(3 days, 1 hour ago)
Grand Committee
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, this amends the Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013, which govern the composition of and eligibility criteria for the board of commissioners of the Judicial Appointments Commission, to which I shall refer as the JAC for brevity.
As your Lordships will be aware, the JAC is the independent body established under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to select candidates for judicial office in England and Wales, and for some tribunals with UK-wide powers. It is governed by an independent board of commissioners, appointed by His Majesty the King, on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor.
One of the board of commissioners’ primary objectives is to ensure that the JAC fulfils its statutory responsibilities and obligations. These include ensuring that judicial appointments are made solely on merit through fair and open competition and having regard to diversity and good character. Commissioners oversee the selection processes, review recruitment strategies and make final selection recommendations to the appointing authority.
The current regulations set out the structure of the JAC’s board, specifying that there should be 15 commissioners, including a lay—i.e. non-judicial—chair. Of the other 14, seven must be judicial officeholder members, five must be lay members and two must be professional members—that is, people practising or employed as lawyers.
One of the purposes of these regulations is to expand the number of professional members from two to three, which will then expand the overall number of commissioners. Each of the professional commissioners must come from one of the three categories of legal professional; they must be either a barrister or a solicitor or a fellow of CILEX, which is the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives. At the moment, there is a barrister commissioner and a solicitor commissioner, but there is no CILEX commissioner. Apart from the three senior judicial members, the other 12 commissioners are recruited and appointed through open competition.
The regulations are being updated to strengthen the JAC’s capacity and ensure its continued effectiveness in judicial recruitment in two ways. First, the total number of JAC commissioners will be increased from 15 to 16, which is needed because of the anticipated increase in the volume of work. This will be done by increasing the number of professional commissioners from two to three. The requirement that they be from different professions will remain, so the effect will be that all three main legal professions—barrister, solicitor and CILEX fellow—are represented simultaneously on the board.
The reason this matters is that CILEX membership is generally more diverse than the other legal professions. Some 78% of CILEX fellows are women, and because CILEX provides a non-graduate route to become a lawyer, its members tend to be from more varied socioeconomic backgrounds. This amendment will support the JAC in its duty to promote diversity in judicial appointments by providing for a commissioner to lead on outreach in this field.
Secondly, there is, at present, an anomaly in the eligibility criteria for the senior tribunal commissioner role. These regulations will expand the eligibility criteria by including a wider range of senior salaried tribunal officers. Currently, only Upper Tribunal judges, chamber presidents of the First-tier Tribunal, chamber presidents of the Upper Tribunal and presidents of employment tribunals for England, Wales and Scotland are eligible.
The effect is that it is not open to all senior salaried members within the unified tribunal structure. In order to remedy this, the amendment expands eligibility to include all salaried members of the Upper Tribunal, certain judges of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, deputy chamber presidents of the First-tier Tribunal and deputy chamber presidents of the Upper Tribunal. This ensures equality of opportunity for those holding broadly equivalent roles, and it is a change that has been requested by the Senior President of Tribunals.
The extent of this instrument is UK-wide, and the territorial application of this instrument is UK-wide. The Lady Chief Justice and the JAC chair on behalf of the board, the Bar Council, the Law Society, CILEX, the Legal Services Board, the Senior President of Tribunals, the Lady Chief Justice of Northern Ireland and the Lord President of Scotland have all been consulted and are all supportive of these changes.
As far as public consultation is concerned, although there was a public consultation exercise for the 2013 regulations, it has not been considered necessary to conduct a further such exercise for these amendments given their limited effect. The amendments are necessary to strengthen the JAC’s capacity, provide greater equality of opportunity for those applying to be commissioners and support the JAC’s commitment to encouraging judicial diversity. I beg to move.
My Lords, I hope not to detain the Committee for very long. I declare my interest as a solicitor of the senior courts of England and Wales—a professional qualification that fills me with considerable pride even now, after many years of practice. In mixed company, where no one is aware of my political or administrative responsibilities over the years, I always indicate my function, when I am asked, as being a lawyer, not a politician, because that is the priority I place on that profession.
