference, which is that victims of crime are involved in process that leads to—and is at least partially resolved by—a criminal trial, where there is to be such a trial, or a criminal investigation where it does not lead to a trial.
The Minister has accepted that the existing victims’ code is directed to that set of circumstances. Victims of a tragedy that is a major incident which does not involve crime—or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, may or may not involve crime but does not lead to a criminal process—have a whole different set of needs that arise from tragedy rather than crime. I cannot understand from the Minister’s answers why a separate victims’ code is inappropriate in those circumstances. There may, of course, be areas of overlap but why is there no separate code to deal with this very real issue?
The additional point is that I would suggest—and the Minister has not suggested otherwise—that all of this cannot be addressed simply by the provision of an independent public advocate, however worthy that is, and it is.
While the Minister is still sitting down, I agree with everything that has just been said but also the victims I was talking about—the victims of state wrongdoing—have not been treated as victims of crime so they would come under the original code, except they have not had access to all the information, and so on. It is worth understanding that the current code is not enough. Plus, I am “Jones of Moulsecoomb”, not “Jones of Whitchurch”—no offence.
My Lords, I support the amendments that call for proper support for this new role. It should not need to be spelled out that the IPA will need a budget. I happen to think that he or she should have a budget and discretion as to how best to spend it. I am a little alarmed by Clause 31, which provides that the Secretary of State “may pay” reasonable costs and, quite separately, “may make provision” for secretarial or other support. Should the latter be distinguished from reasonable costs incurred in connection with the exercise of their functions? I think not.
I am particularly prompted to mention this because I learned the other day that the newly appointed—after a period of 22 months—independent anti-slavery commissioner is having her budget reduced on a yearly basis throughout the term of her appointment, by 5% a year over the three years. I know that the two jobs are different positions, but that indicates strongly—and it is very much accepted by people in the sector, including the new commissioner—that the Government are downgrading that role. Do the Government agree on the importance of creating champions, if I may call them that, just to give them a collective noun? They have to make the job possible.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Wills, has explained, of the amendments in this group, Amendments 123A to 123D, 124B, 126A and 126B would perform a number of functions. They would inject urgency into the appointment of the standing advocate; they would give a Select Committee of the House of Commons a prominent role in the selection and appointment of the standing advocate; they would clarify the standing advocate’s role if other advocates were appointed as well; and they would provide that the appointment of additional advocates was to cover for unavailability or to provide additional assistance to the standing advocate. All those amendments would strengthen the statutory requirements and give the standing advocate role more significance and the standing advocate more personal responsibility for the performance of that role.
On Amendment 124A, I fully agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wills, on the need for urgency in establishing inquiries, and agree with all the observations he—and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson—made about the delays inherent in the present system. The difficulty I see with the amendment as drafted—I would appreciate some clarity on this from the Minister—is the following:
“The standing advocate may request from the Secretary of State all the relevant powers to establish a fact-finding inquiry, including those to see and report on all relevant documentation.”
That would give the standing advocate the power to establish a fact-finding inquiry. My concern is that I am not convinced that establishing a fact-finding inquiry is the role of the standing advocate as envisaged by the Bill. I invite the Minister to explain how he sees the role of the advocate in inquiries and to consider, certainly between now and Report, how the role of arbiter or inquiry establisher is compatible with the role of representing and supporting victims. Is there another route—the noble Lord, Lord Wills, might also be keen to be involved in this discussion—to establishing an independent, quicker, more effective way of producing inquiries that does not involve the standing advocate, but that also does not involve the length and delay of a full-blown public inquiry in every case?
I also invite clarity from the Minister on how he sees the standing advocate’s role of providing support at inquiries. That is plainly envisaged by Clause 33, but Clause 33(5) permits advocates to support victims’ representatives; it does not deal with acting as victims’ representatives. Clause 33(7) would prevent a person representing victims if the person concerned was under 18—that is perhaps uncontroversial—or if, in so doing, they would be carrying out a legal activity. A legal activity is as defined in Section 12(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007.
It is unclear that representing a victim at an inquiry is a legal activity. Paraphrasing, or at least truncating, the meaning of Section 12(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007, a legal activity is exercising the right of audience, which is not a phrase normally used in representation at an inquiry; the conduct of litigation, which plainly an inquiry is not; offering advice, assistance or representation in connection with the application of the law; or legal dispute resolution. I do not regard any of those activities as equivalent to representing a victim or more than one victim at a public inquiry. I would be interested to know, therefore, how the Government see that role.
I turn now to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson, about the right to see all relevant documents. It seems to me that, whatever the role of the standing advocate, the right to see all relevant documents is central, as is the right to insist on calling for particular witnesses to be cross-examined.
It follows that, with the amendments as phrased, there is a right to make a request to the Secretary of State and the right to a reasoned and timely response to that request, when it concerns seeing documents and calling witnesses. This is a modest, probably overmodest, approach. It seems to me that the standing advocate ought to have an absolutely clear right to call witnesses or to have them called by the inquiry if it is independent, as I suggest it probably should be, so that they can be cross-examined by or on behalf of all parties.
Amendment 133ZA would require a review of the operation of the standing advocate scheme and the appointment of additional advocates six months after passing the Act. I quite agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson, that such a review is important because this is a complex and new mechanism. I suggest that six months after passing the Act may be too soon, because it is unclear how many major incidents would be declared in the first six months, and it is certainly unclear how long it would take to see how the system was working in practice. I think we would be looking at a period of at least two years or thereabouts before we have an effective review. However, I agree that a review of what is, in essence, a new system should be incorporated into the statutory scheme.
Finally, Amendment 128A, to which I have added my name, is the amendment on which my noble friend Lady Hamwee spoke. It seeks proper secretarial support and other resourcing for the standing advocate. The first point is that appropriate support is essential to enable the advocate’s role to be performed effectively. An advocate without a proper budget quite simply cannot do the job, but there is a further, very important point about independence. It is crucial that this advocate scheme acts independently. Without statutorily guaranteed resourcing, an appointed advocate would be dependent on the Secretary of State for the resources needed to carry out the job which they are charged to perform. That is entirely unsuitable.
There are amendments about the termination of advocates’ appointments, and the spirit of independence being threatened by the present drafting of the Bill, which we will come to in a later group, whereby the Secretary of State can remove an advocate for reasons that seem appropriate to him or her. We are all for the independence of advocates, but their role needs clarification and a review would be helpful.
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on pursuing this matter over many years. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Sanderson, has been at his side for most, if not all, of those years. My noble friend introduced this group comprehensively, so I will not go through the amendments in detail.
In essence, the first part of this group of amendments injects a greater urgency into the whole process, specifies roles and contexts of roles, and strengthens and increases the significance of those roles. As was self-evident, my noble friend is frustrated by the failure to actually implement this new role.
My noble friend went on to speak at some length about Amendment 124A, which would give the standing advocate powers to establish a fact-finding hearing. In talking about the necessity of that, he said that this was one of the most important amendments in the group. The figures he gave for the costs and delays in the various inquiries that we have had over the last couple of decades were very stark. I was not aware of the contrast between the way that the Hillsborough inquiry was conducted and the others that he mentioned.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Wills, so ably explained, this group of amendments covers a number of issues: the appointment of the standing advocate, the function of the standing advocate, the appointment of additional advocates, and a review of the scheme’s effectiveness.
I will deal first with the noble Lord’s Amendment 123A, which would set a duty on the Secretary of State to appoint a standing advocate within one month of Royal Assent. The Government entirely share the noble Lord’s desire for the standing advocate to be in place as soon as possible once the Bill becomes law. However, we have a few concerns about the proposed amendment.
