Scotland Bill
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(8 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord McAvoy
No, and I am sorry if the noble Lord took that the wrong way. However, I spend my life in Scotland, week in, week out. I listen to people there and am heavily involved in community organisations. I am not trying to devalue the noble Lord’s point of view but I can speak only from my experience. There is a suspicion there—justified or not—about Westminster trying to lay down the law. I know I tempt fate saying that in front of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, but there we go. We are suspected of laying down the law in a popular way, not in a legal way—once again, there are too many lawyers. We are talking about how this would be seen as being dictated to by Westminster and interference in the mandate. The Smith commission had the agreement and we are pushing that forward. We would be interested in supporting the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, and I look forward to an interesting night.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
First, I thank all noble Lords and the right reverend Prelate for their informative submissions, observations and comments, with regard to both Clause 1 and the proposed amendments to it. I begin by making a number of general observations. First, no one on the Government Benches is in any doubt about the supremacy and sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. In that regard, I take issue with some of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. Ultimately, it is for this Parliament to determine the constitutional arrangements of the United Kingdom.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, alluded to some observations he made in the case of AXA General Insurance and others in 2011. I recall those well. He may in turn recall that my client came second in that case. Reference was also made to some obiter dicta of the noble and learned Lord in the case of Jackson, to which we would not necessarily subscribe. However, they are there and are a helpful insight into the thinking of the court at that time with regard to the issue of sovereignty.
The purpose of this Bill is to implement the Smith commission agreement. To suggest that there is no mandate for that is, in my respectful submission, quite inaccurate. Each of the five political parties in Scotland went into the Smith commission and negotiated the terms of an agreement. The Government have undertaken to seek to implement that agreement. That is the purpose of this Bill.
Lord Maxton
On that point, all the political parties went into that Smith commission and all of them signed the report. However, the Scottish National Party immediately came out of the Smith commission, John Swinney among them having signed the report, and rejected it.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am aware of the conduct of the Scottish National Party in that regard and do not make any comment at this stage upon that. Perhaps it will be seen by others as extremely unfortunate that it should have lent credence to the agreement and then sought to renege from it. The point that we make is that it was signed—it is an agreement. It is in that context that this Bill is brought forward.
As I say, no one on the government Benches seeks to take issue with the proposition that this Parliament is sovereign and supreme. What we have here is a provision in the Smith commission agreement that we should recognise the permanence of the Scottish Parliament. It has been observed that it is, in a sense, already permanent—so be it—but let us remember that Clause 1 is concerned with a political statement, as much as any legal statement. That is its purpose, and it is not wholly exceptional in that regard. The noble Lord, Lord Norton, made reference to the Cabinet Office provisions on legislation at Chapter 10.9 of the Guide to Making Legislation. But when looked at, it expresses a generality—and, where there are generalities, there may of course be exceptions. This is one of those exceptions. I note that my noble friend Lord Forsyth agrees with me on that point.
My noble friend in turn suggested that there was little if any precedent for this form of legislation. I remind him that the Act of Union with Scotland of 1706, under the Gregorian calendar, referred to a Parliament of Great Britain for all time. In saying that, it made a political statement as much as a legislative provision—and that, again, is what we are doing here. We are recognising the political reality reflected in the Smith commission agreement.
Amendments 1 and 3 seek to modify Clause 1 by removing reference to permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the UK Government’s commitment to the permanence of that Parliament. We would not consider that appropriate. It appears to us that, in light of the Smith commission agreement, the Government should be prepared to make that political declaration of permanence. It does not take away from the supremacy or sovereignty of this United Kingdom Parliament. That remains.
Lord Cormack
Can my noble and learned friend give any other example of an extra-parliamentary body—the Smith commission in this case—binding Parliament, saying that Parliament will do this or that? Can he give any example of any other outside commission or body making such a declaration and binding Parliament?
Lord Keen of Elie
The proposition is not well founded, with respect. The Smith commission is not binding this Parliament in any sense. Whatever the wording of the Smith commission agreement itself, it does not and could not bind this Parliament; it will be for the Parliament of the United Kingdom to decide whether it passes this Bill into law. So I do not accept the underlying proposition that was relied on by my noble friend Lord Cormack in that context.
On the terms of subsection (2) of new Section 63A, a point was raised about the words,
“with due regard to the other provisions of this Act”.
In my submission, those are helpful, because the other provisions of this Act include the cross-references to Section 28 and, in particular, Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998. There again, you have underlined the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament and the right of this Parliament to legislate on all matters, including devolved matters, in respect of Scotland.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I am slightly behind my noble and learned friend’s speech, but I wanted to check the facts. He has made great play of the importance of including the word “permanence” as a result of the recommendations of the Smith commission. Will he explain why the Bill as originally presented to the House of Commons made no mention of permanence and why Part 1 was headed “Constitutional Arrangements” and “The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government”?
Lord Keen of Elie
In the course of the Bill’s consideration, steps have been taken to strengthen the political statement contained in Clause 1. Indeed, the noble Lord’s proposed Amendment 2 picks up this very point. He noticed that in the other place the words “recognised as” were removed from Clause 1 for the same purpose. Perhaps I anticipate the further contribution that the noble Lord may wish to make to this debate.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Forgive me, but as in the best parliamentary answers, my noble and learned friend is telling me something I already know. My question was: if the Government thought that they were meeting the obligations of the Smith commission by presenting the Bill as it was originally presented, that they met the terms of the Smith commission and that that is the overriding purpose and the agreement, why was it necessary to add these words which create such difficulty, as is clear from the speeches made in the House? My noble and learned friend has not really answered the point.
