Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Wills

Monday 15th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, as someone whose title was taken from Lerwick in Shetland, I was somewhat startled and delighted this afternoon to arrive here to find that Shetland is once again in the cockpit of history. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, was equally delighted as a former MP for Orkney and Shetland. I do not think that Orkney and Shetland have been so near to the pulse of the nation since Charles James Fox was for a short time the Member of Parliament for the rotten borough there. That was after he had contested the Westminster by-election and there was an inquiry into whether the result was fraudulent. However, I do not think that I ought to go into the merits of the special treatment of Orkney and Shetland.

I wish to follow the noble Lord, Lord Snape, in one respect, as I shall talk mainly about AV. On Part 2 of the Bill, which seeks to reduce the size of the House of Commons, I agree with the point made by my noble friend Lord Baker that, when we compare the size of our legislature with the size of legislatures in other countries, we should look not at Europe—as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, did—but at countries such as Japan, the United States and India. There is a strong argument for saying that our legislature is too large.

Briefly, on the second principle of equalising constituencies, I will listen carefully to what the Opposition say, but I do not think that so far the case has been wholly convincing.

[Lord Wills]

My Lords—

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I want to deal briefly with this, as I really want to talk about AV, if the noble Lord does not mind.

We heard moving speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Myners and Lord Elystan-Morgan, about natural boundaries, rivers, county boundaries and history. I remember in my suburban constituency of Kingston that people used to think that Worcester Park should be excluded simply because it was on the other side of the bypass. I am sure that in Shetland, too, some people think that Orkney should be excluded because it is too far away. These are, as has been said, important points and principles, but the overriding factor must be the integrity and fairness of the democratic system and, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, elegantly said, ensuring that as far as possible each vote is of equal value.

Part 1 of the Bill stems from the coalition agreement. As I support the coalition and the necessity of a coalition because of the economic situation that we face, I support the general principles of the Bill. However, I have some suggestions for improving it. In the coalition agreement, there is one statement with which I disagree. The agreement says:

“The Government believes that our political system is broken”.

The phrase,

“our political system is broken”,

was last used by Sir Oswald Mosley. I do not believe that our political system is broken. Of course we have had, rightly, anger and disillusionment with politicians over expenses. We have had some rotten apples. We have had some people who should be and will be punished. However, that is not the same as saying that our constitution is broken. There is no connection between the scandal of expenses and arguments about fixed-term Parliaments, an elected House of Lords or, indeed, AV; they are totally separate. There might be more respect for politics, which is what we all desperately want, if we admitted that AV is being put forward because of a political alliance, as a result of which one party that would not naturally have favoured it has conceded it to the other party. There is no reason to justify this by saying that our political system is broken.

Bismarck once remarked that laws are like sausages, in that it is better not to see them being made. Many laws, many aspects of our constitution and many anomalies in our constitution are the result of accidents of politics and political deals. That applies even to the wonderful and pure theory of PR in Europe. In continental European countries, PR was often introduced in order to save the Liberal party from the rise of socialism and Labour parties.

None the less, we should be cautious about trading permanent changes in the constitution for short-term political advantage. We do not want to get into the situation of Latin American countries, where people campaign on changes to the constitution. We do not want to get into the situation of the fourth republic in France, where there was an old joke about the man who went into the library and asked for a copy of the constitution and was told, “We don’t stock periodicals here”. We do not want to get into the situation whereby one political change is seen as a precursor to the next. Some see AV as precisely that—as a precursor to a move towards PR.

The support for AV in the Bill and the coalition in some ways seems quite surprising. In February this year, the Deputy Prime Minister described AV as a “miserable little compromise”. As has been said, AV is the system used in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Australia. In Australia, AV has proved to be often less proportional even than first past the post and to lead to even larger swings—the large swings under first past the post have been among the things most criticised about our present system. AV has not reduced the proportion of safe seats, which is a very high proportion that is similar to the number in this country. In addition, the system of AV often leads to deals, which are not always declared publicly, between major and small, minor or fringe political parties in order to secure office.