First, Part 2 of the Bill will be commenced by regulations made by the Secretary of State. That is the appropriate commencement mechanism for this type of provision. Secondly, it has always been our intention to run a fair and open competition for the office. Obviously, there is due process involved in that, which necessarily occupies a certain amount of time. Thirdly, as I hope the noble Lord will appreciate, the Government will want to carry out all relevant due diligence prior to making the appointment, and this process will also take a little time.
If the Government were to proceed as the noble Lord suggested, it would necessitate a direct appointment by Ministers. Of course, that is theoretically possible, but such appointments are normally used to address a short-term need and are typically for posts that last 12 to 18 months or something of that sort. This point also relates to the noble Lord’s other amendments on the appointment process, which would require the Secretary of State to obtain the approval of a relevant Select Committee and to hold a Motion for resolution before making the appointment, or to give an Oral Statement if it is refused.
It may help if I outline the Government’s current intentions for the recruitment process. Given the nature of the role and the tireless efforts and campaigning of so many people—not least the noble Lord, but also other parliamentarians, Bishop James Jones and, in particular, the Hillsborough victims and their families—for the establishment of the IPA, it is of the utmost importance that we get this right. On that basis, the Government intend to recruit the standing advocate through the public appointments process.
To remind noble Lords, theprocess is operated under the Governance Code on Public Appointments and is regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The scheme will ensure that the competition for the role is fair, open and transparent. It will provide the opportunity for anyone with the appropriate skills and experience to apply and help to ensure that we will have as a diverse a range of candidates as possible to choose from.
I would also like to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Wills, that the public appointments process already provides the opportunity for the appropriate Select Committee to interview a proposed candidate. If it would be helpful, I am open to discussing this point further with the noble Lord. Indeed, it is within the discretion of Select Committees to encourage potential candidates to apply. They can also hold a statutory officeholder to account once in post, as the noble Lord well knows. Additionally, we have also taken the step of ensuring, within this legislation, that the IPA will be subject to the scrutiny of the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, which adds a further layer of accountability. Taken together with the pre-appointment scrutiny that the public appointments process already affords Select Committees, it is the Government’s belief that no changes to the process are required at this time.
I now turn to Amendments 123D and 124B. These add a specific mention so that the clauses apply only when additional advocates are appointed. I do not think these amendments are necessary; the legislation as drafted already covers the point the noble Lord is trying to make. Ultimately, the clauses in question are intended to allow the standing advocate to provide a leadership function to any additional advocates appointed alongside them. Where no additional advocates are appointed, the leadership function would not be needed or executed. These amendments are therefore not necessary.
Amendment 124A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wills, seeks to grant the standing advocate the right to request all the relevant powers to establish an inquiry; to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to answer any requests from the standing advocate within two weeks; to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to make an Oral Statement to the other place should they refuse any request; and to impose a duty on the Secretary of State to demonstrate that they have had regard to various factors while considering the public interest. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, asked me to clarify the Government’s policy intention in this area. The Government have always been clear that the purpose of the IPA scheme is to support victims of major incidents, rather than undertaking their own independent investigations. Our position remains unchanged. This amendment would run counter to the policy intention.
The noble Lord, Lord Wills, quoted the words of my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy in explaining the rationale for the Government’s approach. Briefly, the Government are of this view because they believe that giving the IPA investigatory powers could conflict with the work of other investigative authorities and risks duplicating or undermining them. I acknowledge all that the noble Lord said about the intended effect of his amendment. I am sure that he will know that, in recognition of the desire here and in the other place to see the IPA having a greater role in reviews, the Government announced additional functions for the standing advocate. The standing advocate’s functions, as set out in Clause 29, give it the ability to advise the Government on the most appropriate form of review mechanism in relation to a major incident and what the scope of that review should be. It will also have a vital role in relaying the views of victims in relation to this decision. The Government believe that this is the most appropriate form of involvement for an advocate to add value, without duplicating or undermining other processes.
While I obviously regret that the noble Lord and the Government are not at one on this issue, I hope he will welcome the shift that the Government have made. I did not close my ears to what he said; I also listened carefully to my noble friend Lady Sanderson. I would of course be happy to discuss this further with him and my noble friend in the coming weeks, as I know would my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy. For now, I hope that the noble Lord will not feel the need to move the amendment.
My noble friend Lady Sanderson asked me what engagement has taken place with victims in shaping the role of the advocate. I can tell her that, since March, we have written to victims and given them an inbox, and we are happy to keep those conversations going while operationalisation continues. We have also met the representatives of the Grenfell and Hillsborough families. Further to that, we wrote to the victims of Hillsborough, Grenfell and Manchester at each stage of the Bill where amendments were being made, and very much welcomed their engagement.
On the question of whether, if Horizon occurred today, the victims could write to the IPA and ask it to look into the matter, the advocate would be able to ask questions of public authorities, such as the Post Office, and could advise the Government if it became aware of a developing situation. However, it could not currently represent Horizon victims, because this would be retrospective. If an IPA had been in place at the time that that scandal emerged, then they could have spoken to it.
On the question of whether the advocate could support victims at inquiries, at statutory inquiries the chair is able to make provision for legal representation for core participants. The advocate would not represent victims in a legal capacity at either inquests or inquiries.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about—
I am sorry to intervene on the noble Earl. I may be an amendment or two later than the point in the speech which I address, but is he sure that Horizon would count as a major incident, bearing in mind the definition of major incident in Clause 28(2), where a major incident
“means an incident that … occurs in England or Wales after this section comes into force, … causes the death of, or serious harm to, a significant number of individuals, and … is declared … by the Secretary of State to be a major incident for the purposes of this Part”?
I can see that Horizon caused serious financial harm, but is that the harm envisaged? I am not sure that it is. Would the Secretary of State be entitled to declare a major incident in the Horizon circumstances?
I think we have already debated the latitude that the Secretary of State enjoys in interpreting the word “significant” when we debated the previous group of amendments. The noble Lord has asked a very fair question; I perhaps should not have rushed into an answer to the question I was given on Horizon in particular. It might be wise if, rather than go further at the Dispatch Box, I wrote to the noble Lord about the Horizon case specifically.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked about the IPA’s secretarial and admin support; that was also touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. We will be coming to that in the fourth group of amendments, so if they will allow, we can defer the point to that debate, which my noble friend Lord Roborough will be responding to.
My Lords, I rise briefly—the Minister will be relieved to hear—to support these amendments. What is important about them is that they would put on a statutory basis that the views of the victims will be communicated to the Secretary of State. As I have already said at some length, we need to do more and give more teeth to the powers of the independent public advocate, but this is a good step forward. I hope that the Government can accept these amendments, which really are not contentious.
My Lords, this group concerns the obtaining of the views of victims by the standing advocate and their being taken into account, or relayed to the Secretary of State so that they can be taken into account. The central point was that made by the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove. If victims of major incidents are to be given a voice and that voice is to be heard, they need, under this scheme, the standing advocate to be that voice—a voice that co-ordinates and articulates the victims’ response. It will often be a joint or combined voice and the stronger for that.
Under Amendment 124, the type of review or inquiry held would be the subject of the views that must be obtained and relayed. It is a matter on which the views of victims are strongly held. They are often views that are in conflict with the views of the Government. That is a central point about independence.
The next point under this amendment is their views on
“their treatment by public authorities in response to the major incident”.
Again, this is an area of not invariable but regular conflict between victims and government. The questions that arise are, “Was enough done to avoid the incident?”, “Was what was done done in time?”, and “Were sufficient resources devoted to relief and recovery after the incident?”. All those are crucial issues on which the voice of victims needs to be independently heard and taken into account.
Amendment 125 concerns the appointment of additional advocates and says the Secretary of State must seek victims’ views on whether to appoint additional advocates and whom to appoint. Again, that is a requirement that is plainly right, because the identity of the advocate and the appointment of additional advocates matter to victims, who are extremely concerned to know that the investigation and any inquiries are going to be properly carried out.
