(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 184, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, concerns the power of immigration officers to examine the immigration status of those entering the UK. Clause 20(2) inserts the ability of the immigration officer to curtail existing leave to enter the UK. The amendment would replace the consideration of whether the leave “should be” curtailed, which implies an inappropriate degree of discretion, and substitute “is required to” be.
Also in this group is our opposition to Clause 21 standing part of the Bill. It seems disproportionate that immigration officers should have the power to search premises simply to establish whether an employer should be given a civil penalty for employing an illegal worker, or to establish whether a landlord should be given a civil penalty for leasing a property to a disqualified person. Immigration officers already have powers to search for evidence in relation to criminal offences related to these two activities. Surely it is only in the most serious cases, where a criminal prosecution would at least be being considered, that it would be appropriate for immigration officers to search premises in this way. It is rare for powers of search to be granted in connection with civil penalties in British law, and Clause 21 should not undermine such a principle.
We also oppose Clause 22 standing part of the Bill. This clause allows an immigration officer who is lawfully on premises to seize anything that he thinks may be evidence of any offence, under any legislation, if he thinks it necessary to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. Initially, this appears a sensible approach, to obviate the need to call for police assistance when something is discovered that is not related to an immigration offence—for example, discovering what appear to be class A drugs.
Police officers receive extensive training in securing and preserving evidence, and in the questioning of suspects in relation to the discovery of evidence during searches. In addition to the need to carefully question the subject about the ownership of the items in question, since usually the owner of the premises denies that the item belongs to them, there is the question of whether photographic or forensic evidence is required in situ. I have been involved in searches of premises, and there have been many cases of police being involved in searches of premises where the very facts that the substance in question was on the premises and who it belonged to have been questioned subsequently in court. It is something of which the police have now had extensive experience, and they know how to handle these situations. I suggest that it would take a lot of training and experience for immigration officers to reach the level of expertise necessary to ensure that convictions subsequently take place. Either immigration officers will require extensive, and necessarily expensive, training in evidence preservation and the questioning of those suspected of non-immigration offences, or there is a real danger that valuable evidence will be lost in such cases.
There is also the question of what I might call false positives, when immigration officers seize items that they wrongly believe to be evidence of an offence and then pass them on to the police, placing a significant administrative burden on the police to process, secure and subsequently return the items to the owners. With significant cuts to police resources, the last thing the police need is for immigration officers to dump innocent items on them that they then have to deal with. We therefore believe that Clause 22 should not be part of the Bill. I beg to move.
My Lords, Amendment 184 and the two clause stand part debates in respect of Clauses 21 and 22 give an important opportunity to explore here exactly what the intention is behind the clauses. It is important that the Minister carefully sets out what he believes are the reasonable grounds for immigration officers to conduct a search for documents in respect of illegal working or leasing premises to disqualified persons obtained in the commission of an offence. Will the Minister set out what he means by a search of the premises? At any point, would that include a search of the person? How would that be conducted?
These are very sensitive matters and I want to be satisfied that proper processes are in place, and that people are treated with respect. We often need to remember that asylum seekers have not always had a good experience of meeting officials of the state in other countries, and we must ensure that actions are taken in a proportionate manner and to the highest professional standards. I have the highest regard for the officers who undertake this work for the Immigration Service; they do a very difficult and challenging job.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an important point when he talked about the extensive experience and knowledge that police officers have when it comes to conducting searches and preserving evidence to secure convictions. Are we confident that the immigration officer would have this knowledge? The noble Lord makes another important point when he talks about the burden of bureaucracy arising from items taken during a search that are then passed on to police but in the end do not secure any convictions because there is no offence at all.
My Lords, before the Minister replies to the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Paddick, may I add a word in support of their points, particularly the point about proportionality that has just been made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy? Why does the Minister feel we need to add to those powers that immigration officers already have, as set out in chapter 16 of the Home Office Enforcement Instructions and Guidance?
Would he also comment on the extensive powers that immigration officers already have to search without warrant in connection with a criminal offence? What is envisaged here, as I try to understand it, is to give those same officers powers to search premises without a warrant, in circumstances where they do not have any reasonable suspicion that a criminal offence has been committed. Is that the case? Is there no restriction in this clause authorising an immigration officer to act only where it is not practicable to obtain a warrant? If that is so, this is quite an extension of powers, and one that is disproportionate in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, has described.
My Lords, on that very point, I know that the Minister cannot do it today, but would he be prepared to write to noble Lords, or to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and explain what that training and guidance will be? He said it would be very extensive, and I am sure it will be, but I wonder how long it will take, what the cost will be and how practical it will be.
