European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Kerr of Kinlochard and Lord Cavendish of Furness

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I suspect we will find out. To me personally, this is an extremely sad moment. When I was ambassador to the European Union I found that the things I was allowed to suggest as policy prescriptions were taken seriously in Brussels, partly because it was assumed that if the EU followed the British prescription, the British would ensure that the Americans came in behind it. When I was ambassador in Washington I found the same. Access to and influence on the President was a function partly of the perception that, on a foreign policy issue, the British could call the shots in Brussels.

I am glad that this discussion started with a tribute to Lord Hurd of Westwell, who was the exemplar of how to handle common foreign and security policy. I am glad too that it started also with a tribute to Lord Carrington. The original EPC was, in many ways, a British construct. CFSP as it emerged, with the strong support of the Healeys and the Callaghans, was Douglas Hurd’s construct. The European External Action Service was a British proposal. We punched more than our weight but we have to accept that when we leave the European Union, if we do, that is all gone and we should not pretend that we will have the same influence from outside. What should we do?

[Lord Cavendish of Furness (Con)]

Can the noble Lord explain to us why it is not in the interests of our European partners—100% in their interests—to co-operate as we have always co-operated before?

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I am coming to that. I agree entirely that co-operation is in everyone’s interests. This is one of the areas of negotiation where we are not talking about a zero-sum game; rather, we are talking about a common interest, so I agree with the noble Lord. The point I am making is that we are in the next room. We are not in the room where the decisions are taken. We need an offer and an architecture for the next room. We need to come forward very soon and say, “We are prepared to consult on everything in the area of the common foreign and security policy. We are prepared to consult before every great debate at the United Nations. We would like to consult about every conflict area where Europe should have a view and possibly a presence. We would like to go on contributing our analysis and our intelligence. We would like you, o European Union, to build an annex to the Council—the room next door where we, who we hope will be your closest partner in co-operation on foreign policy, will be consulted by you and will consult you”.

A moment ago the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, made the point that the timing is very important. If we leave the European Union in March 2019, we will leave the Council and there will be no such structure in existence. I should think that something will be invented in the end, but there will be a period of hiatus when we will do the best we can. It would be much better if the United Kingdom were now to put forward an offer and an architecture. It would be much better if there had been a third section to the Prime Minister’s speech in Munich in which she had said, “This is how we envisage it working”. I do not see, particularly on the common foreign and security policy, why we should leave it to the European Commission. There is no great expertise on this in the Commission. It seems that it would have been better on a number of the dossiers in this negotiation if we had actually decided to play at home rather than play on their turf. It would have been better if on every issue we had not waited for the other side to make a proposal.

This is the locus classicus. This is the area of our greatest reputation in Europe. We invented the existing structures in this area, which we are now going to walk away from. This is the area par excellence where the other countries would like to co-operate with us. Why do we not put forward a proposal now? That is why I can support very happily Amendments 12 and 185, but I fear that there is no point in pretending that we can remain, on particular issues, a member of the club. We will have left the club, so the best we can do is try to be its closest partner on the common foreign and security policy.