Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Tuesday 14th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I too welcome the Bill, which develops the system of assistance in the courts using modern technology. I also share the concerns already expressed. I do not propose to repeat those, because they have been expressed at least as well as I could have done. It is important that the new provisions should not in any way restrict the accessibility of justice. The figures showing how many people can use the systems we have now are interesting, and I would like to probe the detail of them. My experience, over quite a long time, has been that government numbers are not infallible, so one needs to look at that. I am sure that there is a need for care in this respect because, apart from anything else, modern systems of communication are very amenable to glitches of various kinds: we have had plenty of them over the years. It is extremely important that the public, especially people who may not be very familiar with these systems, know what is going on.

One thing that worries me somewhat is knowing for sure that you are on the correct government system. If you try to apply for a passport without too much knowledge of the system you can find yourself in some other group that wants you to pay fees for advice, something our generous Government do not require—so far—if you get on to the right site. If there is a system for paying fees online, you want to be sure that they are being paid to the courts, not to some other group who are willing to receive the money but have nothing to offer in return. I submit that the Bill itself should contain a degree of protection for people in this respect. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has already suggested that, and it is certainly worthy of consideration at the next stage.

One of the great features of our courts, over all the years that I have had anything to do with them, and for long before, is that they are very immune to any form of leakage. Even in the most important cases that are eagerly awaited by the public as a whole, you do not find a leak in advance of what the judgment is going to be. That is an extremely precious and important aspect of our justice system. One thing that we must be careful about in using an electronic system is that something of that kind could happen. I would certainly like the Bill to have some procedure for trying to ensure that that does not happen.

The next thing I want to mention is judicial discretion. I was always very conscious of the function of the listing officer in making hearings available for people. The speed of getting a hearing is sometimes vital, so the listing officers are officers of the justice system acting under the general directions of the relevant judges. It is very important that if we introduce a system based on electronics, that element does not disappear.

Next, is the Court of Protection covered by the Bill? Is it a civil proceeding, a family proceeding, or a protective proceeding? Is that different, or not?

I have had representations from the Federation of Small Businesses. Apart from anything else, it wants to be represented on the committee, and I shall come to that aspect in a minute, but it is also anxious about the fees that small businesses have to pay to ensure payment by big companies which just delay payment for as long as they can, until they are taken to court. The small business often has to pay quite a substantial portion of the total amount at stake in fees. That matter should be taken into account, and I hope that if a system of electronic communication is introduced, the fees will be reduced, but there is nothing to suggest that in terms in the Bill, although I believe that it should be looked for.

The quality of the English and United Kingdom justice system—I shall come to the distinction in a minute—is generally attributed to the quality of the judiciary. Your Lordships will be aware that there has been concern recently about the availability of quality for the judiciary. I believe that one of the reasons is that the Government, some time ago, departed from the rule that I understood: if someone is appointed to a secure position from which they cannot be taken except by resolution of both Houses of Parliament, the terms on which the person takes it on are the terms which will continue until the time that person retires, or in another way expires. That was undermined by the decision on judicial pensions, which was made some years ago. I believe that if a person is in top-flight practice at the Bar, certainly in England—it may be true in Scotland too—the amount they have to surrender to become a judge is quite substantial. Therefore, the terms on which they are taken on are of vital importance.

The quality of the judiciary is very important. I am not sure about the costs of these proposals, but I am certain that it is more important to ensure that the arrangements for the appointment of judges and the terms of service of judges are secured in such a way that top people can be invited, with a degree of confidence, to take on a judicial position.

As noble Lords know, I have not spent all my time in the practice of the law of England and it occurred to me to see what happens about Scotland. Lo and behold, Clause 14 provides that the Act will apply in Scotland to the two tribunals,

“to employment tribunals and the Employment Appeal Tribunal; otherwise, to England and Wales only”.

If that is so, how is the committee doing? Noble Lords will find that quite interesting. The procedure for committee appointments is made absolutely explicit. First:

“The Committee is to consist of one person who is a judge of the Senior Courts of England and Wales, appointed to the Committee by the Lord Chief Justice”.


So that is a responsibility for the Lord Chief Justice, but the person has to come from the judiciary or “the Senior Courts”. Noble Lords will know that the last time the constitution was changed, one of the results was that England lost its Supreme Court, so it is now from “the Senior Courts”. The important thing is that it is not from the Supreme Court; therefore the judge in question is a judge who exercises English jurisdiction.

The next person is,

“one person who is either a judge of the Senior Courts of England and Wales, a Circuit Judge or a district judge”.

These are all judicial titles from the English system and that person will be,

“appointed to the Committee by the Lord Chief Justice”.

The next person is,

“a judge of the First-tier Tribunal, a judge of the Upper Tribunal, an Employment Judge or a judge of the Employment Appeal Tribunal”—

there are judges of that type in Scotland but the sentence goes on—

“appointed by the Lord Chief Justice”,

and he does not appoint the judiciary in Scotland at all, so there is no possibility of any of these being Scottish judges.

The next person is,

“one person who is either a barrister in England and Wales, a solicitor of the Senior Courts of England and Wales or a legal executive, appointed to the Committee by the Lord Chancellor”.