Lord Keen of Elie
I should add that the guidance on immigration officers’ use of powers is set out in the enforcement instructions and guidance, which are published on the UK Government website. But I would be content to write to the noble Lord to set out an outline of the proposed training for those immigration officers who are going to have the limited power conferred by Clause 22 with regard to the preservation of evidence that they believe has been the product of some criminal act.
There was one further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the false positive, as he termed it, and the administrative burden. I respectfully suggest that that burden will be no greater than the burden imposed upon police officers in circumstances where immigration officers believe that they have encountered the product of a criminal act and then telephone or radio the police and invite them to attend a premises. So there is a question of balance here, but it is not, on the face of it, going to be a disproportionate burden when compared to the present circumstances in which the matter is, in any event, brought to the attention of the police.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord. As he indicated, Amendment 194 would remove the ability for immigration officers to seek an all premises warrant where they have a power to enter and search premises for material which is likely to be relevant evidence of an immigration offence under the 1971 Act. As the noble Lord anticipated, one purpose of this is to bring the provisions on such warrants into line with those for police warrants under PACE.
In addition, Amendment 201 is intended to do the same thing, but I should perhaps explain that when the immigration warrants were originally provided for, as running for one month, that was in parallel with the time that a police warrant would run under PACE. Subsequently, the warrant under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act was extended to a three-month period, so they fell out of sequence. The difficulty is that, from time to time, there are joint immigration officer and police operations which involve warrants being granted, and it is not convenient that the immigration warrant should be a period of one month while the police warrant is for a period of three months. The purpose of Amendment 201 in particular is simply to bring the time limit back into line with that which applies for police warrants.
Coming back to Amendment 194 and the use of all premises warrants, it is considered appropriate that an all premises warrant should be available to immigration officers, not only because that is consistent with the form of warrant available to police officers pursuing their own powers but because there are many circumstances in which an all premises warrant will be required for effective recovery of material pertaining to either illegal working or potential offences in respect of landlords and illegal renting. For example, where you have someone who has a number of restaurants employing persons who may be suspected of being illegal immigrants, you may have a warrant in respect of particular premises and then discover that all the records are actually kept elsewhere—in an office, a lock-up, or something of that kind. Therefore, it is appropriate that all the premises that are subject to the control of a particular employer should be available under the warrant, otherwise we would have a very long, drawn-out, step-by-step process of knocking down one domino, going from one warrant to the next one, and so on. It is in these circumstances that it is considered appropriate that an all premises warrant should be allowed in the case of immigration officers. I hope that that addresses the concerns or reservations expressed by reference to Amendments 194 and 201. In a sense, they bring immigration warrants into line with police warrants, but they were in line with police warrants before the amendment to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. In addition, there are substantive reasons why it is practical and effective for immigration officers to have an all premises warrant facility available to them.
Government Amendments 195 to 200 and 202 to 209 may look rather complex, but have at their core a very simple proposition; that is, in Scotland it is not lawfully possible to secure an all premises warrant and a multiple entry warrant. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that immigration officers operating in Scotland do so within the bounds of the Scottish criminal justice system.
I see the need for the amendments, but will the noble and learned Lord explain further how we have had to come to this stage in the Bill—I assume that it was drafted in the Home Office, checked and rechecked, and then went all through the Commons—and now we find that we have to table an amendment because these powers are not available in Scotland? I am surprised that we had to come to this stage to realise that point.
Lord Keen of Elie
It may be that the Scots only recently had a look at it. I am not in a position to elaborate, but I hope that the noble Lord will accept that as a potential explanation.
My Lords, in moving Amendment 210, in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I shall speak to Amendments 211 to 213 and Amendment 215.
Amendment 210 suggests the addition of “reasonably” in the power of the Home Secretary to direct public agencies to supply documents, so that she must “reasonably suspect”, rather than simply “suspect”, that someone may be liable to deportation under new Section 20A(2). Amendment 211 suggests a similar change to the power of the Secretary of State to retain such a document. Amendment 212 requires the Secretary of State to return a nationality document that is no longer required to the person who supplied it, as previously debated on Amendment 188.
Amendment 213 again queries extending the definition of “nationality document” from “a document showing” the individual’s “identity, nationality or citizenship”, to one that “might establish” the individual’s “identity, nationality or citizenship”, as previously debated on Amendment 189. I do not think that the Minister addressed in that debate the broadening of the definition from a document “showing” the individual’s identity to one that “might establish” their identity. That is a considerable broadening of the definition.