In no way do I wish to criticise these arrangements—indeed, I think that they are very sensible—but I want to point out a little of the history here and a bit about what I think may be a misunderstanding in the composition, particularly in relation to the three professional members that we will be discussing. Before the 19th century in this country, the provision of legal services was an amorphous, muddled arrangement that caused considerable difficulties; I will not refer to Shakespeare’s view on lawyers because plenty of people since Shakespeare have had a similarly negative view.
By the time we reached the 19th century, we had ended up with a clear division between barristers and solicitors. Although many countries went down that path and went on to merge those two sides of the legal profession into attorneys or some other single name, we retained that until the Legal Services Act 2007, so who a lawyer is has probably always been, in most people’s minds, a solicitor or a barrister.
We were then joined by legal executives: fellows of CILEX. I must pay tribute to the people who had previously been described as managing clerks, in terms of their functions in offices—they were people doing enormously important jobs—because all of my knowledge of property law was given to me by the managing clerk of the firm to which I was originally articled and in which I became an assistant. I pay massive tribute to their ability and knowledge.
Originally, though, however well-equipped they were, they were not lawyers. The 2007 Act came in and redefined “lawyers”—a word that is spread around. I know that my noble friend has talked about legal practitioners; again, they are slightly different from lawyers, in my opinion. We had lawyers being redefined in 2007 as solicitors, barristers, legal executives—fellows of CILEX—and licensed conveyancers. I have to say that the word has taken on a rather broad description, frankly. A lot of solicitors now have difficulty in dealing with licensed conveyancers whose licences appear to have been granted by bodies that most solicitors have never heard of. Trademark agents, patent agents and law costs draftsmen are lawyers under the Legal Services Act 2007.
Paragraph 5.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum states that commissioners should be
“persons practising or employed as lawyers”.
This Motion has been defined by the Minister as simply being moved so that fellows of the Institute of Legal Executives are eligible to be the third lawyer. However, if you then describe lawyers more broadly in this document without defining them in the context of, specifically, fellows of CILEX—or you do not include all those defined as lawyers under the Legal Services Act 2007—it is rather confusing because, if you say “lawyers” and maintain that description, there is no reason whatever why a law costs draftsman should not be appointed, thus maintaining the diversity that the Minister rightly suggests should be brought to bear in the commission. I think that that is confusing.
I know that these documents are mostly looked at only by other lawyers, as are the constitutions of the commission. But looked at from a public point of view, or if there is an argument or a discussion, clarification of this really is necessary. The Minister made it clear and I am perfectly happy with that, but it is wrong to generalise the term “lawyers” unless you define it within the terms of eligibility in that long list I have just given of people who are now claimed to be lawyers—much to my surprise, I have to say.
I am not looking at this narrowly; I am old-fashioned and have been around so long that, as I said at the start, I always thought that lawyers were either solicitors or barristers. I did not know about this longer list because of my ignorance in not actually having looked at the 2007 Act, which I have now read. I would be grateful if the Minister would reflect on that and perhaps make it clear—it has to be made clear somewhere—that merely being a lawyer, which is argued to be necessary in having the three representatives, is not broad at all but is actually confined to that one strand of lawyers under the 2007 definition, which is to be a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing these regulations. They make technical changes to the Judicial Appointments Commission. As explained, the number of commissioners will increase from 15 to 16 and a third professional commissioner will be added. This will mean, subject to the observations of my noble friend Lord Kirkhope, that a barrister, a solicitor and a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives will be on the panel. The regulations also expand the list of offices from which the senior tribunal commissioner may be drawn. This ensures that holders of broadly equivalent judicial offices have equal opportunity to serve.
The Minister notes that these changes are intended to help the JAC manage a higher level of recruitment. The number of exercises and recommendations has grown in recent years, and the addition of a further commissioner should assist in meeting that workload. We accept that these regulations are largely technical, but remain concerned about the structure of the JAC. The current arrangements separate ultimate responsibility for judicial appointments from Ministers who are accountable to Parliament. This can weaken accountability, fracture responsibility and leave Ministers less directly answerable when appointments fail or standards fall short.
For that reason, the Conservatives continue to propose a judicial vetting committee within the Lord Chancellor’s office. Such a committee would be appointed by and accountable to the Lord Chancellor, ensuring that appointments are made on merit while restoring democratic accountability. In doing so, it would place ultimate responsibility for judicial appointments clearly with Ministers, who are answerable to Parliament and the public.