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect, I rather thought that I had answered the point made by the noble Lord, but let me reiterate it. The word “permanence” appears in the Smith commission agreement. After further consideration, it was felt that in order to strengthen the political statement contained in Clause 1 that word should feature in the clause itself.
I return to Amendments 6 and 7 which seek to alter the basis upon which any decision would be made with regard to the provisions of Clause 1. As was observed, it is not anticipated that there will at any point in the future be a referendum upon that issue, but nevertheless as this matter proceeded in another place it was again considered that this would strengthen the political statement that is being made here. Let us be clear: the use of a referendum in this context is consistent with precedent. In 1997, the people of Scotland supported the creation of a Scottish Parliament on the basis of a referendum. In 2014, in the independence referendum they reaffirmed their wish to have two Parliaments and two Governments for the purposes of reserved and devolved administration in Scotland. Therefore, it is appropriate that any question about the abolition of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government, which is not envisaged, should be based on the expression of the will of the people of Scotland in a referendum. Let me be clear: that is a theoretical point. There has never been any question that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are anything other than permanent parts of the United Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements. That remains the case.
It is unusual, but not wholly exceptional, for a clause of a Bill such as this to contain a political statement, an affirmation of the status quo, a declarator that it will not change, and that is the fundamental purpose of Clause 1.
Lord Purvis of Tweed
I am grateful to the Minister because I feel that he may well be making my point for me on the subject of new Section 63A(3). If the Government’s position, which I support, is that there can be change only if the people of Scotland make it in a referendum, does that not adjust the absolute sovereignty of this place, which can make an unfettered decision?
Lord Keen of Elie
Clearly it is not, because, notwithstanding the outcome of any such referendum, this place might decide not to legislate in accordance with the outcome of the referendum. One cannot use these arguments to undermine the ultimate sovereignty and supremacy of Parliament.
Lord Hope of Craighead
I shall take up the point that the Minister made about Clause 1 as a whole—I think he was referring to the whole clause as it now stands, with all three new subsections—that it was simply a political statement. New Section 63A(3) is not just a political statement; it lays down a condition. If that is the right reading of the new subsection, does the Minister not recognise that it might be better to address some of the possible imperfections in new Section 63A(3) as it stands? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, among others, made the point that the phrase “the people of Scotland” is a little ambiguous, and it might be better to say “a referendum held in Scotland” to tell you where the referendum is going to be.
It is quite commonplace in Committee debates for Ministers to say, “We’ll take this away and look at it and perhaps reconsider whether the wording we have in the Bill is the best that could be used”. I wonder whether the Minister would be prepared at least to look at proposed new paragraph (b) in Amendment 6; leaving aside the mention of the Scottish Parliament in its proposed new paragraph (a), it suggests a rewording of new Section 63A(3) to see if it is the best wording that could be adopted. I absolutely accept that it deals with a hypothetical situation but, if one is laying down a condition, would it not be better to use the best possible terms in doing so?
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord for reminding me of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, in that context. At this time the Government consider that we have achieved the best possible wording for the purposes of new Section 63A(3) in Clause 1. I compliment the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, on his eyesight and his ability to read my notes at such a considerable distance. However, the position of the Government remains that we are satisfied that a relatively open provision in this context with regard to the people of Scotland voting in a referendum is the appropriate way forward.
Lord McAvoy
The Minister said a minute ago that the result of any referendum would not be implemented if the Bill were passed and became an Act. That is the reply that was given, and in the current atmosphere it will set lots of hares running. Would he care to clarify?
Lord Keen of Elie
I would be pleased to clarify. We were speaking theoretically in the context of the supremacy and sovereignty of this Parliament. In the light of the referendum finding that the Scottish Parliament should be abolished, it would be necessary for legislation to be put forward. It would in theory be possible for that legislation to be defeated in this Parliament. That is all that I was saying. However, we are in the realms of extreme speculation here—or it appears to me that we are.
Lord McCluskey
My noble and learned friend Lord Hope has pointed out the possible difficulty in the current wording. I am very fond, as are many Scots, of the well-known tennis player called Andy Murray. Is he one of the “people of Scotland” in new Section 63A(3)?
Lord Keen of Elie
I am not in a position to say whether he or any other individual falls into that category, and at this stage I would not speculate on his status.
Lord Cormack
If my noble and learned friend cannot answer that very simple, straight question, does not that in itself indicate that he must recognise the validity of the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that the Bill is capable of further improvement? In his eyes—not necessarily in ours—it was improved in the other place. Is he saying that the Government have got it absolutely right and it cannot be improved in this place?
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Maybe I can help the Minister. Perhaps he is saying that this is all just declaratory, because after all it does not matter what you put in new subsection (3). That subsection just makes the permanence referred to in new subsection (1) conditional because there are conditions there which, if fulfilled, would not make it permanent.
Lord Keen of Elie
If I can complete the journey around the houses that the noble and learned Lord has begun on that point: it appears that new subsection (3) simply underlines the political structure—the declaratory statement contained in the clause as a whole. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, observed that of course it goes a step further in so far as it introduces conditionality to the abolition of the Scottish Parliament, which I acknowledge. As to it being,
“a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”,
that term is capable of clear and objective definition in due course. Respectfully, however, it appears that that wording is sufficiently clear for these purposes.
Lord Purvis of Tweed
Just to carry on a little around the House: the Minister did not make it clear at the Dispatch Box when he said that the people of Scotland would not necessarily be sovereign if this Parliament did not adhere to the result in that referendum. That is absolutely contrary to the Edinburgh agreement that the Prime Minister signed, which stated that the Government would respect that view. The sovereignty of the people should be absolute, not anything else he may say at the Dispatch Box this evening.
