European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued) & Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard continued): House of Lords
Thursday 16th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, as we have been told, Clause 38 is essentially meaningless. It is declaratory, I think it was said; a sop to the ERG. Indeed, the Explanatory Memorandum makes clear that the clause makes no material difference to the scope of Parliament’s powers.

However, it is not just neutral. The problem, as we discussed on Tuesday, is that, by having this clause but failing to refer alongside it to the Sewel convention that the UK Parliament will not normally use its powers to legislate in devolved matters without the agreement of the National Assembly—or indeed the Scottish Parliament—it appears to our colleagues there to undermine the devolution settlements.

It is for that reason, as we discussed in relation to Amendment 45 on Tuesday that the Welsh Government wish the Sewel convention to be restated alongside what is in this clause, if it really must remain in the Bill, although it is in fact otiose and it would probably be best for it to go altogether. I see the Chief Whip in his place; he always likes to know what we will return to. That is one point to which we shall return next week.

For the Opposition, however, there is a different problem with the clause, which is that the rest of the Bill does the exact opposite to what it says in it. Virtually all the rest of the Bill dilutes parliamentary sovereignty vis-à-vis the Executive: it takes powers from us, not to give them to Wales or Scotland but to give them to the Government.

Future historians will puzzle over why this clause is here. We are particularly grateful to the noble Lords for giving notice of their intention to oppose that Clause 38 stand part, because it gives us the opportunity to write that into Hansard, so that when future historians—I am a historian—look at why on earth this clause was there, they can say it was there to keep the ERG of the Tory party happy. That does not seem to us to be a very good reason to have it, but if it really must remain, without the reference to the devolution settlements it is in fact unhelpful, rather than neutral.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to noble Lords for their contributions to this part of the debate. I express some concern that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, wishes to concertina hard ideologues of the right, English nationalists and Brexiteers into one uniform group. That is regrettable shorthand and, indeed, the very fact that his party has adopted that sort of attitude towards the issue of our leaving the European Union might go some way to explaining why it returned after the general election with a total of 11 Members in the House of Commons. There are many, many people in the United Kingdom who are not English nationalists but voted to leave the European Union. There are many people in the United Kingdom who are not hard ideologues of the right who voted to leave the European Union.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

It is well known that, latterly, Dicey developed views on home rule for Ireland that differed from what might be regarded as the mainstream at the time. Be that as it may, his works on the principles of the constitution stand the test of time and are worthy of being revisited by the noble Lord.

I shall deal shortly with the point advanced by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, about the scope of the present clause. The Sewel convention is not itself a matter of constitutional law; it is a political convention, as the Supreme Court made clear in the first Miller case. It is a political convention into which the courts would not intrude. Be that as it may, it has of course been restated in statutory form and therefore does not require repetition. Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016 and Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017 restated it expressly in statutory form. So it is there on the statute book and does not invite repetition. What is not contained in any of the devolved legislation, for obvious reasons, is a restatement and recognition of the fundamental principle of our constitutional arrangement, namely that Parliament is sovereign, and there is therefore a desire to see that made clear.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, suggested that there was some deficiency in the drafting of the clause, but I resist that suggestion. It says, in terms, that the principle of our constitutional arrangement—namely, parliamentary sovereignty—is recognised. It is universally recognised, and that is an appropriate way to express the position of our constitution. In other words, nothing in the Bill derogates from the sovereignty of Parliament, and this clause makes that clear.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Does the noble and learned Lord therefore accept that if there was an addition to restate the convention, that would not detract in any way from what is in the clauses at the moment?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It would not detract from the clause but it would be an unnecessary repetition. We do not normally put precisely the same provision into statutes two or three years apart. Here we have the provision with regard to the Sewel convention in Section 2 of the Scotland Act 2016, and again in Section 2 of the Wales Act 2017. It is there. It is on the statute book; it exists. That is why there is no need for repetition.

