Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I am very happy to support the spirit of my noble friend Lord Grocott’s amendment. I have tabled two amendments—Amendments 57 and 58—which also require that a referendum should take place before we move to fixed-term Parliaments in this country.

I do not, in general, favour referendums, but there is a particular case for holding them when major constitutional change is being proposed. I think that is a view that the Constitution Committee reluctantly came to. The basis of that has to be that the constitution belongs to the people—it is not the property of those politicians who happen for the time being to have the privilege of serving in either the House of Commons or the House of Lords. Those who are Members of Parliament in either House, and certainly those who are in Government, should regard themselves as holding the constitution in trust on behalf of the people, by whose authority they have been given and entrusted with the opportunity to serve. They should treat that constitution with the very greatest respect and should move to change it with the very greatest caution. That applies even more particularly to a Government such as this present coalition Government, which does not have a mandate from the electorate for its policies.

It is, as my noble friend Lord Grocott suggested, curious that this Government—which makes great claim to be a liberalising Government who want to improve the quality of our democracy and increase the accountability of Government, and indeed Parliament, to the people—are proposing legislation that would mean that we would in practice have fewer general elections than we have had in the past. The average interval between general elections since the war has been three years and 10 months; if the Government have their way on this Bill, it will be not less than five years. That is one of the reasons why I, like my noble friend Lord Grocott, believe that—although I am no enthusiast for legislating to fix the term of Parliament—if we are to fix the term, then we had better fix it at four years. We do not want to see accountability diminished in a major measure of constitutional reform.

It is also curious that the Government believe that it is appropriate to hold a referendum on changing the electoral system and that it is appropriate to hold referendums when there may be some transfer of power—possibly no very great transfer of power—between London and Brussels, but they do not think that it is appropriate to hold a referendum on whether we should move to fixed-term Parliaments. My noble friend Lady Farrington raised the question of whether there might be a referendum on reform of the House of Lords, which would be a very major constitutional change by any standard. It seems extraordinary that the Government should propose to take that forward without incorporating provision for a referendum in the legislation.

I am not necessarily a devotee of consistency in constitutional matters, because I believe that there are many anomalies in our present constitutional arrangements, which have grown up for compelling historical reasons, that actually provide flexibility and enable the constitution to accommodate different traditions and to adapt itself as time goes by. If we are slavishly schematic in our approach to constitutional change, we shall be even more likely to get it wrong; but I wonder why the Government are quite so inconsistent in their approach to holding referendums on constitutional reform. Surely the Government should conduct themselves on a certain set of principles.

Turning to the particular amendments that I have tabled, I suggest to the House that they incorporate a better design for a referendum than the design of the one we are to have on 5 May on electoral change—there are differences between what I propose and what Parliament has enacted at the behest of the Government. The referendum that I have proposed would be advisory only and would leave scope for Parliament to meditate upon the message that voting in a referendum sends to Parliament. Amendment 57 would also provide that, if less than a threshold of 51 per cent of the electorate support the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments, then the question would be dismissed. That latter point should have applied also in Amendment 58—it was an omission on my part not to have included that in the drafting of that amendment. If we come back to this issue on Report, I can repair that then.

My amendments would provide for two questions. The first would be to ask the people whether they favour the introduction of fixed-term Parliaments, as provided for in the legislation. The second would ask them the other key question: if we are to have fixed-term Parliaments, do they think it right that the term should be fixed for four years or for five years? We all agree, I think, that this is quite the outstandingly important issue that remains to be resolved in this legislation apart from the overall issue of whether there should be fixed-term Parliaments, which has been approved in Second Reading. However, the question of four or five years remains wide open. I put it to the House that that may also be something that should be offered for the decision—or at least for the advice—of a wider electorate.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am one of those who is largely in favour of referendums for important constitutional reforms. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, is quite right to ask in what circumstances referendums are appropriate and to say that the matter should be considered by the House.

The Constitution Committee in 2010 used the word “fundamental” in respect of constitutional reforms for which referendums were appropriate. The question arises as to what is meant by fundamental. I accept entirely that a referendum is appropriate in respect of the proposed change in the voting system to AV on the 5 May, as it was appropriate for the European referendum in 1975, which noble Lords will know was the last UK-wide referendum—I am not suggesting that such referendums should take place only every 36 years, or anything like it. However, it is significant that the same Constitution Committee report produced a list—not an exhaustive one—of the type of issue that might be appropriate, in which it included any decision:

“To abolish the Monarchy;

To leave the European Union;

For any of the nations of the UK to secede from the Union;

To abolish either House of Parliament;

To change the electoral system for the House of Commons;

To adopt a written constitution; and

To change the UK’s system of currency”.

