Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord Thomas of Gresford Excerpts

Wednesday 1st February 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

141: Clause 45, page 31, line 30, at end insert “, (2A) or (2B)”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, Part 2 of the Bill has its complexities, but all sides are agreed on two principles.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, I am aware that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, is hesitating so that he may have the Minister’s ear.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

All sides are agreed on two principles—access to justice must be maintained and undue cost must be squeezed out of civil litigation. The issue is what the best framework is for achieving these ends. Unlike with Part 1 of the Bill, public money is not directly involved in supporting the litigation that we are referring to in Part 2.

All sides recognise the unforeseen and unintended consequences of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which threw the burden of the success fee and the ATE insurance premium on to losing defendants and removed from the claimant any interest in the amount of the success fees and premiums that they were only theoretically obliged to pay. Save for the recent changes introducing fixed fees in Road Traffic Act litigation, lawyers have been able to charge 100 per cent success fees, whether or not they undertake other, riskier cases. Insurers have fixed levels of premiums with which not even the costs judges on taxation are able or willing to quarrel.

This policy may have helped claimants by allowing them to retain the full amount of the damages awarded to them. However, the removal of the restraint of competition as to the size of success fees and ATE premiums has put an undue burden of fourfold cost on defendant insurers. Ultimately, this is not in the public interest, because insurers take their profit and pass the burden on in increased premiums for motoring, household, employers and public liability insurance. Self-insured large companies and public bodies such as the NHS and public authorities that are funded from the public purse generally carry the burden themselves.

The Bill proposes to shift the burden. The claimant will pay the success fee, which will be limited to 25 per cent of his damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenity and loss of earnings and expense to the date of trial. He will also carry the burden of the ATE premium to an amount that is not limited. The champagne corks will indeed be popping in the City by relieved liability insurers and in NHS trusts, town halls and board rooms all over the country. If these defendants win, all their own costs will be paid by the ATE insurers—assuming, of course, that there is still an ATE market and that the premium is affordable—unless a regime of one-way cost shifting that I talked about on Monday last is introduced at the same time, which will require defendants, win or lose, to pay their own costs.

The Jackson report, which sets out all the consultations that Lord Justice Jackson undertook, demonstrates that insurers and public bodies are up for it and accept that one-way cost-shifting, a system that has operated in legal aid cases since 1949, is a fair price for removing from them their present liability for uncontrolled success fees and uncontrolled “after the event” premiums. If one-way cost-shifting is introduced, at a stroke a claimant will lose the fear of having to pay the defendant’s costs if he loses the case, costs that might ruin him and remove the roof from over his head. At a stroke, the “after the event” insurance premium, which is currently in place largely to cover the defendant’s costs, will be savagely cut back. A claimant will have to cover only the risk that if he loses he will be responsible not for the defendant’s costs but for his own disbursements, court fees, expert and medical fees. Just as it is conceivable that in competing for business a solicitor might advertise that he will not charge a success fee, a solicitor with a large standard practice might well be prepared to absorb disbursements in the cases that he loses. We shall have to see whether that happens.

All this is by way of introduction to my amendments, which deal with a discrete area of litigation—environmental law, involving public law and private claims and the tort of nuisance. Public law cases are judicial review claims brought mainly by individuals concerned by inappropriate development—for instance, whether planning permission has made proper allowance for the effect on local flora and fauna by a particular development or whether a waste dump is in the right place. Private nuisance has enjoyed a real renaissance through the help of independent solicitors since the access to justice scheme came into being. A private nuisance is an interference to land or to rights associated with land caused by the unreasonable conduct of the defender. It is the last resort for local residents who need injunctive relief from a polluter who will not run his enterprise with proper concern for his neighbours, and where the regulator is unable or unwilling to take steps to abate the problem.

I am indebted to Stephen Hockman, Queen's Counsel, a former chairman of the Bar, Stephen Tromans, Queen's Counsel, named as environment/planning Silk of the Year at the Chambers Bar Awards 2011, and Gordon Wignall, a barrister specialising in nuisance cases and editor of the third edition of the Law Society’s Guide to Conditional Fees. I have circulated copies of their joint opinion on the impact of the Aarhus convention on costs and funding rules that are applicable in environmental cases.

The Aarhus convention is concerned with access to justice in environmental matters and was ratified by the United Kingdom in February 2005 at the same time that it was ratified by the European Community. The relevant text is set out in the opinion, but the effect is that the United Kingdom is bound to provide “adequate and effective remedies” in this area,

“including injunctive relief as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive”.

The convention applies both to judicial review claims in the administrative court and to private law actions in nuisance. The Supreme Court, in a recent case, has referred the question as to the test to be applied in order to determine whether proceedings are “prohibitively expensive” to the European Court of Justice. In one case that is quoted in the opinion, for example, a defendant’s costs amounted to well over £3 million. Is that prohibitively expensive?

