Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Wills Excerpts

Monday 15th November 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strathclyde]

My Lords, my noble friend makes a very good point—but it is not the fundamental case that the Government are making in the Bill. This is about a general fairness across the country.

[Lord Wills]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Before he moves off this point about the size of the reconstituted House of Commons, does he recall that at the election both the coalition partners were committed to reducing the House of Commons to below 600? Can he explain to this House what exactly changed their minds about that?

[Lord Strathclyde]

My Lords, in the same way as the figure of 650 is one that has developed over time and is basically an arbitrary one, so the figure of 600—I see that the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, plucks a figure from the air. It was not quite like that. Six hundred strikes me as being a nice, round figure. But these are precisely the points that we will take up in Committee.

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[Lord Wills]

I was interested in the noble Lord’s quote from the Deputy Prime Minister. This is what the Bill says—no matter what the Deputy Prime Minister says—in relation to the factors that the noble Lord just outlined:

“This rule”—

in other words, the effect of community and so on—

“has effect subject to rules 2 and 4”.

It says “subject to”, not “alongside”. The rules about the equalisation of numbers take precedence over all those other considerations. That is what we are so worried about on this side of the House.

[Lord Tyler]

That is precisely the role of your Lordships’ House. When we reach Committee stage, I am sure there will be general agreement on both sides of the House that we need to look carefully at the order of priority of those criteria. That is precisely what I said. I am delighted to have the support of the Minister who was previously responsible for these matters and sadly had so little effect on other, more senior members of the Administration. We would have made more progress on these issues if he had had his way.

As I have already said, I have a special connection to Cornwall. My ancestry is there and my constituency was there. There is strong evidence from the people I have spoken to and heard from—whom I knew over 40 years in public life there—that keeping Cornwall whole, as the campaign is called, is a priority. It may be that it is a higher priority even than the equality of representation. I hope we can do something in this House to meet that demand, as perhaps we might for others with a particularly compelling case, such as the Isle of Wight. However, we should recognise that it is a dilemma. In both cases it may be that the communities concerned are prepared to accept a lower level of representation in exchange for maintaining their identity. That dilemma is one that should be put fairly and squarely to the people concerned.

The Bill is not a panacea. It is not some holy grail in the scripture of political re-engagement, but it is a good start. Again, I say to noble Members opposite: it is a great pity that they did not start this process when they were given such a long opportunity to do so. The Bill says that people, not politicians, should have the final word over the architecture of their voting system. It says that whichever system we use, everyone’s votes should be of roughly equal value. These are good principles from a good Government, and principles that the latter day Chartists on the other side of your Lordships’ House should endorse as well. In short, it is a good Bill and, with some work along the way to improve Part 2, it is a Bill we should all be able to support.

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[Lord Wills]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, has already outed me, I begin with the confession that I was indeed the Minister in the previous Government responsible for the issues with which the Bill is concerned. Had my party been re-elected, I am sure that we would have approached these issues rather differently, but that has not led me to oppose the Bill. I oppose the Bill because a large part of it attempts to rewire our constitutional arrangements for partisan advantage; and that is unacceptable.

Part 1 sets out to deliver a referendum on the alternative vote. Had the Government adopted the approach pursued by the previous Government, I might have felt able to support them on that, although I recognise that some of my colleagues in this place will differ from me on this in all conceivable circumstances.

If agreed in a referendum, I believe that the alternative vote could help to tackle the problem of legitimacy created by the phenomenon of Government after Government—including the present Government—being elected to power with the support of only a minority of the electorate. The alternative vote system is not a panacea for all the problems of legitimacy faced by our political system, but it at least ensures that more MPs will be returned from their constituencies with the support of a majority of those voting. Crucially, it does so while retaining the MPs’ direct link with their constituents. Here, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, who made exactly that point. That is vital for accountability in our democracy.

Sadly, the Government have not followed the careful approach of the previous Government, they have pushed ahead with a process which, as we have already heard, is precipitate; it denies Parliament a proper opportunity to scrutinise such an important constitutional measure. As the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, pointed out, this referendum is post-legislative.

