Criminal Justice and Data Protection (Protocol No. 36) Regulations 2014

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Monday 17th November 2014 Lords Chamber

I repeat that I am genuinely grateful to the Minister for his attempt to deal with these issues and present them to the House, and for his genuine willingness in other contexts to engage with the European Committee and the House. However, I would say, with great respect, that the department to which he belongs needs to wake up to its responsibilities, to take parliamentary scrutiny and accountability seriously and, if I may say so, to start making the case for the United Kingdom’s continuing engagement with the European Union. I have said my piece and look forward to the debate. I beg to move.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bates, for introducing this Motion, albeit that he did so at a somewhat galloping pace, which is perhaps not surprising after the marathon that he has already performed today. I agree with the criticisms of the procedures made by the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, although, unlike him, I have some wider reservations about the whole 35 measures that the Government propose to opt into.

The noble Lord, Lord Boswell, talked about the procedure in this House and in the Commons. Of course, a very important point in the other place was that a specific vote was promised on the issue of the arrest warrant. That is an extremely important point. In November 2013 the House of Commons European Security Committee concluded that the vote on opting back in,

“should ensure there is a genuine opportunity for the House to determine the measures the Government intends to rejoin. To consider the 35 measures as a ‘block opt-in’, subject to one motion, would be seriously to misconceive the individual significance of some of the measures … We ask the Government to reflect this by … tabling separate motions for each of the measures in which it wishes to opt back in”.

That was in paragraphs 571 to 574 of the report.

It was a great pity that there was not a specific debate on the arrest warrant as it was impossible for Members of the House of Commons to talk about individual cases as they affected individuals. When one Member of Parliament, Mr Wiggin, attempted to do that, to give an illustration of what this meant for one of his constituents, he was told by the Speaker that he could not go on describing that and that it was out of order.

My second important point is that the European Scrutiny Committee in the House of Commons concluded that the opt-out, combined with the Government’s proposals for opting back into certain laws, represented no significant repatriation of powers from the EU. Indeed, the Home Affairs Committee thought that it could result in a net flow of powers to the EU, given the introduction of full European Court of Justice jurisdiction. This is because of the relative impact of the laws the Government wish to back into, measured against the lesser importance of many of the other measures under the opt-out.

Another important question is whether we have legally binding agreements, treaties or co-operation. In their command paper of July 2013, the Government said that, in some cases, there was no need for legally binding agreements for practical co-operation to take place with other EU countries to tackle cross-border crime. In the case of some of the 35 EU laws which the Government propose to opt back into, the need for binding law is highly questionable. For example, do we really need to have supranational measures to deal with the exchange of information between member states to police international football matches? The Government also said that, where a binding agreement is needed, an alternative to opting back into EU legislation—which is irreversible and entails full ECJ jurisdiction—is a bilateral treaty between the UK and the EU as a whole. This could apply to extradition.

A fundamental problem with opting back into these EU laws with full ECJ jurisdiction was expressed by the Government in 2012 in response to the European Committee of this House. They stated:

“The practical effect of the ECJ gaining full jurisdiction in this area after the transitional period from 1 December 2014 is that the ECJ may interpret these measures expansively and beyond the scope originally intended. This concern is compounded by the fact that the ECJ has previously ruled in the area of Justice and Home Affairs in unexpected and unhelpful ways from a UK perspective”.

Those are not my words but the words of the Government, and we should take them extremely seriously.

Instead of opting back into the legislation, an alternative would be a new bilateral treaty on the matters in question. This would have the following advantages. The UK would negotiate as a sovereign state regarding the relevant matters. A UK-EU bilateral treaty would enable the UK to avoid coming under the jurisdiction of the ECJ; we could apply different rules and safeguards for British citizens. It would also allow us to withdraw from it if it began operating against the national interest; it would not be frozen in aspic for ever.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. He has quoted extensively from the committees in another place and from evidence given by Ministers but he has not seen fit to refer once to the two reports made to this House. Could he come on to those, because they answer every single point he has made?