Amendment 215 would insert a new clause after Clause 30 relating to complaints and the investigation of serious concerns relating to the conduct of immigration officers. It suggests that a commission be established to,
“make recommendations about the establishment of an independent oversight body”,
for immigration officers and other authorised officers, in so far as they exercise powers available to immigration officers. My understanding is that the Independent Police Complaints Commission currently investigates complaints against immigration officers, but only relating to powers similar to those exercised by the police. There is not one overall coherent complaints investigation or recording system. Would the Minister confirm this? Even if the IPCC has a role, we believe that such arrangements may be inadequate and should at least be reviewed to ensure that they are effective.
The Independent Police Complaints Commission is fighting an uphill struggle to win the trust and confidence of the public in general, and the black and minority ethnic communities in particular. Those most likely to come into contact with immigration officers are those seeking asylum and others in a very vulnerable position. The likelihood that such people will have a good understanding overall of their rights and the standard of conduct expected of immigration officers and other authorised officers is far less than among those born in this country or who have lived here for some time. Indeed, the way they may have been treated by officials in their own country may well be far below the standard expected of immigration officers and other authorised officers in the UK.
In all the circumstances, it seems that there is at least a question that needs to be examined as to whether the existing arrangements by which long-standing residents of the UK—well-versed in their rights and the conduct expected of officials—can have their concerns about the police and immigration officers investigated are adequate for asylum seekers and those newly arrived in the United Kingdom. I beg to move.
My Lords, this group of amendments concerns the supply of information to the Secretary of State and the establishment of a commission for standards for immigration officers. I was somewhat surprised that without Amendment 212 or something similar—it may need refining—it would be left to the Secretary of State to dispose of nationality documents as they think appropriate, without any further clarifications. It would be useful if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, would confirm that there is no question that these documents will not be returned to the person when they are no longer needed by the Secretary of State or their officials. I understand that we would not want to return the documents to someone who had no right to have them, but if they have been obtained lawfully they should go back to them.
Amendment 215 requires the Secretary of State to establish a commission to make recommendations for an independent oversight board to set standards for immigration officers. Given the sort of powers that immigration officers exercise as public officials, it is right that we should have in place a proper process to look at complaints about their conduct and standards. It would be helpful if the noble and learned Lord were to set out what happens at present. Is this safeguard in place with regard to certain things but not to others, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, indicated? Does the noble and learned Lord think that the present system is adequate in all respects?
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for their observations on these provisions.
Amendments 210 and 211 are essentially the same as those previously discussed in relation to Amendment 191 in seeking to ensure that the Secretary of State may direct a person to supply a relevant nationality document only—and may retain that document only—if she acts reasonably in her suspicion that the person to whom the document relates may be liable to removal from the United Kingdom, and that the document may facilitate that removal.
Amendment 213 is the same as Amendment 189, put forward to Clause 25, in seeking to limit the definition of “nationality document”. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, observed that I had not addressed the distinction between the term “showing” and the term “might establish”. It respectfully appears to me that it is the distinction between that which is explicit on the face of a document and that which may be inferred from its terms. The terms of a document may not on their face show a particular position but an analysis of the terms of that document would lead to an implication about the source of the document, the person using it or the background of that person. So I suggest that it is the distinction between a document being explicit on its face, and giving rise to what might be termed a circumstantial evidential route to a determination with regard to a person’s nationality or route of travel.
Amendment 212 differs slightly from those previous amendments to Clauses 25 and 26 on the Secretary of State’s power to dispose of documents which she no longer wishes to retain in that it requires the document to be returned to the person who supplied it. However, to answer the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, we again face a difficulty when the Secretary of State is provided with documents which are clearly forged or counterfeit. The desire is to ensure that these should not remain in circulation and therefore be returned to someone who would put them back into circulation or use them again. I hope that that satisfies the noble Lord. It should be acknowledged that some of the bodies supplying documents will not be in a position to establish whether they are forged or fraudulently obtained—but, generally speaking, Immigration Enforcement personnel are able to determine that from the analysis of documents.
As we have discussed, Clause 29 contains powers that enable the Secretary of State to require public authorities, subject to certain conditions, to supply nationality documents to the Home Office for immigration purposes. Schedule 6 lists those public authorities to which the new duty applies. Government Amendment 214A is quite straightforward in terms of its effect in that it adds education bodies to that list: these are schools and further and higher education providers across the United Kingdom. This power will be exercisable only where the Secretary of State suspects that a person to whom the document relates may be liable to removal from the United Kingdom in accordance with a provision of the Immigration Acts, and that the document may facilitate the removal.
I wish to be absolutely clear that this is not a power to require education bodies or, indeed, any of those listed, to collect data or information on behalf of the Secretary of State, or to seize documents from people, as it applies only where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for believing that a nationality document is already lawfully in the possession of the relevant body—that is to say, that they hold the document for the purposes of their own functions.