As I say, leaving the European Union is a matter of some significance in the context of our constitutional arrangements, in particular, the repeal of the ECA. It is therefore appropriate in this context that there is an explicit recognition of the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. Therefore, as the Bill implements the withdrawal agreement so that we can leave the legal order that is the European Union, it is appropriate, when disentangling ourselves from those international obligations, that we ensure that there is no concern about the principle of parliamentary sovereignty. It is for Parliament, acting in its sovereign capacity, to give effect to the agreement in domestic law—that is the duality principle, and nothing in the Bill derogates from that principle as recognised by this clause. In these circumstances, I submit that it is entirely appropriate that this clause should stand part of the Bill, and I invite the noble Lord not to oppose it doing so.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I too am not a lawyer, and I will not even attempt to add to the legal arguments, which have been so well set out by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Woolf, Lord Judge, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, as well as by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and others, as to why any decision on the interpretation of retained EU law should be taken at Supreme Court level, as envisaged in the 2018 Act, and why ministerial regulations are simply not appropriate in this matter.

I will say three things. One is that it is a really bad way to make law suddenly, with such a clause, with no consultation either with the judiciary—if this was the consultation that has happened today, I think we can take it as, “No thanks”—or, indeed, with the devolved nations, which we discussed earlier. I will answer the question put by my noble friend Lady Taylor about what the Government have in mind. At a briefing, it was very clear that they already had something in mind, a sunset clause at the end of this year, and my answer is simply that there is something that is not oven-ready at the moment that is waiting to come in. There is a closed envelope somewhere, and it is appropriate that we should be told what exactly is in it, so perhaps we could hear about that later.

Secondly, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, has said, Clause 26 could result in the divergence of approach within and between the jurisdictions of the UK on matters where a common approach is essential: things that are fundamental to our UK-wide single market. On Monday, the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, recalled that for 40 years EU legislation

“ensured that there was a large amount of similarity and coherence in how these laws were interpreted in the various parts of the United Kingdom. The question that arises now is: will we require to maintain that level of coherence in order to operate as a single national economy? This will be particularly true for food, farming, fishing … in Scotland and … the devolved Administrations.”—[Official Report, 14/1/20; cols. 530-1.]

Harking back to the earlier discussion about the all-United Kingdom economy, this seems a crucial issue. Allowing lower, non-UK-wide courts to interpret the regulations that the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, mentioned, environmental matters, as raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, or VAT or duties, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, mentioned, could open a wide door to divergence on issues within our own single market.

Thirdly, there is obviously a fear that this provision risks undermining workers’ rights, given that the political declaration makes no mention of the rights previously protected by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and its key principles which have found their way into EU case law. Employees in the UK benefit from the ECJ’s sometimes more generous interpretation of employment rights, such as the right to paid holidays, the requirement for employers to keep records of hours worked to comply with the working time directive, and the ruling as to whether overtime is factored into holiday pay. These have been essential and are now part of UK law—of course via case law. Without a guarantee to uphold the body of case law on workers’ rights, the Prime Minister’s commitment to protect our employee rights after Brexit will sound more hollow than any chimes of Big Ben, whether on 31 January or any other day.

Clause 26, which has been dropped in with no rationale, prior debate, consultation or Green Paper, diminishes the Bill while introducing uncertainty into our laws. It has no place here. We will seek to remove it, although, as other noble Lords have said and as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, urged, it would be much better if the Government were to do this.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Beith, for moving the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I will seek to offer some explanation and reassurance with regard to the clause in question.

As has been noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, we are concerned here with retained EU law. For clarity, Clause 26 draws a distinction between retained EU law and relevant separation agreement law, which is applicable as a consequence of the withdrawal agreement and is untouched by any of these proposals, given our international law obligations. Retained EU law will form part of the law of the United Kingdom. It is then a question of how we approach the interpretation and application of that law, which, in turn, takes us to the question of precedent and the binding force—at present—of decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in this context.

Provision has already been made, pursuant to Section 6(5) of the 2018 Act, to confer upon the United Kingdom Supreme Court the power to depart from previous decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The idea that one can depart from such a body of case law is hardly novel. It has been a feature of common law since at least the 1960s, when the judicial committee of the House of Lords expressed its intention to depart from previous case law as and when it felt it was necessary to do so. Therefore, we are not, as it were, moving into novel territory in this context.

