Lord Roborough
Main Page: Lord Roborough (Conservative - Excepted Hereditary)Department Debates - View all Lord Roborough's debates with the Leader of the House
(9 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these are probing amendments, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, explained, and they would substantially increase the range of the Bill in relation to major incidents. That is all to the good. Part 1 of the Bill, as we know, is concerned with victims of criminal conduct and, because of the provisions concerning the new code, is relatively comprehensive. However, Part 2, in connection with victims of major incidents, is not.
Part 2 as presently drafted is concerned entirely with advocates for victims of major incidents. The introduction of the scheme for the appointment of standing advocates and other advocates is a welcome reform, but there are many other areas where victims of major incidents need more support than they currently receive. My noble friend Lady Brinton gave a number of examples. We heard of a further example last Wednesday: the argument about permitting victims’ relatives to register the death of those victims. That is an important issue—one which has received far too little attention before—but is only one of a very large number of issues facing victims of incidents that the Bill simply does not cover.
There are issues concerning the operation and impact of the coronial system more generally, for example, or the availability, establishment, conduct and reporting of public inquiries, as well as representation at those inquiries. There is also the implementation of recommendations of inquiries and investigations, and the monitoring of that implementation; the provision of information to victims and their families; the provision of practical and financial support to victims after major incidents; comprehensive signposting, as mentioned by my noble friend Lady Hamwee; and ensuring that at times of disaster there is a dedicated support system available to victims and their families.
Much of this has been called for by Victim Support and others over some years. The Government’s response has been helpful in providing for local resilience forums. These work well in some areas, but the evidence we have seen shows that they work far less well in others. Victim Support and other charities of course do a great deal to co-ordinate and supply support services, but they are charities and limited by funding restraints in what they can do.
Victim Support recommended in 2020 that local resilience forums should be under a duty to produce civil contingency plans to a minimum standard. I suggest that a new, separate code for victims of major incidents would be a sensible and practical way to achieve a number of worthwhile ends. Primarily, it would set out the services and responses that victims of major incidents would be entitled to expect from public authorities and others. Secondly, it would give victims comprehensive information on how to access the services they need. Thirdly, it would enable local resilience forums to understand what services they needed to provide and so ensure more comparability across the piece. Fourthly, it would establish a standard of good practice, to enable local resilience forums and all responders to know what is needed and expected. A feature of the code I would applaud is that it could be regularly updated to reflect best practice to ensure that unnecessary shortcomings in some areas could be addressed.
These are, as we have said, probing amendments and it is not for now to attempt to draft what should go into such a code. What is needed is a commitment to devote resources to drafting such a code, thinking carefully about it and to consulting on what is needed, with a view to such a code being ultimately incorporated in statute in the same way as we seek to incorporate the victims’ code in this Bill.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, for Amendment 122. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to prepare and issue a new code of practice for victims of major incidents. I will focus my response on the content of Amendment 122, as Amendment 123 is consequential on the former. While I understand the intentions of the amendments, I do not believe they are necessary, because existing codes and related commitments are already in place to achieve their aims.
First, the purpose of establishing an independent public advocate is exactly as the noble Baroness has outlined. It is to ensure that victims understand the processes and actions of public authorities and how their views may be taken into account; to provide information concerning other sources of support and advice; and to communicate with public authorities on behalf of victims in relation to the incident, especially in situations where the victims have raised concerns. Through the advocate’s ability to act as a conduit between victims and the Government, victims will have the opportunity to make their views known and have their voices heard to effect change in real time.