The noble and learned Lord has gone through the various bodies to which we can complain. However, there are a lot of bodies to which one can complain about all sorts of different things. Perhaps his officials should reflect that there is a case for bringing all these things together because having all these bodies may not be the best way to run things. As regards the nationality documents, I entirely accept the point about fraudulent documents but if a document is genuine I assume that it would be returned to the relevant person.
Lord Keen of Elie
On the last point, the Secretary of State will act reasonably, and is lawfully obliged to act reasonably, so there cannot be any real difficulty about that. On the noble Lord’s first point, our complaints procedure may be so comprehensive that it is difficult for him to get his arms round it. However, I would be content to write to outline that procedure in more detail if he felt that would assist.
My Lords, my noble friends have been tempted to move into the next group of amendments. I can see why, as bail and detention are so inextricably intertwined, but I will try to resist that temptation. I would say that the question of bail has been raised on successive immigration Bills, and many of us remember that historic repeal by Labour of the clause that would have brought in automatic bail. This issue has a direct bearing on the next group of amendments and the old problem of the inadequacy of initial decisions.
I will simply quote here the words of the highly regarded Detention Forum, which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Hylton. It said:
“Given the lack of automatic bail hearings for individuals who have been detained, and without the initial decision to detain being sanctioned by any kind of legal proceeding, the lack of effective case-working has serious and damaging consequences”.
I have had some experience of visiting detention centres where there are a lot of patient and courageous visitors who, just like the inmates themselves, have become frustrated with the system. There are some who have committed serious offences but there are genuine migrants and asylum seekers in their hundreds, anxiously awaiting either sentences or appeals for crimes that they have not committed. I understand that in 2014, more than 30,000 individuals were detained but only 12,000 removed. I support the later amendments on the need for a time limit to detention but I will not mention that now. We have already heard the example of Yarl’s Wood and of the work of the Shaw report, so I will leave that for later.
My Lords, the intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, is helpful in respect of this group of amendments. It starts with Amendments 215A and 216A in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. These amendments seem practical and proportionate. I concur with the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee: a person must be released if there is no power to detain and they cannot lawfully be detained, and it does not seem right to use the term “bail”. I particularly agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and other noble Lords that language must be accurate. People seeking asylum should be seen as victims and not treated as criminals. That is an important point.
Amendment 217, which was tabled by my noble friend Lord Rosser, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick and me seeks to add an additional clause that sets out a process whereby somebody detained has a clear procedure to go before the First-tier Tribunal within eight days, then after 36 days and then every 28 days for it to determine whether they should be released on bail. This is an important role for the judiciary, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said. The amendment makes provision for detention not to be indefinite and for a proper review process. Depriving somebody of their liberty is a serious matter. It is right that the reasons for detention should be vigorously tested and that the tribunal should be satisfied that there is no other reasonable course but to detain the person. We support this amendment.
Amendment 219 seeks to remove from the Bill the power for the Secretary of State to detain an individual granted bail by the tribunal without just cause. Amendments 220, 222 and 223 would remove the provisions that would allow the Secretary of State to override the decisions of the tribunal with regard to electronic monitoring or residence conditions on immigration bail. Amendment 224 would require the Secretary of State to make provide accommodation facilities for a person released on bail. This is an important provision under the heading:
“Powers of Secretary of State to enable person to meet bail conditions”.
Ensuring that a person has a roof over their head should be a primary concern. Amendments 221A and 221B in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seek to remove the words,
“causing a danger to public health”,
and,
“in that person’s interests or”.
I particularly look forward to the response of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on this. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made an excellent point.
Amendment 221C clarifies that the arrangements to communicate must be reasonable. It is an important requirement. These are difficult matters and the emphasis on the word “reasonable” is very welcome. Amendment 221D makes clear that the functions are exercised on behalf of the Secretary of State. The remaining amendments are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bates, and I looking forward to an explanation of them.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble Baroness and to noble Lords for their observations on this part of the Bill and on bail. I notice that we have all referred to “bail” throughout the debate. Going back through various parliamentary reports over many years, the references are consistently to “bail”. It is a term that we understand in this context. That is important because, as the noble Baroness observed, the use of language is significant in this context. It is as well to bear that in mind.
