Media: Press Sustainability

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Thursday 22nd March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

To ask Her Majesty's Government whether the recently launched review of press sustainability in the United Kingdom will have the power to call for evidence; whether all such evidence received will be published; and whether all meetings held as part of the review will be public.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Cairncross review into the sustainability of the national and local press is being led by an external chair, Dame Frances Cairncross, with support from an advisory panel. It is not a statutory inquiry and will therefore not have the statutory powers to compel witnesses to give evidence, nor will it be required to hold meetings in public. Dame Frances will determine the process for gathering evidence in due course.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

I am obliged to the Minister and congratulate him on his ability to switch effortlessly from subject to subject overnight; it is almost legendary. I welcome the review, and congratulate the department on its distinguished choice of chair and on assembling what looks like a knowledgeable and expert advisory panel. I am sorry that the evidence is not going to be published automatically and that the hearings will not be in public, but I hope that the chair will see the wisdom of doing that and look forward to seeing how events develop. Does the Minister agree that, given that the aim of the review is to secure high-quality journalism, the remit is oddly framed with its focus on the market environment and on consumers rather than citizens? Given the recent news, will he confirm that section 1.5 of the remit will allow the review to investigate and report on the ways in which social media have clearly been influencing opinion ahead of elections and referenda? If not, who will look at that?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the review will examine the role and impact not only of digital search engines but of social media platforms and other digital content aggregation platforms which have an impact on press sustainability.

Leveson Part 2: Sunday Times

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Wednesday 7th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, the shocking revelations some of the press and other media earlier today about allegations of blagging commissioned by the Sunday Times are, in the words of the Secretary of State,

“totally unacceptable and potentially criminal”,

and the right thing is for them to be investigated by the police. However, the key issue is that the Secretary of State has refused to reconsider the decision to close the Leveson inquiry. Let us be clear: this decision was not supported by the vast majority of those who responded to the public consultation and it was strongly opposed by the chair of the inquiry, Sir Brian Leveson, whose letter is available in the Library.

I say again to the Government that letting down the victims of this type of press activity is breaking all the promises they were given, and is a disgrace. In light of this, I wonder whether Minister can explain why it is not in the public interest to complete the Leveson inquiry, given that, far from being an isolated event from a previous age, today’s revelations confirm that phone hacking and other criminal behaviour was more widespread and affected a wider range of individuals than was disclosed in the written evidence given to part 1 of the inquiry, and that some of the oral evidence given to the inquiry was, at the very least, incomplete, so that, in Sir Brian’s words, it,

“remains unclear exactly how widespread these and similar practices have been throughout the print media”.

It may be that this sort of behaviour has ceased but it is in the public interest to be certain about that. Neither Leveson part 1 nor the civil or criminal trials have provided definitive answers about who did what to whom. Sir Brian suggests that the public interest would be served only by,

“a detailed, reasoned report which covers the whole of the available evidence”.

While there is much about the new press regulator—IPSO—that can be welcomed, the Secretary of State indicated in the other place today that more needs to be done in terms of IPSO’s as yet untested low-cost arbitration system, and in relation to the way apologies and retractions are dealt with. It is surely in the public interest to get this right so that victims of press intrusion can actually get the redress they so patently have not had in the past. Although included in the original terms of reference, there has been no proper investigation of failures of corporate governance and management at News International and other newspapers.

On how to go forward, we currently have two press regulation models, and that is clearly unsustainable. Voluntary self-regulation may well be the right approach, but it will not work unless there is public confidence, particularly when so much has been revealed about wrongdoing, including the events occurring after the publication of the first Leveson report.

When he announced last week that he was dropping the Leveson inquiry, the Culture Secretary said that he was doing do so because he felt the public interest lay in looking forward. I still believe that there is more that unites us on this than divides us. We all want a review of the future of quality journalism and for there to be an assessment of what is required to sustain that for the benefit of our democracy and polity. Where we differ is that we think that the public interest demands that the new inquiry should start with an examination of the recent history, culture and practice of the press, police and politicians. The Government clearly want to draw a veil over that. They should be very careful, particularly when they think they are acting in the public interest.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Government have to take decisions about what is proportionate, appropriate and in the public interest. Our analysis is that the terms of reference for part 2 have already largely been met and that the cost and time of part 2 would be disproportionate and not in the public interest.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, when we debated the right to data protection on Report, the House decided to opt for a declaratory statement, as opposed to the creation of a new right enshrining Article 8 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights into UK law. In that debate, my noble friend Lord Ashton committed to consider further a number of points made by noble Lords, in particular the suggestions of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

Government Amendments 1 and 2 are the result of our further consideration of this matter. Amendment 1 concerns fairness. Data must be processed fairly. We previously took the view that this is clear and does not need repeating. The requirement for processing to be fair can be found in article 5(1)(a) of the GDPR and Clause 35(1) of the Bill. None the less, Clause 2 is entirely declaratory and, if it helps understanding, there is little to object to in this repetition, and our amendment inserts a reference to fairness.

Amendment 2 concerns the right to rectification. The right to rectification is in article 16 of the GDPR, which will soon be part of our domestic law. It is also found in Clause 46 of the Bill. As with the previous amendment, if it helps, we have no objection to covering this matter, and the amendment inserts the reference.

The data subject rights and the controller-processor obligations set out in the Bill are subject to specific limitations, restrictions and exemptions and in this clause and these amendments to the clause we do not change that, but hope that these amendments add to the value the declaratory clause has, as we previously agreed.

It was suggested to us on Report that we should also add reference to “proportionality”. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for taking the time to discuss this with me, and to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, who has also had several conversations with my noble friend Lord Ashton as well as the Bill team. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, will speak more fully on this point in the context of his Amendment 3 but it may help the House if I say a few words on this now.

The GDPR takes effect in May and will be part of domestic law when we leave the European Union. There are 26 references to proportionality in the GDPR. In resisting this amendment we are not saying that proportionality is irrelevant or a concept we are avoiding, but we cannot simply say that the restriction of personal data rights must be proportionate. That oversimplifies a complex issue with unintended consequences. I will sit down but I will return to this once the noble Lord has spoken to his amendment.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I have signed up to Amendments 1 and 2 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ashton of Hyde, and do so in support of the position that we reached after considerable discussion and debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, mentioned a few of the occasions on which we discussed these matters but did not refer to—perhaps it would be embarrassing to do so—the flurry of paper that accompanied those discussions, when drafts were traded back and forth as if they were some bitcoin or equivalent, and people snapped at them in excitement and feverishly opened emails when a new draft appeared. That is not overstating the case.

I jest slightly but stress that, as noble Lords will be aware, this issue was raised on day one of Committee. That signified a sense on our side of the House that this matter was so important that it needed to be addressed early on in the Bill. We have moved our position considerably during the discussions; we were wise to listen to the voices raised at that time. I look at no one in particular but the general voice to which we listened was that more time was needed to think through the implications of this amendment and try to come to an appropriate conclusion on it. That time has been well spent. We have looked at various ways of doing what we set out to do, we have thought hard about the Government’s response, and we have been happy to have meetings and discussions and, as I said, we traded possible options. The conclusion we reached—in keeping with the main thrust of the Bill, which has a large amount of detail in it that is of a signposting nature so that those who read it understand correctly where the source documentation and source principles can be found—was that it would be appropriate to have at the head of the Bill a statement around the basic rights which personal data processing involves and for which the protection and privacy issues are so important.