It is obvious that these are all systems that apply on this side of the border. I suppose the,

“two other persons appointed to the Committee by the Lord Chancellor”,

might possibly have some relationship with Scotland, but it is by no means certain. Can my noble and learned friend explain how this is supposed to work in relation to the application of the Bill to Scotland?

I very much welcome the Bill but I think it probably requires a fair degree of consideration at later stages.

Northern Ireland (Regional Rates and Energy) (No. 2) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 19th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hay of Ballyore]

I was coming to that point. I know that the Minister is around this brief—he is around every brief, but this one in particular—because we have had so many meetings with him. I think my noble friend Lord McCrea is saying: yes, he can still do what needs to be done, but is there any way legally that might help us to move all this on? The issue is ensuring that whatever is done from here on is legal. Let us try to take the politics out of this, because this is too serious a situation to involve politics. Let us take the politics out of it, deal with this serious situation and try to find a way forward.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, this is undoubtedly an extremely complicated situation, but I think the principle is that when a member of the public makes an investment in a government scheme, that member of the public is entitled to trust the terms on which the scheme was launched. Therefore there can be no doubt that those who invested in the scheme, relying on the Government’s statement of what was involved, are entitled to be protected by the Government from any failure on their part to meet the terms on which the scheme was set up. That rule applies to the United Kingdom Government, but also to the Governments of the devolved Administrations. That is the basic principle which cannot be set aside by any legislation that we may pass here, although the ultimate terms of the performance obligation are a matter that we cannot determine here, for various reasons that have been given. The principle seems to me absolutely clear and sound.

[Lord Trimble (Con)]

My Lords, I think we have just heard a contribution that settles the issue to a large extent and indicates what should be done by the Government when the various reports become available. I say “the various reports” because there are two. There is the statutory inquiry conducted by Patrick Coghlin and the inquiry to be held by the Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee. But there is no overlap here: the first looks to the past and how the scheme was framed and administered, whereas I hope the Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee report will be more focused on the future and how one sorts out the problem beneficially for people. I am a bit worried to see the DUP nodding their heads at this stage; I will not say anything more in case I am accused of being political about the matter, which of course I am not.

The only other point I make is to thank the Government and the Chief Whip for giving us this evening to discuss this matter. It has been commented earlier, and on earlier legislation, that the way legislation is handled here during the regrettable absence of the Northern Ireland Assembly is not itself satisfactory. It was heart-warming to see the spontaneous revolt on the Floor of this House last week against the provisions to rush through this legislation in a way that would not have enabled us to discuss it in the way we have this evening. I am glad the Chief Whip listened and gave us the time, and I also thank the many noble Lords who have come in to listen to this discussion. That too is heart-warming for us.

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[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for affording me the opportunity to make some points of clarification. He is absolutely right to say that I am not in charge of that department. My comments are based on conversations earlier today with senior officials in the department. I cannot instruct them, but the discussions led to that proposal, which I believe would be a step forward for noble Lords this afternoon and this evening, on that basis—not my instruction but rather an acceptance on their part that this would be the right way to move this aspect forward. On the terms of reference, yes, these need to be very clearly understood. Financial hardship must be understood in all its manifest forms and I believe it would be incumbent on all those who are investigating and considering to ensure that all aspects of financial hardship, whatever their source or their cause, are examined in detail to ensure that there is a fair and equitable understanding of the situation. So I think the answer to that is yes.

As for what happens on 1 April if we have not made progress, it is very simple: we will not be able to move forward on this scheme, because as a number of noble Lords noted, we have grandfathered in the clause to end on 1 April. At that point, irrespective of our desire to be able to offer or afford support, without the legal underpinnings we will not be able to do so.

On state aid, there has clearly been a kerfuffle, for want of a better word, in Northern Ireland over what that rate should be, but the one thing that has been clear throughout is that the European Union Commission has had no dubiety about what it should be: it has been very clear that it should be 12%. That this has been, one might argue, misinterpreted by certain individuals in the Province is the reason we are having this wider discussion tonight and why there is a particular scandal being investigated across in Northern Ireland. None the less, we are still bound by that rule—namely, state aid at 12% return—and we cannot move away from that.

I hope those points of clarification help the noble Lord to move forward.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I should like to be absolutely certain that there is nothing in the Bill that damages any legal right that people had in Northern Ireland as a result of dependence on the action of the Northern Irish Government taken on behalf of that Government by authorised officials or Ministers. Because that is the fundamental matter: if that is not affected by the Bill, the way in which matters should be brought forward to encourage that is perfectly reasonable as a way forward. The fundamental point is that the legal rights of those who may have been damaged by their contract with the Northern Irish Government, through Minister or official, would not be touched.

[Lord Duncan of Springbank]

My noble and learned friend makes a useful point. I can happily confirm that this will not affect the legal rights or standing of any of those who have been affected by the scheme thus far.