I shall look first at Amendments 215A and 216A on the use of the term “immigration bail”. Let us be clear: no one is seeking to criminalise immigration or to treat immigrants as criminals. It so happens that the term “immigration bail” has come into common parlance in this context. Clause 32 and Schedule 7 are intended to simplify the current powers on bail and temporary release contained in various Immigration Acts, effectively reducing six different forms or statuses to one. The description “immigration bail” was chosen because it is a well-understood concept. The statutory underpinning for criminal bail and immigration bail are in entirely different pieces of legislation. The naming of immigration bail is not about criminalising people. It is about being clear about an individual’s situation. The term “temporary admission” could have been chosen, but it is a less accurate way of describing the status as it would not capture, for example, the circumstances of individuals encountered in the UK without leave or those who had leave but are subject to a deportation order. In these circumstances, we resist the suggestion that “immigration bail”, which is widely understood by those who engage in this debate, should be replaced by “temporary admission”, which is less exact and less accurate as a means of describing the relevant status.
Amendment 217 is on automatic bail hearings. It would require a bail hearing in the tribunal after eight days of detention, then after 36 days and every 28 days thereafter. The Government take matters of liberty seriously and have made clear in the recent Written Ministerial Statement by my right honourable friend the Minister for Immigration that changes to policy and the operational approach to detention should lead to a reduction in the number of those detained and in the duration of detention before removal, especially for the most vulnerable. However, the Government do not consider that introducing mandatory and scheduled bail hearings will aid these reforms. There is already well-established judicial oversight available. Individuals detained under immigration powers have unrestricted opportunity to apply to the tribunal for bail at any time. They can also apply for a judicial review of their detention or for a writ of habeas corpus to the High Court, again at any time.
The current system is flexible by design, both in the interests of justice and in allowing the detainee ready access to the tribunal. Introducing automatic bail hearings at set periods in all cases would be a significant resource burden on the tribunal at the expense of the taxpayer and would take valuable judicial time that could be spent on other matters, potentially prolonging the time spent in detention and denying other appellants timely access to justice. Mandatory bail hearings at set intervals were placed on a statutory footing, as a noble Lord observed, the last time the Opposition formed a Government, being legislated for in Part III of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. However, they were never brought into force and were repealed in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. What was the reason for the repeal? The plans were unworkable in practice and would have been a significant resource burden. That remains the position today, so we resist the amendment.
Amendment 221A would remove the requirement to consider the public health implications of bailing an individual. It is not about incarceration. In order to detain pending removal, there must be a realistic prospect of removal in a reasonable timeframe. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 7 sets out a number of factors that the bailing authority must have regard to when considering whether bail is appropriate and the conditions of bail that should be imposed. Naturally, risk to the public and community is a paramount consideration, whether that is the likelihood of the person committing an offence, the likelihood of the person absconding or the likelihood of the person’s presence in the UK being a danger to public health. This would, for example, be a consideration if there were a pandemic and an individual were infected and detained pending removal. Clearly it would not be possible to detain under immigration powers if the sole consideration was protecting public health and there was no underlying immigration justification for the exercise of the detention power. It is a justifiable power in the context of protecting public health.
Amendment 221B would remove the requirement to consider whether it is in a person’s best interests to be detained before being released on bail. I understand the reason why this amendment has been laid, as when could it ever be in anyone’s best interests to be detained? First, let me be clear on a point of principle. It is the Government’s policy that there is a presumption of liberty and that immigration detention should be used as a last resort. This is long standing and will not change. It is important to put that on the record and I am sure that the whole Committee will agree that this is right.
(10 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I add a certain scepticism to that of the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, although from a different angle. I would like to say how much I admire his concern for the proper functioning of electoral institutions in the United Kingdom. My point is different and relates to the future. The Minister has brought the draft instrument to the House and there is no choice. The argumentation on technical details is fine, although it requires a certain degree of trust in the Chief Electoral Officer—although I see no reason why he should be denied that trust. So there is no problem with the legislation as such in that narrow sense and, anyway, we must now proceed.
In his opening statement, the Minister talked about the reason why we are in this situation. It was entirely accurate from the Government’s point of view, but it is not actually why we are. The reason why we moved the date of the election to the Assembly a year later than the people of Northern Ireland had been told it would be was because of a deal between the local parties. There is no compelling, wider logic that said it must be at the same time as the elections in Scotland, and so on. There was no particularly compelling logic, though I can understand that there was a clash with the Northern Ireland general election. Essentially, the local parties themselves, worried that their performance was poor, said, “We need more time to put together a programme of governance”. As noble Lords will be aware, no such programme of governance actually appeared, even given the extra time. I simply make the point that this ruse should not be played again in the next Parliament. It is bad practice to tell any electorate, “This is a Parliament that will be there for four years—no, sorry, five years”. In Ireland 100 years ago, this was disastrous, because for very good reasons the general election that would normally have been held in 1915 was postponed, because of the First World War. That gave the people who lodged the Irish insurrection the great excuse of saying, “We are not revolting against democratic institutions, because they are dead. Do not tell us that the Irishmen in the Parliament that sits at Westminster have different views from us; of course they do, but they do not have a mandate. They were elected in 1910 on a five-year term and now their mandate has run out”.
