Modern Slavery Bill
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I have Amendment 36 in this group, and I have put my name also to the amendment moved by the noble Baroness. I shall take the amendments in the group in reverse order. Amendment 36 would provide that a compensation order could be made to reflect injury and so on resulting not just from the principal offence, if that is the way that one should describe it, but from other relevant offences taken into consideration by the court when it determines the sentence.
The amendment comes from Section 130 of the 2000 Act, which is the subject of Clause 10(1). When I read that section, I saw the reference to offences taken into account in sentencing and wondered whether it needed to be made explicit in the Bill. If it is implicit, fine; if it is not covered, it should be.
My comment on the noble Lord’s amendment is that while obviously we are on the same page as him, I would hope that any provision that results from this debate will allow for claims not only in the county court but in the High Court. The county court is the court for lower claims and the High Court for higher claims, as is the case with all civil claims. I think that we agree that the damage to individuals can sometimes be very great.
One of many reasons why a civil claim would be appropriate is that those who have survived forced labour, slavery or exploitation have different levels of vulnerability, different reactions and different responses. Some are more resilient than others. Current civil remedies may not provide a remedy for those who are resilient enough not to suffer an injury, such as a diagnosable psychiatric condition.
There are, of course, recognised bases for bringing civil claims in tort, contract and employment, but often they do not adequately reflect the gravity of the situation. I add to the mix the possibility of exemplary damages and perhaps civil remedies being available to be pursued against not only those who committed the offence but those who knew or ought to have known—I am picking up language from elsewhere—of the offence and who have benefited from it.
I conclude by saying that I am aware that, for some, the experiences they have suffered are articulated in comments such as, “Twelve years and no money”. That is the way that some victims are able to put it, because they cannot necessarily express everything that they have undergone, but many years for no pay is something keenly felt, and the noble Baroness’s amendment would meet that.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I wonder whether anything covered under Clauses 1, 2 and 4, creating these criminal offences, is not already, under the ordinary law, a civil wrong. If it is, it would carry a claim of damages and other remedies for civil wrongs with it, such as injunction. If I am wrong about that, this is a good move. On the other hand, if I happen to be right about it, the people who are wronged before this becomes law would have a right of action which the Bill cannot confer on them until it is enacted. I also wonder whether there may be more scope in the civil remedies that exist now in respect of the people who are involved in the perpetration—not the actual perpetrators, but those who organise it and are behind it; they are sometimes called the brains. Whether that is appropriate, I shall not comment. We need to think about that question in relation to this group of amendments. I am all in favour of having people who damage others under conduct which is made criminal by Clauses 1, 2 and 4 being subject to civil action. What I am wondering is whether that is not true already.
Lord Stevens of Kirkwhelpington (CB)
My Lords, I, too, support the noble Baroness’s amendment. These cases are incredibly difficult to investigate and even more difficult to bring to court to a successful conclusion. To have some remedy which would allow more people an avenue to justice, bearing in mind the problem of resources that the police service has at present, surely has to be a good thing. Equally, I take the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. A large number of people in this country have been damaged beyond our imagination and for them to wait for justice in the way that some of them have to is not acceptable. Sometimes these cases will take year after year to bring to successful conclusions. I for one totally support what the amendment is aimed at doing: to assist those people, either financially or otherwise, to come to a conclusion in some of these cases.
I go back to my original point. These cases are difficult to investigate and take a long time and then people have to come to court and prove the cases. I would add that I went to America in 2004 and can support the American system. I looked at it closely and it works. I think that it has now gone beyond the 33 states to about 42. It works in the American system and may be one thing that we can take back from America to use successfully in this country.
Lord Bates
The noble Lord was gracious enough to mention that he is not a lawyer, and I join in that fellowship of non-lawyers. I am quickly looking for guidance from my team, but I think guidance is about to come from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, I think the situation is that if there is a criminal conviction for a civil wrong that, of itself, will be sufficient to justify the civil action and to permit the judge in the criminal court to make a compensation order. There are arrangements for the proper linking of the two. You cannot get money twice for the same wrong, so there is a connection between the compensation order you can get in respect of the criminal conviction and what can happen in a civil action related thereto.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, raised questions about whether the existing civil protections are adequate. I have not seen any particular comment on that. I raise that as a question. I am not saying for sure that all the matters covered would be fully covered by the civil law, but I rather suspect that they may well be. The important thing is that a criminal conviction certainly helps in respect of civil action, but it is not necessary to have a criminal conviction to have a civil action. These two are independent.
Modern Slavery Bill
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Lawrence of Clarendon (Lab)
My Lords, I add my voice in support of Amendment 1A, which proposes a new Clause 1. All of us in your Lordships’ House and in the other place speak with one voice when we say that the intent of the Bill is good. We are as one in our agreement that the overarching ideal is to eradicate the festering sore of modern slavery from our society.
The reason we are gathered together on this is the outrage that burns within each of us that children can be spirited across borders against their will; that girls, boys, women and men are forced into sexual servitude; that some in our country have to work back-breaking hours for little or no pay, with the promise of only a beating if they try to escape; and that in this day and age, when so much progress has been secured, so many still live lives under the violent control of others, exploited for their labour and robbed of any free will or hope. However, it is not for our outrage that the Bill should exist. The current Bill suggests that our primary objective is to punish the perpetrators. While I understand that our first outraged impulse may be to punish the perpetrators in anger for their inhumanity, we must remember that we are acting for the humanity of the victims—for the thousands in this country and millions around the world who are locked away, isolated and invisible.
At Second Reading, I explained my view that all the people we represent in this country—whether they are born here or not—are our children. This perspective should set our standard for how victims should be treated: with compassion for their suffering and the will to give them a chance of a better future. It means, first, ensuring that victims are recognised and treated by public organisations, including the police, as victims, not criminals. This should be done not only out of compassion but from necessity, because without victims’ co-operation we will never secure the convictions we need to end modern slavery. It means putting their interests first in the process of tackling the perpetrators. As I mentioned earlier, Anthony Steen, the Government’s former special envoy on human trafficking, has made it clear that only a Bill with victims’ interests at its heart will be effective in enforcement. It means the Government considering the potential impact of their broader legislation, rather than instigating measures such as the 2012 visa changes for overseas domestic workers, which dramatically increased the risk of domestic slavery. It means the Government doing more, through the proposed anti-slavery commissioner and in partnership with other organisations, to help victims recover and build new lives of dignity and opportunity.
