Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I was trying to be helpful—and obviously failing—in asking why the Government do not accept that the principle of proportionality must apply at the second stage. It is an ancient principle of our common law that you do not take a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Provided that the judge has that discretion, it seems a very important safeguard. Could whether or not to write it into the Bill be considered before Report?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

If I may add to that, my Amendment 58 seeks to add words to Clause 7(1)(c) that would introduce a test of proportionality. Clause 7(1)(c) says,

“that the court is required to give permission for material not to be disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be damaging to the interests of national security”,

to which my amendment would add,

“and that damage outweighs the interests of justice in disclosure”.

That would introduce a balancing test for the judge. As I understand what my noble and learned friend is saying, Clause 6(2) is concerned with the gateway and that could be satisfied by the production of a sample of material. But when you get to the second stage, the judge would be considering things in absolute detail, endeavouring to perhaps make things available by redaction or other means. Even when doing that, my Amendment 58 would be a very appropriate addition to Clause 7(1)(c).

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I rise as probably the least knowledgeable and competent person to say much about this but I do so because of my experience as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, has raised the issue. I do not expect an answer to my question this evening but it would be helpful if before Report stage what I am about to ask could be answered.

I am mystified about the principles that should apply not to the ISC but to parliamentary Select Committees generally. When we come to consider the Norwich Pharmacal matter, we will be considering the extent to which courts should not be able to order the disclosure of documents that might show serious wrongdoing of the kind indicated in the amendment of my noble friend Lady Hamwee because of the harm to national security or international relations. To that extent, the Executive would be less accountable to the courts than at present. The question then arises of the extent to which the Executive should be accountable to Parliament and especially to parliamentary committees. I understand why the committee we are concerned with should be treated differently from the ordinary parliamentary Select Committee for very good reasons to do with Clause 2 of the Bill. My question is: what ought to be the position with other parliamentary Select Committees? The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has tabled an amendment dealing with that general issue.

It would be very desirable if there were a practice direction of some kind, whether in the Ministerial Code or elsewhere, that indicated what needs to be done when a Select Committee seeks evidence of a non-sensitive kind and a security service gives an informed view not about policy but about other matters to the committee. I do not understand whether any practice is laid down on how that should be done and what the limits are when a Select Committee seeks such evidence.

Under the previous Government, when Andrew Dismore was chairman of the committee, we dealt with administrative detention without trial. We tried to get help from the security services. We were helped to some extent by the police service and we took evidence in camera from the police on some matters to do with counterterrorism. However, we were told that we could not do that with the intelligence and security services.

As I said, I do not expect an answer now, but it would be helpful if, between now and Report, we could be informed by letter of what the Government consider to be the general position on those issues. Certainly, if there is wrongdoing of a serious kind involving the sorts of issues covered by the amendment of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and if that sort of material is not to be shown either to this or any other parliamentary committee, and is to be barred from, or limited in, legal proceedings, I am troubled by the lack of accountability of the Executive to the judicial branch of government as well as to Parliament itself.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, my question to the Minister is: what is meant by “proper” in paragraph 3(3)(b) of Schedule 1? One has to postulate a situation where a Select Committee, for example on health, asks for disclosure from a Minister, who says, “I would love to give you the information but it would not be proper—it would be contrary to propriety”. What does the word mean? Proper in what sense? Would it be immoral or illegal? What is the word supposed to convey? I simply do not understand and would be grateful if the Minister would help me.

Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Debate between Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Lord Thomas of Gresford

Wednesday 1st February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am most grateful to my noble friend for interrupting me with one paragraph to go, which would have relieved your Lordships a great deal. The opinion has only recently been produced to me and the Bill team has had it only for a day, so I could hardly expect an immediate response. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to deal with some of the issues that are raised and the issues that I am raising in my remarks.

To conclude, that one size does not fit all is a recurring theme in the Jackson report. Every practising lawyer will agree with that. Proof of the issues that arise in litigation—sometimes liability, sometimes causation, sometimes quantum, and so on—gives rise to different risks and therefore to different solutions. This very Bill, for example, proposes different statutory instruments making different provision for different types of case. I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s response in due course. I beg to move.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I must choose my words carefully because I do not wish what I say to be taken to be outright opposition to my noble friend’s amendments, although I have a certain degree of agnosticism, if not scepticism. I suggest that those who are interested in this area might read the New Yorker article of a couple of weeks ago, which described the abuse of power by the claimant lawyers in the Exxon South American environmental litigation case. That indicates the need for very careful safeguards, even in an environmental setting.

The only reason I speak at all is because it occurs to me that there is a less radical solution to some of the problems that has been fashioned by the courts themselves without any legislative intervention: namely, the protective costs order. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, shakes his head. I shall explain what I am talking about. The problem with English cost rules is, of course, the winner-takes-all rule, which can, as my noble friend has indicated, have a seriously chilling effect on the ability to bring public interest litigation. It is the fear of claimants and their advisers of having to pay the legal costs of the defendant that has a chilling effect.

I was involved in the Corner House case for a small NGO that was seeking to challenge the lack of proper consultation by the Secretary of State in relation to anti-corruption provisions in the export guarantee area. This was not an environmental matter but it did concern public law. The problem was that the little NGO had absolutely no funds to pay for me but, more importantly, the department. The department would not give an assurance in advance that if it succeeded, it would not ask for the whole of its costs against the NGO. Therefore, the puzzle was how the NGO could bring the public interest proceedings not simply by dealing with the claimant’s position but dealing with the other side.