This was a risky thing to do. What the noble Lord said about why it was done, from the Government’s point of view, is entirely correct, but it is not the underlying politics of Northern Ireland. I simply use this opportunity to say to the Minister that the next time the Government should be very careful about playing around with mandates, timing and duration. In the end, the parties that said, “Give us another year and we will give you a programme of government” delivered nothing.
My Lords, first, I am very pleased that the Government are allowing registered voters to be retained on the register for another year in Northern Ireland. Action taken to improve the accuracy and completeness of the register is always welcome. Like the noble Lord, Lord Tyler, however, I regret the inconsistency of approach in respect of how voters are treated in England, Scotland and Wales and fully support his amendment.
It is in fact astonishing that we have had a system of IER in place in Northern Ireland since 2002 and that the Government felt it necessary on 2 November 2015 to put an order down for consideration in both Houses to allow a further year for voters to be retained. IER has been in force in Northern Ireland for only 13 years, yet this additional year of retaining voters until 1 December 2016 is deemed necessary. I recall the speech on 27 October 2015 from the noble Lord, Lord Empey, who is in his place, telling us how IER had been in force since 2002, how well it was going, and that we needed to get on and complete the job in the rest of the United Kingdom.
In the rest of the United Kingdom we were some years behind: that is correct. However, the process was speeded up with the 2013 Act and then people in England, Scotland and Wales were given until 1 December 2016 to be verified under the new system, or they would be removed. But they have had a year taken away from them in order to complete the verification process, and they now have only until next Tuesday. Therefore an Act in place for two years and a year taken off the transitional period is contrasted with Northern Ireland, which has had IER in place since 2002 and is given an additional year. That does not seem very fair or consistent—it seems grossly unfair and completely inconsistent. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, will say that the canvass arrangements are different, but he cannot get away from the fact that in Northern Ireland these arrangements have been in place for 13 years. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, and, on the Minister’s own Benches, the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, were full of enthusiasm for what had gone on there.
Paragraph 4.1 of the Explanatory Memorandum states:
“Amendments to these provisions are required to extend this for one further year to ensure the electors who have not since confirmed their details remain registered for the Assembly elections in May 2016”.
I think that the elections to the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, the Greater London Assembly, the Mayor of London, the mayor of Bristol, the police and crime commissioners in England and Wales, and thousands of councillors are just as important, and voters deserve the right to be treated in the same way. I do not recall a word being mentioned in the debate on 27 October in this noble House that Northern Ireland might need an extension of a further year. It would be very helpful to the House if the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, could take us through the process that led to this order being put down for consideration on 2 November 2015. Looking at the Explanatory Memorandum, I see that consultation has taken place with the Electoral Commission, the Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland, the Department of Justice and the Justice Minister in Northern Ireland, who were also advised of an incidental impact of a criminal offence, in terms of change of official duties.
It is important for the House to understand whether all of that, along with the decision to grant the additional year, happened after 27 October when the additional year was removed from voters in England, Scotland and Wales, or whether the decision had already been taken before 27 October and the vote on the fatal Motion and the House was just not told about it. It was completely at odds with what the Government were seeking to do for England, Scotland and Wales, and it would have completely undermined the argument being put forward from the government Front Bench if the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, had made us aware of the proposal. The noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, was in the House on 27 October and voted against both my amendment and the substantive Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Tyler. Was he aware at the time that this order was going to be put forward? It is very important for the House to be clear on the timelines and on how and when decisions were taken by the Government.
Before the noble Lord sits down, he mentioned some comments that I made. Actually I would have no difficulty if the proposal were to remove the 82,000, but the difference is that the people on the register in Northern Ireland are not ghosts. They had to have their national insurance numbers and so on verified at the time. So there is a significant difference in that these people clearly did and do exist. We have a continuous process of registration going on and other sources are found to verify their existence.
The noble Lord, Lord Bew, said that the parties wanted the extension to 2015 for the election. Two parties did. My party did not, and neither did others; it was a decision between the DUP, Sinn Fein and the Government. When the people went to the polls in 2011, they thought that they were voting candidates in for four years. Although Scotland and Wales had been told that their Administrations would be there for five years, it did not apply in Northern Ireland. I regret that. The point that the noble Lord, Lord Bew, made is also very valid.