Finally, the views of the victims to be taken into account include the views that they express before the termination of an appointment of an advocate. Again, that is self-evidently right. We have in a later group an amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, removing the right of the Secretary of State to remove the standing advocate on such grounds as he thinks appropriate. I put my name to that. That is an important amendment that we will address when it comes, but it goes hand in hand with this amendment because the purpose of both reflects the reality that inquiries into major incidents may cast light on failings of government or organs of government that may cause the Government embarrassment.
One of the chief virtues of the independent public advocate system proposed in this Bill is precisely its independence of government. It is therefore essential that an advocate appointed to represent victims’ interests should be clear and free to carry out those functions fearlessly. If that involves criticism of government or individual Ministers, those criticisms should be made and investigated. The views of victims on the termination of an advocate’s appointment will therefore be central to that process. They should be central to any consideration of the termination of an advocate’s employment. That should not be left to the Secretary of State without regard to the views of victims.
My Lords, I express my thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for these amendments, which bring us to an important dimension of any major disaster or incident: the need to give families a voice in decisions about the support they receive. I have a great deal of sympathy with the aims of these amendments. I will take them in turn.
Amendment 124 would require the standing advocate to obtain the views of victims of major incidents regarding any review or inquiry held into the incident and their treatment by public authorities, and then communicate those views to the Secretary of State. Let me say immediately that there is no disagreement here between the noble Baroness and the Government as regards the desired outcome. We agree that an important function of the standing advocate will be to champion victims’ voices to the Government and facilitate better engagement between them and government in the aftermath of a major incident. We agree that part of this involves the standing advocate understanding the views of victims and relaying them to the Secretary of State.
It is the Government’s intention that through Clause 29(2)(a) the advocate will communicate the views of victims of a major incident to the Secretary of State. This could include their views regarding any government-initiated review or inquiry into the major incident and their treatment by public authorities. This will provide victims with agency in the process, which is vital. It is therefore a matter of the best way to deliver this policy. The Government’s position is that it is best achieved without the Bill being overly prescriptive, and with Clause 29(2)(a) providing the foundation. A particular advantage of this approach is that the standing advocate would be able to advise on the full range of review mechanisms, including non-statutory inquiries—as I said a while ago to the noble Lord, Lord Wills—which by their nature cannot be specified in legislation. These are valuable options and can be very successful. The Hillsborough Independent Panel has already been mentioned as a good example.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 125 would require the Secretary of State to consider the views of victims before making the appointment of additional advocates. The intention behind the appointment of additional advocates has always been to prevent a single advocate being overwhelmed, or to ensure where necessary the specialist knowledge needed to provide swift and tailored support to victims. One of the key functions of the standing advocate, as outlined in Clause 29, will be to advise the Secretary of State as to the interests of victims, and the Government would consider this to include advice on whether additional advocates are needed and who may be suitable to appoint. This advice could include the views of victims which they had gathered.
Furthermore, as the Secretary of State has already committed, we will publish a policy statement that will give additional detail about the factors the Secretary of State will consider when appointing additional advocates, including the needs of victims. We believe this to be a better and more flexible approach to ensure that additional advocates can be deployed swiftly when needed. I am concerned that if we were to proceed as the noble Lord suggests with this amendment, a consultation process with the victims would be required prior to any further advocates being appointed. A consultation has the potential to unduly delay the appointment of further advocates and reduce the agility of this scheme to react to the developing situation. Furthermore, the last thing that we would wish to impose on victims during their grief is an additional bureaucratic consultation process.
I come lastly to the noble Lord’s similar Amendment 128, which says that the Secretary of State must consider the views of victims before an advocate’s appointment is terminated. There are a few scenarios in which we imagine that the Secretary of State will use his or her discretion to determine the appointment of an advocate using this power. I will speak to this in more detail in response to the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in a later grouping. However, I believe it would be helpful to briefly summarise those scenarios.
First, should additional advocates be appointed, it is right that the Secretary of State has the ability to scale down the number of advocates should the need no longer exist when the peak of activity is over. Secondly, the Government have always been clear that we will prioritise rapid appointment of an advocate following a major incident to ensure that victims are supported from an early stage. However, it may be necessary, following a greater understanding of the developing needs of the victims, or conversely the capacity of an advocate, to substitute one advocate for another. Thirdly, this power may be used to replace an advocate who does not command the confidence of the victims. I hope that those explanations are helpful to reassure the noble Baroness as to the intent behind this provision.
Lastly, as with the noble Baroness’s Amendment 125, I am concerned that, should the Secretary of State be required to carry out a consultation process with the victims, that would severely cut across the ability of the scheme to be flexible and adapt quickly to changing demands.
I believe that victim agency—if I may use that word again—is important, and that has come through strongly during the passage of the Bill, not least in another place. While the amendments serve as a reminder of that principle, I do not believe they are necessary.
I support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. There can be no disputing that independence is key, and it would be very sensible if the Bill was slightly amended to refer to the independent standing advocate, or something of that kind. Independence not being in dispute, the issue is how to safeguard it. Normally, independence is achieved by three things: the first is a process of appointment, which we have already discussed; the second is the provision of resources—again, that has been raised but I am not sure whether it has been entirely dealt with; the third, and most critical, is removal. It seems to me that that is what this amendment is concerned with.
There are two ways of removing to ensure independence: one is to specify the grounds in the Bill, while the other is to derive an independent process. One or the other will work. There are all kinds of processes, such as an independent parliamentary process or an independent tribunal. But bearing in mind the uniqueness of this post, it may be best to look at specifying in the Bill the grounds for removal. That is a matter for discussion and debate.
I do not wish to add anything about Amendment 129, save to support it, but I would add one observation on Amendment 132. It is critical to show that everything is open, and that if the standing advocate is to issue guidance, such guidance is made public. We do not want, in this area, questions relating to what is going on without the victims having full confidence.
My Lords, I shall be relatively brief on this short group of amendments. I stated my support for the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in advance, in principle, during debate on the third group. I apologise for mentioning his amendment before he had had an opportunity to speak to it. However, his reasoning was a development of the reasoning that I then expressed. I reiterate his point: for an independent advocate system to work, the advocate must be independent. I take the point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that if “independent” has only appeared, or might only appear, by virtue of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that is wrong. We have all called it independent because the independent public advocacy scheme is a term that has been frequently used. The word “independent” ought to appear in the Bill specifically, and the independent standing advocate could be called exactly that to make the point clear.
That means that such an advocate must be able to advance the victims’ interests without a concern that they are liable to be removed by the Secretary of State without very good reason. For such reasons
“as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”,
which is the wording used in the Bill, is just not good enough. Nothing less than the formulation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, of them being
“unfit or unable to fulfil their functions”
will do as a justification for removal.
I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. This could also be achieved by a process for termination, not simply by the grounds for termination. Those are not necessarily alternatives; we could have both approaches. I suggest that the Government ought to consider whether the process should not be strengthened. To make the point I have made before, the Bill is shot through with the difficulty that the interests of the victims may conflict with the interests of the Secretary of State. That important conflict of interest can be resolved only by removing power from the Secretary of State.
I turn to Amendment 129 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, which proposes that office facilities may be afforded by the Ministry of Justice, provided that they do not compromise the functional independence of the standing advocate. That is another point on independence. It is plainly administratively convenient and may be necessary that the Ministry of Justice provides the office facilities, but that does not mean that the bodies are not completely separate, and they must be.
Amendment 128A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wills, to which I have added my name, was moved into the second group, but Amendment 129 remained in this group although they are on similar subjects. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, said that the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, would answer on Amendment 128A. The point I made was that proper secretarial support and resources are crucial for the standing advocate if the system is to work. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, made the point about resourcing in general terms but made it very powerfully. Appropriate support is essential for the role to be properly done, as are statutory guarantees of adequate resourcing.
