Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 14th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my registered interest in the universities sector. Like the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, I am not a lawyer, but I often find myself—this is an embarrassment for him—agreeing with every word he says. I commend the forensic contributions made by those who do have legal expertise, including my friend, as I think I can describe him, the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner.

We should take a step back and ask what we think we are doing with this legislation. Thank God we are not America. Thank God that, normally, we can sort things out without recourse to the law or to a regulator. Normally we can apply common sense, but let me clarify a case where common sense does not apply.

Let us call someone Kathleen. She must put up with the totally unacceptable behaviour of those extraneous to a university and of some colleagues inside it. She is not dismissed but is put in a position surely intolerable to all right-thinking people, except those who are fanatics for a particular cause and acclaim it as being all about equality and justice, only then to deliver the exact opposite. In this case, would she be entitled to claim constructive dismissal? If she would, there is a remedy already in the system. I take the point about the amendments to do with the employment tribunal system: you cannot bring a case if you have not been employed for two years. Let us say, however, that Kathleen has been employed for 16 or 20 years. Would she succeed in a claim for constructive dismissal in these circumstances? If she would, there is no cause for increased nightmarish leviathan legal structures. If she would not, this clause and the Bill do not assist her.

We have the OIA and the Office for Students. Now, under civil law, we want this engagement of tort to deliver something that either can be delivered under existing legal structures, or cannot be and which the Bill does not deal with either. It is a nonsense. The whole Bill is a nonsense. There are other ways of going about this in a civilised democratic society, for people to stand up to those who intimidate or to what might be described as cancel culture. It is time for people with a commitment to democracy and freedom to do that, rather than rely on regulators or the law.

I speak from experience. When, as Secretary of State for Education and Employment, I introduced the first tranche of fees in higher education, I was driven out of university premises. We just met outside them. We continued to have those meetings and that dialogue, irrespective of those trying to shut down free speech. Therefore, I have had a bit of it, though nothing like the example of someone we might call Kathleen, which sees people’s lives destroyed. We need a society that stands up for what is right and not a Bill that will cause even more confusion, difficulty and regulatory nightmares. On Report, we should eliminate this clause—and, in the end, we should eliminate the Bill.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly sympathise with the Government’s intention in pressing Clause 4, which is precisely to protect people such as Kathleen Stock. That is its purpose but it goes about it in the wrong way. Speaking as a former academic administrator, I see two particular problems, both of which have been alluded to briefly in this debate.

The first is vexatious litigation. Whenever a free speech row arises in a university, pressure groups are not slow to get involved. Some come from a standpoint of complete integrity and their interventions are helpful. Others are more politically motivated and, as I have seen frequently, in the fight to cause mischief. Some of these pressure groups are very well funded. Some are religious organisations, some political organisations. I fear that one result of this clause, were the Bill to become law, would be to place a significant burden on universities in fighting off vexatious claims. That is highly undesirable.

This leads to the second real problem with the clause. In reality, far from encouraging free speech, which I am certain is its intention, it will have the opposite effect, as the noble Lord, Lord Willetts, said. Universities, unions and university societies will fear the heavy hand of litigation and the effect will be a chilling one. Universities will be less likely to host controversial, vibrant events if a tort of this sort is pressed by this Parliament, than they would be if no such action is taken. I strongly oppose this clause for those two reasons—and others, but for those two in particular: vexatious litigation and the clause’s chilling effect on vibrant debate in our universities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe (Con)]

The point the noble Lord, Lord Collins, makes goes hand in hand with the point that I would like to reflect upon. The issue raised by a number of noble Lords was the sequence of events: whether the Bill should make clearer that the complaints process should have first been exhausted before a recourse to the courts is made. So if I may I will consider the noble Lords “chilling effect” point in that context, as well as in the context of the overall clause, and write to noble Lords accordingly.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I might ask the Minister to consider this. He mentioned earlier in his remarks that the question of pressure groups was not really relevant because they would not be an entity to which a duty of care was owed. The problem with pressure groups is their willingness to fund litigation on the part of other people: I think that is the relevance. Would the Minister care to reflect on that?

Schools Bill [HL]

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Monday 20th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, I too have put my name to Amendment 171F because, as your Lordships have heard, it is important that parents should be able to discover what their children are being taught and, in particular, to see the materials. This has arisen because the commercial providers of materials have apparently tried to prevent parents getting access to those materials. They have met requests for information or to see the materials with the assertion that these are protected, and they can rely on an exemption under the Freedom of Information Act.

I find that surprising. The material has been, or will be, referred to in class to the children, perhaps with slides shown. I should have thought that any duty of confidence on the part of the school to the commercial provider has been waived by that disclosure in class, but so be it—the effect of the assertion is to put parents off and, as we have heard, it puts the schools in an embarrassing and awkward position. The parents and the schools are on the same side.

The issue is, of course, particularly sensitive where the subject matter is RSE—relationships and sex education—but it is not limited to that nowadays. History, economics and politics—a whole range of subjects—raise awkward and difficult matters in which there are strong differing philosophies and political views. It is very important that parents should know what is being taught and, in particular, whether their children are in fact being indoctrinated; things are not always the facts that they appear to be. The content must be accurate and balanced.

This amendment will give statutory force to a policy to which, we would argue, there can be no reasonable objection. In the case of RSE material, there is already statutory guidance, provided by the Government in 2019. I note that only the other day, on 17 June, my noble friend the Minister wrote to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. I quote one short passage, as follows:

“When schools choose resources and external provision for Relationships, Sex and Health Education and PSHE, we expect schools to consult with parents on these matters and to make reasonable decisions about the content of their curriculum. Schools should also ensure that when they engage parents, they provide examples of the resources they plan to use (for example, the books they will use in lessons).”