Saying this is not to suggest that we should not punish perpetrators: of course we must. It is to say that the overriding purpose of the Bill is to free those of our children who are enslaved and to work to ensure that there will be no more. The Bill is about them. That is why I support this amendment to create a new Clause 1. To repeat my words of two weeks ago, we must send a clear message to the boys, girls, men and women who are currently enslaved, living lives where hope becomes more distant and the future more bleak. We will not let you live lives without dignity, without rights, without a future worth living. You are our children, too. This amendment is one part of that message and it should have the support of this House.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I underscore what the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, has just said about the reason for the Bill. However, one has to remember that the idea of introducing laws to enable prosecutions to take place is not primarily for the purpose of having prosecutions: it is for the purpose of preventing conduct that is subject to prosecution. In so far as it is successful, it will do that. The number of prosecutions that happen under an Act is not necessarily the best test of whether the Act has been successful. If the conduct which is penalised under the Act stops, that is the best kind of success you can have, and with no prosecutions at all you are even better off.
I entirely accept the view that the Bill should clearly be dealing with the complete amelioration of the tragic circumstances of those who are subject to slavery, trafficking or exploitation. However, I wonder a little about the way in which the proposed new clause is constructed. First, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, that judges of a Family Division know exactly what is meant by the “best interests” of the child in relation to disputes between parents about the child’s future. However, this is a more difficult issue. I shall make another point about that in a minute. To what extent does the court have power to determine the future circumstances of a victim of slavery, for example? That is a very important aspect of securing the best interests of the victim. I think we all would like to see the best interests of the victim secured but how you go about that, and which powers the court needs to secure that, is something we need to hear a little more about.
Secondly, I find it hard to distinguish between the circumstances in proposed new subsection (1) and those in proposed new subsection (2). I think that the court is a public authority. However, the power is based on interpretation by the court. The court has to interpret the provisions in such a way as to secure the best interests of the victim, whereas in proposed new subsection (2), it is a question of the public authorities and the Secretary of State, in exercising the powers given by the Bill and, ultimately, the Act, having the power to secure the best interests of the victim. I find it hard to know why that should be different and why proposed new subsections (1) and (2) should not have exactly the same framework. I do not object at all to the court being specially mentioned as one of the public authorities, but the powers conferred by proposed new subsection (2) would be better from the point of view of achieving the result in question.
There seems to be a somewhat unnecessary elaboration in proposed new subsection (3). It starts saying what the personal circumstances are but then gives up and refers to anything else that is relevant. Starting to make a definition that you cannot effectively complete strikes me as possibly unnecessary. If a new clause of this kind were to be incorporated, possibly with some elaboration, it may be wise to leave it at the personal circumstances of the victim.
Baroness Howarth of Breckland (CB)
My Lords, whatever the technicalities involved in placing a clause at the beginning of a Bill, I urge the Government to consider putting victims very much at the heart of this legislation. Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, I was not in the House when the Children Act 1989 went through Parliament. However, I implemented the provisions of that legislation. Children were very much at the heart of that legislation and, because of that, work focused on children moved forward substantially. A similar situation has occurred with care issues. However, we know that despite that we have still not fully implemented the children’s legislation and much care legislation still waits to be addressed—never mind acted on—on the ground. Given the pressure on resources and the problems of implementation, which are myriad, I fear that unless victims are mentioned at the beginning of the Bill there will be no forward movement on this issue. The Minister may say that the Government have a plan to do that and many other things. However, placing victims firmly at the forefront of the legislation ensures that people’s minds are concentrated on them, particularly in local authorities, the police and other services. For that reason, I encourage the Minister to consider the amendment or, if not this one, something like it.
May I make one more point in response to something that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said? It is complicated with adults, many of whom, particularly those in the 19 to 20 age range who were taken into prostitution as young girls and some of whom have been seen as runaways for years—we are only just recognising what the runaway issue is—may say that they definitely do not want any intervention. But is it in their best interests? We all know that they will have been indoctrinated, groomed and terrified and we often have much more work to do to intervene with them. So it is not easy, but we need them right at the centre of this legislation.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
I would very much like to see a good clause that envisaged the sort of considerations that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has mentioned. However, there are quite fundamental difficulties, notably what the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, said about the best interests of the victim, for example, on the question of which witnesses are brought or, indeed, on whether a prosecution is brought at all. I am not sure how far these two should be interrelated. This is a difficult issue and merits a good deal of consideration on how it is done. If the victim has a family in some country where the traffickers have power, it might be in the best interests of the victim for there to be no prosecution at all, for reasons of possible ramifications for the family. On the other hand, we do not want a position whereby it is possible, in some way, for people to prevent a prosecution by threatening the families of victims. That is the kind of difficult issue to be faced in relation to a clause of this sort.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
Following on from what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, might it be sensible to look at a further amendment on Report that does not involve the various issues pointed out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lord, Lord Quirk? Could there be a short general clause about the purpose of the Bill being to look after the best interests of victims? The Minister has said that the best interests of the victims come into each of the clauses, but a very short clause of two sentences might perhaps set out the primary purpose of the Bill. Indeed, the Home Secretary has mentioned the victim focus in her introduction. I wonder whether that might be a way out of all the points we have been making.
Immigration Bill
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(10 years ago)
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Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I, too, support this amendment, which raises a short but vital issue of principle, which is whether it is consistent with the rule of law for one party to the proceedings to have the power to determine the scope of the jurisdiction of the tribunal before which it appears. So far as I am aware there is no precedent for such provision, for the very good reason that it is objectionable in principle. It should be a matter for the tribunal to apply whatever criteria Parliament thinks appropriate to determine whether the tribunal can hear an appeal that raises new grounds. I simply cannot understand why the Secretary of State does not trust the tribunal to decide on the application of the criteria which Parliament sees fit to lay down. I, too, hope that the Minister will be able to tell the House that, in the light of the concerns expressed this afternoon, the Government will think again on this important matter before Third Reading.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I have the disadvantage of not seeing this matter quite in the way that my colleagues have seen it. This tribunal is an appeal tribunal from a judgment of the decision of the Secretary of State. This clause deals with a situation in which it appears, in the course of the proceedings or perhaps before they start, that there is a new ground of decision that has not as yet been dealt with by the Secretary of State. It is the Secretary of State’s jurisdiction to decide that, and the appeal tribunal’s jurisdiction is to consider appeals that arise from the decision of the Secretary of State. Therefore the essence of this particular procedure appears to be that a new decision is called for from the Secretary of State on a matter which has not been before the Secretary of State previously.