Amendment 132 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, deals with guidance to other appointed advocates on what matters they should consider in relation to a major incident. It is not right that such guidance should come from the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may have interests in diverting attention to some aspects of a major incident against the interests of considering others. Guidance should come from the standing advocate who has, as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, put it earlier, a leadership role. That is the proper source of such guidance and not the Secretary of State, who has a political interest that may be opposed to the interests of the victims. I suggest that the Bill’s formulation on this is simply quite wrong in principle.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his amendment. This group of amendments concerns the independence of the advocate, and therefore I will discuss them together.
First, the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seeks to limit the discretion of the Secretary of State as to the grounds on which an advocate’s appointment in respect of a major incident may be terminated. I believe it will be helpful if I explain the rationale behind the current provisions in the Bill. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be reassured that this power will be used carefully.
There are a number of scenarios in which we envisage the Secretary of State exercising their discretion to terminate the appointment of an advocate. First, for the scheme to be as agile as possible, it is important that we can adapt the resource required to support victims. No major incident is the same, and the processes that follow can often take years to conclude. During this time, there will likely be peaks of activity when it may be prudent to increase the number of advocates actively supporting victims. Following these peaks, it is only right that the Secretary of State has the ability to scale back the scheme to be proportionate. This power enables the Secretary of State to do that effectively.
Secondly, we have always stressed the importance of being able to deploy an advocate as quickly as possible following a major incident. It may be appropriate, following a greater understanding of the developing needs of the victims, to substitute one advocate for another who may be better suited by virtue of their skills or expertise. The Government believe that having this flexibility is important. This amendment would diminish the Secretary of State’s ability to ensure that victims have the best possible representation.
Thirdly, as we have heard throughout the various debates on this part of the Bill, it has been highlighted that victims must have confidence in the advocates for them to be effective. The Government therefore anticipate another use for this power: to remove advocates who may not command the confidence of victims, as touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in the debate on the previous group, or stand down any advocates towards the end of official processes because victims no longer want or need support from the advocate.
To go a little further, the reasons why the Secretary of State may terminate an advocate’s appointment could also include a lack of capacity, misbehaviour or a failure to exercise their functions in accordance with their terms of appointment. These terms of appointment, including the potential grounds for termination, will be published. The views and needs of victims are incredibly important. A strong emphasis will be placed on the support needs of the victims, and decisions on the termination of an advocate will always be made with these in mind. Therefore, while I understand and recognise the intent of the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, the Government believe it is necessary for the Secretary of State to have a wider discretion in this area.
I completely agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that independence is critical. We believe that the Bill protects that. However, there was a constructive suggestion from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, that “independent” be added to the definition of the advocate in the Bill. I will take that away to the department.
The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wills, would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to provide the advocate with
“secretarial and all other support necessary for them to exercise their functions effectively”.
While he is not in his place, I would like to answer the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on this point. The advocates will be supported by a permanent secretariat, and the Ministry of Justice has already allocated funding for this. Clause 31 provides for an effective system of support for the independent public advocate by making provisions for a secretariat and remuneration. Work is already under way to provide the advocates with this secretariat and to ensure appropriate separation between them and the Ministry of Justice.
I will take the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in turn. The first seeks to make it clear in the Bill that advocates will sit within the Ministry of Justice for administrative purposes but be operationally independent. While I support the intention and spirit behind this amendment, the Government do not believe that this is necessary as this is already our intention for how this new statutory office will operate. Furthermore, the wording of this amendment may not best achieve its goal. It is generally not helpful to refer to government departments by name in legislation, due to any potential machinery of government changes.
The Government are committed to the operational independence of the standing advocate and any advocates appointed in respect of a major incident. The Government took steps to bolster the advocate’s independence earlier in this Bill’s passage by empowering them to report independently and at their own discretion. The legislation is also clear that the advocates will make decisions and utilise their experience to provide support to victims of a major incident in a manner they deem appropriate.
The other amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks to transfer the power to issue guidance to advocates appointed in respect of a major incident from the Secretary of State to the standing advocate. I reiterate the Government’s commitment to the operational independence of the standing advocate and any advocates appointed in respect of a major incident. They will be empowered to take decisions and utilise their experience in a manner that the advocates deem appropriate. However, given the nature of major incidents and the unpredictability of the future, we believe that the Secretary of State’s ability to issue guidance is crucial to future-proof the scheme. The Government are mindful that guidance issued by the Secretary of State should not have any effect on the independence of advocates, which is why Clause 38 specifically prevents this guidance being directed at any specific advocate or incident.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will make a very brief point, following on from that made by my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.
There is a group of victims who are particularly vulnerable: those with impairments in mental capacity, who may have difficulty in expressing and explaining what has happened to them and are vulnerable to misinterpretation of anything they say—they are in particular need of advocates who understand their needs.
Many years ago, I was asked by Gwent Police to assist them in a prosecution in relation to people with profound mental incapacity who had been abused and raped. It was very difficult to pull the evidence together, and it was a very steep learning curve to see how difficult it is to let the veracity of what they were trying to tell one be heard and come through. I hope the Government will recognise that there is a group in the population who are particularly vulnerable to exploitation and to sexual abuse by the very nature of having learning difficulties and impairments, and of course that also includes young people with autism—we know how vulnerable they are to influence, and to coercion into a situation that they believe.
My Lords, in this group, I will speak only to Amendments 78 and 79, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Hamwee. They call for free independent legal advocates and free independent legal advice for victims of rape, and I support the principle behind them. I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that they do not necessarily talk about advocacy in court, although Amendment 78 does talk about free independent legal advocates.
The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, said that the amendments will not affect our adversarial system; nor will they affect it adversely. However, I hope that they will, if adopted, have an effect by ensuring that the interests and voices of victims are considered and heard throughout the criminal justice system, and—certainly for the purposes of these amendments—more comprehensively in rape cases, and that will be wholly beneficial.
These amendments lie at the heart of what this Bill is all about, which is to bring about a transformation in the way we look after the victims of crime. We have moved, but far too slowly. When I practised in the criminal courts a long time ago now—and this is not intended to be an exercise in reminiscence—as both prosecutor and defender, we were almost encouraged to take pride in the structure of criminal cases as a contest between the state—the Crown—represented by the prosecution’s lawyers, and the defendant, represented by independent barristers and solicitors, generally paid for by the state. The adversarial system was all. The victim, usually called the complainant—or in financial cases, the loser—was universally treated as no more than a witness, liable to be harshly cross-examined almost without restriction, and deserving of no extra consideration on account of the ordeal suffered as a result of the crime.
I have heard the strength of feeling on this, and I will be more than happy to take the issues raised back to my colleagues and officials in the department. I will be happy to write to noble Lords about this, and I would also be happy to arrange for my noble friend and interested Peers to meet me, or my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy, to discuss the issues that have arisen.
I turn to Amendment 103, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hampton. We recognise the importance of ensuring that the distinct needs and experiences of children are reflected in the code of practice that the noble Lord mentions, and that is why we have included specific guidance in the draft code for handling victim information requests for children. I agree with the noble Lord that it is essential to make sure that the final code reflects best practice in this area, and that is why my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy has instructed officials to review the list of statutory consultees for this code of practice.
I turn next to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, which seek to require the development of proposals for schemes to give victims of rape access to free independent legal advice and representation. I agree that it is extremely important that victims are confident in their rights and are aware of those rights, particularly when preparing for trial and when requests for their personal information are made; I found much that I could agree with much of the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
We wanted to ensure that our understanding of this issue is as comprehensive as possible and, to that end, the Government asked the Law Commission to consider the merits of independent legal advice for victims as part of its comprehensive review into the use of evidence in sexual offence prosecutions. The consultation closed in September last year, and we expect the final report to be delivered in the autumn of this year. To avoid making changes at this stage that could pre-empt the outcome of the Law Commission’s review, and to ensure that we are considering all the evidence as a whole, we will consider the Law Commission’s report and respond in due course. There is no reason why the tenor of this debate should not form part of the Government’s deliberations once we have the Law Commission’s report in our hands.