I shall return to some other flaws with this process shortly, but I turn to Part 2. It aims to reduce the number of seats in the House of Commons and equalise the size of the constituencies that remain. It is reasonable at the very least to debate such reduction and equalisation. There is nothing axiomatically right about that Chamber's current size. As the House will know, the principle that all constituencies should be a broadly similar size is already written into legislation.

However, when we examine how the Government are setting about these tasks, we see principles and practice which have long ensured the fair working of our constitution rejected in what I am afraid can only be construed as partisan self-interest. It has long been accepted, as we have heard over and over again this evening, that the boundaries of a constituency should be shaped not only by numbers but also by the specific character of the constituency, local identities and natural boundaries, such as mountains and rivers, which have throughout history helped to define communities. But in this Bill such considerations have been demoted by the Government.

Nor do the Government appear to have given any consideration to other relevant factors—for example, the optimum size for a constituency; not a number plucked out of the air, like 76,000, but the optimum number, taking into account the respective role of MPs in their constituencies and their role in Parliament, and the implication for both those roles of further decentralisation of power to local authorities and, indeed, then to local councillors.

Instead of a proper consideration of all these important issues, what we see is the Government claiming that the equalisation of constituency size must be elevated above all these other important considerations. Why? We are not given any satisfactory answer whatever. But then they do not uphold even this dubious principle consistently. Wales, as we have heard, is to lose in one swing of the axe 25 per cent of its parliamentary representation while Northern Ireland, for perfectly understandable reasons, is allowed to depart from the electoral quota rule.

Moreover, as we heard in a previous discussion earlier today, the Bill makes an explicit and privileged exception for two Scottish seats, one of which, I am sure coincidentally, is held by the Liberal Democrat MP, the Deputy Chief Whip of the Government. And then again, as we have already heard, a further exemption from the electoral quota is given on the basis of the territorial extent of a constituency, drawn up coincidentally, I am sure, in such a way that it can have practical effect in only one area of the United Kingdom—the Scottish Highlands, where only one constituency currently falls into this special category: the seat held by the former leader of the Liberal Democrats. So why exactly does the Bill allow the factors of sparsity and geography to be given priority over electoral equality in these places but nowhere else?

It is hard to find anywhere in the Bill anything that could pass as a consistently applied informing principle. The Bill abolishes the ability of local people to have any significant say in the shape of the constituency in which they live, even though local representations have significantly influenced boundary revisions in the past. As we have heard, the Boundary Commission report in 2007 found that just about two-thirds of local inquiries had led to changes in the original recommendations of the Boundary Commission.

The Deputy Prime Minister has justified this change with these words—I quote them because they are worth hearing:

“The review process is lengthy and time-consuming”.

Lengthy and time-consuming—exactly the same might be said for democracy itself. Administrative convenience for the Executive is never a good argument for attacking the foundations of accountable democracy.

Then we have the decision on the proper size for the House of Commons. How exactly did the Government alight on the figure of 600? Both the coalition partners were committed before the election to reducing the House of Commons to below the number of 600. They had different figures but they were united in their belief that the House of Commons should be reduced to a figure below 600. So what exactly changed their minds? Will the Minister tell the House whether any modelling was done by the Government or the Liberal Democrats or the Conservative Party on the effects on those parties’ representation in the House of Commons of reducing the number of MPs below 600; and if so, what such modelling showed?

Then the Deputy Prime Minister tells us—we have heard a lot about this from the government Benches already tonight—that,

“it is patently obvious that individuals' votes should carry the same weight”—[Official Report, Commons, 6/9/10; col. 35.]

That is right—but they already do. They are only counted once. Every vote is only counted once. What the Deputy Prime Minister appears to mean is that on average it takes fewer votes to elect a Labour MP than a Conservative or Liberal Democrat MP. However, that is not because votes for the Labour Party weigh more than votes for other parties; it is the consequence, in part, of the fact that turnout and electoral registration are lower in Labour areas and in part it is because Labour’s vote is currently distributed more efficiently within the first past the post system. There is no inherent, systemic bias in favour of the Labour Party. The same system worked against the Labour Party throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

As Liberal Democrat MPs, of all people, should know, if each vote weighing equally means that the share of the vote translates directly into an equal proportion of seats held in the House of Commons, there is only one electoral system that delivers that. We have already heard that tonight. It is proportional representation, which is not on offer in the Bill and carries with it all sorts of other problems that mean that I for one would never want to see it introduced as a method of election into the House of Commons.