Secondly, it is likely that in most circumstances in which a major incident is declared and an advocate is appointed the victims will have been a victim of a crime. In such instances, they are already covered under the victims’ code, which sets out the services and support that victims of crime can expect to receive from criminal justice agencies. An additional code for victims of a major incident may therefore be duplicative, and as such may be counterproductive.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton, Lady Brinton, Lady Hamwee and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, have argued powerfully that non-criminal major incidents may need to be addressed. Victims of non-criminal major incidents will have an advocate appointed to help them access support services, navigate the processes—
I wonder whether the code would cover the Hillsborough situation. It seems that the definition the noble Lord has just given would not cover that situation—one in which people may think that a crime was committed but nobody has ever been charged with a crime, and there were definitely a very large number of victims.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for allowing me to intervene. The other point he has raised about the type of—if I can call it this— “victimhood” completely ignores the experience of the victim, the journey they have to make, and the services, which are so vital to the victims’ code. How can he explain that victims of major incidents that are not deemed to be a crime at the time would be able access those services in the same way? They are no less victims.
I understand the points made by both noble Baronesses. I have had extensive dialogue with the department on this point today and I will try to give the best answers I can. We can follow up further beyond that.
As cases of non-criminal major incidents do not go through the criminal justice system, the measures in the Bill and code are not appropriate for this cohort. If a major incident subsequently becomes criminal, victims will be entitled to services under the code. The majority of measures under the code help those going through the criminal justice system, so would not be appropriate for those who are not.
In relation to support services under the code and broadening access, expanding these to those incidents where no crime has been committed could impact access to support services designed for victims of crime, but that does not prevent separate provision designed to meet the needs of those who have experienced a major incident.
I am really sorry to intervene again and am very grateful to the noble Lord. The amendment does not say that it is the same victims’ code as under Part 1 of the Bill; this is a different victims’ code. Can he explain to your Lordships’ Committee why a separate code, often with references to different services and agencies, would impact on the other one?
As I have already said, I believe that most victims will be victims of crime; most major incidents will involve criminal behaviour of some description, or a criminal investigation. We believe it is a subset, but nevertheless a very important subset, of victims who need to have their needs addressed. We completely agree with that.
The Minister has accepted that there is a subset and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has demonstrated, it is a very important subset of victims who are not victims of crime but of tragic accidents or incidents. I am not sure that his answers so far and his speech so far have taken in the real difference, which is that victims of crime are involved in process that leads to—and is at least partially resolved by—a criminal trial, where there is to be such a trial, or a criminal investigation where it does not lead to a trial.
The Minister has accepted that the existing victims’ code is directed to that set of circumstances. Victims of a tragedy that is a major incident which does not involve crime—or, as the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, pointed out, may or may not involve crime but does not lead to a criminal process—have a whole different set of needs that arise from tragedy rather than crime. I cannot understand from the Minister’s answers why a separate victims’ code is inappropriate in those circumstances. There may, of course, be areas of overlap but why is there no separate code to deal with this very real issue?
The additional point is that I would suggest—and the Minister has not suggested otherwise—that all of this cannot be addressed simply by the provision of an independent public advocate, however worthy that is, and it is.
While the Minister is still sitting down, I agree with everything that has just been said but also the victims I was talking about—the victims of state wrongdoing—have not been treated as victims of crime so they would come under the original code, except they have not had access to all the information, and so on. It is worth understanding that the current code is not enough. Plus, I am “Jones of Moulsecoomb”, not “Jones of Whitchurch”—no offence.
I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for a much more eloquent summing up of what I was trying to say than I was capable of doing.
The Government acknowledge that there is a subset of victims of major incidents where a crime does not occur who are not being addressed because the victims’ code addresses principally the victims of major incidents where crime does occur. The Government believe that the independent public advocate will be a significant step forward in helping all victims of major incidents to have their needs met during this very difficult time.
The Government’s view is that the charter and the proposed code for victims of major incidents bear many similarities and it may be duplicative to implement both. The Government are also not convinced at this time of the necessity of placing these codes and charters which aim to change culture on a statutory footing, but we are happy to consult all Ministers, given the strength of feeling about how best to address the needs of victims of major incidents where crime is not involved. As I say, we have had dialogue today on exactly this matter and I am conscious that I am not giving noble Lords a very good answer but I think it is best if we agree to consult on that, if that is acceptable.