Lord Keen of Elie
I cannot agree with the interpretation of sovereignty the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, puts forward. At the end of the day, if there was a referendum—and we are talking about a theory, not political reality—it would be necessary for there to be legislation to implement the outcome of that referendum if it involved the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. No one in reality is contemplating the abolition of the Scottish Parliament. The whole purpose of Clause 1 is to make clear the permanence and the recognition of the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has to recognise that the outcome of any referendum could be implemented only by way of legislation that went through this, the sovereign Parliament of the United Kingdom. That is the only point I seek to make.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I may be able to help my noble and learned friend to get off this line of argument. I have been reflecting on what he is saying about this clause, which is essentially that the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament remains unaltered, and that what is contained in this clause is simply a declaratory political statement. Can he explain to me what a declaratory political statement is? Is a political statement one that says something but means something else? He appears to be saying that the statement is that the Scottish Parliament is permanent, and at the same time that it is not permanent because this place is sovereign. Is his definition of a political statement one which can mean whatever you want it to mean and which is basically not entirely straightforward?
Lord Keen of Elie
I do not accept that expression of the position. As I said at the outset, the whole purpose of Clause 1 is to make a political statement that reflects the terms of the Smith commission agreement, which determined that there should be an expression to the effect that the Scottish Parliament is permanent. We acknowledge that, and that is the political statement being made. It is a declaration of will. However, we also recognise, as I believe this House will recognise, that the United Kingdom Parliament is ultimately sovereign and supreme. I am seeking to make that point. At the end of the day, this Parliament is sovereign, and it cannot disclaim that sovereignty.
Lord Purvis of Tweed
In that case, can the noble and learned Lord expand on the meaning of the Government’s wording in this clause? It states that,
“the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are not to be abolished except on the basis of a decision of the people of Scotland voting in a referendum”.
Therefore, if the people of Scotland vote in a referendum and make a decision, and the Government or Parliament then disregard the view and the decision of the people of Scotland, does that mean that this clause has no purpose at all in legislation? If that is the case, what is the point of this wording being in the Bill?
Lord Keen of Elie
It has a purpose inasmuch as it determines that there cannot be abolition without a referendum. I am simply making the point that, as this is a sovereign and supreme Parliament, it could decline to legislate in accordance with the terms of that referendum result. However, politically that just would not happen.
Lord Davidson of Glen Clova (Lab)
Perhaps I may intervene. The noble and learned Lord—I was going to say “my noble and learned friend” but he is not in this context—has made it entirely clear, beyond peradventure, that this Parliament may do what it chooses because it is sovereign. When he says that this Parliament makes a declaratory statement, that is within its sovereign power. Surely that is the end of this point. If Parliament decides to make this declaration, then so be it.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to my noble and learned friend. It seems to me that we make no further progress on this point, notwithstanding the further observations of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis. I simply underline the sovereignty of this Parliament, and nothing in Clause 1 derogates or takes away from that. That is the bottom line. It is necessary to make progress with this Committee debate rather than to stay in still waters on one sterile point. Therefore, at this point I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hope of Craighead
Perhaps I may return to new subsection (3), which relates to a separate point from the one that the Minister has been emphasising concerning the sovereignty of Parliament and so on. If we look ahead to the day some time next year when this Bill comes back on Report, it is quite likely that there will be an amendment seeking to reword new subsection (3), perhaps along the lines that have already been discussed. I respectfully suggest to the Minister that he would carry a little more credibility if he were to depart just a fraction from the briefing that he is reading from and were prepared to say that he would look again at this. He does not have to commit himself to any rewording, but sometimes when we have these debates in Committee it softens the atmosphere a lot if one is prepared to say simply, “Well, some interesting points have been made. We’ll have another look and perhaps come back with something on Report, or perhaps not”. It would ease the atmosphere a little on this point and avoid repetitive interruptions.
Lord Keen of Elie
I notice what the noble and learned Lord says with regard to new subsection (3) in Clause 1.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
Section 1(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 also refers to the fact that it is a declaration that:
“Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom and shall not cease to be so without the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll held for the purposes of this section”.
Subsection (2) goes on to say:
“But if the wish expressed by a majority in such a poll is that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland, the Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament such proposals to give effect to that wish as may be agreed between Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Ireland”.
Obviously there is a context to that, but does the noble and learned Lord think that it might be helpful to add a further subsection indicating that, if a wish is expressed by a majority in a poll of the people of Scotland that the Scottish Parliament should be repealed, the Secretary of State will bring forward the necessary legislation to give effect to it?
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect, it does not appear to me that the two situations are immediately comparable. In those circumstances, it does not appear to me that that would add to new subsection (3) in Clause 1. I renew my submission that the noble Lord should withdraw the amendment.
Lord Cormack
I ask my noble and learned friend to respond more positively and helpfully to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. It was a very simple point that he made. All he asked was that my noble and learned friend would reflect on what has been said during this debate and come back at a later stage, having reflected. He may be equally adamant, but he really owes it to this House to reflect on what has been said in this debate.
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect to my noble friend, I will reflect upon all observations that have been made in this House, but without commitment.
Lord Norton of Louth
Well, my Lords, this has been a quite fascinating debate. I say to the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, that I fully accept I am a Lord and not the Lord and therefore am quite capable of getting things wrong. However, on this occasion, I am not sure that I have, given the excellent speeches that we have heard in support of these amendments. I really think it is incumbent to pursue the matter further along the lines that several noble Lords have suggested.