If the Government were really so concerned about equality among voters, they would not be seeking to redraw the electoral map on the basis of a register that fails to include over 3 million voters who would otherwise be eligible to vote. Do the Government seriously believe that any credible equalisation of boundaries can take place when some constituencies achieve nearly 100 per cent registration rates while others achieve barely half that? When we look at it, another so-called principle crumbles.

Then there is the way the Bill has been introduced in a display of contempt for Parliament by the Executive. The Labour Government introduced a raft of constitutional reforms, and they always did so by seeking consensus wherever possible on the grounds that whenever constitutional changes are made, they should be made in the interests of the legitimacy of our constitutional system as a whole. This is a crucial principle. These changes should not be subject to claims that partisan advantage is being pursued. I am truly sorry that this Government have rejected this approach.

In the rushed passage of the Bill through the other place, not a single Opposition or Back-Bench amendment was accepted by the Government. That is not the only example of the Government’s contempt for good practice. The Electoral Commission has consistently made clear its view that:

“The rules on how the referendum will be conducted must be clear from at least six months in advance”.

For that to have happened in this case, the Bill would need to have been passed on to the statute book two weeks ago.

If due process and consistent principle do not underpin the Bill, why are the Government bringing it forward? A clue might be provided by the speed with which these measures are being rushed through: speed in rushing this through the other place, speed in holding a referendum less than six months from the presumed passage of the Bill on to the statute book and unprecedented speed in completing the wholesale revision of constituency boundaries. Why the rush? Surely such important constitutional measures deserve appropriate pre-legislative and legislative scrutiny. Surely people should have the time and opportunity to have their say on the shape of the constituencies in which they live.

It is clear that the reason for this haste is that the Government want to get the new system in place by the next election, but why? Important as I believe these measures to be, there is no popular clamour for them, nor any other compelling reason to rush these measures through. Why rush to draw up the boundaries on the basis of an inaccurate and incomplete register when legislation has already been passed by the previous Government—this is the answer to the charge laid by the noble Lord, Lord Baker—to task the Electoral Commission to make the register comprehensive and accurate by 2015 and gave it new powers to do that? The Governments that the noble Lord, Lord Baker, so illuminated in his time in the other place never did anything like that to achieve a proper register. The date selected in that legislation was 2015 because it was judged that that time was needed successfully to compete the task, not least because the key to guaranteeing that the register is comprehensive and accurate is going to be using the results of the 2011 census, the most up-to-date figures we have on the population, to validate it.

Such an analysis is unlikely to be available before 2014. So why are the Government rushing it through before that crucial analysis is available? Why could the Government not wait just a few months longer to be sure that boundary revisions can take place only on the basis of a comprehensive and accurate electoral register, which is the only fair basis on which such revisions can be conducted? The only reason can be that the new boundaries would not be in place for the next general election, but constitutional changes of this significance should be drafted to endure for generations. In this context, whether they are in the place for the coming general election or the one after that really should not weigh in the balance.

Why, after all this, might the Government still be so anxious to get these measures in place by the time of the next election? They must have foreseen these criticisms. I am sure that they did. But why are they proceeding like this nevertheless? Is it too cynical to suspect that it is because they expect to benefit from them? It is widely accepted that revising the boundaries when millions of eligible voters are missing from the register is likely to damage the Labour Party most.

Let me quote from a prominent Conservative, Mr Mark Field, Member of Parliament for the Cities of London and Westminster. On his website, which is available to all Members of this House, noble Lords can read that,

“the current proposals for AV and the reduction in number of parliamentary constituencies are being promoted by Party managers as an expedient way to prevent our principal political opponents from recapturing office”.

That is the purpose of this legislation in the words of Mr Mark Field MP.

