Estates of Deceased Persons (Forfeiture Rule and Law of Succession) Bill

Debate between Lord Kerr of Kinlochard and Lord Taverne

Wednesday 15th June 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

My Lords, this is the Hemingway amendment—because the sun also rises. This amendment is really rather important. I wish to speak for it on constitutional grounds and on grounds of foreign policy. I shall make an argument about parliamentary sovereignty, and an argument about the national interest.

I begin with the constitutional argument. I see two of them. First, the provisions of this Bill are all otiose in this Parliament. The coalition has made it clear that there will in this Parliament be no treaty changes, no transfers of power and no extensions of qualified majority voting. Therefore, there will be no referenda and none of the matters which have engaged us through all these days and nights are of any relevance to this Parliament; they apply only in the next Parliament. I cannot think of any previous constitutional Bill which has had that effect. I can think of no precedent for a Bill that is designed solely to influence future Parliaments. Of course, the letter of the doctrine that one Parliament cannot bind its successor will remain the case, because a new Government could repeal the Act. In my contention, however, the spirit of the doctrine would be much better honoured if there were a requirement for an affirmative decision as a first act of each new Parliament that the provisions of this Act should continue.

My second constitutional argument concerns the fact that the referenda called for in the Bill would in every case be asking—whatever the substance of the issue —the question, “Do you wish to overrule your Government and your Parliament?”. Before the referendum stage was reached the Government must by definition be in favour of the measure, because they all require unanimity in Brussels and both Houses of Parliament would have voted for the measure before the referendum question. The result of the referendum, if it was no, would be that an Act of Parliament was thereby revoked. I can think of no precedent for that. It has not applied to any past referendum in this country. In my contention, a referendum called for in this Bill is a direct undercutting of parliamentary sovereignty.

I believe it entirely right that each successive Parliament should be asked whether it wished its sovereignty to be undercut in the way provided for in this Bill, and that is why I favour a sunrise clause. This is my second constitutional argument and I have not mentioned Edmund Burke.

On the foreign policy argument, I do not believe that we shall see many referendums. We know that we shall see none in this Parliament as a result of this Bill, and I do not think that we will see many in future Parliaments either. Some of the circumstances listed in the Bill that would trigger a referendum are wildly implausible. There are some which I cannot see many member states supporting, while there are others which I think it inconceivable that any Government would support. For example, there is a reference to the own resources decision. Unanimity on the own resources decision is absolutely crucial, and I cannot think that any British Government would be stupid enough to give it away, so I do not think we will have a referendum on that. There are other items which are minor matters of detail. No Government are going to be politically naive enough to go to the country on an obscure matter of procedural detail lost in the treaties.

However, as we saw in the debate touched off by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, on his Amendment 22A the other night, there are some matters where a change would undoubtedly be in the interests of the UK. The clause he referred to is one where British industry would greatly welcome the introduction of qualified majority voting. But there is no question of any British Government agreeing that the country should be asked, “Do you want to overrule Parliament on whether the list of military goods that are exempt from single market disciplines should be changed by qualified majority voting?”. Any Government who put that question to the country would be laughed to scorn, so none of them will. The British negotiator in Brussels will be unable to put forward the proposal or support it if it is made by anyone else because his Government back home will tell him, “Don’t be silly. That would trigger a referendum”.

Ministers have argued that my fears are exaggerated. They have also argued that the price is worth paying and a bit of rigidity is necessary in the interests of restoring confidence in successive Governments’ handling of European affairs and recreating trust. I do not agree, but they may be right and I accept that only time can tell. My fear is that other member states, seeing how much concrete we have poured over our feet, will be tempted or forced to bypass our perceived rigidity by excluding us from the debate and proceeding by what is known as “enhanced co-operation” or acting outside the treaties without us. I think that we may be at a Messina moment. Again, the Government think that I exaggerate, and they may be right because, as I have said, only time will tell. It took a long time for the penny to drop that we had made a terrible mistake in walking out of the Messina conference.

I accept that the Government are certainly right to say that our exclusion is not an imminent threat. So little is going on that there is not much risk of our excluding ourselves by way of institutional or constitutional developments. But as time passes, the risk that our self-exclusion will be damaging increases. In nature, any organism that does not change and renew itself is by definition dead. The Government are making a virtue of rigidity. The case for flexibility will become more evident over time. New challenges will arise. The European Union will want to change itself in some ways—I cannot predict what they will be; none of us can. We should not rule out the possibility that we might want a change and that, as with the Single European Act, we might on occasion want to say yes.

This debate, I accept, is a bit academic now because of the coalition’s decision that nothing which could trigger a referendum will be done in this Parliament. Since the provisions of the Bill that we are passing are otiose until after the next election, it is an academic issue. But it is an issue that we should come back to after the next election; it is an issue where regular reassessments of the costs and benefits of the position that we have put ourselves in would be appropriate.

That is the national interest case for the amendment. It is the softest conceivable sunset clause, because the subsequent sunrise is so simple to effect. It is appropriate because the Bill is constitutionally innovative, affecting the sovereignty of Parliament in at least two rather serious ways. It would permit regular reassessment of whether rigidity is working or whether the national interest would be better served by avoiding self-exclusion from key debates and future developments. I beg to move.

[Lord Taverne]

My Lords, I want to look, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has done, at the constitutional implications of the Bill, which should concern all Members of the House irrespective of their views on Europe.

The Constitution Committee has recommended a very important principle; namely, that referendums should be confined to changes of fundamental constitutional importance. If that principle is respected and strictly observed, such a referendum may not seriously prejudice parliamentary government as we know it. But this Bill as it stands drives a coach and horses through that principle.

There is no dispute about a referendum on the euro, or on joining a common European army or a common European foreign policy. But how can it be argued that the 56 possible changes that would trigger a referendum under this Bill are fundamentally constitutional? The noble Lord, Lord Howell, has several times argued that these items are all important. Well, they may well be important. Lots of minor changes may be important, but that does not make them fundamental constitutional changes.

If there is a European public prosecutor's office, it will have an important role in dealing with certain kinds of European financial crime. But if we decide to participate in that office, will it fundamentally change the British constitution? Does the noble Lord seriously argue that? Of course it would not. Are changes in the way we vote on the appointment of an Advocate-General or on the protocol on the excessive deficit procedure a fundamental change in the British constitution? Of course they are not.