The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, argues that declaratory statements are appropriate—and indeed they are but, as the guide to legislation makes clear, not necessarily in legislation. Declaratory statements are the sort of thing that should be done at the Dispatch Box. As the Minister pointed out, there have been occasions when declaratory statements have appeared in statute. But what is quite clear from the debate is the unusual context in which we are discussing this, given that it derives from extant legislation and actually complicates, rather than clarifies, what Parliament has already stipulated in legislation.
My starting point in all this is very similar to that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead—that the Smith commission heads of agreement said that the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government will be made permanent. All parties accepted that, as he said, and the debate has proceeded on that basis. It has largely been taken as given.
It strikes me that there are two problems deriving from that. The first is that it has not been properly debated. I really think that the debate this afternoon in your Lordships’ House is the first thorough, proper debate on principle in relation to this issue. What it has demonstrated is the need for further consideration of the matter. The second problem is the extent to which the Government appear to have taken almost literally the heads of agreement—they have just taken what was said and plonked it in legislation. We will see that shortly when we discuss the Sewel convention. The Government’s line is that this is what Lord Sewel said, so that is the convention and the words go into statute. It is not put on a statutory footing; it is just plonked in statute. I think that the same has happened here. Because the heads of agreement said that it would be made permanent, the Government decided to put in place legislation to make it permanent without thinking through the implications.
Those implications have been well drawn out by the Constitution Committee, as my noble friend Lord Lang has pointed out, and I declare an interest as a member of the committee. In the context of the debate, it is well worth reminding your Lordships of the committee’s report on the Bill, especially paragraph 36:
“It is a fundamental principle of the UK constitution that Parliament is sovereign and that no Parliament may bind its successors. There is now a strong argument that Parliament is seeking to limit its own competence in a way that the courts may seek to uphold in future given that it rests on a requirement for popular consent. While we recognise that it is extremely unlikely that this will ever be tested in the courts, it is nonetheless symbolically important and we are concerned that these provisions, as currently worded, risk introducing uncertainty concerning the absolute nature of parliamentary sovereignty where there should be none”.
This is an extremely serious issue.
I agree with my noble friend Lord Lothian and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, who have come up with some very positive suggestions. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said, I see no reason why the Government could not at least go away and think about the wording of the clause and come back. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has said, we must try to do better. I hope that between now and Report that is exactly what we will do. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McAvoy
My Lords, the Government in their wisdom accepted the Labour amendment in the other place to reflect the Bill as it is. We support that. We think that it was very wise of the Government to do so. It puts the permanency of these institutions beyond any doubt. We all know the law regarding ultimate sovereignty but nevertheless it would be foolish—I am repeating myself—to reject the symbolism of having that in the Bill, so for those reasons we oppose the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I begin by making the observation that, without commitment, of course we are listening and of course we reflect upon the terms of this debate. There can be no question about that. We are here for that very purpose. I do not accept the implication that somehow we have come here with our ears closed or our minds closed, because that is not the case. I say that without commitment.
In the context of this amendment, the words “recognised as” appeared in the original drafting of the clause. I cannot accept the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Lang, that by amending a clause of this kind we end up with second best. With great respect, that is to invert the whole process of Parliament. The object of amendment—of adjustment—is to achieve a better result, and that is what the Government believe was achieved by accepting the amendment put forward by the Labour Opposition in the other place.
I note—and with great respect adopt—the observation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that if you go down the route of “recognised as”, it opens up the question of recognised by whom, in what circumstances and why? That seems wholly unnecessary in the context of this form of declaratory provision within the clause. In these circumstances I invite the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, to withdraw his amendment.
Lord McAvoy
My Lords, not to anyone’s surprise, we oppose the amendment. It was our amendment in the House of Commons that made it clear that it should be the Scottish people who determine the permanency of their Parliament. It is not a decision for the United Kingdom as a whole.
I believe firmly in the role of this House as a revising Chamber. Therefore, there is no question of having to have a mandate, to be elected or any other method of claiming to represent people. With respect to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, it has to be taken into account that he has no mandate for this type of quite dramatic intervention. There is not much of a cry in England, Wales and Northern Ireland for inclusion in such a referendum. It would also pose the additional point made by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that it would lack consistency and political reality to include the whole of the United Kingdom in a referendum in Northern Ireland, although I accept that there are unique circumstances in Northern Ireland.
I hope that I am not getting too repetitive, but it is my opinion, based on my experience of living and staying in Scotland—I have been in Scotland all my life—that there would be complete outrage if such an amendment were supported by this House. I ask colleagues to reject it.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to noble Lords. I reiterate that the purpose of the Bill is to implement the recommendations in the Smith commission agreement. I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Smith, has already observed that the terms of the Bill do that. This provision is consistent with the spirit of the agreement. It is also with precedent, if I can put it in that context. The referendum in 1997 over the matter of devolution was a referendum of the people of Scotland. The referendum on independence in 2014 was a referendum of the Scottish people. It is considered appropriate that we should continue with that model. I note that the noble Lord, Lord Empey, pointed out that the Northern Ireland Act 1998 proceeds in a similar vein. So it is consistent and appropriate that, for the purposes of this Bill, any such referendum—the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, himself acknowledges how extremely unlikely it is that that would even be contemplated —should be a referendum of the Scottish people. I therefore urge him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I am most grateful, but before my noble and learned friend sits down, could he tell me where in the Smith commission agreement there is a proposal that there should be a referendum of this kind?
Lord Keen of Elie
There is no express reference in the Smith commission agreement to a referendum. As my noble friend is aware, that provision was brought into the Bill in the belief that it would strengthen the political statement contained in Clause 1 with regard to the permanence of the Scottish Parliament.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
My Lords, I believe that this introduces the Welsh element. There would be a profound disinterestedness in Gresford about whether the Scottish Parliament exists or not, save in so far as the Barnett formula gives them so much more money than we get. On the other hand, we would resent it hugely if the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, had a vote in a referendum for the abolition of the Welsh Assembly, or, indeed, any successor.