We would be grateful if the Minister could offer a few brief points of clarification. First, will the expanded eligibility of the senior tribunal commissioner affect the independence of the JAC or the balance of judicial representation? Secondly, is any further review of the JAC’s structure planned, particularly in light of proposals for a judicial vetting committee? Thirdly, will guidance be issued to ensure that adding commissioners does not create delays or extra burdens in the recruitment process?
Finally, I touch on the observations of my noble friend Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate. He acknowledged that these arrangements are sensible, but helpfully highlighted that the definition of a lawyer has been expanded over recent years to include a much wider range—not simply barristers, solicitors and, more recently, legal executives, but licensed conveyancers, patent agents and others. He suggests that the term “lawyer” is looked at carefully if it is to mean eligibility for judicial appointments, because it needs clarification if it is not to extend to a wider range than those in the three premier categories—if I can call them that—of barristers, solicitors and legal executives. Having said that, and subject to the assurances which I have sought, we on this side recognise the technical purposes of these regulations and are content not to oppose them.
(5 months ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Timpson (Lab)
The residential centre in Swansea is something that we are considering. We have had the spending review and we are waiting for the allocation process. I know it has planning permission. We talk about it a lot with Welsh colleagues. Other residential and non-residential centres for women, such as Hope Street in Southampton and Willowdene, are really important, not just to help them recover, often from addiction and mental health issues, but as a safe space. A number of the women in the criminal justice system are there because of dysfunctional relationships; often they experience violence at home, so these need to be very safe places.
My Lords, there is a great difficulty here in that the penalties have to be applied equally to men and women despite their circumstances, which might be different. Is the Minister satisfied that it is more in the interests of children always to be with the mother in prison, rather than being outside that environment and being looked after more adequately by society?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
Children always have to come first in these decisions. I have met a number of mums in prison who are with their babies, and it is the best place for them and their baby. It is a safe place, they are getting a huge amount of wraparound support and they are able to build really important relationships with their young children, but it is for the judiciary to decide who goes to prison.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it did not take the threat of a strike from the Criminal Bar Association for us to respond to Sir Christopher Bellamy’s report, but I hope that our responding in a way which has drawn broad welcome from the Bar Council, the Law Society and the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives will mean that the Criminal Bar Association will withdraw its utterly ill-thought-out and unfounded strike proposal.
My Lords, I declare my interests here. Can my noble friend say what further proposals there may be to allow solicitors to appear in the higher courts?
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that I will not bore you for long. I shall take careful note of the Chief Whip’s remarks but I am very pleased to introduce Amendments 100, 101 and 102. I thank those Lords spiritual and temporal who have added their names to these amendments and who are supportive of the contents.
These amendments seek to remove amendments to Section 77 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 from Schedule 3. The intention is to erase the proposal contained in the Bill to introduce powers to export offshore any person in the UK who is seeking asylum without first considering their claim. Few would disagree that protection and control of our borders, primary responsibilities of any Government, are noble and necessary objectives. A Home Secretary must be able to discharge her duties in this respect, which include expediting deportation swiftly and without delay where illegality has been determined under the rules. This was certainly my approach when I served as Immigration Minister in the 1990s.
Most would agree that the process by which we pursue these objectives matters no less than the solutions on the table. Indeed, solutions need to be effective, but they must also be pragmatic and practical, and enforceable under domestic and international law. They need to be imaginative but also financially viable. They must be firm but also fair. I am afraid that Clause 28 and Schedule 3 fail on these counts. In very literal terms, Clause 28 amends the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which states that a person seeking asylum cannot be removed from the UK while their asylum claim is being processed—in other words, before a final decision is given on their refugee status, including access to an appeal. However, paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 to the Bill withdraws those rights by allowing the transfer of any asylum seeker to any country which will be listed in Section 77 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as amended by Schedule 3.
Before Brexit, under the Dublin regulations, the UK Government could remove an asylum seeker from the UK while their claim was still pending but only to return them to the EU country of first entry and only after having issued a certificate under Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration Act that permitted them a legal right to do so. With the end of the UK’s involvement in the Dublin regulations this option became inaccessible. However, Clause 28 would provide the Home Secretary with the legal power to forcibly remove any asylum seeker from the UK while their claim is still pending to another country which the Government have deemed safe. Clause 28 would allow them to do this without seeking and issuing a certificate under Schedule 3 to the 2004 Act. This goes against our legal and constitutional principles and surely should be repudiated.