Withdrawal Agreement: Attorney General’s legal opinion on the Joint Instrument and Unilateral Declaration

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I have had the opportunity to study the earlier and most recent legal opinions of the Attorney-General. I agree with him that as a matter of law there is a risk. But I was a mathematician before I became a lawyer. One has to find out the size of the risk. Every one of us who crossed the street today to come here had to take a risk, did we not? I came yesterday by aeroplane, which also has a risk. The question is: what is the risk? A good deal of the discussion that has just taken place is about what happens in the event of extremes, but the most important way to annihilate the risk is by reaching an agreement that supersedes the protocol altogether. If we want to see how probable an agreement is, we have only to listen to Mr Johnson, who said: “They are keen to sell us their prosecco”. The European Union is as keen to have a free trade agreement with us as we are to have one with it. In fact, its trade is greater towards us than our trade is to the EU. Therefore, the chances are high, to be judged on the facts as they are now, that there will be an agreement to supersede the protocol. That is what one has to measure. So far as I am concerned, the risk is negligible—a very unlikely event. I would feel sorry if the future of our United Kingdom, in this connection, were determined by an appreciation of a so-called risk that is practically negligible.

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

Just to deal with “egregious” first, surely the word derives from the Latin “e grege”—

Non-Contentious Probate (Fees) Order 2018

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, noble Lords will not be surprised to hear that I have been in this area before. Indeed, in my time there was a very serious question as to whether the courts service should be dealt with at all by fees. It was thought that it was a public service for which the taxpayer should pay. However, that contention has gradually passed away. The only occasion on which I was overturned in judicial review was in relation to a fee that was being charged under regulations which were signed as approved by the heads of division as well as myself. Notwithstanding all that, we did not succeed: the Divisional Court held that our fee structure was slightly defective and we immediately tried to put it right. An interesting result of that, which I must say is dear to me, about the administration of justice at the time when I had responsibility for it, was that the advocate, the barrister who defeated me and the others in the court, was nominated for silk shortly after and wrote to me to say how fair the system seemed to be.

The point as I see it is that the ordinary rule is that an amount charged as a fee which is substantially more than the cost of the service would be a tax, unless authorised by statute. That is where Section 180 comes in, as has been very clearly explained. Exactly what is done about it is a matter of discretion given to the Lord Chancellor. Here, there is a distinction between the bigger estates and the small estates justifying that kind of approach, which my noble friend Lady Browning referred to. She is a bit anxious about the middle and might prefer to see the bigger bit at the top and a smaller bit at the middle. However, I am not going to enter into that; I am just saying that it is quite impossible, in my view, to say that this is unconstitutional. The matter is one for the discretion of the Lord Chancellor and I entirely agree with the view that the courts service urgently needs as much money as it can lawfully get.

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I understand the concerns expressed by noble Lords, but I also believe that these measures deserve support. I declare an interest as an executor of the estate of a relative who would need to pay these higher fees. Nobody likes the idea of paying fees but someone has to pay for the courts system and, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay have both explained, as have other noble and learned Lords, this is a valid use of ministerial powers.

I was critical of the previous proposals in 2017, which seemed to me excessive, but I am delighted that the Government have listened. Some 60% of estates will pay just £250—not that different from now—and 25,000 more of the poorest estates will be lifted out of probate fees altogether. More than half of all estates will pay nothing. If we pass the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, the entire proposed reforms would fall, so more of the poorest estates would pay higher fees while the largest estates would escape the higher fees. The other place did not oppose this. How will it look if this House prevents a measure that would ask higher-value estates to pay more to help lower-value estates? This money will be ring-fenced and it will help secure access to justice, which is a fundamental British value that has to be paid for.

I understand that there is concern about the level of fees. I think there are times when we have to recognise that there are issues for which cross-subsidies are relevant. In terms of fees, if we look at other areas of the economy, estate agent fees and solicitors’ fees are very often charged as a proportion of the value being transacted, if you like. An estate agent probably does not have to do a lot more work to sell a house worth £500,000 than one valued at £5 million, yet they will be paid much more in so-called fees. So I do think that there is an element of proportionality here. A £500,000 estate will pay £750. The consumer group Which? estimates that an estate worth £500,000 would face enormous legal fees. For example, the bank will charge £20,000 on average; solicitors will charge £10,000 on average; the funeral, which has to be paid for, will cost £5,000 or £10,000, perhaps more. So the idea that the maximum amount of £6,000 is being charged in order to help access to justice for domestic violence victims, mental health review tribunals or social security and child support does not seem to me to be disproportionate. I hope noble Lords will accept the idea that this is a necessary change that fulfils an important social purpose about which the Government are entirely entitled to take such decisions.

Brexit: Legal Position of Withdrawal Agreement

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Monday 3rd December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble Baroness, the then First Minister’s record on when he did and when he did not receive legal advice from the law officers was somewhat uncertain, if I can put it in those terms. I therefore do not believe that any of that sets a precedent for the present situation.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, it has been the legal position for many years that when a legal adviser advises a client, that advice is confidential. It is not for me to criticise what went on earlier in the other place, but it seems to me that it had forgotten that the Attorney-General has an absolute duty to advise the House of Commons. It could have asked him to do so and answer any questions of law that it could think of putting to him. That is the correct way to deal with such a matter. Reference has been made to what happened in the past, which I believe was very much in accordance with that.

In my view, it is impossible as a matter of law for the legal adviser to say that he will publish legal advice which has been given to someone else in accordance with an obligation of confidentiality. So far as the Government and Parliament are concerned, that is no disadvantage, because they have the advantage that the Attorney-General is the adviser of the House of Commons—as he is the adviser of this House also. He is bound, in connection with that advice, to answer any questions that may be put to him on the relevant law. I cannot see any better system than that for reconciling the two fundamental problems about the position of a legal adviser.