Lord McAvoy
My Lords, is it not the case that the sovereignty of the UK Parliament is already protected by Section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998, which provides that the UK Parliament can always legislate for Scotland?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I compliment the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, on his optimism. The position is clear: we have repeatedly stated, across this House, that the United Kingdom Parliament is a sovereign Parliament. The noble Lord decided to seek a declaratory statement of that. I submit that this is wholly unnecessary: it is beyond doubt that this Parliament is supreme and sovereign. This is restated by Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998. The existing declaratory statements in Clause 1 are not in any sense misleading. They are an expression of a political reality and they are intended to declare that reality as clearly as possible, acknowledging all along the supremacy of this, the United Kingdom Parliament. The proposed amendment is wholly unnecessary and, if anything is misleading it is the necessity for it. I urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.
Lord Cormack
I will not prolong this brief debate unduly, but my noble and learned friend seems to be adopting a fairly intransigent line. If it is permissible to make declaratory statements to appease those who would destroy the United Kingdom, is it not permissible to insert them for those who are dedicated to its future?
Lord McCluskey
The actual wording of Section 28(7), which I do not suppose many noble Lords will have memorised, reads:
“This section does not affect the power of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to make laws for Scotland”.
It does not talk about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament at all. It talks about its continuing power to make laws for Scotland.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I shall give way to my noble and learned friend in a moment. I wish to deal with the points that have been made and what my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay indicated the section said. I have huge respect for him. You always know that the Government are in difficulty when he has to come to their aid. He said that the relevant provision was already in the Bill. However, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, has pointed out, it says nothing of the sort. If this provision was already in the Scotland Act, my noble and learned friend could have said, “In order to make that clear, we will move that provision into this clause in the new Bill”. It is not necessary to duplicate it. The point is that the Scotland Act, as amended by this Bill—if it becomes an Act—will have in it sentences which, to say the least, are very provocative in terms of the continuing powers of sovereignty of this Parliament. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to think that any declaration about the sovereignty of this Parliament should be placed alongside the provision in that section of the Act.
I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, because I thought that what my noble and learned friend said from the Dispatch Box was a little misleading, to say the least.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My noble friend puts it so succinctly. I wish that I had the ability to put it as concisely as he does. I absolutely agree. My noble and learned friend the Minister wanted to intervene. I will happily give way to him if he still wishes to make his point.
Lord Keen of Elie
I apologise to my noble friend Lord Forsyth. I must confess that I was unclear who was intervening on whom. I add to the point made by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. As I understand the point he was making—it was one that I had endeavoured to make before, but obviously had not made clearly—it is simply that Clause 1 is amending and introducing Section 28(8) of the Scotland Act 1998. It is necessary to read that in conjunction with Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, which refers to the ability of this Parliament to legislate in respect of Scotland on all matters. That is a matter to which the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, alluded earlier as well. That is why the issue of sovereignty—the supremacy of this Parliament—is already contained in the relevant section of the Scotland Act, as it will be amended by this clause of the Bill.
Lord Hope of Craighead
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way, but Clause 2 amends Section 28. We are still talking about Clause 1, which amends a different part of the Scotland Act, so there is a separation there. However, I very much endorse what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, said—namely, that any reader of the Scotland Act knows perfectly well that you have to look at Section 28 to understand the competence of the Parliament and the relationship between the two Parliaments. The point is simply that Clause 1 does not deal with Section 28.
Lord Keen of Elie
I accept that correction from the noble and learned Lord. I believe that Section 63 would be amended under Clause 1. However, essentially, the point is that if you read through the whole of Section 28, subsection (7) of that section makes it absolutely clear that this Parliament remains supreme and sovereign in the matter of legislation for Scotland, whether it be reserved or devolved.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My Lords, I think this may be a good moment for me to withdraw my amendment. However, before doing so, I gently point out to my noble and learned friend the very wise words of my noble friend the Earl of Lothian.
Lord Steel of Aikwood (LD)
My Lords, I back up what my noble friend has said. I was in the House when we passed the Scotland Bill and I was never, ever happy with having the Sewel convention translated into law. So I am very glad to support the amendment and it is high time that this was put right.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, first, there is the question of whether the heading is a matter for the parliamentary draftsmen rather than this House, and that is an issue, in my respectful submission. But let us turn to the substance of the—
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I did take advice on this. The amendment has been tabled so the amendment is in order, surely.
Lord Keen of Elie
I was going to continue by saying that, the amendment having been tabled, I would look to its substance, which is that the heading should be, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament”. I am reminded of Voltaire’s observation about the Holy Roman Empire, that it was,
“neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire”.
Clause 2 is not about competence; nor is it about the Scottish Parliament. It restates in statutory terms the procedural convention of the United Kingdom Parliament with respect to its legislation for devolved matters. If we were to have a heading, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament” when in fact we are dealing with a matter that concerns the legislative competence of the United Kingdom Parliament, in my respectful submission, we would not only puzzle historians but confuse everyone else with regard to the content of the relevant clause.
I note what has been said about the present heading. I will reflect upon the observations made about that heading. But given that it is strictly a matter for the draftsmen, I go no further at this time. I hope that my noble friend will see fit to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Purvis of Tweed
I am neither a lawyer nor a historian so I wonder if the noble and learned Lord can help me with his interpretation of this. As this is an amendment Bill to the 1998 Act, once this clause takes effect, if Parliament approves it, will this title actually exist in the amended 1998 Act? If it does not, is this not all rather academic?