Since the Minister and others already have a copy of the full opinion, I will simply put the conclusions of the learned counsel on the public record. First, the current costs rules run contrary to the international treaty obligations of the United Kingdom, which the United Kingdom voluntarily accepted. Problems arise largely out of the insistence on the “costs follow the event” rule, which tends to lead to inconsistency with the aims of participating in environmental justice and results in a claimant’s liability to pay prohibitively expensive costs.

Secondly, the compliance committee’s last deliberation in the ClientEarth case required the United Kingdom to review its costs rules and recommended rectification. Thirdly, two detailed reviews relevant to environmental proceedings in England and Wales have subsequently been undertaken and presided over by members of the Court of Appeal. The learned counsel are referring to the Jackson report, which we have been discussing, and to the report of Lord Justice Sullivan on access to environmental justice. These have been endorsed by the senior judiciary, and the primary recommendation was that the use of qualified one-way cost-shifting in environmental cases would have a dramatic inroad into the “costs follow the event” principle.

Fourthly, by withdrawing the recovery of “after the event” premiums, the size of which cannot be met by claimants or their legal representatives, without providing at the same time for one-way cost shifting as a replacement in environmental claims, the Government have elected to retreat from the full proposals of the Jackson report and the Sullivan report, which were conducted by those eminent Lords Justices. Fifthly, the consequence is that the United Kingdom, already in breach of its convention obligations, is diverging from rather converging with its own environmental expectations and those of the international community.

Sixthly, the further consequence is that claimants who wish to protect the environment and participate in environmental justice are even less likely to be able to do so than at present. This is predominantly because of the risk of incurring a liability for defendant’s costs that may well be prohibitively and grossly expensive in any event, but also because of the uncertainty that claimants face about their liability for those costs, which under the Government’s proposals will be known only once the litigation, whether public or private, has been concluded.

Claimants in environmental cases do not want damages; they want relief from the consequence of poor decision-making by public bodies or protection from the degradation of their environment. Even in multiparty actions, damages-based agreements are not a solution. My amendments would enable the Government to honour their international environmental obligations rather than turn their back upon them.

Amendment 147 would provide in subsection (2A) that in an environmental claim the losing defendant would pay the premium in respect of disbursements by way of fees for expert reports paid by the claimant. In subsection (2B), the losing defendant would pay the premium on the costs insurance policy if he had agreed to do so prior to the commencement of the proceedings. There are occasions when a defendant will agree to pay the claimant’s premium for “after the event” insurance whether he wins or loses, because if the defendants succeed then they will get all their costs from the ATE insurers.

Amendment 150 defines “environmental claim” by the same definition as is contained in the Aarhus convention. The use of this definition would ensure that only nuisance cases that were truly environmental in nature would be within the scope of my amendment. Insurance recovery claims and private nuisance—for tree-root subsidence, for instance—would not get the amendment of the amendment.

Amendment 157 would introduce qualified one-way cost-shifting in both environmental claims and other claims. The amendment was drafted before I had refined my own views, which I explained at small length on Monday last on this topic. The word “unreasonably” therefore appears in the amendment but I repeat my objections to the vagueness of the word “unreasonable” and reiterate the necessity for clarity by expanding what is unreasonable, as Lord Justice Jackson did, into the familiar expressions of “fraud”, “frivolous and vexatious conduct” and “abuse of the process of the court”.

Why should we single out environmental law for different treatment from other areas of litigation? Essentially, I am not. In the amendments I am arguing for one-way cost-shifting as a precondition for change and for the premium for cover for disbursements—a far lesser amount than the current premiums recovered against the potential defendant’s cost liabilities—to be recovered from the losing defendant. That is very similar to what I was saying on Monday, when I suggested that there are positive benefits in dividing liability for these lesser premiums between the claimant and the defendant in a staged way. In any event, the issue is far more urgent in environmental cases because of our obligation to comply with the Aarhus convention.

A tidy mind might try to bring every aspect of litigation into one structure, one piece of architecture—the word that the Minister used on Monday—but litigation is not like that. Time and again the Jackson report emphasises that one size does not fit all. I quote from page 44:

“many submissions during the Costs Review have emphasised that ‘one size does not fit all’. The Bar Council, for example, states: ‘What is abundantly clear, from Jackson LJ’s Preliminary Report and from the Bar Council’s review, is that “One size does not fit all.” Particular types of litigation give rise to particular issues, be they funding issues, case management issues or otherwise”.

That is a recurring theme in the Jackson report and every practising lawyer will agree.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I apologise for interrupting my noble friend. Before he sits down, will he help us on this matter in relation to his narrower point on the Aarhus convention? He was kind enough to circulate the learned opinion of Mr Hockman and others, including, as I understand it, to my noble friend the Minister. Will my noble friend tell the House whether he has had a response to the opinion of Mr Hockman and others? If not, does he agree with me that it might shorten the debate if, after he has sat down, the Minister were to indicate whether or not the Government accept the premise of the Hockman opinion?