Perhaps I could add something around the therapeutic support issue. Victims of rape should not be told that they cannot access the therapeutic support that they need to heal from the trauma that they have endured. The Crown Prosecution Service pre-trial therapy guidance is absolutely clear that therapy should not be delayed for any reason connected with a criminal investigation or prosecution. The guidance sets out clearly that it is for the victim to make decisions about therapy with their therapist and that criminal justice practitioners should play no role in the decision-making process.
In the rape review action plan, we recognised that victims of rape frequently experience intrusive requests for personal information. To improve that situation, we have taken a number of actions, including legislating through the Bill to introduce a statutory code for the police to ensure that requests for victim information are made only when necessary, proportionate and relevant to a reasonable line of inquiry. The police must also provide full information to the victim on what information has been requested, why it has been requested and how it will be used. A draft code of practice has been published. When it is finalised, it will be statutory, and police will have a duty to have regard to the code when making requests. I hope that that is helpful.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for giving way. I ask whether the code will, in fact, introduce what the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, called a privilege against requests made for records of therapeutic interventions. That is one of the problems: therapy is deterred by the fear of a future request for notes to be disclosed. That is a very serious issue.
I recognise the seriousness of the issue. I have no advice in my brief on that, but I will be happy to write to the noble Lord on that point.
My Lords, as we have heard, Amendment 82, the first in this group, is designed to prevent a parental alienation argument, usually relating to contact but sometimes to residence as well, being used by perpetrators of domestic violence or child sexual abuse to harass their victims through repeated applications to the family court.
The Government need no reminding of the background, because it was the Government who commissioned the panel on the risk of harm in 2020, to which my noble friend Lady Brinton referred. That was responsible for a significant change of thinking in this area. The assumption that ensuring that children should always continue contact with both parents unless the circumstances were exceptional had dominated courts’ thinking for many years and was given some statutory force, though not in absolute terms, by Section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989. However, the panel found that there was a pervasive culture of disbelieving victims of domestic abuse, compounded by a pattern of abusive ex-partners abusing the courts’ processes by applications to the court, and effectively of the courts ordering contact, in particular in favour of abusive parents, against the wishes of the victim—the other parent.
Allegations of parental alienation—I accept that the term became something of a term of art, perhaps unjustifiably—are frequently made by abusive parents, and they still are, generally seeking contact but also residence. My noble friend Lady Brinton has given a detailed account of why the parental alienation issue has represented a significant failure of the family courts in recent years. The process involves the abusive parent claiming that the resident parent is opposing contact in an effort to alienate the child from the non-resident parent; essentially, it is the bad-mouthing allegation taken to extremes, in a way that is wholly unjustifiable. I will not repeat the persuasive account of the issue that my noble friend Lady Brinton has given. However, in these cases with which we are concerned, the victim’s allegations are generally true. We need to remember that the children may be put at risk by unwanted contact with their parent’s abuser.
Summarising the position in 2020, the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, wrote in the ministerial foreword to the panel’s report:
“The Panel found that too often, adversarial court proceedings retraumatised victims. Allegations of domestic abuse were too readily disbelieved or dismissed, alongside poor risk assessments and siloed working. The report also identified a view amongst many respondents that courts often placed an undue emphasis on ensuring children had contact with both parents”.
In its recommendations, the panel recommended a series of principles, which included:
“The court and those working within the system will be alert to those seeking to use … processes in an abusive or controlling way. Such behaviour will be actively identified and stopped”.
However, the issue persists.
Amendment 82 is directed at preventing victims being treated as responsible for parental alienation if they oppose applications made by perpetrators of violence against them to the courts. The amendment, as framed, would prevent a victim of domestic violence being considered as responsible for parental alienation.
The Committee may accept that the amendment as it stands is too absolute. As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, pointed out, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, the amendment as drawn purports to prevent a court reaching a conclusion of fact, which it ought to be entitled to reach in a case where the evidence supports that finding. Nevertheless, I suggest that, in the view of the evidence that the panel and many other experts have considered, the direction of travel of the amendment is right. The interventions of my noble friend Lady Brinton and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in response to the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, made it clear what the point and intention of this amendment are. If it needs redrafting, that could be dealt with between now and Report. The aim is to prevent perpetrators of domestic abuse continuing that abuse by transferring it to the court, abusing the court process with unwarranted accusations against their victims of turning the abusive parent against the victim.
Amendment 111 would reflect in the Bill a principle implicit in the findings of the panel: that in domestic abuse cases the court should disapply the Section 1(2A) presumption that parental involvement of both parents is generally in the interests of a child or furthers a child’s welfare. Furthermore, by the amendment, unsupervised contact should not be ordered in a case where the parent concerned is a defendant or a potential defendant in a case of domestic abuse, child abuse or a sexual offence. The level of supervision specified involves the presence of an approved third party at all times during contact, to ensure the physical safety and emotional well-being of the child, but the court would be left to determine the precise nature and location of the supervised contact permitted. I suggest that that represents a relatively minimal level of safeguarding. I accept entirely the caution expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, as to the difficulty sometimes of arranging supervised contact. However, that difficulty needs to be weighed against the danger of exposing children to unnecessary risk, and I suggest that the amendment provides a reasonable balance.
Amendment 110 would ensure that anyone carrying out psychological assessment of a person as a victim for family proceedings would be suitably qualified by being regulated by the Health and Care Professions Council. I accept again the point that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, made, that often the perpetrator needs psychological assessment as well. Whether the qualification for making psychological assessments should be as is suggested—that is, regulation by the Health and Care Professions Council—is a matter for discussion. However, suitable qualification is always important.
Amendment 117 would protect victims from orders to disclose medical records to proven or alleged perpetrators of domestic abuse against them, unless the circumstances were exceptional. We have been through much of the detail of that and the principles behind it in relation to group one, and I suggest that the amendment is important in just the same way as the amendment in group one.
(9 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the probing amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, which is an opportunity for the Government to look at court order compensation.
The compensation for victims when they leave a court is not the amount they receive and it takes many years. I will not repeat what the noble Baroness has said—it is on my sheet as well—but, for the victims I meet, compensation causes further problems and trauma. It gets worse if victims apply for criminal injuries compensation, because the court order compensation is deducted from any award that is made. This is fine where the court order compensation is paid, but, if not, the victim is left worse off as a result. I agree that we should look at how the Netherlands pays up front.
I know that there is no money tree but, to make it smooth for victims, instead of being for the offender to hide once again and use as a tool in financial cases for coercive control, I hope the Government will review this court order compensation scheme. I know from speaking to judges that they know that, when they award this, the offender will pay it in dribs and drabs. Now is the time for a good review of this.
My Lords, I will briefly address both amendments.
On the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, I completely agree with the need for a review and the points made by the noble and learned Lord. His speech dealt largely with corruption, but the amendment deals with bribery and money laundering, which gives rise to significant hardship in countries where it can bite. The weakness of our system is that there is no real provision for proper compensation or properly assessing compensation—even in domestic cases, let alone international ones—where there is a conviction but the degree of loss has not been properly investigated. Noble Lords will no doubt have a great deal of sympathy with the noble and learned Lord, who was allowed to address the judge out of consideration and kindness but had his submissions rejected because there was no legal standing.
I have a very short amendment—wholly unrelated to what has just been put forward—and I thank those in the Whips’ Office for suggesting that it remain in this group, and not, as I had proposed, move to a later group, which would be reached much later this evening. It does not really matter which group it is in, because it does not really affect anything else. It is a simple, short point in relation to the co-operation between Governments within the union and, therefore, has to do with devolution.