Therefore, in support of both the original amendment placed by the Government on Report, which was voted in after debate and discussion, and in full support of the amendments to that, which would include “fairly” and,

“and to require inaccurate personal data to be rectified”,

we are happy to sign up and support this amendment today. However, as the Minister said, a couple of other issues were raised in the context of those debates, one of which is this question of proportionality. He has given a sense of why the Government have resisted our approach, and I will spend a couple of minutes just to make sure that we have explored this properly in the context of this Third Reading.

The point about proportionality is that it can, as I think he has argued and will argue again, be brought into the very drafting of the Bill. It is suffused throughout the GDPR and exists alongside a number of other documents to which we will still be bound, both while we are in the EU and should we leave, in the light of current legislation that is going through the other place and is soon to come to this House. It is therefore possible to argue—I hope that the Minister will reflect a little on that when he speaks again—that proportionality is a matter of fact to be determined by the readings that one makes of the Bills that pass through this House. I am sure that there is a better way to express that in legal language but that is the sensibility I take from it.

However, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, which is reflected in our amendment, is that at times in the future adjustments may be made as a result of changes in legislation itself or perhaps because of judgments made by courts that hear data protection cases, and that other strands of thinking, points and issues may come to bear on the relationship which an individual subject has to the data controller and on the relationship which the whole has to the law. In that sense, Amendment 3 in my name is an attempt to try to add to the present signposting amendment—that is all it is trying to do—that proportionality is not just fixed as of today’s date or the date the Bill receives Royal Assent but that it is to be brought forward on all fours with the Bill and the Act as that Act progresses. On Report the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, observed that Her Majesty’s Government’s amendment on Report made no mention of the principle of proportionality, despite it being an important element of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, and noted that it featured in the wording we are putting forward. The response “We don’t need to do this because it is already well cooked into the Bill, the GDPR and the applied GDPR” may not take into account the issue I have been raising, which is about what will happen in the future. If the Minister can reassure us on that point, I would have little difficulty in not pressing the amendment, but at the moment I would like to hear his comments before I respond.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I take this opportunity to further reassure noble Lords that proportionality is a concept that has a continuing role in the Bill. Not only will the obligations in the GDPR carry over to domestic law but they will continue to apply to the Government. If Ministers are minded to use the powers in Clauses 10 or 16, for example, that allow new processing conditions or exemptions to be created in the future, they will need to continue to be proportionate. Further, the courts will continue to apply a proportionality test where appropriate. The Human Rights Act ensures that any public body must act compatibly with the convention, and as data protection is within Article 8 —the right to privacy—the public authority must act proportionately.

Clause 6 of the EU withdrawal Bill has the effect that any question as to the validity, meaning or effect of any retained EU law, including the GDPR, is to be decided, where relevant, in accordance with any retained case law and any retained general principles of EU law. Proportionality is one of those retained principles, so it will live on for as long as this legislation is in force.

Indeed, leaving the EU will not shake proportionality out of our legal system—it has worked its way into public law. Any public body acting disproportionately must be at risk of being challenged. Whenever any public body acts, it must act compatibly with the convention rights. Where qualified rights are concerned, such as Article 8 of the convention, which has been held to encompass personal data protection, there exists a requirement for that action to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. So to that extent it is implicit that the Executive as well as data controllers must act in a proportionate manner. With that explanation, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, not to press his Amendment 3.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Report: 3rd sitting Hansard: House of Lords
Wednesday 10th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, I sense that the House wishes to move on, to hear from the Minister and move to the inevitable vote, which I think would be a good thing for all of us. Therefore I will not speak at length. We have had a really important debate today, ranging from the deeply personal to the high realms of public policy, and it is very hard to find a balancing point at which we might, as the noble Lord, Lord McNally, has just said, actually find a reason for dividing on the various issues. It is complicated and multilayered. It is also time-sensitive and there are very inconvenient issues in the way. However, one can dig down a little and start with the fact that the Bill, as I have always said and will continue to say, is not the right Bill to solve all the problems in relation to press regulation in the future. It is a Bill about data protection and although it has elements that obviously bear on everything we have been saying today and in the previous debates around the need to balance the rights to privacy against those of freedom of expression, it is not a complete picture and we should not think it is.

It is important that we learn our lessons and move forward. We have an existing framework, set out in the Data Processing Act 1998. It has worked well; it has been said that it will work well in future, and the Bill establishes that again as the basic understanding on which we operate. I welcome that, but we are uncertain about how the issues that were raised between 2010 and 2013, the period that led to Leveson 1, are going to be resolved in the Bill—maybe they cannot be. They include the need to ensure that, for all time, there is an effective redress mechanism for those affected by illegality and bad culture in the press, and that we should understand and learn the lessons of what has happened in the past. We certainly have a lot of information but I do not think we have a full understanding of it all.

As has been said by a number of noble Lords, we must anticipate changes that are in train for the new media, the media sources of information and news and the changes in consumption. We have to explore—this is really important—how we sustain our huge tradition of quality journalism without which this democracy would be a shadow of its current self. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, in a very powerful speech, said we need to go back and rethink what we were thinking at the time Leveson was set up, the promises that were made and the impact it will have on the country if we do not deliver on those promises. We promised the completion of the Leveson inquiry. Whether it is Leveson 2 or another inquiry is a lesser point than the need to honour that promise. Too many people are relying on it, too many people will be upset if it does not happen and we will all be the losers.

The noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, said that this is really a policy issue, not an issue around data processing: noble Lords will have understood from what I said earlier that I agree with him. The problem is that we do not control policy—we are unable to put any pressure on that. The victims do not control policy. The Cross-Benchers and Liberal Democrats do not. The Government control policy but successive Governments have seemed unable to move forward. I happen to think, from private conversations, that a lot more unites us on this issue than divides us across this Dispatch Box.

I would welcome some words from the Minister explaining precisely what will be the way forward. However, I do not think he will be able to do that, for all the reasons that have been given about the inconvenience of timing, the difficulty about cutting across other measures that are in place and the need to think through some implications. I am sympathetic, but the problem is that we need action; we need to move this forward, and the only power we have is to put an inconvenient roadblock in the current thinking. That is why I support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and I will support—although I think that they are probably not the whole story—the amendments in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. It is important that the Government own up to the fact that this is a problem of their own making, show that they understand the issues and take action.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government recognise that there is great deal of passion and genuine concern on all sides of the debate and on all sides of the House on these matters. I am obliged to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, for the passionate way in which she advanced her argument on these amendments, and also to the noble Earl, Lord Attlee. Casting my mind back to my limited experience in government—and limited it is—I am slightly perplexed. Usually, Government are accused of seeking to avoid issues or hard decisions and of kicking matters into the long grass by proposing an inquiry. For me, it is a novelty that the matter should be reversed in this fashion. Indeed, I note that a number of noble Lords have made the same observation in various ways in the course of this debate. For us, it is a matter of concern that we should move forward and look at how we can maintain a suitable, appropriate and respectable media for this country, but also the freedom of that media, which underpins our democracy.