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am most grateful to my noble friend for interrupting me with one paragraph to go, which would have relieved your Lordships a great deal. The opinion has only recently been produced to me and the Bill team has had it only for a day, so I could hardly expect an immediate response. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will be able to deal with some of the issues that are raised and the issues that I am raising in my remarks.

To conclude, that one size does not fit all is a recurring theme in the Jackson report. Every practising lawyer will agree with that. Proof of the issues that arise in litigation—sometimes liability, sometimes causation, sometimes quantum, and so on—gives rise to different risks and therefore to different solutions. This very Bill, for example, proposes different statutory instruments making different provision for different types of case. I look forward to hearing my noble friend’s response in due course. I beg to move.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I must choose my words carefully because I do not wish what I say to be taken to be outright opposition to my noble friend’s amendments, although I have a certain degree of agnosticism, if not scepticism. I suggest that those who are interested in this area might read the New Yorker article of a couple of weeks ago, which described the abuse of power by the claimant lawyers in the Exxon South American environmental litigation case. That indicates the need for very careful safeguards, even in an environmental setting.

The only reason I speak at all is because it occurs to me that there is a less radical solution to some of the problems that has been fashioned by the courts themselves without any legislative intervention: namely, the protective costs order. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, shakes his head. I shall explain what I am talking about. The problem with English cost rules is, of course, the winner-takes-all rule, which can, as my noble friend has indicated, have a seriously chilling effect on the ability to bring public interest litigation. It is the fear of claimants and their advisers of having to pay the legal costs of the defendant that has a chilling effect.

I was involved in the Corner House case for a small NGO that was seeking to challenge the lack of proper consultation by the Secretary of State in relation to anti-corruption provisions in the export guarantee area. This was not an environmental matter but it did concern public law. The problem was that the little NGO had absolutely no funds to pay for me but, more importantly, the department. The department would not give an assurance in advance that if it succeeded, it would not ask for the whole of its costs against the NGO. Therefore, the puzzle was how the NGO could bring the public interest proceedings not simply by dealing with the claimant’s position but dealing with the other side.

Sir Henry Brooke, to whom I pay tribute and who throughout has led thinking on this issue within the judiciary, advocated the use of a protective costs order, which enabled us to go before the court and say, “Even if we lose, can we please have a protective order that protects us against the risk of having to pay the other side’s legal costs in advance, so that we know that the worst thing that could happen to the Corner House NGO would be if it had to pay its own costs?”. I am glad to say that that was what was eventually decided and the result was that the Corner House was able to litigate.

I am embarrassed to say that I signed a 100 per cent success fee agreement without realising the consequence, which was that I actually profited from what I had thought to be a public-spirited case. I did not return the money, since it was being paid by the Government. I am against 100 per cent success fees and I would never do it again—ever.

However, the point I am making is not about success fees, but that if one develops through the courts, on a case-by-case and flexible basis, a way of softening the winner-takes-all rule in appropriate cases—not just environmental but all cases—that would enable the weak and impecunious to avoid the effect of that rule. The Constitutional Court of South Africa has decided that the winner-takes-all rule should never apply in important constitutional cases, and that in a proper public-interest case each side should at least bear its own costs and, in some circumstances, the Government should be required to pay the claimant’s costs, or give an undertaking in advance to give that protection.

This is a slightly long-winded way of saying that there are other means that perhaps are to be encouraged by the legislature, or perhaps not. There are other means that the courts themselves have been developing that can deal with some of the points made by my noble friend without something quite as radical as the proposals suggested in his amendments.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Actually, I cannot agree, because the Court of Appeal’s decision was a kind of precedent and it has been followed. There have been arguments about what limits there should be on claimants—whether they should be like an NGO or otherwise—but it would be perfectly possible for a rule to be made by the Lord Chancellor expressly empowering the courts to apply protective costs orders on a more general basis. This was not just a one-off decision; it applied in a line of cases and has been developed since.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am sure that my noble friend would agree, however, that protective costs orders are matters of discretion for the judge who hears an application, and that the threshold is extremely high. In his particular case, he obviously advanced matters of considerable public interest that were much wider than only the issues in the litigation that affected his clients. So a protective costs order can be applied for in such cases. However, I was involved in the case following the flooding of houses at Aberfan that occurred as the result of the spoil banks placed there after the disaster. In that sort of case, where individual householders were affected, protective costs orders would not have met that threshold.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, at the risk of being accused of unqualified one-way sycophancy, I must again congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, on the clarity of his presentation of this complex issue. Although I somewhat dissociate myself from the preamble to the substantive part of his speech, I entirely concur with his amendments. At this stage, I should also express my thanks to the learned counsel whose advice has instructed me in a matter about which, hitherto, I knew nothing. Aarhus meant absolutely nothing to me up till now. It seems that I may have shared that failing with Her Majesty's Government. We shall see from the Minister’s reply whether that is a correct inference or not.