I do not see how that is in any way a breach of principle, but I know from experience long past that the way in which immigration tribunals deal with these matters has been a cause of great difficulty. During my time there were great accumulations of arrears in the immigration tribunals, and all sorts of efforts were made to try to deal with that. One of my successes, which I cherish, was to get money from the Treasury to set up new immigration appeal tribunals in the hope that that would reduce the number of cases waiting. Like all such efforts, that does not seem to have worked, as the list of appeals still seems to be pretty long.
That seems to be the essence of this issue. I agree that there are problems when this sort of thing arises in the course of an appeal on an earlier decision, but the fact that that happens is something which has to be dealt with. One of the difficulties that my noble friend Lady Berridge referred to was that it is often very difficult, in the course of these proceedings, to get in touch with the Home Office representative before the case starts; the case goes ahead without anyone getting in touch with them. That is not a new difficulty, and I suppose that this amendment is intended to deal with it to some extent. There is an underlying difference in principle between the way in which my colleagues look at this and the way I think it is possible to look at it.
Lord Woolf (CB)
My Lords, this is a matter in which I, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, have had considerable practical experience, first as a Treasury junior, who for years advised and acted for the Government on these problems that arise in immigration matters, which can be very frustrating indeed.
I have been delighted at the steps that were taken, with the encouragement of the judiciary, to transfer matters which previously went before the courts on judicial review to tribunals. We have to recognise that there are situations within the court system where tribunals are better equipped to deal with matters than the courts are, because the tribunals’ knowledge and experience is so considerable. Because of that, this process has continued. I am happy to say that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, does himself an injustice when he suggests that what he sought to do has not produced positive results. It has, and I can say to the House with confidence that if we had not built up the tribunal system in the way it has been built up, from a practical point of view judicial review would be an area of great difficulty in the courts today.
It is therefore very important that we do not do something that is contrary to principle and which reflects adversely on the tribunal system. Of course, that was not the intention of those who were responsible for drafting the amendment now under consideration. However, the transfer from the tribunal that has jurisdiction to deal with matters of this sort, for the sort of reasons that have been put forward, to one of the parties of the proceedings, is just totally and utterly contrary to principle and it should be and can be rectified in a way that is acceptable.
The noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, was very modest about her amendment; she said that it may not be perfect, and she may be right about that, but this matter certainly warrants consideration. It would be a very undesirable precedent indeed to create a situation where one of the parties to the proceedings has in effect to give its consent to the other party doing something that justice may require. In addition, the suggestion that something should go back to the beginning is just out of accord with what is now the practice in the courts. It is true that the real decision-making body is the Minister and not the courts, but for years, in my experience, the courts, when a new point has arisen, have taken the view that it is more practical and more in accord with common sense for the tribunal that is dealing with the matter to continue to deal with the new matter, if it thinks that it is right to do so, rather than to send it back to the Secretary of State, who is technically the decision-making body under the legislation.
With respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, to whom I bow in these matters, because he has been such a benign influence in the development of our court system, on this occasion the difference that he has with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, and myself is misplaced and is not in accord with the practice adopted by the courts today, when a matter comes before them that should technically go back and discretion is exercised by the court to save everybody’s time and money by dealing with it themselves. So I urge the Minister to have another look at this matter, consult on it and come back at Third Reading.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(10 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Mallalieu (Lab)
My Lords, my name has been added to this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Dear, moved it with his customary reason and calm; I fear that I shall not be following in quite the same vein.
Whoever thought up Clause 1 and managed to slip it under the radar of the other place is a strong contender for some kind of award. Perhaps it should be a citation for attempting to increase the power of the state to interfere in people’s lives; perhaps a golden globe for providing the authorities with a new and easy-to-discharge weapon in the war against inconvenient and annoying expressions of dissent; or perhaps even an Oscar for thinking up a way to take out those who are a nuisance or annoyance in any one of a thousand unspecified ways—and doing it in a manner that admits virtually no defence or safeguard and that requires the minimum of evidence.
Those on whom the Government propose to confer this extraordinary power are fully set out in Clause 4. Apart from the housing providers, to whom I will come shortly, they include the Environment Agency, all local authorities, British Transport Police, Transport for London, the Secretary of State for Health—and, of course, the police themselves. In other words, they are in every single case an arm of the state. The proposed definition in Clause 1(2), that the respondent must be someone who,
“has engaged or threatens to engage in conduct capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”,
has been adopted, as we have just been told, from a very limited provision, carefully restricted to conduct affecting the housing management functions of the relevant landlord. Both the applicant and the respondent are carefully defined. It is intended to assist a housing provider to control the behaviour of neighbours—tenants—living in close proximity who, as has been said, cannot simply look the other way, pay no attention or move easily—and in a situation where, because of fear, evidence may be hard to obtain.
The Government propose to take this particular power, designed for the particular problem of anti-social neighbours, and give it to a wide range of state bodies for use without restriction against absolutely anyone. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Dear, recognises the force with which many housing providers have lobbied us between Committee and today. They wish to retain that power in their own very limited and special context. Under this amendment, they would do so.
In Committee—and I anticipate more of the same later when the Minister replies—the response of the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, to my similar amendment on the ASBO definition that this amendment seeks to retain, was, “You are not thinking about the victims”. By that he clearly means those who are on the receiving end of anti-social behaviour. I have to say that he is wholly wrong in that. It is precisely because we are concerned about those who are harassed in our hospitals, caused alarm on public transport, or distressed by the conduct of others in the street that we want to see this legislation targeted at that behaviour.
In reality, most anti-social behaviour that the public worry about is already covered by existing criminal law offences under criminal damage, public order and harassment laws. There are unquestionably problems of court delays at present—and not just with ASBO applications. Inadequate resources for police, prosecuting authorities and courts are all factors. Ironically, by making IPNAs so much easier to obtain than ASBOs, for a far wider range of behaviour, and with a lower evidential burden, there is a real prospect that Clause 1 will slow down the courts by clogging them with myriad IPNA applications and will be of little help to real victims in need of urgent help.
I also remind the Minister that there are other victims of whom he appeared to take no account. They include those against whom an allegation is made that is unfair, unwarranted or untrue, or without any proper evidential basis. There is no defence of necessity or lack of intent in the Bill. I see no compensation provisions for a wrongful injunction, or any of the safeguards that normally attach to a civil injunction, especially when the defendant is not present at the initial hearing. This is all worrying, but particularly worrying for me is the lower burden of proof that is now proposed. However, my main concern is the extent to which lowering the threshold to behaviour,
“capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person”,
has the potential to undermine our fundamental freedoms, and in particular the way in which the proposed law might be used to curb protest and freedom of expression.