The Attorney-General is responsible for keeping that confidentiality unless the client thinks the advice can be disclosed without any problem, but that depends on the nature of the arrangement. So far as I am concerned, by far the best arrangement is that the Attorney-General personally comes to the House of Commons and gives his advice, answering any questions that are required. That is what happened, as far as I understand it, today. There are enough problems with this Brexit business, which we are going to discuss over three short days in due course, without trying to complicate them with material about the conventions of the UK that, as far as I know, have lasted a long time and been extremely satisfactory.

[Noble Lords]

Question!

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

In my view, the fact that the House of Commons is entitled to get any advice from the Attorney-General that it wishes is the answer to this question.

Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 30th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, my intention is to speak about Clause 4 only and the legal situation which is the background to it. I am taking no position on the substantive issues which underlie the clause, but it is quite clear that the intention of those who promoted the Motion put to approve Clause 4 as an amendment in the House of Commons, on a free vote, was to bring the law on abortion in Northern Ireland into line with modern law on the other side of the Irish Sea. The position is that abortion has been made a devolved subject. Therefore, the only statutory authority with authority to alter the statutes and statutory instruments is the Legislative Assembly of Northern Ireland and Ministers of that Assembly. There is no power whatsoever in the United Kingdom Parliament to interfere with that while it is devolved.

The noble Lords, Lord Steel of Aikwood and Lord Bruce of Bennachie, mentioned that there is a border in the Irish Sea on this point. That is certainly true. There are borders between here and Scotland on a number of things, including, for example, free prescriptions in the health service. It is part of devolution that the law on one side of the devolved border may be different from the law on the other side. I am a little surprised that exponents of devolution found that surprising, but that is the fact. That is part of the background of the law on this matter. The devolved issue is one, as I say, for the Northern Ireland Assembly and Ministers acting as Ministers of that Assembly.

Where that is the law, the question of the Human Rights Act is important. Your Lordships will recollect that the Human Rights Act does not modify existing law. There is a power in the courts to declare a provision of British law—this would apply in Northern Ireland as well—incompatible with the convention provision in the Human Rights Act. That decision of the courts does not affect the law unless and until it is acted on by Parliament. Perhaps the best example of that was the relationship between the Westminster Parliament and prisoners’ voting rights. That was declared incompatible with the convention rights by a Scottish court many years ago and the English court followed it, saying it was not necessary to do it twice because there was nothing wrong with the way that the Scots had done it—which is a compliment that I always like to hear. Anyway, that is what happened, and it remained the law of the United Kingdom for a long time. There have been some slight modifications recently but the idea that the Human Rights Act changes existing statutes is wrong. It is part of the provision of the Human Rights Act that it does not do so.

Therefore, the only authority to alter the existing law and bring it into conformity with the Human Rights Act is the legislature in question, if it is a statute that is in issue. Therefore, there is no question that the Secretary of State could by guidance alter the law in this matter, which is to a considerable extent defined by statutes which are in existence and in force in Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State is mandated to do this—she must do this—but if she were to make an order, it would be immediately set aside because it is quite clear from the statistics that have been given that not everybody in Northern Ireland is of exactly the same mind in connection with abortion. If it were so, it might pass without any challenge but in Northern Ireland that is extremely unlikely. Therefore, if the Secretary of State were to make an order trying to escape the existing statutes of Northern Ireland relevant to this subject, she would be immediately struck down as doing something which she is not entitled to do. The fact that she would have been asked to do that by Parliament is an extraordinary situation.

I know that those who moved this amendment in the House of Commons did so with that in mind—that this might be a way forward—but in this House we must take the view that that is not possible. I tabled an amendment for Committee—the last one, which will presumably come fairly late this evening—about that. I am proposing to move the amendment so that discussion will be possible but I do not intend to press it to a Division because abortion has always been—rightly, because it is a matter of conscience—on a free vote. This amendment was passed on a free vote in the House of Commons and therefore I do not intend to press it here. There may be others who want to do that and the fact I have tabled the amendment makes that possible. I just make it clear that I am not going to do that because it would be completely ineffective in producing the result that the movers of it wanted.

Northern Ireland (Executive Formation and Exercise of Functions) Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 30th October 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, my response to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is that of course the devolved institutions are not even sitting in Northern Ireland at the moment, so we face two issues in this respect. The first is that the Northern Ireland Assembly should be given an opportunity to address this matter. Clearly, it does not have that opportunity at the moment because it is not sitting. The Bill seeks to ensure that the Northern Ireland Assembly does sit and is sustaining an Executive by the end of next March. The second point concerns the situation if the Assembly is not, even when it is sitting, able to address this issue, I do not believe it is consistent with the poll that the noble Lord has just cited that the people of Northern Ireland would regard it as satisfactory for the Assembly in Northern Ireland not to address this issue of fundamental rights. One way or another, in a short time, this issue must be resolved. It will not be satisfactory either for the Assembly in Northern Ireland to fail to address this issue or for this Parliament to allow fundamental breaches of civil rights to take place in a substantial part of the United Kingdom. I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 16 has the honour to be joined to the two amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, Amendments 10 and 11. It seems to me that Amendment 10 breaches a fundamental aspect of the constitution, namely that it is not right for anyone not connected with the prosecution to intervene to alter or to direct a prosecution decision. That is what Amendment 10 does. Amendment 11 again breaches the constitutional rule that our judiciary is not to be directed by departmental guidance. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has no authority whatever to direct the prosecuting authorities in Northern Ireland not to prosecute existing statutory provisions there, and certainly no authority to order the judiciary in Northern Ireland not to obey a part of the rule that is there already.

