Lord Avebury
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(11 years, 4 months ago)
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Lord Avebury
My Lords, I am most grateful to the Government for considering the matters raised in my Amendments 148B and 148D in Committee, and for coming up with this new clause which addresses them—as the Minister has explained—in subsections (1) and (2). It appears that subsection (3) of the new clause deals with the problems identified by the Upper Tribunal in the case of Ahmadi, as my noble friend the Minister said, and also that of Adamally and Jaferi. In Ahmadi, Upper Tribunal judge Mr Lane said:
“It would clearly be possible for Parliament to amend s.47 of the 2006 Act, so as to enable the respondent to make simultaneous decisions ... Unless and until that is done ... In practice ... the present usefulness of s.47 is highly questionable”.
This is, I suggest, a good example of the complexity of our immigration law, and the risks incurred by getting the language wrong. If the original Section 47(1) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 is being amended, it has taken senior judges and Parliament six years to remedy the flaws that made this particular section unworkable so that it was impossible to remove the persons concerned who had no right to remain in the UK.
We do not even know whether it is indeed the original Section 47(1) that we are amending because the website that is intended to provide your Lordships with the text of Acts as amended carries the warning message:
“There are outstanding changes not yet made by the legislation.gov.uk editorial team to Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006”.
This is an unsatisfactory situation, which does not apply only in this instance, and I hope that my noble friend might say something about the steps being taken to ensure that legislation.gov.uk is brought up to date, so that your Lordships and another place know what they are being asked to amend.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, perhaps I may add to what my noble friend has just said. My wife is an immigration and asylum judge and from time to time she and her colleagues are sent for training in order to try to understand what the Home Office is producing. I hope that she does not mind my mentioning this, but she and her colleagues find themselves in a quite terrible situation in trying to understand the Kafkaesque material that flows out of the Home Office. There are two people in the Chamber who will understand these amendments—one is the Minister and the other is my noble friend Lord Avebury. I do not understand them. For me to understand them I would have to read the three different Acts of Parliament, all of which are put in play in these amendments, and I would have to listen to and read again what has been said by the Minister. The net result would be that we will continue to have a network of regulations that it is quite impossible for ordinary men and women, including Members of this House, to understand unless and until the Home Office does what we have repeatedly asked it to do for the past many years—to consolidate the legislation into a single measure that can be understood by users, whether they be would-be immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers, or lawyers, NGOs or the public. At the moment it is almost incomprehensible and lacks, therefore, legal clarity. I very much hope that, when I do understand these amendments, what I have just said may be listened to by the Home Secretary and other Ministers who will instruct their officials, please, to come up with consolidating legislation that we can understand.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness. A great many of the refusals of applications for leave to enter have been due to misunderstandings about what information is required, and there ought to be a simple procedure for rectifying elementary omissions. I think that I recognise the particular case that she mentioned, because that person has already been in touch with me as well. He made every effort by sending numerous e-mails to the people dealing with the case to try to find out exactly what omission he was guilty of, but was never successful in establishing what further information he needed to provide.
Clause 26 removes the right of appeal against the refusal of a visa to visit family members, except where the appeal is brought on racial discrimination or human rights grounds. I had hoped that in the five months since we considered this matter in Committee, and in the light of the arguments that we advanced then, the Government would have had second thoughts about this clause. It is disappointing to see no sign of that on the Marshalled List.
I shall explain why we felt the need to return to this matter. The Government’s hostility to the right to family life is exemplified by the making of new Immigration Rules making it far more difficult and expensive for spouses and elderly dependent relatives to join heads of households in the UK, reducing the number by an expected 35%, over which the Immigration Minister is already crowing. Clause 26 turns the screw further by preventing appeals that would have been successful under the law as it now stands. I pointed out in Committee that if the argument for Clause 26 was that the number of appeals had risen to far greater levels than were expected when the right of appeal was restored in 2000, as was argued before the Home Affairs Select Committee, the obvious remedy was to get UKBA’s decisions right in the first place. Almost one-third of them are overturned, according to my noble kinsman Lord Henley in Committee, involving the taxpayer in a great deal of unnecessary expense. My noble kinsman said that taking away the right of appeal would lift the burden of processing 50,000 appeals from visa staff, but that was based on the assumption that officials would continue to reject bona fide applications at the same rate as they have in the past. We are told constantly that UKBA is undergoing processes of reform, which will enable them to be more accurate in the first decisions that they make.
