European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Cavendish of Furness Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I was urged by my noble friend Lady Deech to be more polite to President Trump, so I will respond to that by thanking him extremely warmly for having brought home to us the value of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy. In the year he has been in office, he has singlehandedly illustrated why our national interests in a number of areas are much closer to those of our European partners than to those of his Administration: for example, as regards the nuclear deal with Iran, the rather unfortunate decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem, his very lukewarm support for NATO, his withdrawal from the Paris climate change agreements and his trade policy. In all these areas he has brought home to us why this debate and this amendment, which I support, are vital to our future national interests. I hope that when the Minister responds, she will be prepared to go a bit further than generalities.

As others have already said, there is a complete lack of specificity in what the Prime Minister has said—she has, quite laudably, set out in very firm terms her desire that this should be a major pillar of the new partnership—about what the Government have in mind. It really is time that we saw more. The Prime Minister has spoken about a new treaty. We are in a negotiation. Normally, if you are in a negotiation and make a proposal, you table it. I have not seen the treaty. Has anyone seen it? I do not think that anyone has. Does it exist? I suspect not because, judging from the rather lukewarm attitude of the Foreign Secretary, he might not be able to produce much of an input into it.

This really is getting important now. We are only a year away from dropping out of all the complex machinery which makes the common foreign and security policy work. I have to say to my noble friend Lady Deech that her caricature of common foreign and security policy is bizarre. For example, the idea of a nuclear agreement with Iran originated in the European Union, and it was followed up, rather belatedly, by the United States. Therefore, I do not think that we should belittle such co-operation. In any case, the Prime Minister is firmly of the opinion that it matters and that we need to work very closely with the EU. I wonder whether it would not be better to say here and now—perhaps the noble Baroness the Minister replying to this debate could do so—that our co-operation in this area of common foreign and security policy is not subject to the rubric “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” and that it is, as we are trying to say but have been rather hesitant about saying, completely unconditional.

[Lord Cavendish of Furness (Con)]

My Lords, is the noble Lord aware that the phrase “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” came from President Tusk, not us?

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

It was not only President Tusk; it was part of the agreed conclusions of the first part of the negotiations—that is, we subscribed to it too.

As that first stage did not cover common foreign and security policy, all I am suggesting is that, now we are moving into that field in the negotiations, we should make it clear that our proposals—including the proposal for a new security treaty—are not subject to “Nothing is agreed until everything is agreed” but will be put forward to the mutual benefit of all parties. That would make a huge difference, because there is a lot of misunderstanding and a certain amount of suspicion that we are approaching this in a spirit of transactionalism—that we are trying to trade off one part of the negotiations against another. That would be a mistake in the field of common foreign and security policy. If it is to be pursued after we have left the European Union, it can pursued on a basis of mutual benefit only and not by a transactional approach.

Therefore, I hope that when the Minister replies to this debate she can give a little more clarity on what the Government are seeking and that she can state in absolute terms that the unconditional nature of what we are pursuing here is our policy.

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[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords, I have four amendments in this group, which, following on from what the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, has just said, seek to maintain British membership of the EU’s Political and Security Committee, the EU’s common foreign and security policy, the EU Foreign Affairs Council and the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre.

First, I warmly welcome the noble Baroness to the Front Bench and to our debates. We have very high hopes of her and her response to this debate because she is not the noble Lord, Lord Callanan. We regard her as the more accommodating face of Her Majesty’s Government. We think that, while the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is not on the Front Bench at the moment, she has an opportunity to make all kinds of very sensible statements of government policy which can then go on the record and we can move on from there. This is a golden opportunity for her to do so in respect of foreign policy.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, made a very powerful speech on why it is important that we remain thoroughly engaged in the security apparatus of the European Union and he spoke about the big dangers that face us as we leave. I do not think there is any point in my repeating those remarks or those of the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. I just want to make two comments.

The first relates to the only speech that the Prime Minister gave, on 25 April 2016, in the debate on the referendum, where she weighed the arguments for remaining in the European Union. What is so remarkable about that speech is how much emphasis—it was an almost exclusive emphasis—she placed on the security aspects of the European Union and the dangers to our security of leaving. Clearly, given her experience in the Home Office, she was particularly concerned about some of the Home Office dimensions of that, and we will cover those in a later group. However, she also raised the broader security issues.

If one looks at the words that she used in that speech, it is very clear that she regarded membership of the multilateral institutions of the EU, particularly in foreign policy and security co-operation, as being of huge importance to the Government and to this country. She said:

“If we were not members of the European Union, of course we would still have our relationship with America … But”—


these are the key words—

“that does not mean we would be as safe as if we remain”.

As the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said, we will be leaving all these institutions in one year, and I believe it is incumbent on the Government to give the House some sense of what their policy will be in respect of those institutions. That is hugely important.