Clause 33 sets out the functions of the advocate who is to be appointed in respect of a major incident. None of the functions in this clause is a reserved matter, so under the Government of Wales Act, the Senedd has the powers to appoint. Therefore, in any particular incident, the Senedd could make provision so that it could appoint its own advocates. I do not believe a different view is taken by the Government in London.
It may also be the case that Welsh Ministers can appoint a non-statutory inquiry following a major incident in Wales, but that is not the kind of point to go into at this hour. The only power that the Senedd could not make provision for is for an advocate appointed under the Act to automatically secure interested person status in a statutory inquiry—those powers are reserved as they are part of the justice powers. Of course, a public advocate appointed by the Welsh Ministers would be free to apply for interested person status, and would probably get it—so I do not think it makes any practical difference. As I understand it, this point has caused the Senedd’s consent to the legislative consent memorandum to be qualified and reserved until this matter is resolved.
There are four short points to make. First, it seems sensible that the Welsh Government are involved as part of the scheme if there is a major incident in Wales. That would avoid any possibility of duplication. Secondly, it is important that the Welsh Government have a say in the person appointed. The advocate must have knowledge of Wales as well as the necessary ability to do everything in Welsh as well as English, since in Wales, English and Welsh have equal status.
Thirdly, significantly, it would be a further step in underpinning by statute co-operation between the Governments as part of the normal exercise of shared functions within a union. Fourthly, the Minister provided the greatest possible help in achieving something similar in relation to mission statements in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act, as provided for now in Section 2 of that Act. This seems to be yet another step that can be taken to put in place a strong statutory framework for co-operation to ensure that there is no duplication and there is good working co-operation.
My Lords, I support Amendments 119A to 119C in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wills.
I suggest that the usual basis for avoiding retrospective legislation does not apply in this case. Generally speaking, we take the view that it is wrong for new legislation to have retrospective effect. That is because, if an individual behaves in accordance with the law as it is at a given time, it is regarded as wrong for the law subsequently to be changed—I believe this is a correct analysis—in such a way as to change the legal framework in which that person legitimately operated at the time when they acted as they did. However, that principle cannot be relevant in the treatment of victims of major incidents and the provision of advocacy services to such victims. It is not as if there is anything in the Bill that could affect the behaviour of victims or indeed the behaviour of others in respect of major incidents, regardless of whether or not those others may have been culpable in some way for the occurrence of the incident.
There is a safeguard in the Bill against stale incidents becoming the subject of the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Wills, simply because they are past and could be a long way past, but the meaning of a “major incident” includes the definition in Clause 28(2)(c), which says that a
“‘major incident’ means an incident that … is declared in writing by the Secretary of State to be a major incident for the purposes of this Part”.
For that reason, the Secretary of State could take the view that, if an incident were so stale that it ought not to be the subject of a major incident determination, he or she simply would not make one.
The other point I wish to make is that the noble Lord’s Amendment 119C shows the importance of the possibility of making the legislation retrospective. It talks about a single event or a series of linked events over time. In the case of a series of linked events, it may be the last event that gives rise to the need to call it a major incident but all previous events need to be taken into account as well. Therefore, the amendment shows how important the Wills amendments could be—if I can put it in that way.
I will speak briefly to Amendment 120 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, which he has not addressed because no doubt he is going to wind up. I will not be winding up on behalf of these Benches as a result. His amendment concerns the possibility of declaring a major incident when only a small number of individuals are killed, injured or suffer major harm. To us, it is important that that amendment is permitted.
I take as an example—it is one that I simply thought of—the terrorist attack on Fishmongers’ Hall by Usman Khan in November 2019, when two people were killed and three more injured. In the words of the BBC a little while later, that incident
“touched the lives of so many”.
One knows that the incident must have touched the lives in a very serious way of those who intervened, those who witnessed the offences on London Bridge, and those who attended the Fishmongers’ Hall rehabilitation conference which led to such disastrous consequences. All were, in a sense, victims of the attack. All may have suffered, if not serious harm, at least some psychological harm. All may have needed some support. That need could be helped by the provision of advocacy services, advice or representation of some sort. The amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Wills and Lord Ponsonby, taken together, would secure that that would be possible, even in the case of past events.
My Lords, on the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wills, in some of the issues he raised—infected blood or sodium valproate—people raised the alarm and were not listened to over decades; it can take a long time for the enormity and scale of a tragedy to come to light. That is a defining theme for many of the issues that could potentially be looked at by the IPA. I fully support those amendments.
On Amendment 120, a concern about the way the IPA has been set up is the point about major incidents. It will kick in when there is a major incident, such as Hillsborough or Grenfell. In such an instance, there is a very good chance there will be a public inquiry; I think the public would demand it. There has always been a concern about incidents that perhaps do not meet that bar: there will not be a public inquiry but something appalling has happened and, as in the nature of this amendment, it reveals a systemic failure and it may be repeated. It would need the support of the IPA. Looking at the make-up of this role, I think we should be very careful not to overlook those incidents in our desire to talk only about major incidents.
My Lords, I support this amendment. The Manchester Arena terror atrocity in 2017 chilled every parent in the country. When you watch your children head off to a concert or a party, excited and happy, you are never at ease until they are safely home. I have met many victims from this concert, and I have to say that it saddens me every time I hear about it. What happened that night is every parent’s worst nightmare and our hearts go out to them. We can only imagine their grief, which is still there today, and it is a loss from which they will never recover.
All of us in this Committee will want to be sure that these parents have all the support they need—this is what the Bill is all about. It is therefore deeply upsetting to hear that, after these parents sat through what must have been a harrowing public inquiry, they were then told that the registration of their children’s deaths would be done not by them but by a local authority official. This is bureaucracy at its most cold. The treatment of bereaved families by the state will always have a profound impact on their recovery. For those parents, being able to register their children’s death was, for them, an important step in their grieving process and it should be their right, as the parents, to have that facility.
It would appear that under the Home Office’s Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 and the Ministry of Justice’s Coroners and Justice Act 2009, it is standard practice for a registrar to register deaths involving an inquest or inquiry. I understand that, if a person dies in usual circumstances, such as due to a health condition, a close relative can personally register their death. I did that in September for my mother, so I know that it is important. However, I am told that if they die in a major incident, it falls to the registrar. I also acknowledge that not all relatives want to register the death of a loved one, as in most cases, an interim death certificate is given soon after the incident for funeral arrangements —something I know about personally as well—but I want to see families being given a choice.
Having been to see so many Ministers is an insult: not just that they have been told “Yes, yes, yes” and then something else has been done, but every time they speak to a different Minister, it drains them. That they are having to explain, as parents who have lost children in the most horrendous way, beggars belief. What I am asking the Government and the Minister—all that is being asked for in this amendment—is that they be given that choice: that an extra space be found in the toolbar for the certificate, so that when a close family member wishes to be noted on the certificate, this can be achieved, without interfering with the coroner’s findings.
I understand that, sadly, it is too late for the victims of the Manchester Arena bombing, but I feel sure it will bring some solace to them that they have achieved something for future victims and can actually say “Goodnight” to the children they have lost.
My Lords, I wish briefly to add my support to this amendment. It seems to me that there is no good reason why the amendment should not be passed. We have heard from the noble Baronesses, Lady Newlove and Lady Thornton, about the emotional effect of suffering deaths of relatives in major incidents. It is quite clear that the emotional impact is severe. It is also quite clear that some alleviation, some relief, may be found in the process of registering the death. Why on earth should a relative not be able to register the death if they so choose? For that reason, I can see no reason to resist this amendment.