In exercising my personal right to protest in the past, I readily accept that I have on a number of occasions been guilty of conduct capable of annoying someone. Every march that delays traffic, every rally that overcrowds public transport or pavements, and every demonstration with loudspeakers, whistles and horns is no doubt capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to someone, and is usually a headache for the authorities, too. I suppose that there are Members of your Lordships’ House who have never attended a rally, demonstration or protest march, but I would place a small wager that they are in the minority. In a lifetime of attending protests, from Aldermaston as a child to the countryside march and many in between, if I have caused annoyance or nuisance, I hope that I have never caused harassment, alarm or distress to anyone.
Quite simply, the Bill currently sets the barrier too low. It threatens fundamental freedoms and, importantly, it undermines tolerance, which is surely an essential quality for living happily in an overcrowded island such as ours. Speaking in a rather different context but saying what I think is appropriate, Lord Justice Sedley some years ago put it rather well. He said:
“Free speech includes not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative provided it does not tend to provoke violence. Freedom only to speak inoffensively is not worth having”.
To try to prohibit behaviour that is capable of annoying someone is a step far too far, and I hope that this House will do what the other place overlooked and stop it.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I support this amendment; I have signed it and I believe that it is amply justified. As the noble Baroness has just said, one of our fundamental freedoms is the freedom of speech. Surely it is clear that in exercising that freedom, one may annoy one or more other people. From time to time in this House I have witnessed a Minister explaining his present difficulty by reference to the behaviour of the previous Government, and one immediately senses annoyance on the opposite Benches. If I have an opinion which I know some or many people will disagree with, surely I am entitled to come out with it. Do I have to reasonably consider whether it will cause annoyance to somebody else, and if it would, what should be the consequence? Am I to muzzle my point of view to placate people who might be annoyed? It is absolutely plain that “annoyance” in this context, with a wide application, is inappropriate for this purpose.
The position taken up by the Government hitherto, so far as I understand it, is that this definition has been tried and tested in the courts for some 15 years. But definitions in their application are subject to the context in which they are used, and this use has been in the context of social housing and its enforcement has been in the hands of the responsible authorities for social housing. You cannot imagine an authority in that field trying to stop a street preacher, for example, on the basis that he was annoying the passers-by by the denunciations that he was pronouncing against their acknowledged conduct. It is not the same context at all, and the context influences the proper interpretation.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I was asked a parallel question by my noble friend Lord Forsyth. We are trying to simplify the legislation so that we make it easier for practitioners, no matter in what circumstances they are dealing with the application for an IPNA, to have a test that is capable of being applied in all areas.
I have listened to this debate. There may be ways in which the noble Lord’s amendment can be modified to advantage. It is important to recognise that he has made a very valid contribution to this debate, and I would like to have the opportunity to consider further what he is proposing in his amendment.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, if I understand the position that the Minister has taken up, he will have an open discussion, the precise outcome of which cannot, of course, be forecast. He will take account of all aspects of what has been put forward in the hope that we can, between us, reach an agreed solution to the problem which has the support of the whole House.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Mackay of Clashfern
Before my noble friend sits down, I have one question. He will remember vividly that the noble Lord, Lord Puttnam, moved an amendment to the Defamation Bill on Report, which this House carried. My noble friend anticipated at Third Reading that that would be dealt with in due course by an agreement that would supersede the amendment. The passage of time has fulfilled his prophecy, and I am sure we are all glad of that. I am assuming that now the Defamation Bill will be able to proceed, as it merits, to Royal Assent by the end of the present Session.
Lord McNally
Noble Lords cannot imagine the tingle in my shoulder blades when I realised that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, had risen to his feet. I thought, “My God! What question of law is he going to ask me to pronounce on?”. I am very pleased to understand that there is all-party agreement and that after the due process of whatever they do down the other end the Defamation Bill will be returned without the Puttnam amendment, although when the history of this saga is written, it will be said that the Puttnam amendment did its job. I am not so bitter about it, especially since the Bill is coming back without it.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, I support the change in position made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, between Committee and today regarding allowing Parliament to discuss the prosecution code without it being incorporated in a statutory instrument. It might help the Director of Public Prosecutions, the director of the Serious Fraud Office and the prosecuting authorities generally to have the views of Parliament expressed in a debate in Parliament before the code is finally adopted.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon
My Lords, Amendments 116DA and 116DB revisit an issue that we considered in Committee: namely, parliamentary scrutiny of a code of practice for prosecutors to support the DPA scheme. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, the issue has changed somewhat. In providing for a code of practice for prosecutors in relation to DPAs, the Government have been clear that the intention is to ensure consistency with other statutory provisions relating to guidance for prosecutors on operational matters. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to HSBC and the related US experience. As has been said previously, the DPA is a new addition to the UK system, and we will be looking to apply it at a future point. However, for now the Government’s position has been made clear.
The code of practice for DPAs, in the same way as the code for Crown prosecutors, will provide guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in making decisions and on key procedural and operational matters concerning DPAs. The independence of prosecutors is fundamental to the effective operation of DPAs. Therefore, it is entirely appropriate for the code for DPAs to be issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions and the director of the Serious Fraud Office. The Government have absolute confidence in the directors.
I hear what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay mentioned in support of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. However, the Government do not consider it necessary to make the code subject to parliamentary scrutiny. As DPAs become enshrined in UK law, I am sure that we will return to these issues. Indeed, the opportunity remains for any noble Lord to raise this issue through appropriate parliamentary procedures, be they QSDs or any other.
The approach to publication of the code provided in the schedule is wholly consistent with that under Sections 9 and 10 of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 in respect of the code for Crown prosecutors. The code of practice for DPAs, both the first and any future versions, will be provided to the Attorney-General by way of the Director of Public Prosecutions’ annual report, and he will in turn lay it before Parliament. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not raise any concerns about this proposed approach for the code of practice. The code is an operational document that needs to be responsive to the context in which it operates. The proposed amendments would, in particular, restrict the directors’ ability to amend or update the code as necessary to reflect timely changes in the law or lessons learnt having utilised the DPA process. The key elements of a DPA are clearly set out in the Bill. The code of practice will support the operation of the process, and the directors have committed to consult on its contents.