Amendment 16, which was passed in the House of Commons, is intended to deal with both matters as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has explained them. It seeks to get the Secretary of State to issue guidance, which will have effect as they wish, but the amendment is so drawn that it does not specify that the guidance has to be of a particular kind. It is obvious from the way it was introduced in the Commons that that is what they would like to see, but the amendment does not require the Secretary of State to do anything that is unconstitutional or wrong. That is why, as far as I am concerned, I shall not press the amendment. It is a matter that was decided on a free vote, on the issue of abortion—which is always subject to a free vote in both Houses of Parliament—and therefore I shall not press it to a Division. However, I thought it might be necessary to have further discussion on it. Having regard to the amount of discussion that took place at Second Reading, it may not be necessary to do more than introduce it and see whether anybody wants to speak.

As for the first two amendments, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, these are quite unconstitutional. Indeed, the first, on interference in a prosecution, was a constitutional disaster in, I think, the 1920s, and as a result the constitution of the United Kingdom has not had the law officers be part of the Cabinet ever since. Decisions about prosecution are not Cabinet decisions; they are the responsibility of the law officers. In Northern Ireland, in the present situation, the Director of Public Prosecutions is the authority. Nobody has authority under our constitution to tell him what to do in relation to an existing law. The amendment is framed on the basis that this is still an existing law not to be enforced by the department. That is a completely unlawful order. The Secretary of State would be quite wrong to give guidance on that aspect in Amendment 10, and in relation to the judiciary in Amendment 11.

Amendment 16, which I have tabled, is the way that the House of Commons decided to deal with this same matter, which the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, will improve on with his amendments. The Commons agreed the amendment by a majority of about 100. As far as I am concerned, it can stand, because it does not direct the Secretary of State to do anything unlawful. It obviously hopes that the Secretary of State may manage to do something that the Commons had not quite thought of how to do itself. Anyway, that is the way it is. There is no attempt in Clause 4, as it is now as part of the Bill, to direct the Secretary of State to do anything that is necessarily unlawful.

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[Lord Bruce of Bennachie]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Alderdice has made a fairly constructive suggestion, which has already been replicated in the Republic, with quite dramatic results. But my question relates to the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. I accept that the law is where it is and that if it is devolved, it is for the Northern Ireland Assembly, which does not exist, to change the law. However, the Supreme Court has already indicated that it questions whether or not the law in Northern Ireland is compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, and has indicated that if an individual case was brought, it is likely to rule that it is not. In those circumstances, if a ruling was made that said that the law in Northern Ireland is not consistent with the convention, but there is no Assembly and no devolution, what is the mechanism by which the law can be changed to bring it into line with the European convention?

The issue on gay marriage could also move in that direction. It has not yet but given the acceptance of gay marriage more and more widely across the world, it may well become an issue where human rights law says that the right to gay marriage is a human right. If that became the case, somebody would need to change the law to bring it into line with the convention. In the absence of an Assembly—which would have to do it, whether it liked it or not, but is incapacitated because it does not exist—who would do it?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, the answer is that the Human Rights Act makes it absolutely plain that the declaration of incompatibility does not of itself change the law. If the law is to be changed, that has to be done by the appropriate legislature. In this case, because of the devolution, that would be the Assembly in Northern Ireland if it was functioning. Because of the devolution, that is the way it is: it is the Legislative Assembly that has the power to do this. There is no question of the Secretary of State being able to do it by guidance. That is out of the question. The Human Rights Act made that very plain.

There was quite an important discussion on this during the passage of the Human Rights Bill. Some people thought that the courts should be able to overrule existing statutes that were contrary to the human rights convention. But the politicians of that day, including Jack Straw, were very keen on the view that in our constitution Parliament should be supreme and the courts should not be able to overturn Acts of Parliament. That is a matter for Parliament itself. Of course, as I said at Second Reading, the great example of that in our arrangements recently has been the issue of prisoners’ voting rights because it was declared incompatible and yet Parliament decided not to change the law for some considerable number of years.

--- Later in debate ---

Tabled by

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

16: Clause 4, page 4, line 4, leave out from “State” to end of line 15 and insert “shall issue guidance to Northern Ireland departments on the exercise of their functions in a manner which is compatible with section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998”

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I said earlier that I would move this amendment, but since it has been grouped with the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, I think we have had plenty of opportunity to discuss it, so I will not move it now.

Amendment 16 not moved.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 27th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, my amendment relates to the personal injury discount rate, which is the subject of Part 2 of the Bill. Clause 10(1) provides for new Section A1 of the Damages Act 1996. Two of its provisions are important to what I am about to say. One directs the court to apply a rate of return, as may, from time to time, be prescribed by an order made by the Lord Chancellor. The other, which I am concerned about, is new Section A1(2), which states:

“Subsection (1) does not however prevent the court taking a different rate of return into account if any party to the proceedings shows that it is more appropriate in the case in question”.