It should not need me to say that political expediency for one party is an unacceptable basis for constitutional change. This is not the new politics we were promised. It is an old politics where constitutional arrangements are subverted for partisan advantage, which should have no place in our democracy. Far from restoring legitimacy to our politics, as the Government claim, this Bill will damage it further. It is a bad Bill. I hope that this House will do its duty in making all the changes necessary to make it a better one.

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[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, as someone whose title was taken from Lerwick in Shetland, I was somewhat startled and delighted this afternoon to arrive here to find that Shetland is once again in the cockpit of history. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, was equally delighted as a former MP for Orkney and Shetland. I do not think that Orkney and Shetland have been so near to the pulse of the nation since Charles James Fox was for a short time the Member of Parliament for the rotten borough there. That was after he had contested the Westminster by-election and there was an inquiry into whether the result was fraudulent. However, I do not think that I ought to go into the merits of the special treatment of Orkney and Shetland.

I wish to follow the noble Lord, Lord Snape, in one respect, as I shall talk mainly about AV. On Part 2 of the Bill, which seeks to reduce the size of the House of Commons, I agree with the point made by my noble friend Lord Baker that, when we compare the size of our legislature with the size of legislatures in other countries, we should look not at Europe—as the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, did—but at countries such as Japan, the United States and India. There is a strong argument for saying that our legislature is too large.

Briefly, on the second principle of equalising constituencies, I will listen carefully to what the Opposition say, but I do not think that so far the case has been wholly convincing.

[Lord Wills]

My Lords—

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I want to deal briefly with this, as I really want to talk about AV, if the noble Lord does not mind.

We heard moving speeches from the noble Lords, Lord Myners and Lord Elystan-Morgan, about natural boundaries, rivers, county boundaries and history. I remember in my suburban constituency of Kingston that people used to think that Worcester Park should be excluded simply because it was on the other side of the bypass. I am sure that in Shetland, too, some people think that Orkney should be excluded because it is too far away. These are, as has been said, important points and principles, but the overriding factor must be the integrity and fairness of the democratic system and, as the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, elegantly said, ensuring that as far as possible each vote is of equal value.

Part 1 of the Bill stems from the coalition agreement. As I support the coalition and the necessity of a coalition because of the economic situation that we face, I support the general principles of the Bill. However, I have some suggestions for improving it. In the coalition agreement, there is one statement with which I disagree. The agreement says:

“The Government believes that our political system is broken”.

The phrase,

“our political system is broken”,

was last used by Sir Oswald Mosley. I do not believe that our political system is broken. Of course we have had, rightly, anger and disillusionment with politicians over expenses. We have had some rotten apples. We have had some people who should be and will be punished. However, that is not the same as saying that our constitution is broken. There is no connection between the scandal of expenses and arguments about fixed-term Parliaments, an elected House of Lords or, indeed, AV; they are totally separate. There might be more respect for politics, which is what we all desperately want, if we admitted that AV is being put forward because of a political alliance, as a result of which one party that would not naturally have favoured it has conceded it to the other party. There is no reason to justify this by saying that our political system is broken.

Bismarck once remarked that laws are like sausages, in that it is better not to see them being made. Many laws, many aspects of our constitution and many anomalies in our constitution are the result of accidents of politics and political deals. That applies even to the wonderful and pure theory of PR in Europe. In continental European countries, PR was often introduced in order to save the Liberal party from the rise of socialism and Labour parties.

None the less, we should be cautious about trading permanent changes in the constitution for short-term political advantage. We do not want to get into the situation of Latin American countries, where people campaign on changes to the constitution. We do not want to get into the situation of the fourth republic in France, where there was an old joke about the man who went into the library and asked for a copy of the constitution and was told, “We don’t stock periodicals here”. We do not want to get into the situation whereby one political change is seen as a precursor to the next. Some see AV as precisely that—as a precursor to a move towards PR.

The support for AV in the Bill and the coalition in some ways seems quite surprising. In February this year, the Deputy Prime Minister described AV as a “miserable little compromise”. As has been said, AV is the system used in Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Australia. In Australia, AV has proved to be often less proportional even than first past the post and to lead to even larger swings—the large swings under first past the post have been among the things most criticised about our present system. AV has not reduced the proportion of safe seats, which is a very high proportion that is similar to the number in this country. In addition, the system of AV often leads to deals, which are not always declared publicly, between major and small, minor or fringe political parties in order to secure office.