Amendment 119A would introduce a new and very broad basis for corporate criminal liability. Currently, there is a statutory basis for dealing with specific offending on the part of corporate bodies, for example, statutory provisions exist for dealing with corporate manslaughter, bribery and regulatory offending, such as health and safety rules. There is, however, no legislation which expressly creates general criminal liability for companies. Wider corporate liability is founded upon common law rules which attribute liability to a corporate body where the conduct is on the part of the directors, officers and those who occupy roles at the corporate centre. However, reliance is often placed on individual liability where there are many punishments and sanctions available to deal with economic or financial wrongdoing. This is, to a degree, due to the fact that corporate prosecutions are much more difficult and complicated than individual prosecutions and furthermore cases often involve lengthy and costly investigations.
The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, also referred to this point in relation to the Bribery Act 2010. The extent to which the current law of corporate criminal liability can be improved upon by employing the new “failure to prevent” formulation incorporated in the Bribery Act 2010—which the noble Lord’s amendment seeks loosely to emulate—is a matter for long-term examination. As I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, appreciates, the Bribery Act has been in force for less than 18 months. It is appropriate to allow the provision in the Act to bed down before we examine the extent to which the formulation could be usefully rolled out into other areas. However, I assure the House that the Government are committed to ensuring that investigators, prosecutors and the courts have the right tools to address financial and economic crime effectively, as is evidenced by Schedule 17.
DPAs have been specifically designed to ensure that corporate bodies are held responsible for alleged financial or economic wrongdoing on their part by providing an alternative means of disposal and a broader scope of sanctions. We remain satisfied that it is correct for the Government to focus on offering an additional route for holding to account organisations that are willing to engage in the process or otherwise face prosecution rather than on the basis of the liability itself. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, also asked me to speculate on any level about the Sentencing Council and what it may arrive at. I am sure he appreciates that it would be totally inappropriate for me to speculate in that regard. In light of my explanations, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The noble and learned Lord is perfectly correct in that regard.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, just before my noble friend sits down, I would like to understand the position. Somebody is outside the country having had leave to remain in it previously; the Secretary of State gets information to suggest that that person would be dangerous to the country if he or she returns; and the Secretary of State decides, on that information, that that is so. Is the position then that, in order to comply with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, the Secretary of State would have to allow that person, whom he or she believes to be a dangerous person to the security of the country, back to lodge an appeal? Why should that be? Why should the Secretary of State allow somebody, whom he or she thinks to be a danger to the country, to come back into the country solely for the purpose of appealing against that judgment? If he does come back into the country, there is at least a risk that his activities will not be confined to appealing but may include doing what the Home Secretary has considered constitutes the possibility of danger to the country.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, the crux of the matter is that the Minister suggests that credible evidence exists for the Home Secretary to have made this decision that the person has been involved in serious criminality, terrorism and so on. The Secretary of State waits until the person goes abroad for some reason, whether it be for compassionate reasons, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has suggested, or for any other reason, and then pounces—
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I support the amendment. I will not take long because I hope that we will move to a vote very quickly. I am the chair of Justice, the legal organisation, and I can say with confidence that that organisation, which represents the legal profession up and down the country, is wholehearted in its support of this amendment. The stories that the noble Lord, Lord Dear, has told of ridiculous cases being brought before the courts could be replicated in robing rooms and courtrooms throughout the land, and I am afraid that it really is time that we put a stop to this.
A very famous American judge once spoke about the importance of the marketplace of ideas, which means listening to views that sometimes one does not like, sometimes, as Lord Justice Sedley said, are irritating, sometimes are provocative, sometimes are heretical and sometimes might upset us. However, that is what democracy is all about, and we should take pride in it.
I wholeheartedly support the noble Lord, Lord Dear, in this amendment, and I hope that all noble Lords who are here will see the importance of this. Unfortunately, the thin-skinned are not serving our democracy well by seeking to have these cases brought. I pity the police who are put into this difficult position, and I am glad to see that both the former Director of Public Prosecutions and the current one recognise that the law is there to deal with truly offensive behaviour or that would lead to further crime and disorder. I hope that noble Lords will support the amendment.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, as the third string, it seems to me that freedom of expression is an extremely important part of our democratic heritage, and it has not been won without quite important sacrifices by many people who have gone before us. It is a criterion for seeing whether democracy is supported that freedom of speech is supported strongly.
Some matters connected with freedom of speech are very topical at present with regard to the public press, but the notion that freedom of speech can be tampered with without serious consequences to our democracy is a considerable mistake. The amendment would be an important step in clearing our situation regarding freedom of speech. There is no menace in an insult. Abusive or threatening language is different. It is menacing to people and, rightly, is subject to criminal law. An insult, though, is in no way threatening, except as a challenge to what I am saying. Surely we have all had one or two challenges to what we say, and we are usually the better for it, sometimes by strengthening our argument in favour of what we are saying and sometimes leading to wise reconsideration and withdrawal. I suppose that all of us have had such experiences.
I support very strongly the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Dear, and I hope that if the Government are going to finish their consultation, they will do so in the right direction. It seems to me that they have taken a long time. Often that is necessary in order to clear up some issues, but I am sure my noble friend will explain tonight exactly what the position is in relation to this consultation. Why has the result not been given within the timescale that the Government themselves set?
Police: Strike Action
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I am sorry about and rather disappointed by that question. The relationship between government and police is clearly very important, and we are aware of the difficulties at this particular time. I think we all recognise that this is a period of change for the police. The Government want to engage in particular with the Police Federation, because it is holding the ballot, and with all sections of the police force to see a new era for policing that brings the police fully into the modern era.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, where there is an obligation on a service not to strike, is it not important to have respected mechanisms in place for fixing the terms of service for that particular service? Could the Minister direct attention to that aspect for the Police Federation to consider rather than striking? I think it would be much more constructive to look at whether better arrangements could be made for the adjustment of terms of service than perhaps exist at the present time.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Yes, there is a tribunal which considers these matters and, indeed, there are issues before it at the moment. I think that today is the first day on which it is taking evidence. There is a mechanism in place for resolving these issues, but there is also an argument which I think the Government should not be afraid of putting to the police force. The Tom Winsor proposals give the police an opportunity to improve their flexibility of working, for improving pay scales so that there is a better step up from constable to sergeant, and making sure in many ways that the pay structure for the police force, which was set up 30 years ago, is fit for purpose today.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(11 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, can my noble friend deal with the point about funding? At the moment, to what extent does CEOP get outside funding to help it with its work? What safeguard is there? Will CEOP continue to get that money for its work as a result of the Government’s proposals?