It is appropriate to notice that the media landscape has changed significantly since the Leveson inquiry was set up. We have witnessed the completion of three detailed police investigations, extensive reforms to policing practice and significant changes to press self-regulation, which have moved on even further in the recent past, with the changes to IPSO. Of course, we have seen that civil remedies, civil proceedings, provide an effective route for parties, particularly in the context of litigation where conditional fee agreements are available. The Government published a consultation in November 2016 to look at whether part 2 of the Leveson inquiry was still appropriate and, indeed, proportionate and in the public interest.

I note that date, November 2016, because one noble Lord referred to the delay. I just make the point, which I have made before, that progress on that consultation was delayed because the Secretary of State was subject to an application for judicial review with respect to the consultation process. It was not a case of the Government trying to delay that process; we were really quite anxious to bring it forward. Once we were able to proceed with that consultation process, we received more than 174,000 responses. That in itself demonstrates the depth and strength of public feeling on this issue.

We are currently consulting with Sir Brian Leveson as the chair of the inquiry. Sir Brian has asked to see the results of the consultation, along with individual responses to the consultation that were submitted by core participants in the Leveson inquiry. I notice that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, observed that Sir Brian’s views need to be canvassed. I entirely agree: that is what we are in the process of doing at the present time. It is not only right that his views should be canvassed in this context, it is actually necessary. The Leveson inquiry has not been terminated; it proceeds under the Inquiries Act 2005 and it cannot be brought to an end until the Government have formally consulted Sir Brian and considered his comments with an open mind on how to proceed further. That consultation is in train. When Sir Brian has shared his formal views with us, we will look to publish the Government’s response to the consultation. It would be our intention, subject to Sir Brian’s views, to publish his response at that time as well, in order that that can be in the public domain.

Amendment 127A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, assumes that the existing inquiry will be brought to an end, but, as I say, that decision has not—indeed cannot—be taken at this stage. If, for example, Sir Brian produces compelling reasons for proceeding with part 2 of the inquiry in some shape or form, the Government would have to give reasonable consideration to those representations and will do so. However, we clearly do not need two public inquiries going on at the same time into the same issues: that is where we would end up, on one view of this process. We have to take events in their proper order and this amendment is plainly not in its proper order; it is plainly premature and cuts across the present statutory process that is being carried on pursuant to the Inquiries Act 2005.

However, I emphasise that the Government are determined to address the challenges of the new media landscape in which we all live—not just the obvious printed media but the digital media and the issues that turn on that. We are in the process of developing a digital charter to ensure that new technologies work for the benefit of everyone, with rules and protections in place to help keep people safe online and ensure that personal information is used appropriately. We are also working to deliver on a commitment to ensure a sustainable business model for high-quality media online. Again, that underpins freedom of expression and our democratic way of life.

These are matters of active consideration for the Government. It is in these circumstances that I emphasise that the noble Baroness’s amendment is not appropriate at the present time and would simply lead to confusion in this already difficult landscape. Let us move on: let us complete the process in which we are currently engaged; let us receive Sir Brian’s representations with regard to the consultation process; let the Government make a decision by way of their response to that consultation; let us look at it—the idea that it would not be examined in this House is almost mythical, to be perfectly candid. Of course it will come under scrutiny in this House. I would be amazed if it were simply to pass unnoticed in the night. There can be no question at all of that happening.

Turning briefly to Amendments 147 and 148, again, I recognise that these are modelled on Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and I recognise that Section 40, and press regulation more generally, is a matter that people have incredibly strong—and diverse and conflicting—opinions about. I understand and appreciate the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has done in this area and I appreciate her own personal exposure to the difficulties that have emerged in the past with regard to the abuse and misuse of personal data. Again, I reassure noble Lords that the Government are firmly committed to ensuring that the sort of behaviour that led to the Leveson inquiry never happens again. We are determined to address that.

However, we cannot ignore the various concerns that have been raised regarding Section 40. I am not going to go into the issue of convention compliance or any technical issues about that; nor will I elaborate upon the point that Section 40 does, albeit by agreement between various parties, go further than the actual recommendations in Lord Justice Leveson’s original report. Again, that is why the Government have issued their consultation, which will look, among other things, at Section 40 of the 2013 Act. That matter will be addressed. As I say, the Government will publish their response to the consultation shortly. When I use a term such as “shortly” I see some rolling of eyes but let me be clear: the response to the consultation will await the opportunity for Sir Brian to make his own submissions. We will then give due consideration to those, as we will to the 174,000 responses to the consultation.

We understand the serious nature of the matter before us and it will be fully addressed but we do not believe that at this time it is appropriate to advance a provision similar to Section 40 but only in relation to data protection. There is a much wider issue at stake here and that is the issue that needs to be properly addressed and bottomed out. At the end of the day it would not be appropriate simply to carve out one provision on data protection for the purposes of this Bill in order to replicate the sorts of provisions that we see in Section 40 of the 2013 Act.

Of course we have to cast our minds to the abuses of the past but if we are going to make effective policy we have to look to the future and determine how the balance of interests is going to be achieved between the right to data protection, the right to privacy and the need to maintain a free and vibrant media and free expression. These amendments cut across the proper process that we are now following regarding part 2 of the Leveson inquiry and Section 40 of the 2013 Act. That work is ongoing. Of course we are determined to maintain that work and to bring it to a conclusion. This is not the time or the mechanism by which to try to address these issues. I fear that doing so would complicate an already complex picture. I urge noble Lords to withdraw or not move their amendments.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, I had better deal with Amendment 55, which is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Kennedy. I am loath to do so at any length, so I simply say that it will be answered by the Minister when he responds. He has partially given me the answer and it would be wrong for me to anticipate the rest of it. I reassure him that I do not intend to press that amendment.

This debate is not about free speech; it is the latest exchange in a long-running debate on how in a democratic society we enshrine the press’s freedom to publish as it sees fit, root out the culture of abuse, illegality and criminality which has for too long involved all the newspapers at some point or other, and make sure that victims can get effective redress when such abuse happens. We should not lose sight of those cardinal aims.

If the House believes that everything in the garden is rosy, as the previous speaker tried to persuade us, we can of course do nothing and simply allow the Data Protection Bill to go forward as amended. I agree that the Minister has moved a long way and agree with the noble Lord, Lord Black, that we could now rely on the processes and procedures that have worked so well since 1998—for nearly 20 years. They could be allowed to continue, because they are tried and trusted and seem to do most of what we require.