The Minister will recall that I raised this issue on Report when I moved what was then Amendment 50 on the Marshalled List. That amendment sought to tailor the wording of subsection (2) to address a problem that had been the subject—the result, I should say—of decisions in the Court of Appeal in the cases Warriner v Warriner and Warren v Northern General Hospital Trust, following the House of Lords case in Wells v Wells in 1999.

The problem that has arisen as a result of those cases in the Court of Appeal, which was expounded with some care by Lord President Carloway in his judgment in Tortolano v Ogilvie Construction Ltd in 2013, is that there is a very tight straitjacket on any use of subsection (2) in the Damages Act 1996, which is the predecessor of the provision in this Bill in cases where people seek a different rate of return from that prescribed due to the circumstances of the particular case.

Each of these three cases, the two from the Court of Appeal and the one from the Court of Sessions in Scotland, involved injuries of maximum severity—perhaps a prime example of cases where litigants would wish to have a more generous rate of return. However, in each of these cases, it was said that that could not be done on the ground that there had to be an exceptional case-specific factor before this could be achieved.

I was concerned that the provision in the Bill simply reproduces the language of the 1996 Act without any attempt to suggest that the approach the courts have mandated should be any different in this case. I was seeking a relaxation to allow a case where, if the court felt that the award was less than adequate after applying the prescribed discount rate, it could be altered to allow a better rate of return in recognition of the compensation needed to meet the loss incurred or to be incurred during the rest of the claimant’s lifetime.

The noble and learned Lord may recall that in our discussion on Report, reported in Hansard on 12 June, he said that he wished to give further consideration to the matter I had raised so that he could come to a view on whether something might be done to tailor the wording of the provision to address what he described as “the almost complete guillotine” that is in place as a result of the two Court of Appeal decisions. As he put it, there was a balancing act to be achieved and he undertook to look at that.

It is fairly plain from the fact that there is no government amendment on this issue at Third Reading that he and his team have not been able to come up with a form of wording that would address my point without undermining the policy that underpins the scheme which this part of the Bill seeks to lay down. I am grateful to him and his team for meeting me to go over this point last week so that I could understand the position he has adopted, which I fully appreciate. It is a very difficult issue on which to find a form of words that would achieve what I sought to achieve. In the course of that meeting, I suggested that in view of that position it might be better to delete this subsection from the Bill altogether, which is what my amendment would do.

To elaborate a little more on the reasoning behind the amendment, the phrase which the noble and learned Lord used—“almost complete guillotine”—describes the situation very well, although in rather brutal language. I do not criticise that, because the Court of Appeal in its decision was building on what this House said in Wells v Wells in 1999. In that case, we said that the aim of the solution that we adopted in finding an appropriate discount rate was to create as much certainty as possible. Lord Steyn said that only in exceptional circumstances should a party be entitled to reopen the debate. The idea was to close down the expensive and time-consuming business of trying to present a different rate of return from that laid down by the court, the House or the Lord Chancellor.

The problem is that what such exceptional circumstances might be nobody has been able to discover in almost 20 years of the provision’s existence. Any idea that they could be founded on the nature or gravity of the injuries seems to have been completely cut off by the Court of Appeal. My point is that it is very difficult to see what value, if any, can be achieved by retaining this provision if there is to be no change to its wording. It has been a dead letter for some time and it seems rather a pity to reproduce a dead letter in fresh legislation. Indeed, retaining it risks raising false hopes of achieving something that it cannot achieve—indeed, according to the Government’s policy, something it ought not to be able to achieve—which is altering the discount rate in these cases. My suggestion, which I made at our meeting last week, was that it might be better to face the fact now and to delete the provision. Having made that suggestion, I thought it right to table the amendment for discussion so that the Minister could at least report to the House on the view he now takes, having had time to think about my suggestion.

It is right to draw attention to the fact that the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers has circulated a briefing among some of your Lordships in which it indicates that it opposes the amendment. As I understand its letter, that is for two reasons. One is that a court should retain the ability to apply a different discount rate, particularly in cases of injury of maximum severity. That is an example of wishful thinking in view of the decisions I referred to. It is clear that any attempt to do that in that kind of case will not succeed, which is why I am so concerned about the repetition of this amendment in the Bill.

The other reason is rather more fundamental. If I might read what the association says, it puts it this way:

“The ability for a judge to apply a different discount rate is an appropriate safeguard against any abrupt changes in the financial market. While the proposed legislation provides for regular reviews of the discount rate, a scheduled review could be too late if there is a sudden change in the market. The discount rate could be too high, and it could be years until the next review when the rate could be corrected. In the meantime, injured people will be undercompensated, and will be in fear of what happens when their money runs out”.


As I understand the system that Part 2 of the Bill seeks to lay down, it is intended to have the process reviews carried out at regular intervals, with a view to having certainty between each review that the courts would be obliged to apply, subject to the provision I am concerned about. With respect, the Government have to consider very carefully whether the point the association raises is one they would be willing to accept—in other words, that it should be open ground for parties to seek to attack the prescribed discount rate between reviews because of changes in the market. We would get back to the kind of uncertain situation that we were so concerned about in Wells; we did our best in the reasoning in that case to address our seeking certainty and to have the matter addressed in only exceptional circumstances.