Lord Harris of Haringey
My Lords, when my noble friend Lady Smith introduced the amendment, she made it clear that there was not necessarily a desire to stick to the wording before us: rather, that what we are having at this stage is very much a probing discussion. All your Lordships in this Committee support the work done by CEOP and we all want to see it succeed. Given that the Government intend to put CEOP within the National Crime Agency—for which there are some very strong arguments in favour but also some arguments against—the question is how one preserves the integrity of CEOP’s work and makes sure that the work continues and is seen to continue.
The amendment is partly about safeguarding the funding streams, as well as the external funding, and it is partly about ensuring that the existing partnership structures with CEOP, which are reflected in the current board structure of CEOP, are continued. Although the wording of my noble friend’s amendment does not necessarily resolve all these issues, it gives us an opportunity to highlight the concerns.
The principles are clear: we want to see CEOP’s work continue; we want to see it protected; and we want to see the retention of the partnership structure, which involves not only bringing in resources from outside but ensuring that those who provide the resources have confidence that the public contribution is retained and remains transparent. We want to ensure that in the operation of the agency there is a genuine partnership that involves different parties working together to achieve a common end.
We look to the Minister for some account of how the benefits of that separate entity, which is currently CEOP, can be preserved within a new structure. This is not a new concept. The presence on the government Bench reminds me that we had a very similar debate about the creation of Healthwatch within the Care Quality Commission; and there, completely erroneously of course, the Government’s objective was to create something that was independent and that had its own income flow and governance structure that was different from the rest of the Care Quality Commission. Although I do not think that the solution that the Government adopted in that particular model was perfect, it demonstrates that a number of models are available that try to achieve the objective of preserving this continuing area of activity, preserving the partnership structure and preserving the funding and independence of that funding for the future. I hope that the Minister can respond in those terms.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
I wonder if my noble friend can help me. I am trying to follow what he is saying about this. Is this advisory panel to be charged with advising in connection with the first arrangements for the new principal officer? And once that is done, has the panel finished, leaving the Secretary of State to do it himself? Is that the idea, or is the advisory panel to continue and be consulted only when the Secretary of State feels that he requires some extra independent and expert advice since he does not feel able to completely decide for himself?
Lord Henley
My Lords, if I can assist my noble and learned friend, the point we were trying to get over is that the actual designation of the director-general is a matter for my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. She will make an assessment of the director-general’s suitability and capability to exercise the operational powers in any given case. It might be that the advisory panel, through its chair, could then assess whether the director-general was adequately trained to exercise those operational powers and if, as experts—as we hope they would be—they were satisfied that the director-general met the requirements for exercising his designated duties. But it might be that the Home Secretary was satisfied about the director-general’s suitability and capability to exercise those powers, in which case there would be no need for the board.
Crime and Courts Bill [HL]
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Birmingham found himself down to speak both here and in the Grand Committee. Notwithstanding his character as a Lord Spiritual, he did not feel that was possible and he also felt that he had more to contribute in the debate in the Grand Committee. I therefore have to fill his place in the sense of taking it, although not in the sense that he would have fulfilled it at as a Lord Spiritual. I also wish to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the work of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, as a Minister in the Department of Justice and also as a spokesman on legal matters in Opposition. I very much appreciated his support and help and all kinds of particular qualities that he had. I am delighted his place has been taken by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, with his great experience as a member of the legal profession, making him well able to understand the problems that beset it.
I intend to single out one or two items. Immediately after me the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, who convened the Constitution Committee with its very detailed consideration of judicial appointments, will speak. I do not, therefore, intend to get too deeply involved in that position. The noble Baroness will no doubt raise questions about some aspects of the recommendations which do not seem to have been fully reflected in this Bill so far. I want to start by talking briefly about the television provision in Section 22. This is not a new problem and during my term of office it became a very important issue. At that time the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, who was then the Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland, issued a practice note as a result of which the television authorities took a great interest in televising a number of cases in Scotland—something of the order of eight altogether. It was pretty obvious to me that they were interested in setting that up in places other than Scotland and in due course that interest was manifested in that they prepared a video with a considerable selection of television films of the courts in Scotland which was presented to senior members of the profession in England. It may be that the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf and Lord Lloyd of Berwick, will remember this. In any case, the result of these presentations was that the English profession was not encouraged to go down this road. There had never been a statutory prohibition in Scotland, although the courts were pretty cautious about it and, as I say, while the position opened up a bit at the time, it did not continue. However, noble Lords may have seen on television recently the sentencing remarks in a murder trial made by a Scottish judge who, following the territorial method of description, is called Lord Bracadale, after a most beautiful part of the Isle of Skye. I think that his remarks were broadcast widely and attracted a good deal of positive attention.
The Government proposals aim to open up the courts to television on the basis of orders made by the Lord Chancellor with the approval of the Lord Chief Justice. I would suggest that, in the vast majority of cases, the arguments and the decisions of the Court of Appeal will not attract the immediate interest of our public, whereas sentencing remarks will attract great interest. One has only to look at the print and other media to see that sentencing has a much bigger impact than arguments in the Court of Appeal. Occasionally, of course, a judgment from the Court of Appeal, particularly if it surprises the media, is given a good deal of attention, but I would venture that it would be wise to bring forward arrangements for broadcasting under the proper conditions appropriate to sentencing remarks instead of leaving them, as it were, to the end, which I gather from what I have seen so far is the suggestion.
The other matter I want to mention briefly in connection with television is that the exposure of the Houses of Parliament to television does not seem to have promoted a tremendous increase in the avidity with which the public enter into politics. I do not know the reason for that, although I could guess, and some noble Lords may have the advantage of me in that.
The next matter I want to mention is one that the Constitution Committee has certainly considered, and on this occasion I am going into its area to raise the issue of diversity. I believe that it is extremely important that there should be a sufficient amount of diversity within the judiciary as a whole to make it look reasonably fair in terms of job opportunities for all sorts of duly qualified people in the community. I think it is fundamental not to go down the road that people must be tried by those who belong to the same community as them; that would be completely inimical to justice. On the other hand, diversity in the sense in which I define it is highly desirable, and I believe that progress has been made. The statutory recommendation is that where two candidates are of equal merit, the consideration of diversity should be allowed to prevail. The occasions on which two candidates are of absolutely equal merit are likely to be fairly scarce, but the emphasis put on diversity in this statutory provision, although it may not strictly apply all that often, will help those who have to make these decisions to give effect to it as a desirable aim. Therefore, this is to be welcomed. I agree that it will not happen simply by legislation; a good deal of work is required. Of course, we are told that the new system is transparent—I am not sure what is meant by that because I certainly do not know exactly who is on the committees and so on—and transparency is a great thing: you are able to see through it in a way that you could not do when it was done by the Lord Chancellor on his own. The system has created a degree of breadth which the Lord Chancellor alone could never have attained.