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

The noble Lord can, I am sure, speak and answer my points. I have not yet finished my speech: I have quite a few more points to make. I know that the committee in this place went in a completely different direction from those in the House of Commons. I confess that I found those in the House of Commons more persuasive than the committee in this House. However, it is, as always, open to the noble Lord to speak and I am sure he will do so as persuasively and charmingly tonight as he always does.

Pursuing the point about a bilateral treaty between ourselves and the EU, there is a precedent for this. Denmark has its own opt-out on justice and home affairs and concluded three treaties with the EC prior to the Lisbon treaty. The point is often made that the three EU-Denmark treaties under the provision are subject to the ECJ. That is true, but it does not follow that a UK-EU agreement would have to be: it depends entirely on what we say. It depends what the Government negotiate. A UK-EU treaty could provide an alternative dispute mechanism as the EU has some treaties with various other countries. Of course, I accept that a treaty would take time, but the EU treaty—specifically Article 10(4) of the Protocol on Transitional Provisions—allows the Council on a proposal from the Commission to agree to transitional arrangements in the light of the opt-out. The UK could ask for the relevant pieces of the EU legislation, such as the arrest warrant, to continue to apply for a period of time that allowed for the conclusion of a replacement bilateral treaty. That would not entail opting back in—which is, as I say, irreversible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

It is necessary, I would suggest to the House—and I am about to move on to the European arrest warrant—for those who may not have had the opportunity to read the debate to appreciate what went on. Those who have read it will form their own view as to how helpful it was.

Considerable anxieties have understandably been felt in the past about the European arrest warrant and about particular cases. There is insufficient time, as the House will understand, for me to go into the details of those, but what is important is the fact that the European arrest warrant now has additional safeguards. In one of the more useful contributions to the debate in the other place, the right honourable James Arbuthnot pointed out that there is considerable judicial oversight of the European arrest warrant. Following the changes in the law made by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, a British judge must now consider whether the alleged offence and likely penalty are sufficient to make someone’s extradition proportionate. A British judge must also consider whether measures less coercive than extradition are available to foreign authorities.

As to dual criminality, the European arrest warrant must be refused if all or part of the conduct for which a person is wanted took place in the UK and is not a criminal offence in this country. Furthermore, a decision to charge and try an individual can be questioned by use of video link without the suspect having to leave the United Kingdom. These are all important safeguards which should mitigate some of the anxieties that have been expressed about the unsatisfactory nature of foreign jurisdictions. A large number of people who are not necessarily enthusiasts for the European project have been persuaded that it would be a great mistake to lose the European arrest warrant. I respectfully agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, that this is a correct decision.

My noble friend Lord Lamont asked whether it was possible for us to come to a separate, bilateral treaty with other European Union countries—after all, we have extradition agreements with other countries. There is of course the considerable problem of timing, as the House will be aware. Denmark negotiated a separate deal. The deal struck through Protocol 36 means that the United Kingdom has to follow the rules set out. Denmark has its own protocol so could make its own arrangements, but they are not the arrangements that we would want to copy. Every agreement that Denmark has made separately with the EU has required it to submit to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and, in effect, the Danish agreement simply binds Denmark to EU law by another means—which I suspect is not what most who are interested would have in mind. Of course it would be possible, but it would be cumbersome and it would probably be expensive to make such separate agreements. Far more sensible is to have the now tried and improved system of the European arrest warrant that we have.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My noble friend did not address the point that I raised in respect of the Government’s safeguard, so called, that extradition should not take place until a decision has been made by a foreign court to prosecute and to try—I drew a distinction between a decision to prosecute and a decision to try. I referred to the numerous delays that took place in the case of Mr Symeou. That was why I suggested that the safeguard was not really a safeguard. My noble friend has not addressed that point.

[Lord Faulks]

We consider that the safeguard should be capable of answering that particular problem. The important issue is whether there is an unnecessary delay. It will be appropriate to look at the particular facts of the case and for the judge responding to the warrant to decide whether he or she is satisfied about the arrangements. That, I suggest, is an answer, and unfortunate cases such as that of Andrew Symeou, which I accept was an egregious example of the European arrest warrant not working satisfactorily, should be avoided.