For what it might be worth, the wording of subsection (2) does not permit an across-the-board change to the discount rate because it talks about a different rate being taken if a party can show that it is,

“appropriate in the case in question”,

which suggests that one is taking a particular case out of the generality that deserves special treatment, rather than something across the board, which is what I think the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers is addressing.

I have said enough to indicate that there are reasons for concern as to why this provision is still in the Bill, and to ask whether it should still be there and possibly whether, as the Bill proceeds through the other House, further thought might be given to its wording or its presence in the clause. I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, it is fairly plain that this phrase was used by me more than once around this time. One area in which it was used was fixed sentences in criminal cases, because there was a feeling that laying a particular sentence or assigning a particular rate tended to deprive judges of their inherent discretion.

In the two judgments referred to, the Court of Appeal indicated that it felt it was given no discretion. It was enough to get me through the difficulties that I had at that time. Therefore, whether it should remain is a question I find rather difficult. I am not keen to remove anything that gives the presiding judge in a particular case some degree of discretion. If the courts have held that such sentences do not give that, it is rather difficult. I cannot think of a better phrase; needless to say, it occupied my attention quite a lot at the time and was hotly debated. Obviously, my noble and learned friend the Minister has given the phrase consideration and I would be interested to hear what he has to say.

Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill [HL]

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 20th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I will immediately take up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about consolidation. It is a rather important function of Parliament, but it is not a particularly attractive one. I served on the Consolidation Committee for some time. I remember that it is a committee of both Houses. We had the greatest difficulty in securing a quorum for the committee to proceed—and not because of the absence of Members of the House of Lords.

When I first looked at the Bill, what astonished me was that court staff were going to be authorised to advise judges on the law. I thought that that was rather strange. I thought that judges were supposed to know the law before they got to that position. Of course, when you look at it more carefully, the judges are judges of the family court and justices of the peace. There will be professional judges in the family court from time to time, as well as judges who are there effectively as magistrates. As I understand it—and certainly for all the time that I have known anything about it—justices’ clerks have always been responsible for giving legal advice to magistrates in magistrates’ courts. That was dispensed with only when the court had a stipendiary magistrate because he, being stipendiary, was thought to know the law and therefore not to require the advice of the justices’ clerk.

It is a sad day for me to see the justices’ clerk’s title being set aside in a schedule to a Bill in Parliament. The office of justices’ clerk is very old and very distinctive, but it will be replaced. Let me find the passage. Paragraph 7(a) of the Schedule says that,

“for ‘justices’ clerk’ substitute ‘designated officer for the court’”.

Apart from anything else, it seems a little longer, so it will take longer to type—but it is anything but a distinguished-looking title.

Seeing my noble friend Lord Baker of Dorking not far away reminds me of a fact about justices’ clerks that I learned long ago. It was the habit of the Lord Chancellor to attend the annual meeting of the justices’ clerks of England and Wales. To one of these I went and I was told by the president of the Justices’ Clerks’ Society, who had recently been at an international conference of their brethren, that he had been told by the people there that they were astonished that a court official as important as a justices’ clerk should be responsible to a Minister who was also responsible for prisons. Of course, in those days the justices’ clerks were the responsibility of the Home Office, and the Home Secretary certainly had the undoubted privilege of being the Minister for Prisons.

That encouraged me to think that it was time for a change, so we had an arrangement under which the justices’ clerks’ policy department moved from the Home Office to the Lord Chancellor’s Department. I regret to say that that very important judicial development has now been reversed, in that the justices’ clerks, with all the other court staff, are in the political area of the Ministry of Justice, which has, as one of its most important functions, looking after prisons. So the whole improvement has been reversed, which is what you may call progress. So far as I am concerned, I think it rather unfortunate that there needs to be change of this title—but perhaps more enlightened people can advise me whether there is any option.

Another provision in the Bill changes the names of some officers. One that I would like to suggest, which my noble and learned friend knows all about, is the district judge (magistrates’ court). That title was suggested instead of “stipendiary magistrate” because it was thought that reference to remuneration was not quite the right thing for somebody of that order. Therefore, this is what has happened. So far as I am concerned, after a good deal of time during which this has been running, it would be quite a good idea to forget the bracketed “magistrates’ court”. In the Bill we are talking about judges getting legal advice who are in fact lay people, whereas the district judge sitting in a magistrates’ court is quite a distinct officer, so the necessity for the rather long title has now been removed.

One other point I will mention is not in the Bill, but the Bill changes the names of judicial officers and some of the masters now have a different title. I was in Edinburgh last Thursday when the President of the Supreme Court gave a lecture. One of the important functions of the Supreme Court is that it is the Supreme Court for the whole of the United Kingdom. Apparently when it was created—I learned this on Thursday—the staff of the Lord Chancellor’s Department wrote to the Scottish authorities to say that the Supreme Courts of Scotland were now required to change their name to something else. Not entirely to my surprise, they got a letter back to say that they were proposing to do no such thing and there are Supreme Courts in Scotland still.