In answer to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, about cases where the victims’ code is not followed and where, potentially, victims are victims of state actions or some other incident, the victims can direct complaints to the organisation itself. It will have internal complaints-handling processes in place; I accept that in this particular instance that may not be much use. But if they feel that their complaint has not been resolved, they can escalate it to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman, who will investigate further.
Through the Bill, we are making it easier for complaints to go to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman where the complaint relates to the complainant’s experience as a victim of crime. It may also be open to victims to challenge a failure to deliver the entitlement set out in the code by way of judicial review. This will depend on the circumstances and standard public law principles will apply. As the most senior governance—
I apologise for intervening again, but this is Committee and I am trying to understand. I am grateful to the Minister for outlining possible alternative routes, but he is suggesting two, three or four possible routes that a victim of a major incident, who may never have had any encounter with any of the services and agencies, has to know and understand. It is very complex. Is the Minister happy to meet between Committee and Report to discuss this? I do not want to detain the Committee with a couple of possible examples, but, thinking about other major incidents, I already have examples I would like to put to the Minister and his officials to try to understand how the system he is proposing would work. At the moment, it seems more of a muddle than the current system.
I am of course happy to commit to meeting to discuss this matter, but we are not leaving the victims defenceless in this situation: they will have an independent public advocate, who will help to guide them through all these processes. But I completely agree that we should meet and consult further on this matter.
My Lords, during the debate on the victims’ code, we discussed the problem that victims are often advised not to undergo any counselling or therapy because that might damage how their evidence is characterised by the defendant’s counsel. I have no idea whether this issue has arisen in connection with major, possibly non-criminal incidents, but I can see that this could become something that makes its way into people’s thinking: “Don’t go for therapy because you might have to give evidence to a public inquiry, and how would that be perceived?” I just throw that in as another consideration. There may be similar points, not about what victims should do but about things they should not.
My Lords, I shall be relatively brief on this short group of amendments. I stated my support for the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in advance, in principle, during debate on the third group. I apologise for mentioning his amendment before he had had an opportunity to speak to it. However, his reasoning was a development of the reasoning that I then expressed. I reiterate his point: for an independent advocate system to work, the advocate must be independent. I take the point of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that if “independent” has only appeared, or might only appear, by virtue of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that is wrong. We have all called it independent because the independent public advocacy scheme is a term that has been frequently used. The word “independent” ought to appear in the Bill specifically, and the independent standing advocate could be called exactly that to make the point clear.
That means that such an advocate must be able to advance the victims’ interests without a concern that they are liable to be removed by the Secretary of State without very good reason. For such reasons
“as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”,
which is the wording used in the Bill, is just not good enough. Nothing less than the formulation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, of them being
“unfit or unable to fulfil their functions”
will do as a justification for removal.
I take the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. This could also be achieved by a process for termination, not simply by the grounds for termination. Those are not necessarily alternatives; we could have both approaches. I suggest that the Government ought to consider whether the process should not be strengthened. To make the point I have made before, the Bill is shot through with the difficulty that the interests of the victims may conflict with the interests of the Secretary of State. That important conflict of interest can be resolved only by removing power from the Secretary of State.
I turn to Amendment 129 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, which proposes that office facilities may be afforded by the Ministry of Justice, provided that they do not compromise the functional independence of the standing advocate. That is another point on independence. It is plainly administratively convenient and may be necessary that the Ministry of Justice provides the office facilities, but that does not mean that the bodies are not completely separate, and they must be.
Amendment 128A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wills, to which I have added my name, was moved into the second group, but Amendment 129 remained in this group although they are on similar subjects. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, said that the noble Lord, Lord Roborough, would answer on Amendment 128A. The point I made was that proper secretarial support and resources are crucial for the standing advocate if the system is to work. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, made the point about resourcing in general terms but made it very powerfully. Appropriate support is essential for the role to be properly done, as are statutory guarantees of adequate resourcing.