The noble Lord referred to the ClientEarth case in which the Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee observed that the cost rules pertaining in the United Kingdom placed it in systemic breach of Article 9.4 of that treaty. The committee concluded that we had not as a country adequately implemented our obligation to ensure that procedures are not prohibitively expensive. Counsel's opinion, to which the noble Lord referred, identified two particular issues. The first is that of uncertainty. The second is the sheer amount of the defendant’s costs that might fall on unsuccessful claimants. The noble Lord referred to the case of Barr and Biffa waste company, which arose from a complaint about odours emanating from a landfill site, where the costs were indeed nearly £3,250,000.

Lord Justice Jackson has much to say about those issues. His remedy is, as the noble Lord pointed out, a move to qualified one-way cost shifting. He gave six reasons for his conclusions, which are germane to the thrust of the amendments. He said:

“This is the simplest and most obvious way to comply with the UK’s obligation under the Aarhus Convention in respect of environmental judicial review cases”.

He continued:

“For the reasons stated by the Court of Appeal on several occasions, it is undesirable to have different costs rules for ... environmental judicial review and... other judicial review cases”.

His third reason was that the requirement for permission,

“is an effective filter to weed out unmeritorious cases. Therefore two way costs shifting is not generally necessary to deter frivolous claims”.

They simply do not arise. His fourth point was that,

“it is not in the public interest that potential claimants should be deterred from bringing properly arguable judicial review proceedings by the very considerable financial risks involved”.

He pointed out that:

“One was costs shifting in judicial review cases has proved satisfactory in Canada”.

His final point, which goes to the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lester is that the protective costs order regime,

“is not effective to protect claimants against excessive costs liability. It is expensive to operate and uncertain in its outcome. In many instances the PCO decision comes too late in the proceedings to be of value”.

So with respect to the noble Lord, the protective costs order regime is not, in the view of Lord Justice Jackson, an answer to the difficulty.

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[Lord McNally]

I am not sure that I am able to commit to anything as rash as following up a recommendation that is a mere 62 years old. As always with interventions by my noble friend, I will take that away, but I should also make the point, given that this is the last of a series of amendments chipping away at—to use the term that I used the other night—the central architecture of the reforms that we are trying to introduce, that we have consulted on these matters. We have indicated the idea that PCOs may be a way forward in our commitment under the Aarhus convention. I will certainly make sure that the learned counsel’s opinion is fully studied. As I have explained, the Government’s view is that the best way forward is within the rules rather than within legislation, but this has given a good airing to the issue. The whole House is now more familiar with the Aarhus convention—I understand it is a Danish town—and we are the better for that debate. I therefore ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, it is a relief to know that the Ministry of Justice, like New York, never sleeps. No doubt the opinion will be pored over and there will be further discussions before we get to Report.

I invite my noble friend to do this now. He says that the proper way to proceed is for one-way cost-shifting to be introduced by tailored Civil Procedure Rules. Your Lordships will recall that on Monday the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and I made the point that there should be guidance from Parliament, not simply a discussion between the Executive and the Civil Procedure Rule Committee, about the parameters of those rules and what the boundaries and structure are to be. I would be grateful to know from the Minister the position on this particular point. He is shifting the burden of the success fee and the ATE premium over to the successful claimant. Is that going to be co-ordinated and timed to come into effect at the same time as one-way cost-shifting? That is the key issue. If you do not have one-way cost-shifting, you are shifting to the claimant the liability for the defendant’s entire costs, if he should lose, and consequently an enormous premium. We heard of premiums of £900,000. I am familiar with a premium of £80,000. I think that the standard is in thousands for any sort of claim. If, on the other hand, one-way cost-shifting comes in and the defendants’ costs are paid by the defendants win or lose, we will be concerned with a premium for a much smaller thing, which is the disbursements of the claimant, should he lose. The risk is that much smaller.

[Lord Bach]

We on this Front Bench agree absolutely with the question that the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has asked the Minister. It is crucial. To broaden the point slightly, the great danger in the Bill is that we are changing the current arrangements, but the way that they will work in practice is subject to regulations of which there is no sight at present. We need from the Government a statement about how they intend to implement this part of the Bill if they get it through. We have no idea at all. The example that the noble Lord gave is the best one of all. It is critical, but there are other examples where a great deal relies on regulations that are to be made at a later stage, sometimes to be passed by affirmative resolution, sometimes by negative resolution. It is not really a satisfactory way of changing the civil law in such a fundamental way. I would be grateful if the Minister, in his reply to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, would deal with the general point as well.

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[Lord McNally]

The pained look with which the noble Lord, Lord Bach, comes to the Dispatch Box and implies that the Government is the first Government in the world to bring forward legislation with further consultations needed about specific regulation is a bit rich. The implications of this Bill will come into force in April 2013. We have a period of time for such consultations. As I said before, I take the point that there has to be a synchronisation in these matters. I do not think we are doing anything unusual by legislating in this way, but we take on board the points made in this debate.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am grateful to my noble friend for saying there will be synchronisation. The scales of justice have been tipped against defendants by this fourfold cost that they have been calling for over a period of time. The purpose of this Bill is to even the scales of justice up. If there is any period between shifting from that side to this side the success fee and the ATE insurance without providing one-way costs as the balance, the scales will go completely in the opposite direction, and it is the suffering claimants who will come out the worst in a situation like that.