Lord Keen of Elie
As I understand it, the title will not exist in the amended 1998 Act. The title is a matter for the parliamentary draftsmen but, as my noble friend Lord Forsyth observed, the amendment was put on the Marshalled List and therefore it is addressed. As I say, I will reflect upon his observations, but at this stage I urge him to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My Lords, I am very happy to withdraw it. I am grateful to my noble and learned friend for relieving me of the responsibility for adding to the statute book the words, “Competence of the Scottish Parliament”. But the point remains that it would be ridiculous to put the Sewel convention into statute and to retain a reference to the Sewel convention. If he is saying, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has very helpfully indicated, that in the consolidated Bill the words “the Sewel convention” will disappear from statute and that the Sewel convention will cease to exist as such because it will now be incorporated in statute, I am absolutely delighted. I am happy to withdraw the amendment with that reassurance. Perhaps he could just give us that assurance and then there will be less for him to reflect on.
Lord Keen of Elie
The term “the Sewel convention” will remain in this Act but will not appear in the amended Scotland Act 1998, which is going to be the relevant amended legislation.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Right, well, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment but give notice that we will return to this at a later stage in the Bill.
Lord Davidson of Glen Clova
Perhaps I can try to explain the proposition put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in his amendment. As we see this, it reflects the reality of the way in which legislative consent Motions have been used over the 15 years, beyond the original.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged for the contributions that have been made with regard to Clause 2 and the proposed amendments thereto. I shall begin by making an observation on a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, with regard to English votes. The provision with regard to English votes does not limit the sovereignty of this Parliament in any sense. English votes introduces the principle of English consent for English measures. The new procedures maintain the important principle of Members of Parliament from all parts of the United Kingdom being able to deliberate and vote on all legislation. Members of Parliament are not excluded from the legislative process. I would not accept the proposition that these provisions somehow derogate from the sovereignty of this Parliament.
Lord Stephen
Does the Minister accept that the House of Commons could pass something and the House of Lords could agree with that proposal but it could then be vetoed by the subgroup of the House of Commons who are defined as English Members of Parliament?
Lord Keen of Elie
It merely means that in respect of matters that are English measures, there must be an element of English consent, but I do not accept that that derogates from the sovereignty of this Parliament. In due course, this Parliament might decide to legislate contrary to those provisions.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
While it is true that legislation still requires the consent of both Houses, EVEL gives a group of Members of the House of Commons who are English MPs the ability to veto a provision so that it proceeds no further. I think that is the point that the noble Lord is making.
Lord Keen of Elie
The term “veto”, if you wish to employ it, is there. It means that English measures require the consent of English Members, but it does not derogate from the sovereignty of this Parliament.
Clause 2 delivers paragraph 22 of the Smith agreement which sets out quite clearly that the Sewel convention will be put on a statutory footing. As with Clause 1 on permanence, the Smith commission agreement did not intend that the constitutional position should be changed, but that legislation should accurately reflect the position that already exists and has existed for 15 years.
I shall put this into context. Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998 makes it perfectly clear that this Parliament can legislate in respect of Scotland in all matters, including devolved matters. It preserves the sovereignty of this Parliament.
The Duke of Montrose
When the Minister talks about the Sewel convention as it has been for 15 years, that does not include the various modifications that have been introduced in the 15 years. The Government will have to be careful about how they describe it.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to his Grace. That does not, and that is why the convention is expressed as it is in Clause 2. There has been Devolution Guidance Note 10 with regard to how from time to time the convention may operate, but those are working arrangements which may alter from time to time and should not be enshrined in statute. That is not considered appropriate. That is why Clause 2 is in the terms in which it is found—because it reflects paragraph 22 of the Smith commission agreement.
My understanding of why the Sewel convention came to be expressed as it was is that Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act allows this sovereign Parliament to legislate, notwithstanding the terms of the 1998 Act, in respect of all matters pertaining to Scotland. There was, I apprehend, concern that if, for example, in a devolved area of competence, such as education or health, the Scottish Government got into serious difficulty, this Parliament might be open to the criticism that it had done nothing about it, even though it reserved to itself the power to legislate for Scotland on devolved matters in terms of Section 28(7). Therefore, the convention was expressed that normally this Parliament will not legislate for Scotland in devolved areas. That was expressed in those terms in order that this Parliament would not face criticism that it had done nothing as the health or education service in Scotland had deteriorated in the face of legislation from the devolved Parliament. That is the background to the introduction, as I understand it, of the Sewel convention. It works both ways.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I am most grateful to my noble and learned friend. Does that mean that as the number of passes being achieved by school leavers since I left office back in 1997 has fallen by 20% compared with England, there is still the possibility that we might intervene in the hash that is being made of the education services by the present Government in Scotland? I assumed that the answer to that question would be absolutely not, so what is my noble and learned friend getting at?
Lord Keen of Elie
The point is that in terms of Section 28(7) we in this Parliament could, on the face of it, intervene in such a matter. That was the whole point of the convention: to make it clear that normally we would not do so. I may have misunderstood the intervention of my noble friend Lord Forsyth but, with respect, it seems to me that that is precisely why the Sewel convention was expressed in the terms in which we find it—so that if educational attainment in Scotland was failing we would not be faced with the criticism that the United Kingdom Parliament had done nothing about it because conventionally we would not normally intervene in a devolved matter, but we retain sovereignty and we have the right to do so. That is why the Sewel convention is expressed in the manner in which it is. The intention is not that Clause 2 should give rise to any justiciable issue. It is a political expression of the convention in statutory form. That is why the term “normally” appears within Clause 2. It makes it clear that this is not a justiciable issue. It is quite clear that in terms of the Smith commission agreement the Sewel convention will be expressed in statutory terms. It is there, but whether this Parliament would consider it appropriate to legislate for Scotland in a devolved area, which it can do pursuant to Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998, is a political issue. It would not be for a court to decide what “normally” meant in that context. It would be a political issue. If it could be litigated in court and made justiciable, the question would be: what possible remedy could the court provide other than a political one? That is why it takes us back to the simple proposition that Clause 2, as set out, would not give rise to a justiciable issue. I give way to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.