The intellectual justification for AV seems somewhat elusive. The system was first proposed in 1917 in the Speaker’s conference, which is more likely to be remembered for having proposed votes for women over 30. The system was put forward in 1931 as a positive solution, and Winston Churchill described it at the time as,

“the worst of all possible plans … the stupidest, the least scientific and the most unreal. The decision … is to be determined by the most worthless votes given to the most worthless candidates”.

As has been said in this debate, in many cases the outcome of a poll in a constituency under AV will be decided by the person who comes bottom, who might be the British National Party candidate, as has been said. In any case, it seems difficult to justify why the result should always be decided by the second preferences of those who voted for the candidate who came bottom, even if he is only the third candidate. I recently read an article by an Australian academic who suggests that, under AV in Australia, it is possible that, depending on the number of candidates standing, someone might actually be elected who was nobody’s first choice.

As was said by my noble friend Lord Forsyth, the referendum proposed on AV is unusual in that it is not an advisory referendum but an implementary one. That raises an important matter. Changing our voting system is a very significant move. As the noble Lord, Lord Wills, said, when we make such changes they ought to be for generations—for the long term—and the outcome must be seen to command confidence and respect. They must be seen to reflect a real demand for change. If there is a derisory turnout, those conditions will not be met. I submit that this is a significant change.

The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, made some points against the first-past-the-post system, but I say that it has served us well. The same system is followed by leading democracies such as the United States, India and Canada. It has accommodated change, such as when the Labour Party replaced the Liberal Party in the interwar period. What some see as inflexibility or the insensitivity of the system has often protected us from extremism, such as we see when we look at the different electoral systems in Europe and the rise of far-right parties in Holland and Belgium. That was particularly the case in the 1930s, when extremists of both left and right failed to get any parliamentary representation whatever in this country, which was quite different from the experience in continental Europe. We like to put that down, of course, to the moderation and good sense of the British people. I am sure that that exists, but we should not deceive ourselves too much. It may also have a lot to do with our electoral system, so I suggest that we have to think carefully before we change that.

That brings me on to the point about referendums and constitutional change. Many countries have a specific threshold, either of turnout or of the numbers voting yes, before constitutional change can be made in a referendum. Germany and Spain have provisions for a fixed majority before they can effect a change in their constitutions. In Denmark and Italy, the requirement is for a specified proportion—in Italy, it is 60 per cent, I think—not in outcome but in turnout. In 1979, of course, George Cunningham inserted into the Scottish devolution bill a requirement for a 40 per cent yes vote. That has possibly somewhat scarred the Labour Party—I am not quite sure why—so I was particularly interested that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, returned today to the subject of a threshold.

I want to put a question to my noble friend Lord McNally, the Minister who, as I understand it, will answer at the end of the debate. I understand that the coalition agreement specified that there should be a simple majority in the referendum without an outcome-specific threshold—that is, there should not be anything similar to the Cunningham amendment. Am I not therefore right that the coalition agreement does not specify that there could not be a turnout threshold and that a provision in the Bill which said that the result of the referendum would only have the effect of law provided that there was a certain turnout would not be inconsistent with the coalition agreement? That turnout provision could be put at whatever level the House decided. It could be quite low. It could be in accordance with the recent turnout in local elections—in the high 30s or higher than 40 per cent—which would mean that, to get a yes vote, you would have to get the votes of 20 per cent of the electorate as a whole.

Some people object to a turnout threshold on the grounds that it encourages people to abstain but, first, the referendum is to be held—this is a subject of controversy—on the same day as local elections, when people have every reason to participate. Secondly, in order to encourage someone who would have voted not to vote as a gesture with political meaning, you would have to have some sort of campaign. I do not really accept the argument that having a turnout threshold would simply encourage people to stay away and would invalidate the whole idea of initiating a debate on this subject. The result of the referendum vote would be much strengthened if there was a provision for a minimum turnout. That would lend much greater legitimacy to the outcome of such a referendum, and I hope that my noble friends on the Front Bench will give it serious consideration.