The intention behind this clause is to give a power to make regulations to ensure that the United Kingdom courts are not inappropriately bound by retained EU case law as part of the body of United Kingdom law after we have left the European Union. It goes no further than that. These courts may choose to follow that case law, but the point is to ensure that they are not bound to do so in circumstances where they form a view that it would be inappropriate to the development of UK law for them to do so.

The Government are sensible in the manner in which they will seek to exercise the regulatory power. The Bill requires that Ministers must consult the senior judiciary across the whole of the United Kingdom before making any regulations, and indeed may consult other appropriate persons, and any regulations will be laid before Parliament under the affirmative procedure. Those safeguards are clearly in place.

We want to ensure that United Kingdom law after we leave is consistent and clear. The power will be employed in a way that is consistent with our own constitutional norms and traditions: judicial independence, the doctrine of precedent and the separation of powers. Any regulations will respect these long-established principles but will also allow that retained EU case law is not the sole preserve of the court of final appeal, be it the United Kingdom Supreme Court or, in the context of criminal matters, the High Court of Justiciary in Scotland.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The Minister says that this will be done under the affirmative procedure. Should that come here, we have always had the right to negate such an order. However, should this House do that, given the advice it has had, it would not be challenged as a constitutional outrage but would be a proper use of this House’s power.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

It would always be a proper use of this House’s power, albeit there are constitutional norms that apply. However, it is not just this House; the House of Commons would also have the opportunity to address the terms of any regulations. I have no doubt that, having regard to our constitutional norms, this House would have regard to the determination of the House of Commons on that point, but would not be absolutely bound by it. I fully accept that.

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[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not consider that this clause in any sense violates the principle of the separation of powers.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Given that that Minister has not answered my noble friend’s question and given that there is a sunset clause on this, there must be something ready to go. Can he not explain what it is?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

No. What is ready to go is a consultation process. That is why we have not reached a conclusion. The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, asked two questions, the first of which was, “Are the Government going to use this power?” We are going to use it in order to consult with appropriate parties. May I give examples? Examples have been given by noble and learned Lords. One example is a reference system to the Supreme Court. Another example is to extend this power to the Court of Appeal. That is what we want to determine by virtue of the consultation process we wish to take forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect to the noble and learned Lord, we seek to consult on the appropriate test to be applied in taking this matter forward. We intend to do that in consultation with the senior judiciary.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, given that the existing law has now been in place since 2018 and all that time could have been used for this consultation, why has this suddenly gone in now with the power to make changes by ministerial decision? If it was not felt at the time that the 2018 position was correct, why has this consultation—which could take place without an Act of Parliament—not already taken place?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, in the interim there had been certain distractions, including a general election—the outcome of which the noble Baroness will be familiar with.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 2nd reading (Hansard)
Monday 13th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by acknowledging the powerful maiden speeches delivered by my noble friend Lord Barwell and the noble Lord, Lord Mann, in whose speech there was nothing with which I could have possibly disagreed. I believe that every Member of this House would embrace both the content and sentiment that he expressed.

This Bill is of the highest importance and consequence for the country and is vital in delivering our withdrawal from the European Union at the end of this month. In opening, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, was candid and—I would venture—generous in acknowledging the position in which we stand since the general election. This Bill is not about whether or not we will leave the European Union; it is not about determining the terms of our departure from the European Union; it is not about the future relationship. The Bill ensures that the withdrawal agreement and the associated agreements under the EEA, EFTA and Swiss separation agreements are implemented in domestic law in order that they can be given full effect and thereby allow the Government to fulfil their obligations under international law.

I echo the sentiment of my noble friend Lord Callanan in acknowledging the work of all our Select Committees, including that of the Constitution Committee; the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, indicated that it would deliver its report tomorrow, and we appreciate the speed with which it has addressed these matters. I also thank all noble Lords who contributed to today’s debate and discussion, although it will clearly not be possible for me in the time available between now and midnight to respond to each and every point that has been made.

