Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 11th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Manningham-Buller]

My Lords, I am surprised to be compared to a regulator on the strength of the organisation to which I once belonged. I see very little parallel between the security and intelligence agencies and regulation. The conclusion that that makes them overcautious is therefore entirely spurious.

Of course, public opinion of and confidence in the judiciary is extremely important, and we do not want to do anything to damage that. Notwithstanding comments in the Daily Mail, I think that public confidence in the security and intelligence community is not helped by the fact that, in many cases, we have been unable to defend ourselves because of the problem that we are describing today. None the less, as I said at Second Reading, the support that my colleagues get from the public is extensive and perhaps greater than the noble Lord, Lord Lester, suggests.

Another point relates to secret information. We need to have the confidence of those—including many young men and women from the communities to which the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, referred—who give information to the security and intelligence agencies at risk of their lives and in secret. That is one of the fundamental reasons for secrecy. I ask the Committee to remember that in thinking of the confidence in other regards that we want to maintain.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I respect the views that the noble Baroness has just put forward, but I do not think that public confidence is improved if a closed judgment is given on closed material to the Government in a particular case. It is essential that the public know what is going on as much as is conceivably possible. The interests of national security can be invoked in only the smallest area of cases if confidence is to be maintained.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

The noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Lester, and the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, have made important points, but we must surely address the issue on the basis of what within our court system produces the most just result available, recognising that imperfect justice may be involved. Everybody accepts that two conflicting principles are valid, namely a properly functioning justice system and the need to protect national security. My view is that if a case is made that unjust results might be being reached, with claimants making claims that they know the Security Service cannot defend, then we should do enough to enable our justice system to properly defend those cases. Open justice is a means to producing justice. The courts have always recognised that if you cannot do justice that is open—for example, if you destroy the confidentiality that the justice system is designed to protect—then exceptional measures are needed for exceptional cases. I do not think our security services are being well served if they are forced to admit claims that they should not, and neither is respect being paid to our judges if they are simply a rubber stamp.

The right answer in relation to this issue is, first of all: is the case proved? That is an open question at the moment, as far as I am concerned. If the case is proved that some measures are needed then these should be kept to a minimum and the judges should decide what is required in order to create the fairest possible system. The problem with the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, which I think he would be the first to acknowledge, is that they involve the judge considering whether there would be any serious risk of injustice to either party if the application for a closed material procedure were to be granted. However, everybody involved in closed proceedings knows perfectly well that if you have procedure that reveals evidence about person A and A never knows what is said about him or her, the prospect of an injustice is significant. However, that may be the best that can be done under the circumstances.

I respect the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, for raising these points. I just do not think the House of Lords can avoid asking: what is the right answer? The only guide we have is to try to reach the right answer. That is the only way we shall retain respect for what we do. The task we are engaged in is trying to balance those two factors. As I said before supper, what we are aiming for in this bit of the debate is fairness because ultimately national security can be protected by the security services pulling a case, so it is all about deciding whether there are a sufficient number of unfair cases that some special procedure needs to be crafted.

As it happens—and I think the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, is right here—the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, are pretty well the same points we had before supper, and he acknowledged this in his opening remarks. The noble Lord’s basic approach in Amendment 44 is to say that one should go the PII route first; then only if the PII decision is non-disclosure do you go on to CMP. I do not like that approach for the reasons I advanced in response to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, in concert with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. It is too inflexible. I do not see why we cannot give the court all the options at the time it makes the decision, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, suggested. This would avoid opportunistic applications and allow the court to come to the fairest possible results. I would be repeating myself if I went on about that. The noble Lord’s amendment has promoted debate, but the effect of that debate is that we do not want the lack of flexibility that his amendment proposes.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

Amendment 45 takes us to Clause 6(2), which begins:

“The court must, on an application under subsection (1), make such a declaration”.

My amendment seeks to replace “must” with “may”. I intend to be quite brief and to call up very shortly the heavy artillery of my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford in support. There have been, of course, many references to the key role of judicial discussion in the operation of CMPs under Clause 6. This amendment simply seeks to ensure that the Government’s claim that a judge will have the final say on whether a CMP takes place is a reality. As drafted, the Bill does not seem to do this. While it gives the judge the last word, the reviewer of terrorism legislation has said that:

“The only difficulty is that that word is dictated to the judge by the Secretary of State”.