Amendment 132 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, deals with guidance to other appointed advocates on what matters they should consider in relation to a major incident. It is not right that such guidance should come from the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State may have interests in diverting attention to some aspects of a major incident against the interests of considering others. Guidance should come from the standing advocate who has, as the noble Earl, Lord Howe, put it earlier, a leadership role. That is the proper source of such guidance and not the Secretary of State, who has a political interest that may be opposed to the interests of the victims. I suggest that the Bill’s formulation on this is simply quite wrong in principle.
My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his amendment. This group of amendments concerns the independence of the advocate, and therefore I will discuss them together.
First, the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, seeks to limit the discretion of the Secretary of State as to the grounds on which an advocate’s appointment in respect of a major incident may be terminated. I believe it will be helpful if I explain the rationale behind the current provisions in the Bill. I hope that the noble and learned Lord will be reassured that this power will be used carefully.
There are a number of scenarios in which we envisage the Secretary of State exercising their discretion to terminate the appointment of an advocate. First, for the scheme to be as agile as possible, it is important that we can adapt the resource required to support victims. No major incident is the same, and the processes that follow can often take years to conclude. During this time, there will likely be peaks of activity when it may be prudent to increase the number of advocates actively supporting victims. Following these peaks, it is only right that the Secretary of State has the ability to scale back the scheme to be proportionate. This power enables the Secretary of State to do that effectively.
Secondly, we have always stressed the importance of being able to deploy an advocate as quickly as possible following a major incident. It may be appropriate, following a greater understanding of the developing needs of the victims, to substitute one advocate for another who may be better suited by virtue of their skills or expertise. The Government believe that having this flexibility is important. This amendment would diminish the Secretary of State’s ability to ensure that victims have the best possible representation.
Thirdly, as we have heard throughout the various debates on this part of the Bill, it has been highlighted that victims must have confidence in the advocates for them to be effective. The Government therefore anticipate another use for this power: to remove advocates who may not command the confidence of victims, as touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in the debate on the previous group, or stand down any advocates towards the end of official processes because victims no longer want or need support from the advocate.
To go a little further, the reasons why the Secretary of State may terminate an advocate’s appointment could also include a lack of capacity, misbehaviour or a failure to exercise their functions in accordance with their terms of appointment. These terms of appointment, including the potential grounds for termination, will be published. The views and needs of victims are incredibly important. A strong emphasis will be placed on the support needs of the victims, and decisions on the termination of an advocate will always be made with these in mind. Therefore, while I understand and recognise the intent of the noble and learned Lord’s amendment, the Government believe it is necessary for the Secretary of State to have a wider discretion in this area.
I completely agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that independence is critical. We believe that the Bill protects that. However, there was a constructive suggestion from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, that “independent” be added to the definition of the advocate in the Bill. I will take that away to the department.
The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Wills, would impose a duty on the Secretary of State to provide the advocate with
“secretarial and all other support necessary for them to exercise their functions effectively”.
While he is not in his place, I would like to answer the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on this point. The advocates will be supported by a permanent secretariat, and the Ministry of Justice has already allocated funding for this. Clause 31 provides for an effective system of support for the independent public advocate by making provisions for a secretariat and remuneration. Work is already under way to provide the advocates with this secretariat and to ensure appropriate separation between them and the Ministry of Justice.
I will take the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in turn. The first seeks to make it clear in the Bill that advocates will sit within the Ministry of Justice for administrative purposes but be operationally independent. While I support the intention and spirit behind this amendment, the Government do not believe that this is necessary as this is already our intention for how this new statutory office will operate. Furthermore, the wording of this amendment may not best achieve its goal. It is generally not helpful to refer to government departments by name in legislation, due to any potential machinery of government changes.
The Government are committed to the operational independence of the standing advocate and any advocates appointed in respect of a major incident. The Government took steps to bolster the advocate’s independence earlier in this Bill’s passage by empowering them to report independently and at their own discretion. The legislation is also clear that the advocates will make decisions and utilise their experience to provide support to victims of a major incident in a manner they deem appropriate.