The intellectual justification for AV seems somewhat elusive. The system was first proposed in 1917 in the Speaker’s conference, which is more likely to be remembered for having proposed votes for women over 30. The system was put forward in 1931 as a positive solution, and Winston Churchill described it at the time as,

“the worst of all possible plans … the stupidest, the least scientific and the most unreal. The decision … is to be determined by the most worthless votes given to the most worthless candidates”.

As has been said in this debate, in many cases the outcome of a poll in a constituency under AV will be decided by the person who comes bottom, who might be the British National Party candidate, as has been said. In any case, it seems difficult to justify why the result should always be decided by the second preferences of those who voted for the candidate who came bottom, even if he is only the third candidate. I recently read an article by an Australian academic who suggests that, under AV in Australia, it is possible that, depending on the number of candidates standing, someone might actually be elected who was nobody’s first choice.

As was said by my noble friend Lord Forsyth, the referendum proposed on AV is unusual in that it is not an advisory referendum but an implementary one. That raises an important matter. Changing our voting system is a very significant move. As the noble Lord, Lord Wills, said, when we make such changes they ought to be for generations—for the long term—and the outcome must be seen to command confidence and respect. They must be seen to reflect a real demand for change. If there is a derisory turnout, those conditions will not be met. I submit that this is a significant change.

The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made some points against the first-past-the-post system, but I say that it has served us well. The same system is followed by leading democracies such as the United States, India and Canada. It has accommodated change, such as when the Labour Party replaced the Liberal Party in the interwar period. What some see as inflexibility or the insensitivity of the system has often protected us from extremism, such as we see when we look at the different electoral systems in Europe and the rise of far-right parties in Holland and Belgium. That was particularly the case in the 1930s, when extremists of both left and right failed to get any parliamentary representation whatever in this country, which was quite different from the experience in continental Europe. We like to put that down, of course, to the moderation and good sense of the British people. I am sure that that exists, but we should not deceive ourselves too much. It may also have a lot to do with our electoral system, so I suggest that we have to think carefully before we change that.

That brings me on to the point about referendums and constitutional change. Many countries have a specific threshold, either of turnout or of the numbers voting yes, before constitutional change can be made in a referendum. Germany and Spain have provisions for a fixed majority before they can effect a change in their constitutions. In Denmark and Italy, the requirement is for a specified proportion—in Italy, it is 60 per cent, I think—not in outcome but in turnout. In 1979, of course, George Cunningham inserted into the Scottish devolution bill a requirement for a 40 per cent yes vote. That has possibly somewhat scarred the Labour Party—I am not quite sure why—so I was particularly interested that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, returned today to the subject of a threshold.

I want to put a question to my noble friend Lord McNally, the Minister who, as I understand it, will answer at the end of the debate. I understand that the coalition agreement specified that there should be a simple majority in the referendum without an outcome-specific threshold—that is, there should not be anything similar to the Cunningham amendment. Am I not therefore right that the coalition agreement does not specify that there could not be a turnout threshold and that a provision in the Bill which said that the result of the referendum would only have the effect of law provided that there was a certain turnout would not be inconsistent with the coalition agreement? That turnout provision could be put at whatever level the House decided. It could be quite low. It could be in accordance with the recent turnout in local elections—in the high 30s or higher than 40 per cent—which would mean that, to get a yes vote, you would have to get the votes of 20 per cent of the electorate as a whole.

Some people object to a turnout threshold on the grounds that it encourages people to abstain but, first, the referendum is to be held—this is a subject of controversy—on the same day as local elections, when people have every reason to participate. Secondly, in order to encourage someone who would have voted not to vote as a gesture with political meaning, you would have to have some sort of campaign. I do not really accept the argument that having a turnout threshold would simply encourage people to stay away and would invalidate the whole idea of initiating a debate on this subject. The result of the referendum vote would be much strengthened if there was a provision for a minimum turnout. That would lend much greater legitimacy to the outcome of such a referendum, and I hope that my noble friends on the Front Bench will give it serious consideration.