I cannot resist coming back to the question of protective costs orders, having heard my noble friend Lord Lester. Protective costs orders are applied for in public interest cases. I am not concerned simply with public interest cases. These could be the private individual, the householder whose house is flooded, in the example that I gave—

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

They are also applied for in private lawsuits.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

It is as my noble friend says. Lord Justice Jackson examined it and he came to the conclusion that the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to. There is much more discussion to be had. I shall take my noble friend outside—as I once said in relation to one of the Ministers in the previous Government—and have a discussion with him there. For the moment, I withdraw this amendment.

Amendment 141 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

163: After Clause 53, insert the following new Clause—
“Third party litigation funding
(1) A third party litigation funding agreement which satisfies all of the conditions applicable to it by virtue of this section shall not be unenforceable by reason only of it being a third party litigation funding agreement; but any other third party litigation funding agreement shall be unenforceable.
(2) A third party litigation funding agreement is an agreement under which a third party (“the funder”) agrees to fund (in whole or in part) the provision of advocacy or litigation services to another person (“the litigant”) by a person other than the funder in exchange for remuneration.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), “remuneration” includes—
(a) a payment or any other transfer of value representing or calculated by reference to the value of a judgment or settlement; and(b) an assignment of the proceeds (in whole or in part) of any judgment or settlement.(4) The following conditions are applicable to a third party litigation funding agreement—
(a) it must be in writing;(b) it must not relate to—(i) proceedings which by virtue of section 58A(1) and (2) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 cannot be the subject of an enforceable conditional fee agreement;(ii) a multi-party action, representative action or any proceedings which are the subject of a group litigation order; or(iii) any other proceedings of a description prescribed by the Lord Chancellor;(c) it must comply with such requirements as shall be prescribed by the Lord Chancellor.(5) Regulations under subsection (4)(c) may—
(a) require any person which enters into a third party funding agreement with a litigant to first obtain a license from a licensing body to be designated by the Lord Chancellor; and(b) set out conditions to be satisfied in order to obtain such a license.(6) In this section “advocacy services” and “litigation services” are as defined in section 119 of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, in June 2007, the Civil Justice Council—a body headed by the Master of the Rolls and comprising members of the judiciary, the legal professions, civil servants and lay people with knowledge of consumer affairs, CABs, businesses and employers—published advice to the Lord Chancellor recommending the proper regulation of third-party funding; that is, investment by an external party otherwise unconnected to a claim in a lawsuit in order to gain a maximum return upon its investment. In this country, it used to be called maintenance and champerty, and it was both a crime and a civil tort. In 1641, maintenance was described by the jurist Coke in his Institutes as:

“A taking in hand, a bearing up or upholding of quarrels or sides, to the disturbance of the common right”.

“Champerty” is the “maintenance” of a person in a lawsuit on condition that the subject matter of the action is to be shared with the maintainer. It was abolished as a crime in the United Kingdom in 1967 but as recently as July 2009 a solicitor in Hong Kong, where the offence still exists and carries a maximum sentence of seven years, was sent to prison for some 15 months. It remains illegal also in New Zealand but not in the United States.

As the practice has spread across the water into this country, specifically targeted at claim by small and medium business enterprises against large corporations, the Civil Justice Council formed a working party to consider the issue further. Consultations took place in February and July 2008 when a draft code of conduct for a third-party funding, which the working party had produced, was considered.

Following Lord Justice Jackson’s recommendations —he obviously considered this as well as conditional fee agreements—the draft code of conduct was revised. In February 2010, the Civil Justice Council held another stakeholder event to consider the revised code. The working party, under the chairmanship of the very eminent solicitor and Queen’s Counsel Michael Napier, chairman of Irwin Mitchell, which is essentially a leading claimants’ firm, produced a voluntary code of conduct for litigation funders, which was published on 23 November 2010. This voluntary code sets out standards of practice and behaviour to be observed by funders who are members of a newly founded Association of Litigation Funders of England and Wales. Without in any way impugning the very hard work of the members of the working party or the motivation of the new association, I am not at all content that this development in litigation funding should be subject to a voluntary code without any parliamentary debate, approval or control—of course I appreciate that it was put together under the auspices of the Civil Justice Council.

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[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I am sure that that postscript will be studied by the Lord Chancellor, and he will carefully study this debate. As I was saying in my concluding remarks, I thank my noble friend Lord Thomas for introducing this subject and noble Lords for expressing a variety of views on it. The Lord Chancellor would like further time to reflect and I ask my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. I accept that the opposing view, put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, was certainly an arguable one. I have not suggested that third-party funding should be banned but that it should be subject to statutory regulation, as opposed to the voluntary code.

