Pre-emption of Parliament: Constitution Committee Report

Lord Lexden Excerpts

Thursday 6th February 2014 Grand Committee

[Lord Lexden (Con)]

My Lords, my little contribution to this debate is almost entirely in an historical vein, but I have one or two preliminary observations. For the best part of two years, I have had the good fortune to be a member of the Constitution Committee. I am extremely grateful to my chairman, the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, and all my colleagues. I am also very conscious of the large debt that is owed to the committee staff, its clerk, policy analyst, administrative assistant and legal advisers. They all serve us quite superbly.

During this inquiry, we learnt about the strict enforcement of unchanging rules laid down long ago under which the Treasury will authorise spending before a Bill becomes law. For me as a historian, the most memorable aspect of that absorbing inquiry was the touching faith in the internal validity and force of the rules displayed in the Treasury’s evidence to us on the grounds of their longevity. The Treasury’s written note to us in January 2013 referred to,

“an ancient convention that the Treasury should strive to look after Parliament’s interest in Whitehall”.

The note went on to refer to the Ram doctrine, adumbrated in November 1945, with which we became extremely familiar during the course of our inquiry as the reformulation in more modern form of “an ancient convention”.

“Ancient” is of course a relative term, but I was struck by the extent to which, in the Treasury’s view, it covers all but the most recent times and provides an apparent justification for a lack of precise answers to historical questions. In the committee’s oral evidence session with Treasury representatives, which took place exactly a year ago on 6 February 2013, it emerged that one of the conventions on which the Treasury has been relying,

“dates back a long way. We have traced something that may be of help. It is from a fat book that is very ancient and yellow, and calls itself the Public Accounts Committee Epitome of Reports”.

The date of that very ancient yellow work? 1884, the year that Gladstone passed the third Reform Act and, as it happened, my grandfather was born. Neither Gladstone’s feet nor my grandfather’s would normally be thought of as having walked in ancient times.

I was left feeling very puzzled by all that. Questions about the origins of ancient conventions that go back no further than the 19th century ought surely to be taken straight to the Treasury’s archives for full, detailed answers. Gladstone, perhaps the greatest of all 19th-century Chancellors, would have insisted on proper record-keeping. It is highly likely that the Treasury’s self-appointed role as the guardian of “Parliament interest in Whitehall” stems from Gladstone’s years as Chancellor in the 1850s and the 1860s—years when, in his own words, he gloried in the name of skinflint, saving the nation’s candle ends. By establishing the Treasury’s firm control over Westminster’s costs at this time he brought down public spending in this country as a proportion of GNP from 10% to 6.4%. The people’s William did not believe in spending the people’s money to create public services for the people.

This rather lengthy historical detour leads to an obvious request of my noble friend the Minister. Could he please check on the state of the Treasury’s archives and, assuming that no misfortune has befallen it, consider issuing a departmental directive that it should be consulted to provide answers to historical points of the kind that were not insignificant in the committee’s inquiry into the pre-emption of Parliament? What emerged clearly from the committee’s consideration of the historical background to the Treasury’s central role since the 19th century is that working habits and practices, which have come to be venerated and hallowed on the grounds of their ancient character have, over the years, mutated into conventions. The committee’s report called for redefinition. It states:

“We accept that the Treasury was not seeking to elevate its internal practices to the status of constitutional conventions. However, clarity in this area is important. We recommend that the Treasury's practices should not be described as ‘conventions’”.

In their very succinct reply to the report the Government stated that they would

“no longer use the term convention to describe these matters”.

That is very satisfactory and other aspects of the Government’s response are also welcomed by us. Not one of the committee’s recommendations has been rejected, although, as has already been pointed out, the acceptance of some was extremely terse. There are reasons for regarding the Government’s response as resembling a heartening outcome for the members of the committee and its excellent staff.