The special advocates have warned that the Bill creates a statutory straitjacket for judges, and we came across this earlier this evening. Martin Chamberlain said this in his evidence to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. He said that a key safeguard that had been promised—enabling a judge to have the final say on when secret proceedings are needed—was missing from the draft Bill. He went on to say that,

“in fact the position is that the judge is required to accede to the Secretary of State’s application for a Closed Material Procedure—the word ‘must’ is used—if there is any evidence at all whose disclosure would be contrary to the interests of national security. So, there is no ability for a judge to say, ‘I think this is the type of case that could perfectly fairly be tried using normal Public Interest Immunity rules’”.

Finally, he said,

“you are going to be giving them”—

that is, the judges—

“a statutory straitjacket that requires them to ensure that nothing is disclosed contrary to the interests of national security … there is to be no balance between national security on the one hand and fairness on the other”.

I argue that we should replace “must” with “may” to once again improve judicial discretion. I beg to move.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I have already made the point that the procedures of the court should be controlled by the judge and not by the Secretary of State. The words “rubber stamp” have been used on a number of occasions, not least by my noble friend Lord Lester, in relation to these provisions. It is a rubber stamp when one combines the provisions in Clause 6(2) with what the judge must do in determining the application, under the provisions of Clause 7(1)(c). This is a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, made in his original submission on an earlier amendment, and we have not followed it up very much. Clause 7(1)(c) states:

“that the court is required to give permission for material not to be disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be damaging to the interests of national security”.

Now, who gives evidence about the interests of national security? It must be, by virtue of the nature of the proceedings, the uncontested evidence of those who are responsible for security. What exactly is meant by the interests of national security is something that I wish to pursue, perhaps at the next sitting of this Committee. In some definitions, it can refer to economic interests, and there are all sorts of others, as well as simply terrorism, which is the context in which we think of national security at the moment. We will need a better definition in due course.

The use of “must” in this clause reduces the judge’s power virtually to nil. The grounds put forward by the Minister may be reduced to the interest of national security, but as I have said, as the Bill is drafted those interests will be defined by the Minister himself. Clause 6(3) instructs the judge to ignore two very relevant considerations: first, that there may be no requirement on the Secretary of State to disclose; and, secondly, that the intercept evidence which the Secretary of State intends to put before him is inadmissible in the very proceedings he is supposed to be judging. If intercept evidence is inadmissible in open court, surely it is inadmissible in closed court. Intercept evidence would have to be normally regarded as inadmissible in such circumstances.

The word “may” will give the judge a discretion to decide what is proportionate and necessary in all the circumstances that come before him. It will give the judge control and power to manage proceedings, and the ability to decide how the procedure will be carried out and which type of procedure would be more appropriate. It will give the flexibility that I talked about in relation to the amendment that we debated earlier.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, this is a key amendment. It has to be read alongside Clause 7(1)(c). The effect of the amendment tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Thomas of Gresford, would be that once it was established that a disclosure to a claimant would be damaging to the interests of national security, it would be open to the court, balancing all the factors for and against non-disclosure, to determine that the case should involve the option for the defendant to have a closed material proceeding. If the position were exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, suggested, and there was some damage to national security but it was extremely minor and only in respect of one document when there were millions of other documents whose disclosure would not do any harm at all, even if the Secretary of State certified that minor harm would be done, it would be open to the court to say, “Yes, we accept that there will be damage to national security but it does not warrant a CMP procedure”. That would give the judges some degree of control.

Currently, if the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs said, “I have spoken to the security services and they tell me that if you disclose this, it will damage national security, and I believe that to be true”, I find it very difficult to imagine that a responsible judge would be able to say no. Once the judge has said yes to that proposition, he or she would be obliged under Clause 6(2) to say, “This is now a case in which an application can be made”. The consequence of that is that Clause 7(1)(c) would apply. Rules of court would have to be made that would then allow the Secretary of State or the relevant party to make an application. If in respect of an individual document or piece of information the Secretary of State says, “I have spoken to the security services and they tell me that disclosure of these 25 documents would damage national security in quite a mild way”—they would not say that, but let us imagine that they did—the judge would have no discretion.