I could not help reflecting on my rugby days and the occasional game in which the leader of the forwards, an extremely formidable person, would observe the scrum-half dropping the ball and say to us in the pack, “Boys, they’ve had their chance. We’re not going to give it to them again”. Consequently, everything changed and we adopted a different tactic.

Here, a voluntary code has been brought in. They have had their chance. In formulating the voluntary code, they did not include what Lord Justice Jackson rightly set out as the essential needs of such a code. They decided not to do that. When approached by the industry to say that they should limit themselves to commercial litigation, they decided not to do that. A two-page code has been produced of nine clauses which gives the broadest possibilities to the funders for the way in which they operate. I am not satisfied with that. I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, for their support. There is a perception of a genuine problem arising.

I look forward to further discussion with my noble friend and, perhaps, the Lord Chancellor, and we will see whether we can take forward this matter for Report but, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 163 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

164: After Clause 53, insert the following new Clause—
“Third party’s insurance company
(1) A third party’s insurance company may not solicit a claimant who has a cause of action for personal injuries against its policy holder, to settle that cause of action where to the knowledge of the insurance company, the claimant is legally represented either under legal aid or a conditional fee agreement.
(2) A third party’s insurance company may not make an offer to settle in circumstances not prohibited by subsection (1), unless—
(a) it has obtained adequate medical evidence of the personal injury and has disclosed it to the claimant; and(b) the claimant is advised when the offer is made of his right to obtain legal advice; and(c) the offer is in full and final settlement of the cause of action.(3) Any settlement made in breach of subsections (1) and (2) shall be void.”

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I apologise for wearying your Lordships once more. The amendment would ban the practice of third-party capture life insurance companies. Third-party capture is something with which many people, including many insured people, will not be familiar, but I have heard about it. Frankly, it is a nefarious practice.

The amendment would ban an insurance company—we are talking about banning in this amendment, not regulation—from directly contacting third parties who have been involved in accidents. That is currently commonplace behaviour following road traffic accidents. An accident happens, two drivers exchange with their details, driver A submits full details to his or her insurer and that insurer contacts driver B and offers an early settlement, usually at a much lower rate than would be achieved through due legal process. Insurers frequently make offers to accident victims that are far lower than the claim is worth, denying a person who has suffered an injury caused by someone else the redress that they deserve. They frequently make settlement offers without proper medical examination to ascertain the full extent of the injury, again denying the accident victim real evidence-based representation.

In this way, insurers seek to close off a claim without offering accident victims the opportunity to seek independent legal advice. There is obviously a conflict of interest. Insurers are acting both for the defendant, their policyholder, and the accident victim. Given that the insurers’ primary objective is to minimise the level of payments, they have little interest in securing a fair deal for accident victims.

There is another, equally unpleasant practice carried out by insurance companies where they contact a third party who has been injured in an accident with one of their policyholders and suggests that he or she makes a personal injury claim through their legal services arm. Other insurers simply refer the case details on, at a price—we will be dealing with referral fees shortly—to an independent personal injury lawyer. That is a major revenue stream for insurance companies, but it overrides common sense and is a substantial conflict of interest for insurers.

Since I tabled the amendment, I have been approached by the Association of British Insurers. It has kindly sent me its code of practice. The ABI code of practice for third-party assistance occupies some 11 pages, unlike the two-page code I was referring to in the previous amendment, and presents advice for insurers on how to contact unrepresented claimants, what they are to say to them about the injuries that they have received, how they are to deal with the damage to their vehicles and how to hire other vehicles. A section headed “Managing the Relationship” says:

“This section sets out how the insurer will manage the relationship with the unrepresented claimant where they have agreed on a provision of services, and covers where a claimant goes from unrepresented to represented”.

It sets out the policy, how to arrange medical treatment and so on. I suppose that in one way this could be said to be good practice. If the insurer is to be allowed to interfere with the other side in this way and to make offers of settlement, it is good practice to advise him to get a proper medical report and so on, as the ABI code says. However, there is absolutely nothing to enforce it. An insurer—and there are many insurance companies—may have a copy of the ABI code of practice but there is nothing to require him to adhere to what it says. Therefore, not only can the insurer ignore the provisions of his own code of practice but he can directly approach the other side. That is what my amendment seeks to prevent. I beg to move.

[Lord Dubs]

My Lords, I should like to speak to Amendment 164ZA in my name and give my support to Amendment 164, which has just been moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.