The report made clear that that was not intended to be a definitive list.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Does the noble Lord agree that this Bill marks a very significant step towards the creation of a written constitution in this country?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I do not accept that. It might indeed be desirable to have a written constitution, but that is a matter for another day.

I accept that the Bill provides for an important constitutional reform, but it is not a fundamental change to our constitution. I say that for a number of reasons. First, in terms of whether or not a referendum is appropriate, the fixed term proposed is within the existing maximum term of a Parliament. Under the 1911 Act, Parliament can last for up to five years; under this Act a Parliament will last for five years unless either of the trigger mechanisms for an early dissolution is activated.

[The Earl of Onslow]

May I interrupt? Actually, it is a fundamental change. As the Bill is not subject to the 1911 Act, we can veto this Bill because it seeks to extend the life of Parliament. That is a fundamental constitutional change, which in my view should be resisted at all possible costs.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the noble Earl is entirely right to say that the Bill is capable of extending a Parliament under the two-month extension proposal. That is the reason why the Parliament Act does not apply. That does indeed give this House the right to veto the legislation, but it is a non sequitur to suggest that it follows from that, and that alone, that this is a fundamental reform of the type to warrant a referendum.

[Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton]

Can the noble Lord, Lord Marks, explain to me, because I listened to the logic he was developing, how changing a system of voting for a Chamber of Parliament, where that Chamber is already elected, is a greater change than introducing a system of voting for a Chamber of Parliament which is not elected at the moment? I raise this as somebody who is in favour of reform—I do not want to be dismissed as somebody who is not—but I find a real fault line in his argument, unless he is about to conclude that he thinks there should be a referendum on Lords reform.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the noble Baroness’s logic is seductive and attractive, but it misses the point that, as all noble Lords accept, this House accepts the primacy of the House of Commons. Therefore, a change to the voting system for the House of Commons, which alters the entire electoral system for the House that has democratic primacy, should have different weight accorded to it from that of a change to the composition of the upper House.

[Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton]

My Lords, can I just press the noble Lord further? As I understand it, the noble Lord’s party’s view is that AV is, to a degree, an acceptable alternative to the present system of first past the post. However, I believe quite senior members of his party have said they regard AV as a staging post. If your Lordships’ House were to be elected by a system that was further down the staging-post road, would we not be in a difficulty, using the reasoning of the noble Lord’s own party, given that it is not certain that the democratic legitimacy of the House of Commons —which I accept—would be accepted by a more democratically elected second Chamber?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is perhaps addressing a debate that we are yet to have on another occasion. It is well known that in the past we have favoured, and indeed do favour, other electoral systems. It is also well known that the coalition agreement commits us to a proportional system of representation for the election of Members of this House. However, noble Lords will accept, I hope, that that is a matter for another day and what we are now concerned with—if I can just finish my response to the noble Baroness—is considering an amendment which calls for a referendum on the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill and a separate referendum on the question of four years or five. The future electoral system for this House is of interest and of course of some relevance, but it is not central to this point. I give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Cormack]

I am extremely grateful to the noble Lord, but when he read out the list of issues which could be subject to a referendum he mentioned the abolition of the monarchy and the abolition of either House. Does he not accept that, if your Lordships’ House is replaced by a different second Chamber, wholly elected, it has to be abolished first? Therefore, surely there is no logic at all in saying there should not be a referendum on that issue.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I do not accept that. It is not the abolition of a House to change its composition, however attractively the point might be put.

I remind your Lordships’ House that we had a very significant constitutional reform with the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, whereby the highest court in the land, having been constituted by a committee of this House, was replaced when the Supreme Court was established. Nobody then argued that there should be a referendum on that very significant and wide-ranging change in the constitution.

Both the noble Lords, Lord Grocott and Lord Howarth of Newport, addressed the question of four or five years. That is an important point which we are addressing in this Bill and on which there will be a separate debate during this Committee stage, and I would not be at all surprised if either or both of them contributed. However, the point here is not the length of a fixed-term Parliament, which is a matter of judgment and on which many speeches were made at Second Reading, including my own, but whether this is a matter for a referendum.

There are a number of further points. In a lengthy consideration of the Bill by the Constitution Committee —which I might say was not an enthusiastic report endorsing the Bill and the way it had been handled—it was not suggested that this was a matter for a referendum. Had it genuinely been believed at that stage that there were respectable arguments that this was a fundamental issue of a nature that required a referendum, I suggest that it would have been put before the committee and either adopted or rejected.