Lord Hope of Craighead
The problem is that paragraph 22 of the Smith commission report states that the Sewel convention will be put on a statutory footing. Rather like the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, I wondered what “statutory footing” meant, and I went to various sources to find out. A translation of it is fairly obvious: it means being put on a firm footing by being written into statute. That raises the question of what the effect is of writing something into statute.
The problem is that, whatever the Minister may say, someone seeing it written into statute is going to say, “Here is something which I can use to challenge a piece of legislation that is apparently being passed without the Sewel convention being observed according to its current usage”. With great respect, it does not do for a Minister to say to the court, “This is just a political matter”, because the judges will say, “It’s a matter for us”. The judge may look at the normal rules to see what the legislation was designed to do, and with a bit of research they will find that it was designed to give effect to the Sewel convention to put it on a statutory footing. The judge will then say, “Well, it’s a matter for me to construe what this means”. I am not at all impressed by the Minister saying that it is all a political matter, because it is now in the hands of the court to adjudicate upon.
The Minister asks, “What remedy does that give rise to?”. It creates uncertainty about the effectiveness of legislation. One of the things that we have to be very careful about is that the legislative process is well founded and not open to challenges, except those that are already subject to legislation in the Scotland Act. So, with great respect, it is necessary to warn the Minister that he cannot get away with assuming that the judges will accept that it is simply a political issue; it is not that at all, once it is written into statute.
Lord Keen of Elie
The noble and learned Lord acknowledges that there would be no remedy other than a political remedy in that context, or appears to do so. He shakes his head; nevertheless, there is no remedy except a political remedy. This underlines the importance of the words “recognised as” and “normally” where they appear in Clause 2.
However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, spoke to his Amendment 19, a proposal that it should be expressly stated that the clause is not justiciable and does not give rise to justiciable rights. That is a matter that I would be pleased to discuss with him, albeit that the Government’s position at present is that there is no requirement to expressly state that in the context of a clause that, on the face of it, is implicitly not justiciable. That would be my position on Amendment 19.
Lord McCluskey
On that point, this provision can be put in to render the matter not justiciable, but that is in the context that the decision would in fact be taken by the UK Parliament and that decision could not be challenged in court. The point about the Sewel convention, which the Minister says is being enshrined in legislation, is that the effect changes entirely because the Sewel convention was not justiciable at all, as I understand it, whereas the statute is always justiciable. The court cannot say, “We don’t want to give it a meaning”; the court has to find a meaning because it always has to answer the question before it.
Lord Keen of Elie
In that context, it would be declaring that this is a clause that gives rise to only a political remedy, and that it was not for the court to intervene and determine whether a particular piece of legislation was normal or abnormal. That would not be an issue for the court, and that is the position of the Government with regard to the clause. That could be made clearer, or could be made express, but, as I say, I would be happy to discuss that in the light of the noble and learned Lord’s proposed amendment.
Lord Cormack
If the Minister is prepared to have those discussions, which are welcome, would he also be prepared to have a discussion with those of us who have signed the amendments to delete the word “normally”? I say very gently to him—echoing someone who should not be echoed in this Chamber, Cromwell—conceive it,
“possible you may be mistaken”.
Lord Keen of Elie
I would respond to my noble friend by saying that anything is possible.
Lord Scott of Foscote
The debate at the moment seems to be concerned exclusively with primary legislation. Clause 2 is concerned with primary legislation made by Parliament, but the bulk of legislation these days is made by statutory instrument—made under powers that are granted by Parliament, of course, and many of these are existing powers—but I cannot see anything in the Bill that really grapples with the position of statutory legislation as opposed to primary. I wonder if that is an oversight or whether it is intended.
Lord Keen of Elie
If I may, I shall respond to the observations from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, after the dinner break. I confess it is not immediately apparent to me what the thrust of his point was, and maybe I am missing it, but I shall give it some consideration.
Lord Lawson of Blaby
If the Minister will allow me, those of us who are not as expert as he is are getting a little puzzled. Can he help the House by giving practical examples of the sort of circumstances in which the UK Parliament would legislate on devolved matters? A few such examples would be helpful for us to understand precisely what this is getting at.
Lord Keen of Elie
In a sense, this is connected to my earlier observation that at the end of the day the clause is not justiciable. It will be for Parliament at the time to decide that it is or is not going to legislate for Scotland in a devolved matter. The term “normally” means “usually” or “generally”, but Parliament at the time may decide that it is going to legislate for Scotland in respect of a devolved matter. There is no limit on that power, as is expressly provided by Section 28(7) of the Scotland Act 1998. There is no limit on this Parliament’s sovereignty and supremacy in respect of that matter. The Sewel convention merely says that normally it will not do so; that is all.
Lord McCluskey
Does the Minister realise that if the UK Government decide that the situation is abnormal and therefore decide to legislate, and the Scottish Government go to a Scottish court and say, “We don’t agree with the judgment about normality”, the court will have to make a judgment about that if the word “normally” remains in the wording. There is no mechanism for that other than the court having to sit down and decide what it thinks Parliament intended when it used the word “normally”.