But it is not like that. One could not listen to my noble friend Lord Prescott and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, for any length of time without feeling that there is still a canker. Something needs to be cut out of what we currently do and we are failing as a House if we do not do what we must to get this right. We have a lot of problems. We had a cross-party agreement; that has gone. We have let down the victims grievously time and again. We are unable to discuss this without accusations of a ridiculous nature being thrown at us about our intentions and processes. We need to do this properly; we need to do it coolly and with some consideration. We need evidence of the changes that are affecting the press. Is it true that the traditional press as we know it is going down the tube? Is it true that fake news, other news sources and the other things that our children are reading and reporting to us will destroy our understanding in a democratic society of what it is to be informed about the way things are done? Will we lose the extremely good points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Cavendish, who said that she was an investigative journalist and proud of her record, which is exemplary? We want that to continue, but we do not want people such as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, to suffer as a result of it. We have to be mature about this; we have to get it right.

I have an amendment, Amendment 165, to be taken on Wednesday 10 January—buy your tickets now—which will rehash a lot of our discussion today. It is focused on running a proper inquiry into what needs to happen now to deal maturely with the issues which the press does not wish to be regulated. It tries to find a way forward, to investigate the illegality of the past and learn lessons from it. Above all, it seeks to get a handle on this whole issue and come forward with a proper set of recommendations that we can implement. I hope that the House will look at that carefully when we come to it. In the interim, my advice to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, whom I admire for the fantastic work she is doing and I want to be with her on it, is to withdraw her amendment now and live to fight another day on 10 January.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has reminded us a number of times in this House of the need for suitable press regulation, and she has some interesting arguments. I am grateful for the time she took earlier this week to meet me and explain her perspective and concerns. However, the position remains that the Government cannot accept her Amendment 50A. The Government support objective, high-quality journalism and a free press. We are committed to ensuring there is a sustainable, effective business model for high-quality media. Of course, we also need a fair system and this Bill is designed to strike a fair balance between individual privacy rights and the right to freedom of expression. The noble Lords, Lord Lester and Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, have just alluded to the requirement in law for us to maintain that balance. I do not seek to repeat that, but I gladly adopt the observations they made about the need for balance in the context of convention rights with regard to privacy and freedom of expression.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I have been trying to search for words to explain what is going on at the moment. It seems to me that we are living in two parallel universes. My first thought was that we were back in World War I territory—the noble Lord, Lord Black, will get the reference—and that we were engaging in sniping over long pieces of dead ground over issues that nobody could understand, fought by people who did not want to be there and led by people even more stupid than that. But I have decided that this is the rerun of an acrimonious family dinner that we had before the break. We are now reflecting on that and trying to nerve ourselves up to talk again to each other and restore relationships, because relationships must go on.

Again, we have had these passionate stories, anecdotes and recollections of times when things have gone disastrously wrong. No amount of legal redress can undo that suffering. From others, we have heard a perfectly robust and understandable account of why things are perfectly all right at the moment and, given time, will be sorted out. I begin to think that Leveson, for all the great work he did and the excellence of his report—and the longevity of its recommendations—is a bit of a McGuffin here. This is about us and society; it is about Parliament. I tried to address some of that at the end of the last debate. We have to get serious about this and work out how to make progress. We have to restore the rightful balance between Parliament, which must be sovereign, and those who work within an environment in which Parliament seems at the moment to have been discounted.

If we do not get this sorted, we will continue to be like this for the rest of time. It is insufficient and ineffective. It will not be the way we want to live our lives and we will all be much the losers as a result. We must give credit to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and her proposals. Yes, they come from Leveson—but underneath that there is the greater truth that things are not working as they could be. They should be working better.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, while we have already debated amendments that are challenging to a free press, I fear that this group of amendments would be potentially hostile to the concept of a free press. Where there are abuses the answer is to enforce the law, not to shut down the media. I adopt the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft in that regard.

Amendment 53 would remove the requirement to give special weighting to the public interest in freedom of expression and information. This is something that we consider an essential way of ensuring that information that is in the public interest is not buried due to the data protection regime that is put in place. In this context, giving special weight to the public interest in freedom of expression and information is an important way of ensuring that we provide constitutional protection of freedom of speech, as required pursuant to Article 10 of the European Convention and the Human Rights Act.

Amendments 54 and 56 relate to the codes of practice to guide journalists in conducting the essential public interest balancing test that has to be carried out. We have already debated this in the previous group, before the dinner break. Amendment 54 intends to take away the absolute requirement to have regard to the listed codes of practice when determining whether publication would pass the public interest test. This requirement is a way of strengthening the obligations on journalists. In line with the enhanced protection of the GDPR, we are making sure that those journalists who are covered by one of the listed codes must have regard to their relevant code.

In a related amendment, Amendment 56, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has suggested that we alter the language of the condition on the special purposes exemption at paragraph 24 of Schedule 2 to the Bill by changing “relevant” to “appropriate”. This amendment makes it unclear which code should be consulted in a given case. We want to ensure that the code which pertains to a particular set of journalists is the code to which they have regard when carrying out the public interest test.

We are not being unreasonable in resisting Amendments 54 and 56. They may look innocuous, just slightly changing the language of the Bill, but if we are to be true to the GDPR, we must ensure that in our law we have resolved the article 85 requirement to set where the public interest lies in managing the balance between privacy and freedom of expression. If we make the use of these codes discretionary and their application vague, we will simply undermine that balance.

Finally, I turn to the amendments from the noble Baroness that aim to create a special group of exemptions only for those journalists who are members of an approved regulator. As drafted, the Bill is designed to protect journalists who should be able legitimately to rely on these exemptions when undertaking journalism in the public interest, regardless of which regulator they belong to or whether they belong to any at all. The reality of the press landscape today is that the vast majority of publishers are not members of an approved regulator. As such, limiting certain exemptions to only those who are members of an approved regulator would limit the ability of most journalists in this country to undertake investigative journalism in the public interest. Whatever the motive or the intention behind these amendments, they are, I am afraid, either wrecking amendments or amendments designed to force publishers to sign up to a regulator to which they object—and that is not acceptable.

Section 40 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 was mentioned. As we have previously discussed, the Government are currently considering Section 40 with regard to part 2 of the Leveson inquiry. We do not believe that using data protection legislation is an appropriate means of trying to incentivise compliance with, for example, Section 40.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, observed just three weeks ago, and earlier this evening, that this is not perhaps the place for this debate. He commented:

“I do not think the Bill is the right place to rerun some of the long-standing arguments about Leveson”.—[Official Report, 22/11/17; col. 195.]


I concur with that observation, which he just reinforced with his observations about the need for us perhaps to look more clearly at what the real issue is rather than being distracted by trying to act as tail-end Charlies to a particular piece of legislation on data protection.