The Bill contains a series of proposals that attempt to dent access to justice for people who have suffered harm. It reduces their damages quite dramatically by taking away the recoverability of success fees and “after the event” insurance premiums. The referral fee ban may go some way to curbing the abuses of some claims management companies, but it will also sweep up many organisations, including important victims’ charities and membership organisations, that do a lot of good hard work in ensuring access to justice, and it will do nothing to curb some of the abuses that have inhibited access to justice.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, referred to third-party capture. What is it and why is it so controversial? Perhaps I may quote from the Financial Services Authority’s guidelines on third-party capture:

“Third-party capture (or third-party assistance) is when an insurer deals directly with a person who has a potential claim against their policyholder, in order to investigate and settle the claim. Typically, an insurer offers a compensation payment to settle the claim directly to a third party, rather than settling through a legal representative for that party. This is mainly used for third-party motor claims. But sometimes it’s used in other types of insurance, such as employers’ liability.

Concerns have been raised by industry bodies and consumer groups that this practice could mean third parties do not receive fair and reasonable treatment and compensation.

The handling of all insurance claims by insurers—including third-party claims—is regulated under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. This means that an insurer’s conduct towards third parties must comply with our Principles for Businesses and, where relevant, the claims handling rules in chapter eight of our new Insurance Conduct of Business Sourcebook ... Complying with our Principles for Businesses includes acting with integrity, due skill, care and diligence and observing proper standards of market conduct”.

The trouble is that that is not how it works in practice, as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has clearly shown.

The system is used by insurers, in their drive to maintain and increase profits, to collect premiums but reduce the amounts they pay out. In short, the insurers want to be their own judge and jury. The system should protect legitimate claimants who may have suffered great harm and be in great mental anguish and who are therefore susceptible to an approach that undermines their rights but ends the process quickly. They should receive what the law says they are entitled to, not what the insurance company says it is prepared to pay, and there is a big difference between the two. In the old days, it was not unusual for the same solicitor to represent both purchaser and vendor in a conveyancing transaction. Of course, there were clear conflicts of interest and major problems as a result. Thankfully, that practice no longer occurs.

Third-party capture has the same risks to consumers attached to it. The insurer, who has a responsibility for paying out on a claim, also decides how much to pay, more often than not on the basis of no, or inadequate, medical evidence and without the claimant having the benefit of legal advice. There could not be a clearer conflict of interest between a big insurance company playing the numbers and an unrepresented, unadvised claimant, but the great irony is that insurers end up actively encouraging claims with the direct approach of offering to settle quickly without the purported inconvenience of a medical examination.

A further irony is that the idea of putting forward a whiplash claim can be put in the mind of a claimant when they had not originally thought of claiming. Of course, the newspapers are full of such behaviour. The insurers are, in some respects, playing the numbers. They think that if they can buy off 10 whiplash cases for, say, £1,000 or so—even if some of them are, dare I say, fraudulent—it will cost them less than paying out the correct compensation to properly advised claimants on, say, four or five of them. That benefits insurers significantly. It can be no surprise that that has led to an increase in low-value whiplash claims and the undersettlement of more serious claims.

The insurance industry and the personal injury industry have been playing games for too long at each other’s expense. The result has been that genuine victims of harm lose out—and lose out significantly. Third-party capture is a damaging practice and I urge the Minister to accept either this amendment or the other one.

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[Lord McNally]

The noble Lord says he speaks from very long experience. As this Bill progresses, I have found that quite often noble Lords on all sides of the House who have more experience than me of the legal profession tell me that there is often a gap between what is written down and the reality of the day-to-day practice.

Third-party contact does not, in itself, cause detriment to consumers and may be to their advantage as a claim can often be resolved quickly. In addition, this practice can allow insurers to reduce the legal costs associated with handling a claim, and this in turn reduces costs for all policyholders. However, I am aware of concerns around the potential risk of conflict of interest and the need for the claimant to have independent legal advice before any settlement is agreed. The FSA undertook a review of third-party contact during 2009-10 and did not find conclusive evidence that unrepresented third parties could have achieved higher compensation had they obtained independent legal representation.

Following the FSA’s review, which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, the Association of British Insurers published a code of practice, to which he referred, in June 2010. The code contains specific guidance for insurers on contacting claimants. This limits unsolicited contact. For example:

“Insurers will not make unsolicited visits to an unrepresented claimant at their current address, including hospitals”.

I know we will be returning to some of this later. The code also requires that claimants are informed of their right to seek independent legal advice and of other options available to them to resolve their claim. As I have indicated, the practice was reviewed in 2009-10 but was not found, overall, to be disadvantageous to claimants.

In summary, most of the issues that these amendments seek to address in respect of the handling of third-party contact claims are already covered by existing regulation. The FSA rules require that insurers fully inform third-party claimants of their legal rights, including to independent legal advice, and of alternatives to settling directly with the insurer. In the light of this, we do not believe it is necessary to go along the lines of the noble Lord’s amendment, and I ask him to withdraw it.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am disappointed with that response. I do think it adequately addresses reality as it exists today in the approaches by insurers to accident victims.

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Neill of Bladen, subsection (1) of my amendment prohibits the third party’s insurance company soliciting a claimant,

“where to the knowledge of the insurance company, the claimant is legally represented”.