My second point is to consider the course that we now appear to be set on. It is what has become known as “hard Brexit”, which is leaving not just the security institutions of the European Union but the economic institutions—the single market and the customs union. I am a novice to international security policy. I have spent most of the last 15 years trying to reform public services at home and, like many other noble Lords, I have had to get to grips with these issues. One of the most important and, for me, influential books that I have read while I have tried to understand what this might mean for the future of Britain in Europe and globally is by Professor Brendan Simms at the University of Cambridge. He has written a quite brilliant book called Britain’s Europe: A Thousand Years of Conflict and Cooperation, which charts our whole relationship with Europe during the last millennium.

Professor Simms makes a quite obvious point, the significance of which becomes greater and greater as we appear to be heading towards leaving not only the security but the economic institutions of the European Union. The basic but fundamental point he makes is that countries which are engaged in trade conflicts and trade wars find it that much harder to co-operate on security issues. To my mind, in terms of the security of the United Kingdom going forward, the most alarming development at the moment is that, as we appear to be in an ever more tense and potentially conflictual relationship with France and Germany in particular over the future of our trade policy, and if we are to start engaging in tariff wars and setting up rival customs arrangements and things of that kind which could lead to quite significant trade conflicts, that can only weaken our security co-operation with them over the medium to long term.

Those of us who are in favour of remaining in the European Union are often accused of carrying out what is called Project Fear, but I recommend to the Minister and to noble Lords the Prime Minister’s speech of April 2016. She draws a direct parallel between the instability of relations between European powers before 1914 and what could happen if we start to fracture those relations today. That came from her, not me. Therefore, what we look for from the Minister while she is able to make positive statements about Europe in the absence of the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, is some indication that she appreciates the need for very close co-operation with our European partners on trade and economic matters, not least because that will tend to promote close alignment in foreign and security policy.

[Lord Cavendish of Furness]

My Lords, does the noble Lord not realise that those of us who advocate leaving believe in free trade, which has been a great source of peace, rather than conflict, throughout history? He belongs to the side that wants tariffs.

[Lord Adonis]

My understanding is that it is the policy of Her Majesty’s Government to put in jeopardy the free trade we currently enjoy in the European Union. If the Government were in favour of free trade, we would stay in the customs union and in the single market. These are straightforward, obvious propositions. The policy of the Government tends only towards reducing free trade with the single biggest set of trading partners that we have at the moment.

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[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I suspect we will find out. To me personally, this is an extremely sad moment. When I was ambassador to the European Union I found that the things I was allowed to suggest as policy prescriptions were taken seriously in Brussels, partly because it was assumed that if the EU followed the British prescription, the British would ensure that the Americans came in behind it. When I was ambassador in Washington I found the same. Access to and influence on the President was a function partly of the perception that, on a foreign policy issue, the British could call the shots in Brussels.

I am glad that this discussion started with a tribute to Lord Hurd of Westwell, who was the exemplar of how to handle common foreign and security policy. I am glad too that it started also with a tribute to Lord Carrington. The original EPC was, in many ways, a British construct. CFSP as it emerged, with the strong support of the Healeys and the Callaghans, was Douglas Hurd’s construct. The European External Action Service was a British proposal. We punched more than our weight but we have to accept that when we leave the European Union, if we do, that is all gone and we should not pretend that we will have the same influence from outside. What should we do?

[Lord Cavendish of Furness (Con)]

Can the noble Lord explain to us why it is not in the interests of our European partners—100% in their interests—to co-operate as we have always co-operated before?

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I am coming to that. I agree entirely that co-operation is in everyone’s interests. This is one of the areas of negotiation where we are not talking about a zero-sum game; rather, we are talking about a common interest, so I agree with the noble Lord. The point I am making is that we are in the next room. We are not in the room where the decisions are taken. We need an offer and an architecture for the next room. We need to come forward very soon and say, “We are prepared to consult on everything in the area of the common foreign and security policy. We are prepared to consult before every great debate at the United Nations. We would like to consult about every conflict area where Europe should have a view and possibly a presence. We would like to go on contributing our analysis and our intelligence. We would like you, o European Union, to build an annex to the Council—the room next door where we, who we hope will be your closest partner in co-operation on foreign policy, will be consulted by you and will consult you”.

A moment ago the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, made the point that the timing is very important. If we leave the European Union in March 2019, we will leave the Council and there will be no such structure in existence. I should think that something will be invented in the end, but there will be a period of hiatus when we will do the best we can. It would be much better if the United Kingdom were now to put forward an offer and an architecture. It would be much better if there had been a third section to the Prime Minister’s speech in Munich in which she had said, “This is how we envisage it working”. I do not see, particularly on the common foreign and security policy, why we should leave it to the European Commission. There is no great expertise on this in the Commission. It seems that it would have been better on a number of the dossiers in this negotiation if we had actually decided to play at home rather than play on their turf. It would have been better if on every issue we had not waited for the other side to make a proposal.

This is the locus classicus. This is the area of our greatest reputation in Europe. We invented the existing structures in this area, which we are now going to walk away from. This is the area par excellence where the other countries would like to co-operate with us. Why do we not put forward a proposal now? That is why I can support very happily Amendments 12 and 185, but I fear that there is no point in pretending that we can remain, on particular issues, a member of the club. We will have left the club, so the best we can do is try to be its closest partner on the common foreign and security policy.