I thank the noble Lord for that. I would say that the inconsistency here is staggering. IER has been in place in Northern Ireland since 2002, while we have had only two years in Great Britain. At the same time as we are giving an extra year to Northern Ireland, we are taking a year away from the rest of the United Kingdom. It is staggering.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Tyler, Lord Bew, Lord Kennedy and Lord Empey, for their contributions. The noble Lords, Lord Tyler and Lord Kennedy, have reminded us of the recent debate over the end of transition to individual electoral registration in Great Britain, particularly regarding the concerns that they have over the impact on GB registers of removing the remaining carry-forward entries this December as opposed to in December 2016. However, what we are considering today are provisions for Northern Ireland alone, and I do not propose to rehearse the arguments and merits of what was determined in that case for Great Britain.
The fact is that the framework in place for ensuring the integrity of the Northern Ireland register is entirely different from that for Great Britain. In Great Britain, we are moving away from household registration and have decided not to carry forward entries that are not IER-registered by this December. We are acting to tackle concerns about ghost entries that the system of household registration gave rise to.
In Northern Ireland we have had individual registration for well over a decade. Every elector on the Northern Ireland register is individually registered. Because Northern Ireland does not have an annual canvass but instead checks entries through data streams, we can and do check the validity of non-respondents.
Great Britain and Northern Ireland have different systems for registration. We believe that there is merit in retaining these individuals on the Northern Ireland register, but that it is simply not appropriate in the case of Great Britain to retain non-IER-registered entries that have not been validity-checked and have not responded to the sustained programme of contact that GB councils have carried out. The chief electoral officer has made it clear that he has no reason to think that non-respondents retained on the Northern Ireland register are anything other than eligible voters. Given the framework of individual registration and data checking in place in Northern Ireland and the current expectation of voters and activists alike that non-respondents who have been validity-checked will remain on the register for the Assembly elections, I urge noble Lords to support this order and the range of provisions in it. I therefore commend this order to the House.
Before the Minister sits down, I remind him that I put a number of points to him about when these decisions were taken—whether before or after 27 October—on what he knew when he was voting on 27 October and with regard to timelines. He has not addressed them at all in his response.
I do not have that information, but I am happy to write to the noble Lord.
(10 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this statutory instrument makes provision to adopt for the purposes of Northern Ireland Assembly elections the same polling districts and polling stations already in place for parliamentary elections.
Members of the Northern Ireland Assembly are elected using parliamentary constituencies. However, at previous elections the polling districts, or wards, used were those drawn up for local government elections. Following the reorganisation of district councils in Northern Ireland in 2012, the local electoral boundaries were changed. This resulted in polling district boundaries that no longer sit discretely within the parliamentary constituencies.
The Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland has made it clear that it is not possible for him to hold an election where the wards straddle two constituencies. So, in advance of the general election, the last Government introduced legislation that removed the formal link which provided for local government polling districts to be used at parliamentary elections.
Under the new provisions introduced for the general election, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland now has a duty to designate the polling districts to be used for parliamentary elections, and the Chief Electoral Officer a duty to designate polling stations within those districts.
The polling districts that the Secretary of State has designated for the purposes of the parliamentary elections are the ones that were in place before the reorganisation of local government boundaries in Northern Ireland. The effect is to retain for Westminster elections the same polling districts as previously used for the 2010 general election and the last Assembly election.
The purpose of this order is to seek to close the legislative gap that has existed for Assembly elections since 2013 by applying the parliamentary polling districts and polling places used for parliamentary elections to Assembly elections. This measure will have the effect of maintaining the status quo, retaining the polling districts that voters are familiar with.
The order provides that the polling places used for the Assembly election will be those listed in the polling station scheme drawn up by the Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland. He will have a duty to amend the scheme in relation to Assembly elections if he considers that the parliamentary scheme does not adequately provide for voters at an Assembly election. As a result of this order, electors and interested parties will have recourse to the Electoral Commission to appeal the scheme if they are not content.
I hope that noble Lords will agree that making provision to re-establish the link between parliamentary and Assembly polling districts and polling places is a necessary and logical step to take in advance of the Assembly elections, and are reassured that these changes are fully supported by both the Electoral Commission and the Chief Electoral Officer. I therefore commend the order to the House.
My Lords, can the noble Lord tell us about any contact taking place with the parties in Northern Ireland with regard to these measures, and perhaps a bit more about the appeal process, if they want to appeal them?
The parties have been consulted and there is an appeal process. Indeed, an appeal is going on with regard to a polling station in Dungannon, and is currently being considered by the Electoral Commission.
(10 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, for putting down this Question for Short Debate. As usual, she raises an important issue, which the Government should look at and take action on. The noble Baroness has an impressive record in raising these matters and the Government would be wise to listen to her.