The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, my noble friend Lord Cope and other noble Lords raised the question of the prohibition the Bill places on the extension of the implementation period. The general election has clearly shown that the public want no further delay in our exit from the European Union, let alone potentially the 40 years’ delay of Exodus, as cited by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. The prohibition in this statute binds the Government to their manifesto commitment not to extend the implementation period beyond December 2020.

However, I reassure noble Lords that all parties have committed to using good faith to secure agreement on our future relationship by the end of 2020, and we will work with great energy to achieve this. Indeed, article 184 of the withdrawal agreement refers in particular to the obligations on all parties and, in turn, refers to point 135 in part five of the political declaration, where the parties themselves express the intention to have the agreement in force by the end of 2020.

The matter of citizens’ rights has been raised by a number of noble Lords, in particular by the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Oates, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson—I will come on to the particular point he raised in a moment. EU citizens in the United Kingdom are our neighbours, colleagues and workplace friends, and of course we value the contribution they make to the United Kingdom and wish them to remain here. We have already provided certainty to over 2.5 million people who have been granted status through the EU settlement scheme. The scheme is free, there is plenty of support for applicants, and they have until at least 30 June 2021 to apply to it.

I understand that the issue of presettled versus settled status has generated concern in some quarters. I make it clear that presettled status is a pathway to settled status, because those with presettled status can move straight to settled status by making an application once they reach five years’ continuous residence in the United Kingdom. I hope that puts some minds at rest. Indeed, we are taking a very pragmatic approach in trying to deal with applications, both of presettled and settled status. If an applicant needs to use the full five years of their presettled status, they will also receive an automatic reminder to apply for settled status before their leave expires. There is therefore no question of people being overlooked in this context. To that end, I understand that the Home Office’s automatic status checker uses the government database to help applicants secure the right form of status in a smooth and effective manner.

Reference was made by the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, to the status of UK citizens in the EU. However, that is of course not a matter of domestic law and is therefore not a matter for the Bill, which is intended to implement the international legal obligations which we have undertaken pursuant to the withdrawal agreement. Therefore, the status of UK citizens in the EU will be the subject of the future relationship negotiations.

Questions were asked, particularly by my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about the status of the IMA. I assure noble Lords that the Bill guarantees that the IMA will be fully independent of government. As the Bill sets out, the IMA will be run by an independent board and contain the appropriate expertise on citizens’ rights, and the Government will have no role in its day-to-day running or in its decisions. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, suggested that, pursuant to the provisions in Schedule 2 to the Bill, the IMA could be abolished. That is simply not the case. There can be a transfer of the IMA’s functions at some point, but those functions must be continued and carried on. After a period of eight years, it will be possible for the UK to negotiate with the EU on the matter of whether the IMA is still required, but the obligation to maintain it is one that we have undertaken in international law, pursuant to the withdrawal agreement, and one to which we as a Government will adhere. So, there is no question of the unilateral abolition of the IMA.

I listened to the concerns expressed across the House, particularly by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, in relation to the delegated powers in the Bill. The original sifting mechanism introduced in the EU withdrawal Act was a response to the exceptional circumstances we then found ourselves in. The situation now is quite different and it would not be appropriate to include a sifting mechanism in the Bill in this instance.

I listened also to the concerns expressed in relation to the power contained in Clause 21 to implement the protocol on Ireland and Northern Ireland. I also took note of the comments of noble and learned Lords on the DPRRC in this regard. But we in this space must be aware of what occurred in the other place and have regard to the response from the Government Benches to the concerns raised there. The Government have stated that providing certainty and reassurance to people and businesses in Northern Ireland is of paramount importance to them. The power contained in the Bill to implement the protocol provides that reassurance.