There are one or two other matters I want to mention. In the clauses dealing with judicial appointments, paragraph 4 talks about a “non-legally-qualified” member, which might be a little ambiguous. Of course, it goes on to define it by saying that if you hold or have held certain judicial appointments that disqualify you for the House of Commons, you are not non-legally-qualified, and if you have ever practised or been qualified as a lawyer, you are not non-legally-qualified. This helps to emphasise the distinction between lawyers and judges that some lawyers are keen to make. I do not intend to pursue that, but later in the schedule you find that the Lord Chancellor can define a lay person by order after consulting the Lord Chief Justice. What is the difference between a lay person and a non-legally-qualified person, if any, for the purposes of this appointment?
That is rather an aside. I notice that the Lord Chancellor is to take responsibility for a good number of civil appointments. There may be a question over whether it is any longer appropriate to call him the head of criminal justice—I think he should be the “head of justice”, and have thought that for a while.
The other matter I want to mention briefly is the family court. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has said, this has been some time in coming. It was very much opposed in the 1980s, as I recollect, and when I was asked to create legislation in connection with the Children Bill, it seemed an opportunity to get something done in this area and get it past the Treasury, which was the obstacle in earlier times. At that time, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, had just produced her report on the situation in the north-east, which in effect recommended a family court. Of course, I could not go the length of having what we have now in this Bill, but by amendments introduced by the Children Act I was able to create a system in which all the levels were available for family justice. This Bill does it in a different way. Apparently mine was good enough to last for 33 years or so—I hope that this one will last for much longer.
Finally, I think the proposals for the county court are to do with questions of jurisdiction. The question I ask is: in what sense is this universal court for the whole of England a county court? There are a lot of counties in England.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
My Lords, I wish to address a number of proposals but I start by saying that I heartily agree with noble Lords who have spoken about the importance of our seeking to find alternatives to prison. The increase in prison numbers is horrifying. In this period of increasing youth unemployment, it is alarming to think of the risk of young people offending in greater numbers. More and more of them may find themselves in prison, their lives ruined. That should be a source of great concern to us all. Therefore, I hope that this time we will pursue alternatives to prison with seriousness and I hope that I shall be able to vote in support of such changes.
I want to speak, first, about the creation of the new National Crime Agency to deal with serious crime. I know that there are concerns about this reform and I have reservations myself, but in general I am convinced that globalisation is presenting us with such serious challenges to our national responses to crime that we should be willing to re-examine our present arrangements and be prepared to consider reform.
The very developments that make legitimate markets work—the ease of travel, the electronic transfer of money, the internet and the mobile phone—are all just as effective in developing black markets. In my work in the courts, I see at close quarters the trade in drugs and firearms, the trade in human beings for labour or sexual exploitation, the trade in human organs, which has been all over the newspapers today, and—I was involved in such a case last year—even the trade in babies. Such high-level crime, whether it is terrorism or just traditional organised crime, involves high rewards for the criminals—the money involved is huge. In years to come, we will undoubtedly see an increase in cybercrime.
For the most part, this sort of crime is very difficult to police but it affects all our lives, with greater quantities of drugs on the streets, an increase in gun crime and a pernicious growth in the sex industry. Policing these activities requires high levels of expertise and collaboration. I saw that first hand last year when I chaired an inquiry in Scotland into human trafficking. What became very clear to me was how necessary it is to have real collaboration and systemic responses to this kind of organised crime. Human trafficking, for example, often falls foul of agencies not knowing who takes the lead. It is a crime and so should be led by the police. It should not be fudged as something that might receive an initial investigation by the border agency.
Therefore, I welcome the possibility of a more focused and strategic response, particularly to human trafficking, but to other areas of crime too. However, there are problems. If you increase the centralisation of policing of serious crime in this way, there has to be much stronger oversight than there currently seems to be in the Bill. I am also very concerned that the freedom of information exemption will be continued here and I think that that should be revisited. It is important that the public know about the workings of such an agency when it is going to interfere in the privacy of so many lives.
I turn to the subject of court reforms. I welcome the idea of demystifying the courts and have written about it for years—ever since the late 1970s. It is important that the public know what goes on in courts. I remember that in the 1980s the drama series “Crown Court” did much to awaken public understanding of the processes and the issues that arose. I have no argument with the plan to televise the hearing of appeals in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal so that the public can watch and listen to the arguments being presented and understand why the judges make certain decisions. However, let us be very clear that that is not what the television companies are interested in. They are interested in new products and new ways of giving us pictures. They are interested in new titillation from “Big Brother” to “X Factor”.
We know what interests most television companies and I am afraid that some of it feeds the less attractive aspects of the human condition. The television companies want criminals. They do not want to watch judges giving judgments in the commercial courts. They want criminals; they want murder and mayhem; they want rape and carnage; and they want pretty victims and nasty, thuggish offenders. They also want celebrities being dragged before the courts. This is not about transparency; it is about voyeurism. Although it may be starting in a small way, I have great concerns about where this is going to lead. Basically, television companies—I have heard it being discussed—want criminal cases and they want to be in the courtroom. Reporting criminal cases is currently very disappointing for television newsmen. Where are the pictures? That is one of the questions that television people always ask. They do not like talking heads. Talking heads are a bore and that is why it is very difficult to cover trials. You get only snatched shots of witnesses leaving the Old Bailey or those cartoon-like drawings of defendants in the dock that look nothing like the people concerned. I can tell your Lordships that—I have represented them. Sometimes I appear in those drawings.
The television companies are desperate to get into the courtroom. It will start with just having the judge giving judgment, but they are not interested in the men in wigs waxing long and impenetrably about law. That is not what they want to see. They want the sensational, the salacious and the grotesque. So I am afraid that this is one of those rare occasions when I am going to disagree with our former Lord Chancellor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, because I do not think that this is a healthy development. I hope that there is no rush to cover judges reading out their sentencing remarks. Letting television cameras into courts carries serious risks and, although this is starting at a low level with the higher courts, the potential for drift is huge and the consequences for justice are very serious.