That seems to be the Government’s policy, and who could argue against it? If that is the policy, what possible objection could there be to having it reinforced by statute, which would meet the arguments put forward by certain providers?

In 2019 the Secretary of State wrote in the foreword to the statutory guidance:

“We are clear that parents and carers are the prime educators for children on many of these matters. Schools complement and reinforce this role and have told us that they see building on what pupils learn at home as an important part of delivering a good education.”


The guidance says in paragraph 13:

“All schools must have in place a written policy for Relationships Education and RSE”,


and in paragraph 24, under the heading “Use of materials”:

“Schools should also ensure that, when they consult with parents, they provide examples of the resources that they plan to use as this can be reassuring for parents and enables them to continue the conversations started in class at home.”


Who could argue with that? It is common sense and uncontroversial. However, as we have heard, parents are not always getting the access to which they are already entitled and should be getting. We have heard about the school that obviously felt on the spot because the provider did not want them to see the material. The provider wrote that the material was exempt and that the placing of the copies of the actual documents in the public domain by inspection or copying is not justified. What on earth does that mean? How can it be right not to put a copy in the public domain or show it to the parents?

So there we are. We suggest that the amendment strikes a reasonable compromise. It would not require schools to copy all the materials, some of which might be quite lengthy, but would allow people simply to go into a school and see what is there. That would spare schools the burden of copying. The amendment is necessary and reasonable. Without it, it appears that parents will not be assured that, without recourse to litigation, they can see what their children are taught. I commend the amendment to the House.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

My Lords, I have also put my name to this amendment. I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Yardley, that the present position is untenable. In 2019 the Government updated the relationships and sex education guidance to make the teaching of certain content compulsory in all schools. The guidance was clear that content should be age-appropriate, developmentally appropriate and—I underline the next words—anchored in science and material facts. It seems that a significant number of independent so-called RSE providers have created materials that promote to schoolchildren, including quite young children, the idea that biological sex is a spectrum, that we all have an inner gender identity that should take priority over biological sex and that our assumed genders are assigned to us at birth.

One may agree or disagree with those propositions, and one may agree or disagree with them being put forward as scientifically based fact, but it is also clear that the 2019 guidance made paramount that parents should have visibility of what is being taught to their children. There are many references to that in the guidance, which says that parents must be consulted in developing and reviewing RSE policies; that

“All schools must have in place a written policy”;


that policies should reflect the communities they serve; and that policies should be “made available to parents” and published on the school website.

However, the intention for openness also covered RSE content because policies should:

“Set out the subject content, how it is taught and who is responsible for teaching it.”


and

“include sections covering … details of content/scheme of work”.

I support this amendment for three main reasons. First, there is clear evidence that the 2019 RSE guidance has resulted in some schools using ideologically driven materials not grounded in science, in my view, with children, including some very young children. This has particularly been so in the field of gender ideology, where some materials appear to deny the reality of biological sex. These teachings have consequences, not least for women’s sex-based rights.

Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Macdonald of River Glaven Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 6th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (LD)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as the warden of Wadham College, Oxford, and express my appreciation to Mr Johnson, who has just left, for being here for so much of the debate so far. All speakers have agreed that the United Kingdom’s universities are among our greatest achievements on the world stage. This is demonstrated by our remarkable placings in the international tables but also by the acclaimed quality of the research conducted in British institutions. However, we would do well to bear in mind that the enduring foundation for all this excellence and the respect which our universities are accorded worldwide is their reputation for determined independence on the one hand and their attachment to academic freedom on the other, so both their freedom to inquire and their autonomy. It is in this difference that we find the contrast between a Trofim Lysenko on the one hand and a Francis Crick on the other. As other noble Lords have eloquently declared, this character and quality of our universities must not be undermined by anything in the Bill.

I would like to address three concerns in particular. Clause 23 places a responsibility on the OfS for the assessment of both the quality and the standards of higher education. This is a significant extension of present powers as it would surely apply to the standards of the awards offered by universities. However, this formulation appears contrary to the accepted view at present in the sector that HE providers with degree-awarding powers are responsible, as autonomous institutions, for the standard of those awards. It appears to contradict the principle of institutional autonomy that has been the basis of HEFCE’s regulation to date. Therefore, I would be grateful for a little more explanation from the Minister on what precisely is meant by the assessment of standards in this context.

Secondly, Clauses 42, 45 and, I think, others give the OfS the right to revoke the degree-awarding powers, and the right to a university title itself, of a higher education institution. There seems very little risk in our country of these powers being crudely abused, and I do not suggest that they would be. However, they are nevertheless new powers and highly significant, and are certainly capable, in theory at least, of impacting on the independence of universities to the extent of their abolition through the removal of rights granted by royal charter or an Act of Parliament. In the circumstances, will the Minister consider again whether it is appropriate that such critical powers should be exercised by the OfS through the device of a statutory instrument?

Finally, Clause 71 gives the Secretary of State power to issue directions to the OfS, in which case he or she must, as the Bill puts it,

“have regard to the need to protect academic freedom”.

However, in my view, these words are quite insufficient. It is essential in the national interest that our universities retain their international reputation for integrity. At the very least, a Secretary of State issuing directions in this context should do so only in the context of an express positive duty to protect academic freedom. Does the Minister agree that some greater comfort than presently exists in respect of academic freedom should be found in the Bill? As I said at the start, independence and attachment to academic freedom are the entire basis for all this sector’s grand achievements.