There will be a response to the consultation on Section 40 and Leveson 2, but I shall make one comment with regard to the suggestion about delay in that consultation process. Noble Lords may recollect that the Secretary of State was the subject of a judicial review application which made it impossible for her to proceed with the consultation because the terms of the consultation were the subject of legal challenge. Thereafter, when the consultation proceeded, there were more than 174,000 responses. They had to be analysed and considered, but the fact that there was that number of responses perhaps gives weight to the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, about there being an issue that needs to be addressed, and therefore we must look forward to the response to the consultation. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

To answer that last point first, we have supported that in the past and on the right occasion we would probably support it again. But my point is not about the quality of the case made or the correctness of the approach. It is just not the right time to do that. The same answer applies to the noble Lord, Lord McNally. I did not say that we would not support him if he brought this back at Report. I am simply saying that, at this particular point, I want to use this debate to focus on something else and that is why I am trying to approach the issue in this way. I hope that noble Lords will bear with me before my voice gives up finally. I hope that I can allow that to ring out so that noble Lords can be inspired by it. That is a faint hope.

Underneath the debate that we have had today are some really important questions. I will pose them quickly in the hope that we will get a response from the Minister. It is really important that the noble and learned Lord uses this opportunity to set out very clearly what the Government’s position is on a number of these key points. Is the regime that currently applies to the press, as set out in the Data Protection Act 1998, still the case in the Bill? In other words, has the regime that has worked well since 1998 been changed in any way by its transposition into this Bill? If it has not, he has to be very clear that that is the case. The case that has been made suggests that, in the rewriting and repositioning of Clause 164, something has happened that has alerted everyone to the point, which was made very well by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Lord, Lord Black. I do not think that that was what we understand to be the case, and certainly I and my noble friend Lord Griffiths have asked for chapter and verse on this so that we can be sure that what we are seeing is exactly what the current law is. That is a straightforward question.

Secondly, we need to be persuaded, if we have not been already, that either the technology or the working practices in print journalism in particular, but also in relation to how print journalism is now often paired up with moving image technologies, has produced such a step-change in the way they operate that the additional defences proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Black, or the additional protections that might be needed by victims, which are so important and relevant, do not need to be brought into the Bill. The case has been made, the charge is there, and the Government must come back and tell us what arrangements have been made.

Thirdly, does the fact that many, but not all, direct investigations of a journalistic type are now done jointly with an audio-visual component, so that we have combinations between major newspapers and television broadcasters or even film, mean that we now have in perpetuity dual regulation, in which case the approach taken by Ofcom has to sit with the regulations under the Data Protection Act 1998 or the Data Protection Bill when it becomes law? If that is the case, we have a problem that needs to be confronted. We have one post hoc regulatory structure and one that is mainly post hoc but has an element, albeit restricted and on a narrow basis, in print journalism. If the way the world is moving suggests that everyone doing this work will have to be involved with two regulators, the Government’s Bill does not take that trick and we will need to come back to the point.

Fourthly, what is it about print journalism which is so different that it requires there to be a predetermination capacity for the ICO compared with the situation when the same work, and possibly the same output, is done under Ofcom? My noble friend Lord Puttnam and the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, made the point that the difference is that the media in this country are very strongly regulated. There are codes, statutory frameworks and editors who are clearly responsible for them and work to them well. However, a different situation pertains here. That does not mean to say that it should be applied across all the outputs involving investigative journalism, but it must be said that if there was in existence a robust, independent and effective press complaints system which enjoyed the confidence of victims, perhaps we would make better progress on the particular issues which have been raised today. That is the point on which we must focus as regards where we might go with this. I hope that when the noble and learned Lord comes to respond, he can bring some light to this issue.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to all noble Lords for their contributions this afternoon. I would hope that recent debates, particularly in Committee on the Bill, have assured noble Lords that the Government are absolutely committed to preserving the freedom of the press and maintaining the necessary balance between privacy and freedom of expression in our existing law that has generally served us well over many years.

Perhaps I may take some of the amendments in turn. The first, Amendment 163A, was brought forward by my noble friend Lord Black. It asks that the Bill should require that greater consideration be given to the right to freedom of expression and information when the Information Commissioner is exercising her enforcement powers. Amendment 164A would require the commissioner to consider, for example, any other financial penalties imposed by another regulator as a result of failure—a point that was touched on tangentially by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, in his closing remarks.

I hope that my noble friend Lord Black agrees that it is important that any amendments in this space do not impact disproportionately on the commissioner’s resources and her ability to execute her regulatory functions in an effective manner. I will give further consideration as to whether these amendments meet that test. I will address my noble friend’s contribution on this point in Hansard and the Government will reflect upon it. I do not hesitate because I am making a concession; I am merely making an observation.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 6th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Let me elaborate on the point for a moment to make it clear. IPSO did not exist in 1998; the editors’ code did and therefore the editors’ code was incorporated as such by reference to the 1998 Act and the 2000 order. The relevant editors’ code is now known as the IPSO code. It is essentially the same code, as I understand it. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, is shaking his head on this point, but it is essentially the editors’ code that is now incorporated within the IPSO code.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I could not resist jumping up. I think the nub of the argument is the four letters IPSO. It is an editors’ code. IPSO is a separate body. I think there would be less concern if it were just simply the editors’ code because we understand what that is. That would be the right reference, but I think we will return to this later.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The terms of the editors’ code are now referred to as the IPSO code, but I take the noble Lord’s point and I will take away and consider whether there is any material issue about using the designation of that code in the schedule. However, it is, with respect, essentially the editors’ code as it was originally recognised. As I understand it, that is reflected in the Information Commissioner’s current guidance under reference to Section 32, which is why it appears in the schedule in the form that it does.

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 20th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

Briefly, the ground has been well covered by the noble Lords, Lord Foster and Lord Aberdare, and I have little to add. Three things strike me. I recalled in Committee that this was one of the areas where we had received the most external notifications and correspondence. It is still something that we need to take carefully. As has just been said, it is surprising that almost the entirety of the industry affected by the judgments of Ofcom have joined up to make the case.

Following on from both speeches, what is required is a statement from the noble and learned Lord. I am sure he is straining at the leash to give us all another compromise solution that will do the trick. He is shaking his head; maybe there are other things he has to cover as well. However, the situation seems to hinge on whether Article 4 of the EU directive applies sufficiently well after this Bill goes through, as before. Yet, as has been mentioned, there will be an opportunity, presumably in the great repeal Bill, to cover exactly this point. So what is the hurry?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords. As the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, observed, there have been quite a lot of external communications on this. Indeed, I notice that the quotation that the noble Lord, Lord Foster, gave on my observations in Committee was identical to that quoted in a letter from Towerhouse LLP to the Department for Culture, Media and Sport on 17 March. Everybody seems to be singing from the same hymn book.

At present, Section 195 of the Communications Act 2003 requires that appeals against Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are decided by the Competition Appeal Tribunal on the merits. I shall come back to “on the merits” in more detail in a moment.

Appellants argue that appeals “on the merits” should allow for a bottom-up review of the decision, inviting the tribunal to substitute its own view for that of the regulator—in effect, two tiers doing the same thing. Appeals are therefore seen as an opportunity to rerun arguments that were considered and rejected by Ofcom in reaching its decision, or to put forward swathes of new evidence to persuade the tribunal to reach a different decision. Such appeals can lead to extremely lengthy and costly litigation, with extensive cross-examination of experts and witnesses. This depletes the regulator’s resources and means that other regulatory action by Ofcom is inevitably delayed, allowing for the potential for providers to frustrate the regulator with speculative or even spurious appeals, causing considerable uncertainty in the market and delay to other regulatory decisions.