Subsection (2) refers to a situation where that is not the case: the claimant is not legally represented or the insurance company does not know that he is legally represented. It sets out three terms: that the offer to settle can be made only when the insurance company,

“has obtained adequate medical evidence … and has disclosed it to the claimant; and … the claimant is advised when the offer is made of his right to obtain legal advice; and … the offer is in full and final settlement of the cause of action”.

The sanction that I have quite deliberately put into this amendment is not that it is an offence or anything of that sort but that a settlement made in breach of those subsections shall be void, which means, in effect, that if a person has been bought off for a small sum, he can reopen the matter without any problems. He can go to a solicitor, get proper advice, get a proper medical report and come back. To my mind, that appears to be the right way forward.

[Lord Neill of Bladen]

Another sanction would be that if a settlement has been made, the money is irrecoverable. Under a void agreement, insurers might get their money back again, but you could have a provision expressly about “money paid by way of settlement”, because a claimant may not find out until later that he has been swindled.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord for that suggestion.

This problem will become more and more obvious as time goes on. As I said, I am disappointed with my noble friend’s reply, but for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 164 withdrawn.

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Perhaps I am being naive, but I cannot believe that the Government really intended those consequences, even though they appear to flow from the Bill as drafted. It means that the expectation that has developed over many years between trade unions and their solicitors—and I dare say the same applies to charities and the solicitors that they recommend as well—that a service would be offered, either free or at a lower charge than might otherwise have been the case because of that connection, would be prohibited by law. That would be the consequence of this Bill. I do not know whether the noble Lord has addressed his mind to that. I would not be surprised if it has not occurred to him, given all the other matters he has to address. However, I would urge him to look again at that aspect even if he is reluctant to look at the other aspects, to which we will undoubtedly have to return on Report. What is being suggested here is a gross interference with a relationship of many years’ standing, covering both the categories of organisation we have talked about. With all respect to the Minister, I do not understand—

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, before the noble Lord does what he is going to do with his amendment, I just make one comment. He said that the Minister was on his own. When I was a young solicitor, I would have given my eye teeth to secure some union work. I did some at the Bar, but it was very difficult in a small firm to compete with a large firm, as I am sure the noble Lord will agree. If I thought I had to pay money to the union to get their work, that would have made it considerably worse. The money that is paid to the union by the lawyer is ultimately reflected in the hourly rate that the lawyer charges to his client—it eventually falls on the client, or on another client. It is not just disappearing or being absorbed by the large firm.

[Lord Beecham]

Not all firms are large firms, and it will not surprise Members to know that my firm was not—and is not—a large one. However, we have had that kind of relationship. The profitability of firms conducting litigation of this kind is not high in any event, even without the question of referrals. I do not think that there are the kind of consequences that the noble Lord assumes to be the case. Equally, organisations with members seeking to derive the best service that they can for their members ought to be free to do that. I repeat that I do not think this Bill is at all on the right lines in what it is seeking to do. I again respectfully direct the Minister’s attention to the peculiar circumstances that subsection (8) proposes.

I was going to finish by commending again the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about solicitor-to-solicitor arrangements. He made a very strong case there, and I regret that the Minister seems to have just dismissed it out of hand. Certainly—

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, I want to say a few words in support of these clauses and indeed of all the amendments that my noble friends have spoken to. One of the most unwelcome trends in litigation in recent years has been its commoditisation, and if this is not stopped I see the development of litigation futures as a commodity that will be traded, just like potato futures and metal futures.

I do not know whether any of your Lordships has had an experience like mine a few months ago. I was involved in a road traffic accident as a rear-seat passenger in a vehicle on a country road in Northern Ireland at about 11 o’clock one morning. I came back by air to Heathrow the same afternoon. I had not been injured in the accident, although it was quite unpleasant. As I was standing on the Heathrow Express platform, coming back into central London, I received a text message from a claims-farming business that referred to the accident I had had the same morning. Now if it happened to me, it must be happening to an awful lot of other people. I suggest that Amendment 165 nails this problem for that kind of activity. That kind of low-level claims farming, but on a very large scale, is putting up insurance premiums and the cost of litigation. Perhaps worst of all, it is encouraging people to make claims that they otherwise would not have made, and which may in the end cost them if not money, a great deal of anxiety.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

Does my noble friend not agree that in the instance that he described and in which he was involved there could have been an element of corruption with people being paid when they gave information about that accident?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

There is certainly that possibility.

I wanted to add something else about hospitals. When I was a Member of another place, I often visited a celebrated orthopaedic hospital in the next county. At that time—I cannot say whether it is the case now—at the end of a long corridor in that hospital there was a solicitor’s office. That was an unusual arrangement but one that no doubt brought some rent to the hospital. I have real reservations about that kind of arrangement. I am all in favour of general advertising and it is right that solicitors’ firms should be able to advertise in local and national newspapers so that people are aware of the kinds of specialist services that they provide. But we must take this opportunity to reject anything that smacks of ambulance-chasing.