After the case of Alvi, which your Lordships have discussed, the information required to be submitted with the visa application is now set out in detail in the rules themselves, so that in theory, there should be fewer cases where an applicant has omitted a particular document. However, considering the volume and complexity of the rules, which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Lester on the previous amendment, it is inevitable that some applications will be refused for that reason. The Government suggest that persons who have omitted a document should put in a new application rectifying the omission at a cost of £78. That may be a trivial sum to my noble friends on the Front Bench, but it is a lot of money to a poor farmer in Gujarat or Sylhet.
I take the point that a new application is less expensive and faster than an appeal; but where the decision-makers have made an obvious mistake, I do not accept that a genuine family visitor should have to pay twice, and suffer the complications affecting future travel, because the refusal has to be declared not only in the UK but to any other intended destinations to which the applicant may travel. Therefore, it is a blot on the person’s copybook that he will want and need to remove if he is to go anywhere without hindrance.
If a person wins the appeal, it is likely that the tribunal will make a costs order against the Secretary of State, so that the appeal will be free in the end. Moreover, if the refusal was due to disbelief that the applicant would return home at the end of the visit, it is only too probable that a fresh application would yield the same result. Only by appealing can the person attack the errors that led to the original refusal, and it was for that reason that I advised Mrs N from Beirut—whom I think was the person that the noble Baroness was talking about a few minutes ago and whose case I mentioned in Committee—to appeal as well as to ask for the original decision to be reviewed.
Therefore, I am afraid that the reasons that were given by my noble kinsman for thinking that an appeal may not be the best remedy for an unjustified refusal do not hold water. I hope that in the light of that consideration, there should be a simple process that would enable the applicant to lodge supplementary evidence supporting the validity of any document or statement which is challenged, rather than having to start again from scratch.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill
My Lords, many years ago, in 1967, I did the first case in Strasbourg against the United Kingdom: a case called Mohamed Alam & Mohamed Khan. Sir Roy Wilson had produced his report advocating an appeal system. It was as a result of the Strasbourg case and Sir Roy Wilson’s report that the immigration appeals system was first introduced —a system which has gone on until now. I strongly support the explanations and powerful speeches given by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lord Avebury.
What is the situation at the moment? Instead of there being a proper process at first instance before there is an appeal—a process of proper decision-taking based upon the kind of common-sense approach that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is advocating—mistakes are made quite frequently. When the appeal comes to someone who is an immigration and asylum judge, often no presenting officer is produced by the Home Office to present the government case or there is no one to represent the applicant. My wife will come home at the end of the day and say, “I have now for the first time to take a proper decision myself as though I were doing it at first instance because I have nobody to help me on either side and I find that the initial decision is defective. I now, on appeal at great public expense, have to correct mistakes which should not have been made in the first place at first instance. The only way in which those mistakes can be corrected is by having an appeal system. It is the only safeguard”.
The system now resembles the fairy story, The Little Prince, which noble Lords may remember, in which the boa constrictor swallows a sheep. One sees the lump of the sheep passing along the boa constrictor. The sheep is the process of taking decisions in this area. Instead of the process being properly determined at first instance and making the need for appeals rare, a great lump, the creature, passes along the snake, which leads to a first-instance appeal, an upper-tier appeal and judicial review.
The remedy is simply the common-sense one. One has at first level as much information as possible for a well informed decision. The advantage of the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is that it would at least enable proper communication between the officer and the applicant or the applicant’s representative. I can see no argument against that, especially if we were to abolish appeals, which I very much hope will not be the case.
Lord Avebury
Will my noble friend deal with the point I made? The exercise of the right of appeal is not only for the purpose of getting the decision reversed but to prevent there being a blot on a person’s record, which may seriously hinder their future ability to travel anywhere?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I do not accept that at all. If someone’s application to visit this country is refused, then I regret to say that it must be because either they have failed to fill in the application correctly or there are substantial reasons why they should not be allowed to make that visit. I cannot accept the premise of my noble friend’s argument.
The Government are not persuaded by the case for my noble friend’s Amendment 118A. To accept it would introduce a right of appeal for people who have, for example, practised criminal or other dishonest behaviour, while those who have acted honestly would not have an appeal. It cannot be right that that type of behaviour is rewarded.