The other amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, seeks to transfer the power to issue guidance to advocates appointed in respect of a major incident from the Secretary of State to the standing advocate. I reiterate the Government’s commitment to the operational independence of the standing advocate and any advocates appointed in respect of a major incident. They will be empowered to take decisions and utilise their experience in a manner that the advocates deem appropriate. However, given the nature of major incidents and the unpredictability of the future, we believe that the Secretary of State’s ability to issue guidance is crucial to future-proof the scheme. The Government are mindful that guidance issued by the Secretary of State should not have any effect on the independence of advocates, which is why Clause 38 specifically prevents this guidance being directed at any specific advocate or incident.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this short debate. I am particularly grateful to the Minister for stressing several times in his reply the Government’s commitment to the independence of the advocate; that is extremely important.
The problem is that that is not expressed clearly enough on the face of the Bill. It is curious, as I pointed out at the beginning, that it appears in the contents but not the text of any of the clauses. That is curious and suggests that something should be done in the wording to clarify the matter further to avoid the impression, which Clause 31(2)(a) gives, that the Secretary of State can dismiss the advocate for any reason.
It is possible to develop my amendment a little further—I am speaking off the cuff—to say that the Secretary of State may terminate the appointment for “administrative reasons” or “having regard to the views of victims” or “because the advocate is unfit”, and so on. The point is that one could spell out in this clause a little more clearly what ability the Secretary of State has to terminate the function without undermining the independence of the advocate.
To some extent, one is talking about the confidence the advocate has in exercising what could be quite demanding functions. In the interests of victims, they could be pressing the Secretary of State to do things that may be awkward, embarrassing, expensive, and so forth. It is very important to get this clarified in a way that achieves the commitment the Minister has very helpfully been stressing in his reply to me. I hope we can come back to this. If there is a possibility of discussing this with the Minister and the Bill team, I would very much welcome that. I hope we can pursue it further that way.
I reassure the noble and learned Lord that we would like to discuss this further.
I am most grateful to the Minister for that. For the time being, I will withdraw the amendment and we can progress the matter further in discussion.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for his introduction to this important amendment. I have to say that I was somewhat shocked when I first read the Bill. In Clause 33(6), it says:
“Where the advocate provides support to victims under the age of 18, the advocate may do so only by providing support to such persons as the advocate considers represent those victims”.
As a teacher, the noble Lord, Lord Hampton, who submitted this amendment, understands the vital issue of whether a child or young person—as a victim of a major incident—can have capacity to consent to the provision of direct support. To expect an advocate to make a decision, by passing it on to someone else to represent them, even if it is a parent—it may not always a parent, for reasons I will come to—without checking the child’s capacity or their interests and understanding is just plain wrong.
The example I want to highlight—I have chosen another non-criminal one, deliberately—is the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. Many children and young people were separated by the tsunami from their families, with no knowledge of who lived, died or who had been injured, and that included a number of British children. We know, from accounts at the time, that older siblings had to take on the care of and responsibility for the younger ones and for making contact and communicating with the British consul.
I cite this example because the issue of capacity and consent in those early days was vital, but in the longer term it would have been really helpful for those children and young people in their recovery to have been party to sensitive discussions about what had happened. There was mention in an earlier grouping about how one registers the death, and in this example there might have been important differential cultural practices in handling deaths and children might be the ones who can talk about what they want and what their family practice is without, for example, a British consul having to make that decision. I think one of the worst things an advocate or a Government could do would be just to impose someone to represent their interests without gaging their capacity first.
However, this does not just happen in criminal courts, and I am really grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for citing the family court approach at the moment. We know that family courts often have to consider Gillick competency when hearing from children and young people about their own future. It is also commonplace in children’s social care and education and, above all, in health and about treatment. The CQC has a very helpful guide on the internet called Brief Guide: Capacity and Competence to Consent in Under 18s that sets out exactly what professionals need to consider. I am not suggesting that the CQC briefing or the rules that it uses should be adopted in whole, because issues about treatment are very different where somebody is acting as an advocate or having some parental responsibility. But large sectors of our public system—whether it is health, education or the courts—already use, and are trained to use, competency and consent. They understand when it needs to move to the area that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, mentioned, where a voice is heard but a decision is not necessarily made on the child’s view. Clause 33(6) cuts that out completely, which seems to be totally extraordinary.