My Lords, Amendment 121, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, is intended to establish a regulation-making power to allow a qualified informant, typically a relative or close friend, to provide information to register a death where the death is the result of a major incident. I thank the noble Baroness for this intervention on such an important and complex issue. I also pay tribute to the Member for South Shields and the right honourable Member for Garston and Halewood for their commitment and determination in championing this cause on behalf of the families bereaved by the Manchester Arena attacks. I also extend my deepest condolences to the families who lost loved ones in that terrible incident.
The Government are committed to ensuring that bereaved people remain at the heart of the inquest process and are able fully to participate in it. Bereavement is never easy, but it is inconceivably difficult to lose a loved one in circumstances which, by definition, are unexpected and traumatic, so we fully understand the importance for bereaved families of having a role in the registration of their loved one’s death following an inquest. For them, as for all who are bereaved, this could be a vital part of the grieving process. In this regard, I agree with many of the comments from my noble friend Lady Newlove.
However, it is also our responsibility to uphold the integrity of the inquest process. While all deaths must be registered, not all deaths will be investigated by a coroner. Deaths which are subject to a coronial investigation and include an inquest cannot be registered until the inquest has concluded. That is because in such cases the inquest is where all the facts including the personal details of the deceased and the cause of death are established. The legislation requires the registrar to register the death following the receipt of a certificate from the coroner. The registrar has the sole responsibility to register all deaths.
The amendment does not disapply the registrar’s statutory duties in this regard and would exist alongside those requirements. So, while I fully understand and sympathise with the intent behind it, it is unclear what the statutory purpose of the relative’s provision of information and the status of that information would be.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I believe that there are a number of good reasons why we will not accept this amendment. We must be mindful that an amendment of this kind could inadvertently undermine the integrity of the inquest process, in particular where the bereaved family is not in agreement with the coroner’s conclusion at the inquest. Furthermore, the amendment is limited to those bereaved by a major incident. The distress of losing a loved one in this way is unimaginably difficult. However, I do not believe that it is right that we legislate for this now, knowing that there would be many who would not be able to utilise the new provision.
While I am sympathetic to the purpose behind the noble Baroness’s amendment, the Government cannot support it for the reasons I have given. That said, we are very aware of the sensitivities surrounding this issue and it is important that we identify the most appropriate way forward. In doing so, we must also take into account the practical implications of other legislation, such as the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill—referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton—also currently before this House, which will enable implementation of remote delivery of registration processes in the near future.
For these reasons, I can confirm that—as my ministerial colleague the Minister for Prisons, Parole and Probation announced in the other place—the Government will undertake a full public consultation, as soon as practicable, on the role of the bereaved in death registration following an inquest. This will enable us to gather a wide range of views on potential ways forward. I hope that the noble Baroness will welcome my reiteration of this commitment, even if it goes no further as she has asked, and that, together with the Members who continue to champion this issue in the other place, she will work with the Government as we seek a solution to this sensitive and complex issue.
(4 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Grender for bringing this Motion to Annul, and I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his Motion to Regret. However, my noble friend is right that the Motion to Regret will achieve no practical result, so the only way to protect the 50,000-odd households faced with eviction notices served between March and August is to annul this SI. It is important to note that the Motion would not protect tenants guilty of anti-social behaviour or domestic violence, as the noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, suggested.
I know my noble friend has thought carefully about this fatal Motion, but, although this step is serious, it does no more than annul this change in the Civil Procedure Rules, which can be changed again to produce a just and humane result. My noble friend put it into context. The Government promised in April 2019 to legislate to end Section 21 no-fault evictions—a promise they have not yet kept. But these are not just no-fault evictions, they are also no-discretion evictions. After an assured shorthold tenancy ends, a court “shall” make an order for possession when the notice period expires.
On 28 August, the compulsory notice period was extended by SI to six months for notices served from 29 August. That was a humane measure to protect renters from eviction during the pandemic. However, by this SI, tenants served with eviction notices between March and August have no protection. From this last Monday, they can be evicted without six months’ notice. They get no genuine protection from the new practice direction 55C. That requires only that the landlord provides information about the effect of the pandemic on tenants and dependants—in a reactivation notice in stayed claims, or under a protocol in new claims. Crucially, however, as the noble Lord, Lord Best, and many others have pointed out, the rules give no discretion, whatever the hardship and unfairness, for a judge to withhold a possession order provided only that the landlord has provided the required information.
We have heard of the likely practical effects of these short-notice evictions: untold hardship for tenants and their families hit by the pandemic, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester said; pressure on local authorities unable to rehouse evicted tenants, described by my noble friend Lady Thornhill; increased homelessness and poverty; exposure of those newly homeless and their families to greater risk of coronavirus. Turning to the numbers, I am convinced by the evidence that the figure at risk is about 55,000 households, but the point is also one of principle. Each affected household is unfairly the victim of an anomaly that causes hardship and injustice.
Nothing in the all-Peers letter from Alex Chalk MP meets any of these points. The Government have been misguided in leaving these tenants without the protection of six months’ notice. If they will not back down, this House should exercise its undoubted power, of which my noble friend Lord Greaves spoke, to annul this unjust SI.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank my noble friend. He is absolutely right that the negotiations involve compromise on both sides. We have a deal and EU leaders have been clear that it is the only one available. Having said that, we have recognised the strength of feeling on one particular issue—the indefinite, or perceived indefinite, nature of the backstop. It is something that both sides want to try to resolve because we both want a deal that will benefit the United Kingdom and the EU and ensure that we have a strong partnership going forward. That is in all our interests.
My Lords, the CJEU’s judgment this morning gave the UK a simple way of withdrawing from Brexit—by unilaterally revoking our Article 50 notice. Should not the Government now reconsider their argument that a people’s vote would be undemocratic, as it is now two and a half years since the 2016 referendum and the various options for Brexit and their risks are better understood? Why should the people not be given the chance to put an end to this chaos rather than condemn the country to years of future uncertainty?
The people have already voted: they voted in June 2016 to leave. This judgment may clarify the law but it does not change our position. I remind noble Lords that the people have voted.
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Mandelson, in this debate. This is the most important issue that this House has debated in a generation. Yet there are voices out there who say that we should just get on with it and vote the legislation through unamended so as not to frustrate the will of the people. Many of us believe that we are about to make our biggest foreign policy mistake in decades, so just getting on with it and voting it through is not an option. As my noble friend Lord Newby eloquently asserted, we cannot and should not stay silent simply because the leave campaign won. That would be just as true even if it had won by a substantial majority.
I believe that the economic consequences of our leaving the European Union will be deep and lasting, but I fear that the most serious consequences will be for Europe and Britain’s place in the world. At a turbulent and dangerous time, we threaten to undermine our closest allies, who share our commitment to democracy, internationalism, the rule of law and human rights. We face an isolationist and protectionist America, led by a President who chooses to govern by Twitter, with scant regard to facts or principles, intent on jettisoning decades of carefully honed international policy that made America a worthy and safe leader of the free world.
In the Middle East we face ever-worsening violence, barbarity and terrorism, with little hope of reprieve. The refugee crisis in Europe, which is a consequence, cries out for a negotiated solution that combines humanity with pragmatism. We must deal with a dangerously resurgent Russia and a powerful and increasingly assertive China. Globally, we face the existential threat of climate change on which, in Paris, with Europe’s lead, we were making progress until President Trump changed America’s direction. Our leaving the EU threatens future European co-operation. Worse still, it strengthens and emboldens the fissiparous forces seeking to pull Europe apart—in France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Hungary, the Netherlands and elsewhere. Already, the referendum decision drives our Prime Minister to a weak and almost needy dependence on Trump’s America and Erdogan’s Turkey. The duty of this House is to mitigate the damage.