The Government consider that appeals in the communications sector need to be rebalanced to ensure that Ofcom is held properly to account for its decisions, but also enabled to regulate in an effective and timely manner in the interests of citizens and consumers, as it is required to do. Clause 80 does just that; it requires that instead of merits appeals, the tribunal must decide appeals against Ofcom’s decisions by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on a judicial review. Judicial review is generally a well-understood standard of review against which very significant decisions made by most public bodies are tested. Importantly, this will ensure that appeals are focused on identifying errors in Ofcom’s decisions, rather than simply seeking to persuade the tribunal to reach a different conclusion.

Those affected by Ofcom’s decisions will remain able to challenge them effectively. In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, said that judicial review was,

“solely concerned with whether the decision is unlawful in a technical sense—that is, was the correct process followed?”.—[Official Report, 8/2/17; col. 1734.]

I hope I can reassure him that this is simply not the case. First, appellants are able to argue that Ofcom’s decisions are based on material errors of fact or law. Material errors will therefore be identified and corrected in a judicial review process. Secondly, judicial review is a flexible standard of review, which allows the court to decide on the appropriate intensity of review according to the individual circumstances of the case. For example, there may be more intensive review processes in the context of matters pertaining to human rights. In particular, Ofcom has various statutory duties to ensure that its decisions are proportionate—in other words, that they go no further than is appropriate and necessary to attain a legitimate aim. In reviewing whether a decision is proportionate, the courts can carry out a closer and more rigorous review of the decision.

Of course, appeals in the communications sector are required to ensure that,

“the merits of the case are duly taken into account”,

as a matter of EU law under Article 4 of the EU framework directive. That will remain the case under a judicial review standard. I understand that there is uncertainty about the extent to which requirements in EU law may become a part of UK law after the United Kingdom leaves the EU, but that will be a matter for Parliament to determine when the great repeal Bill is introduced, as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, observed, and will be looked at in the context of the overall future regulatory framework for electronic communications, including the appeals regime, once the UK has left the EU.

A number of Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are already appealable only by way of judicial review, and the Court of Appeal confirmed as long ago as 2008 that judicial review is capable of taking account of the merits of the case, as required by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of the EU directive. Lord Justice Jacob in the Court of Appeal in the T-Mobile case in 2008 said that it,

“is inconceivable that Art. 4 in requiring an appeal which can duly take into account the merits, requires Member States to have in effect a fully equipped duplicate regulatory body waiting in the wings just for appeals. What is called for is an appeal body and no more, a body which can look into whether the regulator had got something material wrong”.

He also held that,

“there can be no doubt that just as JR was adapted because the Human Rights Act so required, so it can and must be adapted to comply with EU law and in particular Article 4 of the Directive”.

Indeed, in a more recent case involving judicial review and Article 4 in 2016, Mr Justice Cranston observed that, as the Competition Appeal Tribunal had said:

“Ofcom enjoys a margin of appreciation on issues which entail the exercise of its judgment”,


and that,

“the Tribunal should apply appropriate restraint”.

It is not a second-tier regulator, and the fact that it might have preferred to give different weight to various factors in the exercise of a regulatory judgment would not in itself provide a sufficient basis to set aside Ofcom’s determination. It should not interfere with Ofcom’s exercise of a judgment unless satisfied that it was wrong.

These are the relevant judicial review standards that will be applied in these circumstances. We do not want a complete retrial—if I can call it that—or a situation in which, at two levels, we begin at the beginning and end at the end with an entirely different opinion and approach to the evidence, and, perhaps, entirely new arguments being advanced evidentially in support of the merits of a case. That is a never-ending process and is not common to any other area of regulation by a public authority.

The judgments I have referred to have been considered in a number of subsequent cases and it is clear that a judicial review standard is consistent with the requirements of Article 4 of the framework directive. In these circumstances, it is not considered that there is any real need for this amendment. It is appropriate that we proceed with Clause 80 and I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.

Sky and 21st Century Fox: Proposed Merger

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Monday 6th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson and Lord McNally, for their observations, and will seek to respond to some of the points they have raised. The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked “whose court”, as he put it, deals with this quasi-judicial decision-making process. It will be for the Secretary of State to carry out that process, with the appropriate officials advising her. It will not involve other government departments or Ministers; it will be her decision and her decision alone that instructs this matter. I hope that reassures the noble Lord as to how the process will be carried on.

As for the corporate structures and the past involvement of News Corporation, as the Secretary of State indicated in the Statement, when we address the question of commitment to broadcasting standards, account will be taken of past breaches of those and of behaviour and corporate governance failures, including those relating to News Corporation.

Ofcom, of course, has a fit and proper person test, but that applies in respect of broadcasting licences rather than this issue. It is a different test to the one that will be considered with regard to the merger, but it is important to bear in mind that the same evidence may of course be relevant to both tests. As the Secretary of State set out in her letter, she considered that a number of relevant matters warranted further investigation, including facts that led to the Leveson inquiry, for example, and the question of corporate governance at the News of the World. It will be open to Ofcom to look at all relevant areas—none are being ruled out in this context. The ultimate question will be whether the bidder shows a genuine commitment to broadcasting standards, which will raise very real and relevant questions with regard to past behaviour.

The noble Lord, Lord McNally, asked whether we might be in danger of setting an unhealthy precedent, given the other tests that may be put before us in due course by other media outlets. With respect, I do not consider that this decision-making process involves the setting of precedents. Each of these proposals will be considered on its individual, stand-alone merits. I hope that provides some reassurance to noble Lords.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

Before the noble and learned Lord sits down, can I just quote back to him what he said only a few moments ago at the Dispatch Box?

“However, given this remains a quasi-judicial process in which I retain a decision-making role for the next 10 days, and potentially beyond, it would be inappropriate for me, or any other member of this government, to comment on the substantive merits of the case”.


Is there a slight variance with what he said there?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There is no variance. It would not be appropriate for any member of the Government to comment on it, but the decision-making process will be by the Secretary of State.

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 8th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, I am not a lawyer—I feel a bit uncomfortable joining this debate; I am sure there are issues it is much beyond my abilities to deal with. But I say to the Minister before he responds, the point made about the degree of concern in the industry is important. This is a big and complicated Bill with many different aspects. It reaches far into aspects of our digital world. This clause, however, is the one that has generated the largest number of responses and—to judge from the meetings I have had with people—the most anger.

In a sense, so what? If it is the right decision, it should go ahead. However, it is clear that there is a lot of support for the current situation, even though there are arguments against it. The point was made time and again that the existing arrangements seem to work well, so why are we changing them? The industry, as I said, is pretty well united against it. One or two are speaking up for it but they do not represent the majority of voices we have heard.

There is also a real danger that—particularly at a time of uncertainty over technological change and regulatory positioning—having a period when we deliberately create confusion and delay until the new guidelines, or baselines, are established, is probably not the best way of making progress. Uncertainty over a long period will affect investment, which is not what we want. So there are reasons for asking the Government to be very clear that this is the right way forward.