Regardless of whether an application is refused, relying on a general ground of refusal, the applicant is free to re-apply setting out why the previous refusal was unjustified. All refusals on general grounds are authorised or reviewed by entry clearance managers before being served. If refused under general grounds, it is also open for an applicant to make a fresh application by providing new evidence which an entry clearance officer will take into account. A refusal under paragraph 320 of the Immigration Rules may also be challenged by a judicial review. Prior to making decisions, all entry clearance officers have to pass a three-week training course, part of which focuses on making decisions using paragraph 320 of the Immigration Rules. There is also an e-learning package specifically relating to the sub-paragraphs of paragraph 320 that may lead to an applicant’s future applications being automatically banned. This package is completed by entry clearance officers during their induction training on arrival at their decision-making post.
I think I have demonstrated that the process is thorough and that there will be considerable advantage to the efficiency of the system and, indeed, to applicants themselves if the Government’s proposals are approved. I trust that I have been able to satisfy my noble friend.
Lord Avebury
“(4) This section does not apply if—
(a) the person concerned is stateless,(b) the person concerned has previously made an asylum claim or a human rights claim and been granted leave on that basis, or(c) the person concerned asserts in his or her grounds of appeal an asylum claim or a human rights claim.”
Lord Avebury
My Lords, leaving out this clause would ensure that a person who is outside the country when his or her leave is cut short by the Secretary of State retains the right to return to the UK within the time limit for appeal and thus the right to exercise an appeal in country. At issue are cases where a person’s leave is cut short by the Secretary of State under Section 82(2)(e) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 when he is outside of the UK at the time of the refusal.
It happens frequently and not by accident that the Secretary of State takes advantage of a person’s absence to issue the notice, knowing that that person will not be able to return to the UK to exercise the right of appeal. At the moment, that person has an in-country right of appeal against refusal. The courts have had to consider what happens when an individual is outside the UK at the time of the refusal. As I say, these circumstances will not arise by chance. The Secretary of State will have waited until the person is outside the country to serve the notice cancelling their leave. The courts have held that the person has the right to return to the UK and to lodge an appeal within the time limit for appealing if he had been within his previous leave to remain.
Clause 27 provides that such a person will be given no opportunity to return to the UK, reversing the decision of the court in the case of MK. I referred to this case in Committee so there is no reason to repeat the details now. I simply remind your Lordships that MK was a Tunisian refugee in the UK, but was in Italy when his status was revoked by the Home Secretary. His right to contest that decision in the UK was upheld by the court. It is that decision which is reversed by Clause 27.
The clause has been amended to restrict the Secretary of State’s power to exclude an in-country right of appeal to those cases where she exercises the power before the person brings his or her appeal. However, this does not address the fundamental injustice in the clause. In Committee, my noble kinsman said that it was,
“wholly reasonable that judicial scrutiny of the decision should be carried out while the individual remains outside the United Kingdom”.—[Official Report, 4/7/12; col. 719.]
He ignored the fact that a person stranded abroad without access to legal advice and unable to consult face-to-face with his lawyers or to approach witnesses who might testify on his behalf is generally going to be at an overwhelming disadvantage in challenging the Home Secretary’s decision. My noble kinsman said that legal aid would remain available for most applications for judicial review of immigration decisions, and I would be grateful if the Minister would confirm that it will be available in these cases as well.
I mentioned also the Court of Appeal’s finding in the case of MK that the right to an in-country appeal was “valuable” and the fact that pursuing an appeal that turns on character may depend critically on how the litigant appears in court. I submit that it is wholly unreasonable for persons who may have resided in the UK for many years to be put in this position. We are not seeking to undermine what my noble kinsman referred to as,
“the operational integrity of the Home Secretary’s power to exclude an individual from the United Kingdom”.—[Official Report, 4/7/12; col. 721.]
We simply seek to ensure that in exercising this power to change someone’s life drastically for the worse, the Home Secretary must abide by the rule of law.
If the repercussions of Clause 27 are serious for those to whom it applies in general, they would be exceptionally so for stateless persons, refugees and persons granted humanitarian protection. Therefore, retaining for these persons the right to return to the UK within the time limit for appeal and to exercise an appeal in country is only fair. They will find themselves, and possibly their families also, stranded outside the UK and with no other country to which they can legally resort in safety if this clause goes through.