I warmly welcome the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, to the House. I look forward to his maiden speech, responding for the Government. I looked at the noble and learned Lord’s biography and it makes impressive reading indeed. As the noble Lord, Lord Trefgarne, said, he is a lawyer with a distinguished legal career, a Queen’s Counsel and a member of the Bar both in Scotland and in England and Wales. He joined Her Majesty’s Government as the Advocate-General for Scotland immediately after the general election last month. He is a law officer of the Crown and advises the Government on Scottish law. He derives considerable power from the Scotland Act and one of his roles is to consider all Scottish Parliament Bills as they progress, in consultation with interested UK departments, to assess their legislative competence. I, together with all Members of this House, wish him well in his new responsibilities at the start of this Parliament.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, pointed out, the law in respect of leaseholders, commonholders and other aspects of living in a property which is leasehold rather than freehold is complex and not easily understood by people. That is not a good place to be in. The law should always aim to be clear, simple and understandable for ordinary people, particularly when it affects where they live. This must surely be an aim of the Government. It would be useful if in his response the noble and learned Lord could address what plans the Government have to ask the Law Commission to look at these matters, with a view to producing a Bill that consolidates all the various property Acts, as the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, referred to. I think it is long overdue and will be warmly welcomed.
I have never lived in a leasehold property, having grown up with my parents, brother and sister in a council property; each property I have bought and sold as I have moved around the UK has always been freehold. But I have a number of friends who live in flats that are leasehold and I have seen some of the quite unsatisfactory arrangements and conditions they live under. It is not something that I would find acceptable in all cases and the Government really should seek to act on it.
I am also aware of the considerable number of new flats being built in the London Borough of Southwark, where I grew up, and the London Borough of Lewisham, where I live, and other parts of London, which will have these similar leasehold arrangements. The system of leasehold tenure that we have in England and Wales is fairly unique. The lease can be as long as 999 years and ensures that the leaseholders of a property with communal areas are equally responsible for its maintenance. There are significant problems with this type of tenure and the managing agents, who have no responsibility to the leaseholders; the leaseholder is in effect frozen out of any involvement in the effective management of a property they own, which may be their home.
We should all expect good service and value for money but living in a leasehold property with a managing agent, where there is little competition, can be something of a lottery. It is very difficult to change your managing agent or to challenge a service charge. The leaseholders can find it extremely difficult, having to go to the leasehold valuation tribunal to receive a satisfactory remedy. There are further problems with connected companies where a freeholder also owns the management company. Of course, leaseholders have sometimes been successful at the leasehold valuation tribunal and been awarded sums of money, having suffered unacceptably high service charges.
This is a huge issue. We have up to 5 million people living in 2.5 million leasehold properties spending as much as £2.5 billion in service charges per annum. I would like to see the introduction in this sector of an independent regulator which would be able to ensure that agents act in a professional manner and adhere to minimum standards of competence. I would like to see all managing agents subscribing to an ombudsman service guaranteeing leaseholders free and accessible arbitration. I would also like to see reform of the leasehold valuation tribunal, and the order that prevents freeholders reclaiming their tribunal costs retrospectively through service charges should be automatic unless the freeholder can prove that they should be able to reclaim charges and that the threat of forfeiture of properties for failure to pay charges is disproportionate.
The Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002 created commonhold tenure, designed to be used in both new and existing tenure. Similar forms of tenure are used across the world, which offer perpetual ownership of blocks of flats alongside a share of a company responsible for common-area management. The commonhold community association is owned by the unit-holders and they decide who manages the property. The major barrier, which the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner, referred to, is the 100% requirement for converting existing leasehold properties. This should be relaxed because we are giving one leaseholder a complete veto on transferring to commonhold. That is one of the key points the noble Baroness made in her contribution.
That 100% requirement should be reduced to a figure in the region of 75%, which still means that you need three-quarters of the leaseholders to agree, but no one individual has a veto on making this change. I will be very interested in the response to this point from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen. Will the noble and learned Lord also tell the House what plans the Government have to promote commonhold and whether they are considering incentives to sell new blocks of flats as commonhold?
The Government should also do more to promote the right to manage, which allows leaseholders to assume control over management of their properties without having to pay to own the freehold where they get 50% qualifying support to do so, although the freeholder should be required to assist the leaseholders in making contact with each other as they may not be in residence at any particular point in time. Again, the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, referred to this. This is an important policy matter that affects many people and the time has come for the Government to take positive action to help leaseholders and create more flats in commonhold. I particularly like the idea of non-responders being regarded as having accepted. That may be one way of injecting some life into this policy.
In conclusion, I again thank the noble Baroness, Lady Gardner of Parkes, for raising this important issue in your Lordships’ House, and hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen—in what I am sure will be a very eloquent contribution—will be able to set out some hope for the future.