I look forward to hearing from the Minister on why it was there and whether there would be some possibility of negotiating something that reflects the actual practice in our courts and education and health systems for children at the moment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, for introducing this amendment, which relates to an advocate’s support of the victims of major incidents who are under the age of 18. The noble Lord’s amendment would require the advocate to conduct, or refer to, a needs assessment of a victim under the age of 18, to establish whether they have the capacity to consent to receiving support directly from the advocate. Where it was deemed that a child did not have capacity, it would require the advocate to ascertain and have regard to the views of the child as to who best represents their interests before providing indirect support through a representative.
I understand and sympathise with the spirit of this amendment and emphasise that the Government recognise the inherent vulnerability of children in the aftermath of a major incident. Children should not have to bear the burden of navigating complex post-incident processes alone. In the aftermath of a major incident, victims and families will be dealing with grief and injuries and navigating post-disaster processes. This can be a difficult time, and we reasonably expect that child victims will have a parent or guardian who can facilitate their access to independent public advocate support and communicate their views on their behalf. If, in rare circumstances such as those cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, a parent or guardian is not suitable for this, the Bill gives the ability for an advocate to provide support to someone they consider represents the victims. The advocate will ensure that they listen attentively to the views of child victims through their representative and offer the support they need.
It is well established that child protection agencies within the local authorities have designated post-incident procedures and are well experienced in providing specialist and tailored support services for children. Therefore, it would be duplicative and inappropriate for the advocate to conduct needs assessments as they will not be specialised to carry out such functions, which could cause safeguarding concerns.
The noble Lord’s suggestion of a needs assessment is interesting and has merit in its attempts to give children greater agency. However, the Government do not believe that the advocate would be best placed to undertake this assessment. Furthermore, the Government do not believe that the answer to the issue at hand would be for the advocate directly to support children. The Bill sets out measures to allow children to be supported by a person that the advocate considers represents a child. In most circumstances, this will be a parent or guardian. However, we have not been prescriptive on who that person must be to allow additional flexibility. In rarer cases, it is already open to the advocate to better understand the needs of child victims in considering who represents them.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord. He said two things that concern me. First, the amendment says:
“the advocate must conduct or refer to a needs assessment”,
which is what would happen through the CQC system I mentioned earlier, so it is not entirely dependent, as he implied in his response at the Dispatch Box, on the advocate themselves having to conduct that process and decision. The Minister may be coming on to this —in which case I apologise for raising it—but my main concern is Clause 33(6). I hope he is going to explain why it does not even talk about making decisions of capacity; it just says that the special advocate has the right to provide support as they decide. There is no reference to checking capacity or consent at all.
The noble Baroness obviously makes a good point, and this is a complex and sensitive area. We are to some extent relying on the competence that we clearly expect to see from independent public advocates to make the right decisions in what will be varied situations. We think it would be more appropriate and flexible to address this in guidance.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. As she persuasively said, there are many other areas where public bodies take children’s views into account. She went through them—health, education, social services and the rest—and I gave my own particular example. The gist of the noble Lord’s argument was that it is not for the IPAs to undertake this role, that there are other ways of making these assessments and that how that happens in practice would be addressed in guidance. I will consider that answer and see whether we want to take this further, because we are trying to make victims—in this case child victims—as explicitly supported in the Bill as possible. I will consider whether a further amendment is appropriate.
My central point is that, in my experience, agencies over the last 40 years, let us say—the time of my adulthood—have consistently underestimated the capacity of children to engage in difficult issues. This needs to be handled sensitively, it needs to be managed and it needs to be clear that it is the adults who are making the decisions, but listening to children in a direct way is a good thing to do, both for the children and for the adults making the decisions, and that is what these amendments seek to achieve. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.