My noble kinsman said in Committee in response to this amendment that it could provide every individual refused under the provision with an in-country right of appeal, as they would merely need to raise human rights or asylum grounds in their appeal. Proposed new subsection (4)(c) would have this consequence, but of course the appeal would succeed only if the asylum or human rights claim was found on appeal to be justified.
The Government are proposing a hugely oppressive measure of stripping a person of their leave to remain while they are outside the UK and leaving them in limbo. They must accept the need to put in place safeguards. It may not be possible to ensure that no one other than those in genuine need of the safeguards benefit, but if that is the only objection to the amendment, my noble friend should say so and we can preserve at least proposed new subsections (4)(a) and (4)(b) on Third Reading. Those who are already stateless or who have been granted leave to remain on the basis of an asylum or human rights claim are surely not to be deprived of a meaningful right of appeal against a decision that will ruin their lives for ever. I beg to move.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, just before my noble friend sits down, I would like to understand the position. Somebody is outside the country having had leave to remain in it previously; the Secretary of State gets information to suggest that that person would be dangerous to the country if he or she returns; and the Secretary of State decides, on that information, that that is so. Is the position then that, in order to comply with the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, the Secretary of State would have to allow that person, whom he or she believes to be a dangerous person to the security of the country, back to lodge an appeal? Why should that be? Why should the Secretary of State allow somebody, whom he or she thinks to be a danger to the country, to come back into the country solely for the purpose of appealing against that judgment? If he does come back into the country, there is at least a risk that his activities will not be confined to appealing but may include doing what the Home Secretary has considered constitutes the possibility of danger to the country.
Lord Avebury
My Lords, the crux of the matter is that the Minister suggests that credible evidence exists for the Home Secretary to have made this decision that the person has been involved in serious criminality, terrorism and so on. The Secretary of State waits until the person goes abroad for some reason, whether it be for compassionate reasons, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has suggested, or for any other reason, and then pounces—
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I realise we are on Report, but I will just say to the noble Lord that it may be that the conduct that leads to the Home Secretary making this decision takes place while this individual is abroad. I think the notion that this is a premeditated trap is false. It is more to do with the possibility that the individual, while abroad, makes contact with someone, or evidence comes to light as to their true intent, or what they might do when they return to this country becomes apparent, and the Home Secretary wishes to deal with the problem.
Lord Avebury
I do not know. The noble Lord has raised this for the first time. It has often been suggested that the Home Secretary does pounce when somebody is abroad for personal reasons. In the case of MK, which I quoted in Committee and mentioned again briefly during this debate, those acting on behalf of MK certainly believed that the Home Secretary deliberately waited until he was abroad before exercising this power.
The Minister was relying on the Home Secretary having credible evidence of this person’s activities being in the nature of serious criminality, terrorism and so on. One has to take that on trust. In nine cases out of 10, this individual is not going to be able to appeal. The individual will be stateless, as the noble and learned Baroness has just suggested, and that was the case with MK. He was a recognised refugee in this country when he went to Italy, I think. He was in Italy when the Home Secretary made the order against him, making it virtually impossible for him to exercise a worthwhile right of appeal.
I know of cases where it has been alleged that somebody’s presence in the United Kingdom is non-conducive to the public good. I had long correspondence with successive Secretaries of State trying to discover the issue in a particular case—that of the leader of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, who was formally a refugee in this country and was declared by the Home Secretary to be non-conducive to the public good after he had been arrested on charges of terrorism and acquitted. Nevertheless, he was sent packing and has not been readmitted to the United Kingdom since then. I made great efforts to persuade Secretaries of State that he is no danger to the public in this country and that his activities as the leader of the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front have been peaceful, but I have never been able to get behind the decision. The decision that somebody’s presence is non-conducive to the public good is one that the Secretary of State exercises by his or her absolute authority, and it is difficult to challenge.
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Lester for the support that they have given to this amendment. I was thinking of testing the opinion of the House. I have decided at this stage not to, but to think further about what my noble friend has said in reply and to consider what methods we have for dealing with this situation. It is a serious flaw in our procedures to force somebody, who is in exile and has no access to lawyers or to witnesses, as my noble friend has just said, to attempt to refute allegations of which he may be only dimly aware. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.