Perhaps I may explain that the camera does not replicate the public gallery. People say, “But this is just making the public gallery bigger”. It is not. The camera chooses what to look at. It edits as it chooses. Indeed, at the moment the camera is looking at me. It is not looking at the responses of other noble Lords to what I am saying. If you sit in the public gallery of a court, you take in not just what the witness says but what the judge says and you watch the defendant’s responses and other things that happen in the courtroom. That tells you much more than you will ever know from watching snatches of the proceedings on television, and snatches are what they will be. Some states in the United States had to introduce something called gavel-to-gavel coverage because lawyers and people concerned with justice complained that, if you did not show the whole process, people would think that they had seen the trial but they would not understand whole areas of evidence that were never placed before the public. Unfortunately, “News at Ten” will not be interested in putting it all in front of you; it will put in front of you what is most dramatic. The public will think that they have seen the trial because they will have seen bits of it and then they will think that the jury got it all wrong. That will undermine confidence in the system.
Of course, we now have other forms of technology. Once shown on television, cases will be uploaded on YouTube and downloaded on to people’s phones. We will have people playing and replaying cases. Do you think that jurors are going to resist that when we do not have juries staying in hotels as they do in America? Of course juries are reminded not to look at these things, but do you really think that they will not? Do you think that they will not do it in the company of their families at home, so that there is then another jury deciding what it thinks of the evidence? The risks are horrifying. I think that new technology will make it impossible to have a fair trial and, in the end, that will mean that the whole question of jury trial is put in jeopardy.
There is also an issue for judges. In this country, judges enjoy a level of anonymity and unrecognisability. However, that will be lost. You can be sure that comment will be made about the sentences not being strong enough or tough enough. Then judges will be vilified and criticised and they will start to become defensive because they will know that the cameras will keep coming back to their particular court. When Cherie Booth—the wife of a former Prime Minister—sits, will people want the cameras to be in court to see whether her judgments come up to snuff? These may look like advances and transparency to all of you, but I am afraid that it looks like a very serious challenge to justice to me.
I welcome the efforts on diversity. All my professional life I have been arguing about the need for more women in the courts and on the Bench, but I am concerned about a number of things. I am concerned that the issue of merit is not examined in the Bill. I would like to see a new statutory merit test because merit is not a value-free zone; it is an area where many of the judgments that are made are made from a very narrow perspective. As the Chief Justice of Canada has reminded us,
“human beings have a tendency to see merit only in those who exhibit the same qualities that they possess”.
I am afraid that in the recent appointments of two men to the Supreme Court—there is still only one woman in that court—25 consultees were asked for their views and 24 of them were men. The outcome is affected if the gatekeepers are all from one perspective. Currently the emphasis is on one relentlessly individualised understanding of merit and it is too narrow. Instead, the collective competence of the court should be a central feature of appointment, allowing for the correction of deficits in terms of diversity but also in terms of specialist experience, such as people who have experience of trying cases involving children or people who have experience beyond the commercial. Candidates should, in the first instance, fulfil the criteria of intellectual ability and professional experience in practice, but then we might look to some of the other factors that would enrich our courts.
The Bill has much to commend it but much that needs to be looked at again. I hope that in Committee we shall make it very much better.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
Did the noble Baroness see the television recording of the sentencing remarks in a recent murder trial in Scotland?
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws
I did, but I think that one case can often make bad law. Of course, an individual judge giving a judgment in a case can make people think that that was interesting and reasonable. However, you can be sure that, as we cover all cases more regularly, certain judges will be considered too lenient and they will be pursued. We shall find that the hunger for punishment will be fed by certain television stations. I am concerned about where this will go, so I hope that a good deal of caution will be shown before we go down this road.
Protection of Freedoms Bill
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts(12 years ago)
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Lord Henley
My Lords, I can respond relatively briefly and will deal, I hope, with most of the points. First, to protect the honour of the Home Office, I correct just one point made by my noble friend Lady Brinton. She talked about there being a department in the Home Office known as “Death and Violence”. I can assure her that that is not the case. The Home Office team that leads on this is called Interpersonal Violence, which I hope my noble friend will accept is a better name than the suggestion that she put forward.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, for accepting that this matter has been driven by Parliament. It has been cross-party and I pay tribute to all those in this House and another place—the right honourable Elfyn Llwyd and others—who have led the work on this. Perhaps I may also say how important it is that we work with others; and that is why we will continue to talk to NAPO, Protection Against Stalking and ACPO about how we bring in the right training. As the noble Baroness will be aware, my right honourable friend the Prime Minister made it clear on International Women’s Day that training will be provided, and we will work with those bodies to develop that training. It is because we are providing it that we do not believe that the noble Baroness’s amendments are necessary or appropriate. It is because we believe that we have come to a considerable degree of consensus on this that now is the moment to move on and get this Bill on the statute book.
All that I want to do at this point is respond to one matter in the example that the noble Baroness gave regarding Mary and the problems she faced. The noble Baroness said that Mary did not change her daily routine and therefore would not be captured by new Section 4A. As the noble Baroness made clear, Mary on that occasion kept records of her stalker, she did not sleep and had to speak to the police. All those are examples of day-to-day activities being affected. Therefore, new Section 4A certainly could apply in that case, and that is why it is important that we provide the police with exactly the right training, and is why I am trying to give the commitment that we will work with the bodies that we have been talking about to make sure that the right training is evolved.
I should also take on the point made by my noble friend Lady Brinton about the need within the Home Office and Ministry of Justice to make sure we change the culture appropriately—that obviously also applies to the police—in terms of understanding the importance of these matters and ensuring that prosecutions are, when appropriate, pursued with vigour, if necessary at the higher level provided by new Section 4A, or by new Section 2A in much more minor cases. I dealt with the example given by the noble Baroness because I wanted to make it clear that new Section 4A could apply even in that case.
I therefore feel that the noble Baroness’s amendments are not necessary. I hope that she will not press them and that the Bill can move on to the statute book with due speed.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
Is the noble Lord prepared to say that the Government’s view is that the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, is in fact included in the interpretation of their Amendment 51C?
Lord Henley
My Lords, my understanding and what I was trying to get over is that, with the introduction of appropriate training in how the police prosecute in these matters, her amendment is not necessary. I therefore think I am right in saying that what I have said would be covered by my noble and learned friend’s point.