We all share the same wish: we want an efficient and trusted regulator that can deal with this complicated, fast-moving and complex area. But it would be quite improper to have a situation in which there was a very limited right of appeal on any case determined not to have been carried out correctly—not so much about the judicial aspects, but on the merits of the case; in other words, where the evidence does not support the decision that has been taken.

I do not understand quite what the difficulties are. I have looked back over comments made by the noble and learned Lord when he was Advocate-General for Scotland. He is on the record in a number of places and a quick search with an algorithm of some complexity, which I could not possibly describe, reveals him to have said several things about judicial oversight. As it has developed, he says, it has,

“provided us with a flexible standard of oversight, which in many senses is wide-ranging”.

However, judicial oversight is the issue and that is what we have to emphasise. He might like to reflect on that in relation to what has been said. There are other things—I will not quote them as I am sure he is embarrassed enough already, or perhaps not. But the issue needs bottoming out—there is a serious point at its heart. There are issues that will affect the whole nature of the business we are regulating in this manner which need to be resolved.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for raising this matter because it has generated a great deal of heat and debate in the context of the Bill. I appreciate the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, with respect to the number of responses there have been. I just emphasise that judicial review is a form of judicial oversight, and a very effective one, but I will elaborate on that in a moment.

We are aware that the major telecoms operators in particular, and their agents, have lobbied vigorously and in detail on this point. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, brought out many of the points that have been made by their agents in the course of that vigorous and detailed lobbying. I shall not go into the detail of Ofcom’s position on this. It has expressed its position very clearly and we understand it. What I would say is that there is no single position for all utility sectors, and both judicial review and appeals on the merits may be used in the same sector for different kinds of appeals. It is not a black and white situation.

The Government’s case is not that this change is needed to ensure consistency with other utility sectors but that the public interest will be best served in the communications sector by an appeals regime that focuses on errors which Ofcom is alleged to have made, rather than asking the court to reach a different conclusion. Let us remember that Ofcom is a qualified regulator and its decisions are entitled to respect. They are informed decisions and they are not irrational. They are not determined on the toss of a coin. That is why judicial review is an appropriate approach.

The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, also talked about consumers. I find that interesting. Perhaps I may refer briefly to the Which? response to Clause 75. It sees this measure as one of the most important currently contained in the Digital Economy Bill, saying that it will give the regulator the power and confidence to take the necessary actions to protect consumer interests without fear of costly and lengthy litigation procedures. Introducing a judicial review standard for appeals in telecoms will mean that decisions made by Ofcom in the interest of consumers should be easier to implement and quicker to take effect. That is a reflection of Ofcom’s own view of the matter. This is not necessarily about coming to the aid of Ofcom but about recognising these matters from the perspective of the consumer. That is extremely important.

Currently, appeals brought under Sections 192 to 196 of the Communications Act against Ofcom’s regulatory decisions are decided “on the merits” by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. That exceeds and, as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, acknowledged, effectively gold-plates Article 4 of the EU framework directive, which requires that the merits of the case are duly taken into account in any appeal. That is not quite the wording of the proposed amendment.

The result of this over-implementation is an unnecessarily intensive and burdensome standard of review that can result in very lengthy and costly appeals litigation, which in turn can hinder timely and effective regulation. Some of the appeals that have taken place have done so over extraordinarily lengthy periods. Of course, the very large communications operators are in a position to fund that sort of appeal process. Clause 75 will change the standard of review so that the Competition Appeal Tribunal will decide appeals against Ofcom’s decisions by applying the same principles as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review and, in particular, judicial review of other administrative actions. This will focus appeals on the key questions of the legality and reasonableness of Ofcom’s decision-making.

The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, suggested that there might be cases in which there was simply no merit in a decision. If that was so, and if Ofcom proceeded without reliance on the facts of a particular case, that would be amenable to review under a judicial review standard.

Digital Economy Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 6th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, in an idle moment, a moment of complete frivolity, I looked up GOV.UK to check facts—I thought that would be a useful contribution to the debate. The date we have all been searching for is 1837: the General Register Office is part of Her Majesty’s Passport Office and contains records dating back to 1837. I thought that would be useful.

I beg to move Amendment 117A in my name. This stems from my period of service as chairman of a wonderful charity called StepChange, which deals with individual debt owed by ordinary people. In the time I was there—I resigned about two years ago—we had about 600,000 people a year contacting the telephone helpline or going online to try to seek solutions to their debt problems, so it is a very significant problem in British society and something we must take a great deal of care about. Most people who came to us were struggling with multiple debts; in other words, they owed money to a variety of different sources, ranging from local authorities, mobile phone companies, debt collection agencies, Revenue & Customs, payday lenders, utility companies and catalogue lenders—there is a very large number of them.

A median client would be aged about 45, female and owing about £20,000 to eight different creditors, so it is a significant problem that people get into. Within that, with a tremendous requirement now for debt advice, with lots of people struggling with debt, one worrying trend has been how bad central and local government have been in dealing with people, particularly those with multiple debts. A recent survey of about 1,000 StepChange clients found widespread aggressive enforcement from local authorities even when people were asking their authority for help. Clients were more than twice as likely to be threatened with court action or bailiffs than to be offered an affordable payment option. This is despite guidance being issued by central government about how debts should be treated.

Of course, what happens when people face strong demands, very often from central or local government, is that they tend to go to people who can lend them money quickly, probably from an existing credit line, almost certainly, until recently—but even today it is still happening—taking out a payday loan. They try to borrow more to try to pay back original debts and get themselves into a worse situation than they were before. The same survey asked clients to rate what their creditors had done to them and whether they treated them fairly or unfairly. I am afraid to say that public sector creditors came out very badly, occupying three of the top six places in the unfair treatment table. It is interesting to note that HMRC, for instance, scored no better than payday lenders, which the Government, through the FCA, have spent a lot of time trying to sort out over recent years.

That is the background of our concern. We welcome the provisions in the Bill to think again about how debts owed to the public sector are collected. In that light, these amendments are put forward for suggestion, they are probing amendments at this stage, and I hope that they will elicit a response, because it is not just StepChange, the debt charity, that has been concerned about this. Citizens Advice has also raised concern about public sector debt collection practices, finding that public sector creditors are,

“mostly out of step with financial services and utilities companies when it comes to setting affordable repayment rates, and that our clients can suffer detriment when public bodies have uncoordinated and inconsistent approaches to debt collections ... central government debt collection lags behind the higher standards expected of other creditors”.

This is focused on individuals who have problems with their debts, but of course there is a wider cost to society as a whole which, through relationship breakdown, homelessness and difficulties with maintaining concentration at work, et cetera, has been estimated at about £8 billion a year. The Bill contains clauses that relate to this and they seem to suggest that central government as a whole—but in this case HMRC—are thinking about how the data-sharing powers that are coming should be used to allow them to collect several debts at once, but also to do it in a slightly different way. I hope that is the case. We are back with our old friend, the code of practice, because what is said in the code of practice will determine whether this will work.