Furthermore, as my noble friend Lord Callanan pointed out at the beginning of the debate, the Bill’s approach to implementing the protocol is the best way to ensure that the United Kingdom can fulfil its international obligations and make the necessary arrangements to implement the protocol in the time available. Any other approach would risk jeopardising the Government’s ability to fully implement the protocol and would inevitably send a negative signal to both businesses and individuals in Northern Ireland. I hope that the House will agree that the fulfilment of these two aims—namely, ensuring that the Government can fully implement the protocol and reassuring businesses and individuals in Northern Ireland—should not be undermined.

Noble Lords asked about Parliament’s oversight of the future relationship negotiations. It was interesting to observe the different views that came from different sides of the House. For a while, many noble Lords expressed concern about the removal of parliamentary oversight. I believe that I noted both my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley and the noble Lord, Lord Darling, expressing the view that, at the end of the day, negotiation of such matters as international relations had to be a matter for the Executive, essentially, and not one for Parliament to be directly involved in—albeit that, at the end of the day, myriad pieces of legislation will require to be approved by Parliament and put in place in order that the future relationship can be established and maintained.

The political declaration agreed by the Prime Minister as part of our exit negotiation sets out the framework for a comprehensive and ambitious free trade agreement with the EU. The general election result has clearly shown that the public support that vision and we consider that we have been given the mandate to begin negotiations on that basis. As the Prime Minister said in the debate on Second Reading in the other place, Parliament will be kept fully informed on the progress of these negotiations. Both Houses will have access to all their usual scrutiny tools, including Select Committees and the questioning of Ministers, and I have no doubt that the House will take full advantage of them. So, in these circumstances, we do not consider that there is a requirement for any additional statutory role. Furthermore, we are giving the EU Committee the ability to trigger debates on new pieces of law proposed by the EU that raise matters of national interest during the implementation period.

I turn now to the matter of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children, which was touched on by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and mentioned by a number of other noble Lords. Of course, concerns have been raised over family reunion for unaccompanied asylum-seeking children. I wish to make clear that the Government are fully committed both to the principle of family reunion and to helping and supporting the most vulnerable children. The Government, as my noble friend Lord Callanan observed, have a record of providing protection for vulnerable children, receiving 15% of all asylum claims from unaccompanied children in the EU.

Clause 37 does not represent a change to that existing government policy. It removes the statutory requirement to negotiate. This is appropriate as the Government have demonstrated their intentions by already writing to the European Commission to commence negotiations on this issue. It is vital that the Government are not legally constrained in those discussions. We are restoring the traditional division of competence between Parliament and the Executive when it comes to international negotiations. This clause fulfils the essential function of allowing us to continue negotiating a comprehensive agreement and rightly ensuring that Parliament is informed of the Government’s policy intentions in respect of our future arrangements.

I shall move on to deal with the question of the case law of the CJEU. I have noted the concerns that have been expressed here. While clearly EU case law is a defined body of law, it is important that our courts are not eternally bound by historic decisions of the EU Court of Justice after the implementation period has expired. Let me provide some important points of reassurance. First, the approach that we have taken is consistent with our international obligations. Clause 26 already provides for how the separation agreements must be interpreted and nothing that we do here will cut across that. Secondly, we want to approach this matter in a sensible way.

Let me be clear that there is no intention to extend the divergence from retained EU case law to every court and tribunal in the United Kingdom. We must consult with the senior judiciary before making any regulations, and the clause provides for the Minister to consult with others as is appropriate. What we intend is that the power will be used to ensure that retained EU case law is a living law rather than one preserved in aspic. There will be legal clarity at the point when any case concerning this body of law is heard. The power can be used only until the end of the implementation period, and the courts will be interpreting retained EU law only after that period. So we have the period of the implementation time in which to address this issue and it will then apply from the expiry of the implementation period. But I repeat that there is no intention on the part of the Government to extend the power to every court and tribunal in the land. We recognise the uncertainty that would be a consequence of such a move.