All credible immigration systems must first acknowledge the distinction between immigration and asylum. A person who comes here for economic reasons is definitely not the same as a person who comes here to seek safety. The Bill’s failure to disentangle these definitions is significant because in the Government’s bid to control overall immigration, it will be vulnerable people—those fleeing conflict and persecution—who would be disproportionately and adversely affected.
Many years ago, I oversaw an inquiry that included the viability of offshoring. At the time, the proposal was to create processing centres off the mainland but within British territorial jurisdiction. We quickly judged that to be deeply flawed as an idea, but the problems we identified around domestic offshoring are almost trivial compared with the problems we would face by offshoring asylum seekers to foreign territory. For one thing, it would be a clear breach of our principles in the 1951 convention on refugees. We may be abrogating our responsibilities for dealing with applications, as well as those to the asylum seekers themselves, who, by international law, should be able to retain control over where and when they submit those requests. Indeed, a person’s physical removal from the UK would effectively terminate their claim for asylum in the UK, transferring it instead to a third country.
My Lords, I do not have the answers before me, so I will write on the questions that I have not answered, if that is okay with the noble Baroness.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend for her responses and all noble Lords for their very important contributions on a really significant part of the Bill. I stand by what I said in my remarks, and I think that others will do so too, despite assurances that we may have received. I would be very grateful if the Government would perhaps be prepared to discuss this matter further between now and Report. On that basis, without further ado, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, this amendment is also about children, but it is about children who are in Europe and do not have family anywhere. It is similar to an amendment that was passed by this House and became Section 67 of the Immigration Act 2016. There is a long story to that; I will not waste noble Lords’ time on it now except to say that there was quite a lot of resistance then on the part of the Government but, eventually, the amendment was passed and Theresa May, the then Home Secretary, accepted it.
However, as I understand it, Mrs May did so under the pressure of public opinion because, at the time, people were horrified when they saw dinghies and people drowning in the Mediterranean. They saw a little Syrian boy, Alan Kurdi, drowned on a Mediterranean beach. I think that woke up public opinion. The public then came onside and decided that we as a country can do this for unaccompanied child refugees. That is a summary of the history there. Theresa May then summoned me again to see her and said that the Government were prepared to accept the amendment.
The Government then decided that they would cap the number; it was capped at 480, I think. The Government’s argument was that they could not find more local authorities to provide foster families and foster parents to take in more children—a point that was disproved by Safe Passage, which contacted a number of local authorities and found around 1,500 places. Whether they are there today, I do not know, but they were certainly there at the time. There is a problem, of course: there is increasing financial pressure on local authorities, so local authorities are willing to do it but probably cannot afford to do it. There are difficulties; I can see that. Nevertheless, Amendment 115 says:
“The number of children to be resettled … must be determined by the Government in consultation with local authorities.”
That is close to the wording of the earlier amendment some years ago.
The argument here is that, in principle, the Government should accept that we will take a few—only a few—unaccompanied child refugees in Europe, and they should settle on how many and the speed in conjunction with local authorities and with regard to local authorities’ ability to provide foster places. It is a simple proposition. I believe that public opinion is still supportive of it. We have sought support across the political spectrum on this because that is, I am sure, the best way to be successful. Faith groups have been very supportive; altogether, we have a good coalition of people supporting the principle in this amendment and the earlier amendment on Dublin III that I spoke about.
This amendment makes a simple proposition. It would not be difficult for the Government to say that, where there are unaccompanied children who have nowhere else to go and are stuck, we could take at least some of them—not all of them, but some of them—in this country and repeat the small successes of a few years ago. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 116 is in my name. I thank my noble friends Lord Shinkwin, Lady Stroud and Lady Helic for their support. We propose a workable, sensible and impactful solution for the Government to meet their stated objective, as set out in Explanatory Notes,
“to enhance resettlement routes to continue to provide pathways for refugees to be granted protection in the UK.”
Introducing a carefully designed, long-term global resettlement scheme with a numerical target will have the effect of meaningfully expanding safe routes for the world’s most vulnerable refugees.