However, the great jurisdiction of England and Wales has no Supreme Court; it is the Senior Courts. I do not know whether there is a junior court—I do not think expressly so; no doubt the magistrates’ courts and possibly the family court are part of that section. Surely it is time to recognise that the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is not a court of England and Wales. Therefore, there is no reason why we should not have the old names—the High Court and the Court of Appeal, as they were for a long time before the Supreme Court. I think that this suggestion probably comes within the Long Title of the Bill, but I would be glad to know whether it can be contemplated before I put down an amendment for that purpose.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th June 2018 Lords Chamber

Should we leave this to the judges? I have the greatest respect for judges—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf cited what Lord Justice Jackson said about the role of judges—but one of the problems is that judges rarely see these cases. This is the murky world of grubby claims preyed on by a number of parasitic organisations which have created an industry. We can go on agreeing that there is a problem and restating the problem but these reforms will not drive it away—it will spring up elsewhere—but if we wreck this part of the Bill we will be failing to acknowledge the racket and walking by on the other side. Premiums for our children and grandchildren will continue to rise and our necks, collectively, will remain the weakest in Europe.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord McNally (LD)]

My Lords, I have some trepidation in speaking before a former Lord Chancellor does, but perhaps what I have to say will help. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, for reminding the House that I was the Minister who took through the LASPO Bill and I have been watching the Labour Front Bench nodding in unison at every word that could possibly embarrass the Government. However, the origins of what we are doing now lie with the last Labour Government, who shared then the growing cross-party consensus that we were becoming a more litigious society, driven by a compensation culture and a determination to have our day in court—the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, referred to Jack Straw’s campaigning on whiplash—and the response to that was the setting up of the Jackson report under Sir Rupert Jackson.

It is interesting to note that one of the reasons for the setting up of the Jackson report under the Labour Government was that the costs in civil litigation were often disproportionate to the issues at stake. Lord Justice Jackson, who has just retired, spoke at the Cambridge law faculty on 5 March 2018 and, reflecting on his reforms, he said that the problem was that,

“Almost everyone perceives the public interest as residing in a state of affairs which coincides with their own commercial interests”—

he might have said professional interests as well.

My locus in this is not as a lawyer—I have told the House before that when I was a Minister I once said to a visiting distinguished American lawyer, “I must explain that I am not a lawyer”, and he said, “Then I shall speak very slowly”—and, given the array of legal advice and talent we have already heard, I tiptoe into this with trepidation. This is based partly on a family experience of a whiplash, which was clearly fraudulent but the insurers thought that the cost of defending was greater than simply settling. That left me with the experience of not only a fraudulent claim but a fraudulent claim which was sustained by the obvious collusion of both the solicitors and the doctor concerned. Therefore, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, is right to talk about a racket in which many respectable professions are involved. Those overseeing those professions have a duty of care to root out those who are complicit in these frauds.

As I have said, there was a growing cross-party consensus that something must be done. I confess that seven years ago I answered a Question from the Dispatch Box assuring the House of the urgency with which the Government were dealing with the issue of whiplash. I say to my Front Bench and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, for whom the affection and respect I have is overwhelming, that I worry his amendment is just another one kicking the problem down the road when everybody else who speaks on it recognises that there is a problem. This has been said on a number of occasions: we are dealing with not the kind of catastrophic life-changing injuries that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, often refers to when we discuss medical negligence, but the very lowest level of claims where, as the noble Lord again said, many people would not even think of claiming if they were not spurred on by the claims management industry out of its own self-interest.

I fully endorse what my noble friend Lord Marks said about the need for others to take responsibility, not least the industry itself, for fighting fraud and making attempted fraud not worth while. I worry that the legislation says that we need a medical certificate. Somebody said, maybe in a private briefing, that there was one doctor who had a kind of Roneo of letters that he just signed. If you are going to have a medical check in this, you have to make sure that it is not part of the fraud because in the past it has been.

Nevertheless, it is rather sad that we have this collection of amendments. I look forward to the usual forensic dissection of them by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. There are some good and some not so good ideas in there, but I do not want us to see something that becomes a wrecking amendment when we have waited for far too long for this. Perhaps because I am not a lawyer I do not share the fear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, that we are setting some terrible precedent that will weaken the role of the judiciary. I do not see that at this very low end of the process. I hope that, in our usual way in this House, we can extract some of the good ideas that have been put forward but not lose the sense of urgency with which the Bill, at last, tries to address a real problem in a practical way.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I will speak primarily about the amendments that my noble and learned friend Lord Woolf has proposed. This part of the Bill is concerned only with claims for pain and suffering. It has nothing to do with any other form of loss. Other forms of loss are easily quantifiable, but loss arising from pain and suffering is a development of the law that has very little in the way of structure.

When I was a junior at the Scottish Bar long ago these matters were often the subject of jury claims. Pain and suffering was an element in a jury claim. The judges were warned against suggesting a figure to the jury. You can imagine how difficult it was to provide a summing up that dealt with that. I remember well that one of the senior judges that I knew had a formula in which he said, “This is a sum to mark your sense of the pain and suffering that the claimant has suffered”. That was done by juries; it was before the time that judges were involved in this, and therefore it was a jury question. It has all the character of a jury question in the sense that there are no rules that I know of—none has so far been quoted—to determine the amount to be given. How has that been done? As my noble friend has just quoted from the judicial guidance, it has been done by collecting what others have decided in other cases. There is nothing specifically judicial about that. I think almost any of us could manage to deal with that; you do not need to be a very experienced judge to do that kind of calculation.