Sir Henry Brooke, to whom I pay tribute and who throughout has led thinking on this issue within the judiciary, advocated the use of a protective costs order, which enabled us to go before the court and say, “Even if we lose, can we please have a protective order that protects us against the risk of having to pay the other side’s legal costs in advance, so that we know that the worst thing that could happen to the Corner House NGO would be if it had to pay its own costs?”. I am glad to say that that was what was eventually decided and the result was that the Corner House was able to litigate.

I am embarrassed to say that I signed a 100 per cent success fee agreement without realising the consequence, which was that I actually profited from what I had thought to be a public-spirited case. I did not return the money, since it was being paid by the Government. I am against 100 per cent success fees and I would never do it again—ever.

However, the point I am making is not about success fees, but that if one develops through the courts, on a case-by-case and flexible basis, a way of softening the winner-takes-all rule in appropriate cases—not just environmental but all cases—that would enable the weak and impecunious to avoid the effect of that rule. The Constitutional Court of South Africa has decided that the winner-takes-all rule should never apply in important constitutional cases, and that in a proper public-interest case each side should at least bear its own costs and, in some circumstances, the Government should be required to pay the claimant’s costs, or give an undertaking in advance to give that protection.

This is a slightly long-winded way of saying that there are other means that perhaps are to be encouraged by the legislature, or perhaps not. There are other means that the courts themselves have been developing that can deal with some of the points made by my noble friend without something quite as radical as the proposals suggested in his amendments.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Actually, I cannot agree, because the Court of Appeal’s decision was a kind of precedent and it has been followed. There have been arguments about what limits there should be on claimants—whether they should be like an NGO or otherwise—but it would be perfectly possible for a rule to be made by the Lord Chancellor expressly empowering the courts to apply protective costs orders on a more general basis. This was not just a one-off decision; it applied in a line of cases and has been developed since.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am sure that my noble friend would agree, however, that protective costs orders are matters of discretion for the judge who hears an application, and that the threshold is extremely high. In his particular case, he obviously advanced matters of considerable public interest that were much wider than only the issues in the litigation that affected his clients. So a protective costs order can be applied for in such cases. However, I was involved in the case following the flooding of houses at Aberfan that occurred as the result of the spoil banks placed there after the disaster. In that sort of case, where individual householders were affected, protective costs orders would not have met that threshold.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, at the risk of being accused of unqualified one-way sycophancy, I must again congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, on the clarity of his presentation of this complex issue. Although I somewhat dissociate myself from the preamble to the substantive part of his speech, I entirely concur with his amendments. At this stage, I should also express my thanks to the learned counsel whose advice has instructed me in a matter about which, hitherto, I knew nothing. Aarhus meant absolutely nothing to me up till now. It seems that I may have shared that failing with Her Majesty's Government. We shall see from the Minister’s reply whether that is a correct inference or not.

The noble Lord referred to the ClientEarth case in which the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee observed that the cost rules pertaining in the United Kingdom placed it in systemic breach of Article 9.4 of that treaty. The committee concluded that we had not as a country adequately implemented our obligation to ensure that procedures are not prohibitively expensive. Counsel's opinion, to which the noble Lord referred, identified two particular issues. The first is that of uncertainty. The second is the sheer amount of the defendant’s costs that might fall on unsuccessful claimants. The noble Lord referred to the case of Barr and Biffa waste company, which arose from a complaint about odours emanating from a landfill site, where the costs were indeed nearly £3,250,000.

Lord Justice Jackson has much to say about those issues. His remedy is, as the noble Lord pointed out, a move to qualified one-way cost shifting. He gave six reasons for his conclusions, which are germane to the thrust of the amendments. He said:

“This is the simplest and most obvious way to comply with the UK’s obligation under the Aarhus Convention in respect of environmental judicial review cases”.

He continued:

“For the reasons stated by the Court of Appeal on several occasions, it is undesirable to have different costs rules for ... environmental judicial review and... other judicial review cases”.

His third reason was that the requirement for permission,

“is an effective filter to weed out unmeritorious cases. Therefore two way costs shifting is not generally necessary to deter frivolous claims”.

They simply do not arise. His fourth point was that,

“it is not in the public interest that potential claimants should be deterred from bringing properly arguable judicial review proceedings by the very considerable financial risks involved”.

He pointed out that:

“One was costs shifting in judicial review cases has proved satisfactory in Canada”.

His final point, which goes to the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lester is that the protective costs order regime,

“is not effective to protect claimants against excessive costs liability. It is expensive to operate and uncertain in its outcome. In many instances the PCO decision comes too late in the proceedings to be of value”.

So with respect to the noble Lord, the protective costs order regime is not, in the view of Lord Justice Jackson, an answer to the difficulty.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am grateful to my noble friend for saying there will be synchronisation. The scales of justice have been tipped against defendants by this fourfold cost that they have been calling for over a period of time. The purpose of this Bill is to even the scales of justice up. If there is any period between shifting from that side to this side the success fee and the ATE insurance without providing one-way costs as the balance, the scales will go completely in the opposite direction, and it is the suffering claimants who will come out the worst in a situation like that.

I cannot resist coming back to the question of protective costs orders, having heard my noble friend Lord Lester. Protective costs orders are applied for in public interest cases. I am not concerned simply with public interest cases. These could be the private individual, the householder whose house is flooded, in the example that I gave—

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

They are also applied for in private lawsuits.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

It is as my noble friend says. Lord Justice Jackson examined it and he came to the conclusion that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to. There is much more discussion to be had. I shall take my noble friend outside—as I once said in relation to one of the Ministers in the previous Government—and have a discussion with him there. For the moment, I withdraw this amendment.