We are now asked to pass a Bill to set this process in train, and upon the basis that our Article 50 notice will be irrevocable unilaterally—although, as Andrew Marr pointed out to Liz Truss yesterday, that is a legal not a political question and one that is unclear and undetermined. Yet the Government want to deny us all, people and Parliament, the right to decide whether we still wish to leave when the negotiations are concluded. Where is the sense, the political courage or the respect for parliamentary sovereignty in that approach? So we will seek to amend the Bill to let Parliament and the people decide on the final deal before we leave, and with the option of remaining still clearly open.
The Government’s plans were eventually spelt out in Mrs May’s 12-point 17 January speech: no to the single market, despite the Conservatives’ manifesto commitment; no to the customs union; no to Euratom. And all, I suggest, because of two unrealistic and obsessive illusions: first, that our leaving will cut immigration and that doing so will benefit this nation; and, secondly, that it will win us freedom from the Court of Justice of the European Union.
On immigration, no one can say how far it may fall, but what we do know is that our economy, our universities, our research and development, our health service, our cultural life and our soft power all depend to a large extent on it. Already, the threat of our leaving the European Union is damaging confidence.
On the European Court of Justice, the Government’s position borders on the absurd. The court provides an effective and essential system of resolving disputes about the EU treaties and legislation. The Government promise free and frictionless UK-EU trade, which means British exporters of goods and services meeting EU standards. We will have no say in setting those standards, but in determining whether they are met the CJEU will be the final arbiter.
We are told that the agreement,
“may take in elements of current single market arrangements”.
The Government promise close collaboration in science and innovation. They recognise that our arrangements for civil jurisdiction and for the recognition and enforcement of judgments under the Brussels and Lugano regime enable our commercial law to function. Energy, transport, communications, the many EU agencies, cross-border environmental protection, digital security and co-operation all depend on EU regulation. Why should our European partners agree to abandon the CJEU for some inferior alternative to resolve disputes? The White Paper sets out in an annexe a medley of other dispute resolution mechanisms, but this is an inadequate and meaningless response to the problem. Like the rest of the Government’s ill-thought out approach to Brexit, it does the Government no credit.
(8 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this vote has threatened the hopes of my children’s generation. Our young people asked, overwhelmingly, “Why would anyone want to leave the European Union?”. They now feel disillusioned, angry, hurt and betrayed. They have grown up as Europeans; they value their freedom of movement; and multiculturalism, tolerance and international friendship are at the heart of their being.
It could have all been different. With high-handed overconfidence, the Government rejected amendments giving votes to 16 and 17 year-olds, EU citizens resident in the UK and UK citizens living elsewhere in the EU for more than 15 years. Thus they denied votes, which could have proved decisive, to three groups of people who are now most profoundly affected by the leave vote.
Like all other noble Lords, I find it shameful that the Government now try to justify bargaining with the cast-iron promise of indefinite leave to remain given to UK-resident EU citizens, so I welcome the Bill tabled today by my right honourable friend Tom Brake MP guaranteeing their right to stay.
Where next? During the campaign, the Prime Minister said that he would invoke Article 50 of the Lisbon treaty immediately if leave won. Then, as he resigned, he said that this would be a matter for his successor. My noble and learned friend Lord Wallace reminded us that Article 50 includes the words,
“in accordance with its own constitutional requirements”.
With no written constitution, the UK’s constitutional requirements for giving notice are uncertain. David Cameron seems to have assumed that notice could be given by exercising prerogative powers. I disagree. I far prefer the analysis of many senior lawyers, echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, who argue, broadly, that legislation is required.
Whatever the legal position, there is at least a political imperative which requires a resolution of the House of Commons, as the elected House, before an Article 50 notice may be served. The leave campaign stressed the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament; it cannot now credibly argue that a non-binding referendum can take the final decision away from this Parliament. Moreover, the treaty does not say whether an Article 50 notice can be withdrawn after service. Again, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. A negotiation is real only if the parties can walk away.
Implementing this crucial decision must not be rushed through with ill-considered haste; nor should it depend on the Conservatives’ leadership election. Many noble Lords have said that we must respect the will of the people—and so we must.
Remain fought a sad campaign. We failed to raise people’s sights from the threat to the economy, which many believed was exaggerated or worse. In hock to focus groups, we failed to make the principled case for international collaboration, for protecting our environment, for peace and stability, for freedom of movement. We said far too little about what the UK brings to the European Union rather than the other way around. We failed to refute the notion that while the head should say remain, the heart should say leave. That failure of ours allowed the leave campaign to persuade voters, albeit by a small majority, that they should abandon a relationship of 43 years which has involved facing the world together, making compromises, resolving differences by negotiations and discussions—often, yes, protracted and difficult—to pursue the superficial attraction of an independence that will prove entirely illusory and lead in time to economic hardship, isolation, weakness, disappointment and regret.
Much has been said by noble Lords today about misrepresentation during the campaign. With much I agree. But in six months or a year there may be more clarity and the true economic costs of leaving may have moved from the realms of speculation to a starker reality. The public mood may have palpably changed. The real-life options for our future relationship with the EU may be apparent. The EU may have changed its position. In this context we must end the absurd stand-off between a hurt and angry EU refusing to negotiate before notice is served and our being unwilling —reasonably so—to serve notice before negotiations start. Given our right to serve or withhold a notice at our option, we can do better than rely on ill-defined, informal bilateral talks, as outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, yesterday.
The Scottish Government’s threat to leave the United Kingdom is already clearer than it was. Might they not be willing to abandon plans for a second independence referendum if the United Kingdom does not invoke Article 50?
When Parliament takes its decision, my party will stand up for our internationalism and for our fundamental belief that we should play our full part in the European Union. We will take that principled position even if there is a political cost—just as my right honourable friend the late Charles Kennedy did over the war in Iraq, for which we are likely to receive vindication tomorrow, nine years late; and just as my right honourable friend Nick Clegg did when taking us into coalition with the Conservatives at a dangerous time for Britain, and at obvious political cost, leading to five years of stable and successful majority government, but ultimately leading to damaging losses for the Liberal Democrats which, ironically, delivered to David Cameron the overall majority and the referendum that have proved to be his nemesis.
I echo much of what the noble Lords, Lord Armstrong and Lord Butler, said. I trust that not only my party but Parliament will continue to do what Members of both Houses, with full regard for the referendum result, in their consciences believe to be in the national interest of the United Kingdom. That is the basis of parliamentary democracy and of the sovereignty of Parliament. If ultimately Parliament decides that it should put the terms of withdrawal to the people once again, so be it.
(12 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on the latter part of that question, I am not aware of any conversations having taken place. Incidentally, there is no way that I could slither away from anything in this House, particularly when asked by the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert. The Permanent Secretary has said that the content and extent of Adam Smith’s contact with News Corp were,
“without authorisation, and were contrary to the clear requirements set out”,
by both himself and the Secretary of State. He has said that he was “aware” of and “content” with the arrangements that were made initially.
My Lords, whatever the outcome of the present episode, does my noble friend the Leader agree that in future it must be absolutely clear that when a Secretary of State and his department are considering such a bid, all contact between the department and an interested party must first be through permanent civil servants; secondly, it must be properly authorised; thirdly, it must be properly recorded; and fourthly, it must be of a formal nature only? Does he also agree that it must be clear that political advisers should not be involved in such contacts in any circumstances, nor should such contacts be marked by the informality and appearance of partiality that marked the e-mails that have recently been released, and that guidance to that effect should be issued formally as quickly as possible?
My Lords, my noble friend makes a very helpful intervention. Of course, we can all use the benefit of hindsight and see that things were not done in an appropriate way. That is why the Prime Minister, as early as last week, asked the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Jeremy Heywood, and the Head of the Civil Service, Sir Bob Kerslake, to write to all departments and Ministers,
“clarifying the rigorous procedures that departments should have in place for handling cases of this nature”,
so that suspicion does not fall on departments, Ministers and their special advisers.