[Baroness Farrington of Ribbleton]

My recollection is that the Constitution Committee took the view that there should have been pre-legislative scrutiny, which would have led to many of these points being discussed properly, particularly the role and relationship proposed in this Bill between the Prime Minister and the Speaker in another place.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, the noble Baroness is absolutely right to draw attention to the fact that the Constitution Committee thought that pre-legislative scrutiny would have been a good idea. Nevertheless, the committee heard evidence over a number of days and read a great deal of written evidence from some of the leading academics in the land and nowhere was it suggested that this was a referendum issue in my reading of the evidence of the report. That was the point that I was attempting to make.

The other point of importance that I would invite noble Lords to consider is that the principle of fixed-term Parliaments was subject to manifesto commitments of the Labour Party and my own party and in neither case was there a suggestion that it should be the subject of a referendum rather than legislation. The Conservatives embraced that commitment very shortly after the election, and the Members of Parliament elected as Conservatives to represent their constituents did not seek to interpose a referendum before this legislation should become law.

There is a danger, which I urge the House to bear in mind when it considers these amendments, that we move from a representative democracy, which the vast majority of us value a great deal, to government by plebiscite. If you lose sight of the principle that only fundamental changes require referendums, you move some way down that road.

[Lord Grocott]

Did the noble Lord not say in the first part of his remarks that he was very much in favour of referendums? I am not sure how that squares with what he has just said.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I qualified that by saying, “on important matters of constitutional reform”, and I then went on to explain what the Constitution Committee said when they used the term “fundamental”. I stand by that. What I am saying is that, if you extend the number of referendums that you have well outside the ambit of what is fundamental, you move away from representative democracy and towards government by plebiscite. It is a matter for Parliament properly to decide—both the principle and the question of four years or five.

I make one final point about Amendment 57, which the noble Lord, Lord Howarth of Newport, applauded —in spite of the fact that it is his own—and said that he liked its design. He said that the amendment was advisory only. That is entirely wrong since, as drafted, the amendment is a wrecking amendment, as it seeks to impose a mandatory 50 per cent threshold, which means not 50 per cent of those who vote but 50 per cent of the electorate, without which the Bill cannot become law. That is a very high threshold indeed. It means that a turnout of anything less than 50 per cent cannot give effect to the Bill, even if not a single no vote is cast.

[Lord Cormack]

It is nowhere near as high a threshold as has been put in this Bill for a dissolution of Parliament.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, 66 per cent of the House of Commons voting on an occasion when we may expect a turnout of well over 99 per cent is not, in my respectful submission, a very high threshold. The thresholds are different in kind, and my noble friend Lord Cormack knows that perfectly well.

In the recent Welsh referendum we had a turnout of 35 per cent, which was seen as somewhere between respectable and high. Not only do thresholds detract from the view that referendums are valuable, because they involve telling the electorate that we propose to ask for its view and then reserve the right to turn around and reject it after the event, but thresholds of this magnitude, which are mandatory in this way, do nothing for the cause of democracy.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I apologise to your Lordships for intervening at this stage when I was not here for Second Reading, not least because I missed the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which I have had the pleasure of reading since then.

The reason why I was not here on St David’s Day when the Second Reading happened was that, thanks to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, I was at the New Zealand Parliament, which I had the great pleasure of visiting with the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, although he made it home rather faster than I did. When I was there, I discussed the three-year terms that they have in New Zealand, and how business and elections could best be organised around that period. It is true that many people in New Zealand, politicians and civil servants, consider that four years would be a better period. I have to say that they do not even go to five years; it was not on their agenda at all. The interesting thing from the point of view of this debate is that, despite the fact that many would like to move to a four-year period, they have never dared to test that in a referendum with the electors, because from their sample polls and from listening they know that the move from three to four years would be rejected. That is a lesson for us to learn about extending a Parliament’s life. The Government should perhaps heed that.

There is a broader lesson with this amendment, and that is to note the incredible significance that the legislators in New Zealand attach to their electorate. They would not dare even to ask them to extend their term of office without a referendum. They will not do that until they think they can win it. So we should ask the people their view before we entrench anything new in our law. I would even like to put the option of three years as well as four years and five years in that referendum, but I would certainly favour at least going out to ask people for their opinion to find out what suits them rather than suits the politicians who will be elected in those elections.