The correct course, if the case is made that we need to change the legal position, is that the judge should have a discretion. Again, I emphasise that what the Bill is trying to do is not protect national security—that can be protected by the case being pulled—but ensure a fair trial. I look to the noble and learned Lord to justify the fact that there is no balance and no discretion. Why is there an obligation to opt for CMP even if the damage to national security would be very mild? The noble Lords’ amendment would get round this and give the judges real discretion.

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[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I was trying to be helpful—and obviously failing—in asking why the Government do not accept that the principle of proportionality must apply at the second stage. It is an ancient principle of our common law that you do not take a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Provided that the judge has that discretion, it seems a very important safeguard. Could whether or not to write it into the Bill be considered before Report?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

If I may add to that, my Amendment 58 seeks to add words to Clause 7(1)(c) that would introduce a test of proportionality. Clause 7(1)(c) says,

“that the court is required to give permission for material not to be disclosed if it considers that the disclosure of the material would be damaging to the interests of national security”,

to which my amendment would add,

“and that damage outweighs the interests of justice in disclosure”.

That would introduce a balancing test for the judge. As I understand what my noble and learned friend is saying, Clause 6(2) is concerned with the gateway and that could be satisfied by the production of a sample of material. But when you get to the second stage, the judge would be considering things in absolute detail, endeavouring to perhaps make things available by redaction or other means. Even when doing that, my Amendment 58 would be a very appropriate addition to Clause 7(1)(c).

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I know my noble friends are trying to be helpful and I am sure that equally they will understand why I am not prepared to make a concession on the hoof, as it were. This is clearly something one would wish to consider and clearly we will also have the opportunity in good time to consider my noble friend’s Amendment 58. I am glad that he made the distinction between getting through the gateway—which is what Amendment 45 applies to—and the second stage. We are of the view that if the two tests in Clause 6(2) are satisfied to the discretion of the judge, the application for the closed material procedure must succeed and thereupon the detailed consideration of the documentation takes place under the rules of court, which are to be set out under Clause 7.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

52: Clause 6, page 5, line 15, after “matter” insert “, any action against the police or law enforcement agencies, or any action seeking a person’s release from detention”

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[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, the closed material procedure applies when a court is, under Clause 6(1),

“seised of relevant civil proceedings”.

Clause 6(7) defines “relevant civil proceedings” as,

“any proceedings (other than proceedings in a criminal cause or matter) before … the High Court … the Court of Appeal, or … the Court of Session”.

CMP applications can be brought only where a disclosure of material would be damaging to the interests of national security. However, can such applications be appropriate in habeas corpus proceedings or judicial review involving the liberty of the subject or claims for wrongful arrest against the police or prison officers? Not even the United States goes that far. As my noble and learned friend will be well aware, the habeas applications in the Guantanamo cases have a special procedure whereby sensitive material is released to security-cleared advocates acting on behalf of the applicant. Then the court, in such special procedures, can give permission to those security-cleared advocates to discuss specific matters or questions laid out by the court with the client.

In habeas corpus proceedings, the onus is on the respondent to the writ to justify the restraint of the applicant. Blackstone cites the first recorded use of habeas corpus in 1305, during the reign of King Edward I. He explains the basis of the writ in these terms:

“The King is at all times entitled to have an account, why the liberty of any of his subjects is restrained, wherever that restraint may be inflicted”.

I am always conscious of the Magna Carta Lords who look down on our proceedings in this Chamber. At Runnymede nearly 800 years ago, they insisted that:

“No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed”.

Are actions against the police for wrongful arrest to be defeated by secret evidence? Let us take the example of someone arrested on a bus for smoking a fake cigarette. He brings proceedings against the police for wrongful arrest. Those acting for the police go to see the judge in secret and say, “We had a tip-off from the security services. We cannot tell the claimant in this particular case. You must strike his claim out or find in our favour”—or whatever. Is his claim then to be defeated? I suggest that that would be quite contrary to the basis of habeas corpus and the protection of freedom of the individual as we have known it for centuries.

In my submission, the Government should define much more closely the relevant civil proceedings in which CMPs may be applied for. We have been talking all day but only in the context of civil claims for damages brought in the High Court in the ordinary way. We have not discussed habeas corpus and matters of that sort. I suggest that they should be specifically excluded. I beg to move.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I have some sympathy with the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, that habeas corpus proceedings should fall within the civil proceedings provisions of the Bill. I am less persuaded by the argument to include any action against the police. It would probably seem wrong to exclude these specific actions from the procedures, not least in the light of the Crime and Courts Bill, with the creation of the National Crime Agency, the extension of powers to the border agency and the like, and the possible involvement of ordinary police forces under the auspices of the NCA in matters which could go to issues of terrorism or other aspects of national security.