I turn to matters pertaining to devolution, which arose in a number of different contexts. First of all, the noble Duke, the Duke of Montrose, raised questions about the CAP and an agriculture Bill. I assure noble Lords that the CAP will continue to the end of the implementation period, by which time we will have taken forward the agriculture Bill. The noble Duke also referred to the frameworks, and perhaps I may remind noble Lords of the importance of these frameworks in the context of our relations with the devolved Administrations. Between October 2017 and March 2018, we published what was termed a common frameworks analysis, which set out about 153 areas in which EU law intersected with devolved competence. After discussion we have reduced that number, but have carried on an analysis of these areas with the devolved Administrations and continue to work closely with them on these issues.

One example of that is fisheries, which have already been mentioned in this debate, where we proposed a new UK framework to ensure access for UK fishing fleets throughout UK waters. That has been taken forward through discussion with the devolved Administrations and has been governed by principles agreed at the joint ministerial conferences. I give the detail of that just to underline the extent to which we are engaged with the devolved Administrations in this context.

As was suggested early on, the engagement between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations over the Bill has been rather unusual, because the recommendations coming back from the devolved Administrations have been principally concerned with reserved matters. The devolution settlement involved the reservation of specific matters to the United Kingdom Parliament. It was never intended that in the conduct of such reserved matters—for example, international affairs—the United Kingdom Parliament could be inhibited or frustrated by the devolved Administrations. That would not be normal under our devolution settlement, and that is reflected in the terms of the Sewel convention. For our part, the Government have followed the spirit and letter of the devolution settlement throughout the process pertaining to this Bill. The engagement of the devolved Administrations—

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

Does the Minister accept that while the negotiations may indeed be for reserved matters, in many cases the implementation is not reserved? That is why they are particularly worried about the lack of consultation.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

There are clearly circumstances in which the implementation of the withdrawal agreement will impact on the scope of executive competence of the devolved Administrations, and they are well aware of that, but those are not the issues they have sought to address with the UK Government in this context. They have sought to address matters that are reserved. As I say, the fundamentals of the devolved settlement, going back to 1998, never intended that where the UK Government were exercising a reserved function they should be inhibited or prevented from doing so by the devolved Administrations. It is important to bear that in mind.

As I say, we consider that we are taking appropriate steps to engage with the devolved Administrations, and we will continue to do so. Indeed, we continue to hope that the Welsh Government in particular will reflect on this and revise their recommendations to the National Assembly on legislative consent. At the end of the day, what we are doing here is implementing an international treaty obligation; that is the role of the United Kingdom Parliament.

I will now touch on one or two additional points in the limited time remaining. The noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, raised a number of issues with regard to health. Clearly, nothing is going to change before the end of the implementation period, and thereafter it will be a matter for the negotiation on the future relationship. It is not a matter for this Bill, which is intended to implement the present withdrawal agreement. She also made reference to the clinical trials directive. I should observe that the new EU clinical trials directive has not yet been adopted, so we do not even know where the EU will be with regard to that. Of course, once we do know, it may form the subject of negotiations on the future relationship.

The noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, made a powerful point that, after 46 years of being subject to EU law, women have still not secured equal pay. I certainly hope that we will do better after we leave the EU.

The noble Baroness, Lady Parminter, referred to animal welfare. At the moment, we cannot prohibit the movement of live animals because of EU law. But when we leave, let us hope that we can address that, because we have expressed an intention to do so.

The noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, referred to UK worker rights. I notice that, in many respects, UK worker rights are much higher than the norm within the other EU 27 states. One has only got to consider such issues as paternity and maternity leave, and other related issues, to appreciate that what we may hope for after exit is that the EU is able to catch up with us.

I look forward to tomorrow’s Committee stage, where we can enter into more detailed scrutiny and debate on the issues that have been raised today. This Bill ensures that we honour the result of the 2016 referendum and leave the EU on 31 January, on the terms of the withdrawal agreement. It ensures that the agreements have full effect in domestic law and that, accordingly, the Government can discharge their obligations in international law.

Once the Bill is passed and the withdrawal agreement ratified, we will proceed to the completion of a free trade agreement with the EU by the end of December 2020. We can then go on to focus on other national priorities, such as the National Health Service, education and skills, and ensuring that we make our country safe. I commend the Bill to the House.