I have, then, four things I invite Ministers to respond to. First, Clause 45 is limited to departments that seek data-sharing powers and says only that they should “have regard to” the code of practice. This has, I think, been picked up in other amendments that we have considered today. It would be good if the code of practice were also embedded in a much stronger statutory provision, to give it real bite. We have seen examples of guidance—I mentioned one involving central government issuing guidance on council tax collection methods—but such guidance does not work, because it is non-binding and only advisory. If there is a code, it should be embedded in the statute and people affected by it should be able to refer back to it to make sure that it works properly.

Secondly, the public body itself must believe that this is the way in which it needs to operate. Within the amendments are a range of issues that central government bodies might pick up that would match the best practice in utilities, banks, credit cards and store cards—all of which have been through the cycle of trying to get money out of individuals who owe them and other people money, and have recognised that you have to deal with people with multiple debts in a completely different way from those who just owe money directly. That is gradually changing the way people operate. There is further to go, but it is a lesson that should be learned. I hope that the codes can be adapted to reflect that.

Thirdly—this may be too much of an ask, but it should be recognised—this Bill applies only to public bodies, and their creditors, when they are seeking to use the data-sharing powers. The problem is, of course, wider than the data-sharing powers. Problems with central and local government debt collections are widespread: practices need to be reformed and this is not likely to relate only to places where data sharing is used. The Government should think ahead about this and try to set out an understanding for all their agencies that poor debt-collection practices can harm the rate at which they get their money back and the time it takes, and it will also harm the financially vulnerable people. Taking account of that across all their practices would be a very good thing.

These amendments, therefore, try to raise those points, but there is one other thing that the Government should try to do, which is in the first amendment. It is to take a lesson from Scotland—I am sure that the noble and learned Lord from Scotland will wish to pick this up and think harder about it—where, when you have a private or a public debt and seek guidance from the state agency that operates that scheme, you are given statutory protection from excess charges and your interest rates are frozen, providing you stick to your debt repayment plan. That means that people get a breathing space, time to organise their finances, think about their budgets and work out what they are going to do, without the terrible pressure from those who are owed money to start repaying it. It is only when all those issues have been brought together, and an agreement reached between the creditors and the agency, that repayment begins. That has a very much higher rate of success than any other scheme. England lags way behind on this, and it would be no skin off the Treasury’s nose if it took a leaf out of the Scottish Government’s book and brought in their procedures—with a statutory breathing space that gave some hope to people who want to repay their debts but cannot do so because the practices are not as good.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I acknowledge the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that this is a significant issue, and I understand that this is a probing amendment to allow us to consider some of the wider issues that he has touched on in the debate.

Amendment 117A seeks to include in the Bill an additional purpose: to enable debt information to be shared under the powers provided by Clause 41. It seeks to state explicitly that debt data can be disclosed,

“for the purpose of helping individuals to manage their debts”.

There is also a reference to the breathing space, and I will come back to that point in a moment in response to the questions posed by the noble Lord.

In the first instance, we would venture that the amendment is not necessary. The provisions as drafted enable information to be shared,

“for the purposes of the taking of action in connection with debt owed to”,

a public authority or the Crown. This includes but is not limited to, for example, identifying or collecting debt. The provision is sufficiently broad to enable sharing for the purpose set out in this amendment. That is the position of the Government. The Government are considering the recommendations that have been made following work to look into the merits of introducing a breathing space for customers, which we are aware is available in other jurisdictions. While the Government are considering these recommendations, it would be premature to incorporate a reference to this initiative in the Bill at this time. I hope the noble Lord will accept that the matter is being looked at.

21st Century Fox Takeover Bid for Sky: Timetable

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Tuesday 20th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord for repeating the Answer to the UQ granted earlier in the other place. As I said last week—goodness, was it only last week?—the concerns of 2011 were not just about the serious wrongdoing uncovered by the phone-hacking scandal. They were also about the concentration of media power in fewer and fewer hands. I have no doubt that if this is referred, it will be referred successfully to the Secretary of State to act on the issues that have been raised.

More than 135,000 people have already signed an online petition calling for this bid to be referred, and the reasons for their concerns are the same as those which caused the previous bid to be abandoned in 2011. This all makes the kicking into touch of Leveson 2 and the suspension of authorisation of Section 40 look more than just a coincidence. I have two questions about process for the noble and learned Lord, which I hope will be sufficiently broad for him to be able to respond to despite his concerns about due process.

First, I note from his previous response that the Secretary of State will aim to take an initial decision on whether to intervene on public interest grounds within 10 working days of formal notification of a merger to the relevant authorities. Such formal notification has yet to be received, but it could happen—some would say it is highly likely to happen—over the holiday period. As there are a number of public holidays coming up, may I ask the noble and learned Lord to tell me precisely how many working days there are in the period of the Christmas Recess? To get him started with his calculation, I point out that the other place is not sitting tomorrow. If he needs more time to work this out, I am sure a letter would be sufficient, and I would be grateful if he could place it in the Library as well.

Secondly, there is the question of whether James and Rupert Murdoch—if they do acquire the balance of Sky—are fit and proper persons to be licence-holders of a regulated television service. The noble and learned Lord told the House last time that the Prime Minister had not discussed the bid at her recent New York meeting with Rupert Murdoch. He said—I think I paraphrase—that Mr Murdoch had apparently rolled up unannounced, something I am sure he is wont to do. Can we be assured that all such meetings with the parties are logged and published? Given that, last time round, it transpired that the then Secretary of State had set up a parallel, secret communications structure involving his special adviser and a similar person in News International, could the noble and learned Lord confirm for us who in the DCMS and elsewhere in Government have the authority to communicate with the parties? Will he publish a list of those so authorised, including civil servants and advisers, and put a copy in the Library?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. I do not have a calculation of working days over the Christmas vacation to hand, but I assure him that the 10-day period is a guidance period. It was originally formulated by the then DTI and will, if possible, be adhered to. If the noble Lord is seeking a precise calculation of working days over the Christmas period to the point when this House resumes, I will arrange for that calculation to be made and endeavour to ensure that it is set out in writing, with an appropriate copy being placed in the Library.

Regarding the fitness of persons who are to be involved in this matter, as I indicated on a previous occasion, the question of who is a fit and proper person is determined by Ofcom, pursuant to the Broadcasting Act 1990, albeit that one consideration that will arise under the 2002 Act is the Ofcom code of conduct in respect of broadcasting standards, as set out in the Communications Act 2003, and the need for a genuine commitment to adhere to those standards. I have no doubt that the Secretary of State will have regard to all relevant considerations when she comes to address the issue that she has to determine on a quasi-judicial basis.

There will be no question of special advisers being engaged in the process, and certainly not in the process of communication with any parties involved in this commercial transaction—of that—I can assure the noble Lord. That is not going to occur.

I am not aware of any further meetings scheduled between the Secretary of State and any of the parties to this transaction. If there were to be such a meeting, I have no doubt that notice of it would be given and a record kept.