The noble Lord may have a point about habeas corpus and it would be interesting to hear the Minister’s response to that, but I do not think that the Opposition could necessarily support the amendment as it stands. There is the problem that we will refer to later about definitions of national security and the like, which possibly offer a more fruitful way of narrowing the scope of the provisions of the Bill. Having said that, I entirely concur with my noble and learned friend’s view. Anything that I say on subsequent amendments or indeed in relation to this amendment is without prejudice to the stance that we take, but we are yet to be persuaded of the case for closed material procedures in the first instance. All the discussions that have taken place so far, and that we will continue to have in relation to this part of the Bill are subject to that distinct reservation. We are not, therefore, conceding the point when we look to see what ultimate fallback provisions might be desirable and necessary if it is the wish of your Lordships’ House on Report to go forward with the Bill in much the condition that we now find it. We will be looking to discuss amendments and we hope that the Government will respond positively to some of them but in relation to this amendment we will be commending the latter part to the Minister’s attention.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My noble friend’s amendment seeks to narrow further the contexts in which a CMP can be used. I hope I can demonstrate to your Lordships that the Bill is already very narrowly drafted and that the amendment could remove justice from those who are entitled to it. The Bill as drafted allows CMPs to be used only in relation to information damaging to the interests of national security, only in the High Court, Court of Appeal or Court of Session, and not in a criminal cause or matter.

The amendment would mean that CMPs could not be used in any action against the police or law enforcement agencies, or any action seeking a person’s release from detention. Where such cases involve information that cannot be disclosed for reasons of national security, this amendment would not allow judges to reach a judgment based on all the facts. Claims relating to national security should, surely, be capable of being heard, rather than material being excluded by way of public interest immunity, regardless of whether the defendant is the police or a government department. As was reflected in the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, the police play a vital role in national security in, for example, counterterrorism investigations. There may be many civil cases which would involve the police—it would not necessarily be directed against a Secretary of State—and it would be unfortunate if they were to be excluded from the possible use of CMPs. Judges should be able to come to a judgment on the full facts in any case relating to national security.

The Bill is designed to increase justice for claimants and defendants in all civil cases where national security means that, otherwise, information could not be put into open court. This amendment would take that justice away from claimants who bring a national security case against the police or law enforcement agencies, or where, as my noble friend explained, the case is about a person’s release from detention. Cases about a person’s release from detention in the UK will generally be in the context of a criminal cause or matter where CMPs are not available, but should this not be the case, it is important that all of the material is before the court, if possible, rather than being excluded by PII.

My noble friend gave a quotation about habeas corpus going back to the reign of King Edward I. I hope that I do not strike too nationalistic a tone, but north of the border, Edward I is not seen as a fount of justice and liberty. That apart, my noble friend raises a serious point. It is our considered view that in the context of habeas corpus cases it is vital that the court is in possession of relevant material before making a decision to issue a writ. Without all of the relevant information, it may not be possible for the court to come to the right decision.

I know that noble Lords are concerned that the nature of the types of cases covered by this amendment creates a greater need for transparency, and that, indeed, in some circumstances, such as proceedings into potential violations of Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, there is a requirement for transparency. The argument that public confidence requires fully open proceedings in such cases is an understandable one, but I believe that these concerns can be addressed through our current proposals. Nothing in this Bill is incompatible with the ECHR. My noble friend has raised a serious point about detention. I will reflect further on it, but our approach is that it is important, even in these cases, that all the material, if possible, is made available to the court before a decision is made, rather than some of being excluded through PII. I will reflect on what he has said, but our view is that we have struck the right balance. I hope that on that basis he will be able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I know that my noble and learned friend is heading for the sleeper so perhaps we can send homewards to think again about this issue. Habeas applications in the United States have a special procedure and the importance of it is that the applicant for habeas is given some idea of what he is facing. I am not saying that habeas corpus applications should be completely open, but it is inappropriate to apply the strictures and limitations contained in the Bill to applications of that sort. It is a matter that we can discuss. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 52 withdrawn.