Lord Keen of Elie
With respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, I do not accept that proposition. It would be for the court to say that Parliament decides whether it is normal to legislate for Scotland in a devolved matter. It is not for us to interrogate that decision by Parliament. “Normally” means just that—no more, no less. It is not for the courts to say, “We don’t think the situation was abnormal”. That is a political decision.
Lord Keen of Elie
In view of the time, no.
Amendment 11 would clearly impact on the ability of the United Kingdom Parliament to make laws for Scotland. To that extent, it would modify Section 28(7) of the 1998 Act. The effect of that amendment could be interpreted as an attempt to limit the sovereignty of this Parliament, a point that I believe the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, acknowledged, and the Government would not be prepared to accept such an amendment.
Amendment 13, conversely, seeks to state in the Bill that Clause 2 places no limits on the sovereignty of Parliament. We would say that if you say that expressly in one part of the Bill, you have to take care as to the impact that it will have on other parts of the Bill, and that it is appropriate to acknowledge that nothing in the Bill impinges on the sovereignty of Parliament.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My Lords, before my noble friend withdraws his amendment, can I ask my noble and learned friend a question, as he would not accept an intervention? We are in Committee. I am not a lawyer, but earlier in our discussions I gave the example of where the Scottish Government have fallen down on education in the context of his remarks that we retain the right to pass legislation on education, health or other matters where we feel that they are falling down. I put that forward as a debating point, but in circumstances where a Government, perhaps led by me, decided to do this, it would be outrageous if it was a political decision to intervene on an education matter based on a belief that the Scottish Government —an elected Government—were not doing their job. Therefore, if I were on the other side, leading the Scottish Government, I would go straight to the courts and say, “This word ‘normally’ does not provide for the kind of intervention which is being provided”. I do not understand why my noble and learned friend says that the courts would not take a view of what “normally” meant, and in fact, in this case, if I were the judge I would say, “Actually, ‘normally’ means ‘exceptional’”, but they may take a different view. That is what is causing the concern among the lawyers. However, in common sense terms, to have a word such as “normally” and to argue that there would not be judicial challenge and that, if there was, the courts would just walk away from it, cannot be right. Can my noble and learned friend explain why I am wrong?
Lord Keen of Elie
I do not accept the proposition that my noble friend Lord Forsyth advances. The position is that this Parliament is sovereign; in terms of Section 28(7) of the 1998 Act it may legislate for Scotland in all and any matters, including devolved matters. The Sewel convention simply expresses the view that this Parliament will not normally do so. However, that does not fix some black-line test to be applied by the courts as to what is normal and abnormal; it will be a matter for Parliament going forward to decide if or when it would ever legislate for Scotland in respect of a devolved matter.
Lord Norton of Louth
My noble and learned friend’s argument was that the Bill puts into statute the recommendations of the Smith commission, and in this case, recommendation 22:
“The Sewel Convention will be put on a statutory footing”.
Surely on his own argument the Government will have to withdraw Clause 2, not only on the grounds of what constitutes a statutory footing but because it embodies the words of Lord Sewel, which he spoke when the Scotland Bill was before Parliament, and not the convention as understood at the time the commission produced its report.
Lord Keen of Elie
I do not accept that, because it appears that what is understood by the Sewel convention is the expression of that convention by Lord Sewel during the passage of the Scotland Act 1998 through Parliament. I indicated before the sundry working arrangements that developed and changed over the passage of the 15 years after that convention came into place, such as DGN10, which is why there is no attempt, and properly so, to express those working arrangements in statutory terms within the Bill.
The Duke of Montrose
Can the Minister say whether that means that there will be a new convention that includes those elements?
Lord Keen of Elie
It may be that further working arrangements will develop as between the two Parliaments with respect to legislation that touches upon devolved matters. However, the provision as expressed in the Bill is simply that as expressed by Lord Sewel at the time the Scotland Act passed through Parliament in 1998. It merely says that while in terms of Section 28 we have the power to legislate for Scotland in all matters, including devolved matters, we will not normally do so.
Lord Stephen
As noble Lords will know, the Liberal Democrats are very supportive of the Bill, but the explanation just given by the Minister of the Sewel convention and the issues around it worries me greatly. From the outset, I say that I strongly support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, which would leave out “normally”. It seems that much of the Minister’s argument about protecting the sovereignty of the UK Parliament hangs on retaining the word “normally”, because that then gives the UK Parliament very wide discretion, as I read it, to legislate, as the Minister explains it, in areas that could include education, transport, housing, health and all the issues that are the very stuff of the Scottish Parliament. If that is the Minister’s intention, that is hugely controversial. I will say no more than that, because I do not want to develop this issue into a major argument on these points.
However, let me be clear. Back in 1998, when the Sewel convention was introduced, it was not in any circumstances with a view to this Parliament stepping in to legislate in the areas of transport, health and education if the Scottish Parliament was to make a mess of it. That was absolutely not the reason why it was introduced. Its wording and the reasons for its introduction are quite clear; they are here in Clause 2, which says that,
“it is recognised that the Parliament of the United Kingdom will not normally legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the Scottish Parliament”.
Therefore, even by the Minister’s own explanation, the consent of the Scottish Parliament to legislate in these potentially controversial areas would be required, and it would not happen. There is no way that the Scottish Parliament, in terms of the Sewel Motion as it went back to 1998, would cover legislation in health and education—
Scotland Bill
Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts(8 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord McAvoy (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Foulkes of Cumnock for bringing this forward. I cannot help but make the point that it is a pity that we are dealing with this at this time of night and that noble Lords are curtailing their contributions in this most significant period of the evening. Quite frankly, we have been treated to two or three hours of negativity and continual attacks on the Bill and the Ministers bringing forward the Bill, and it is refreshing to have an extremely positive contribution from my noble friend to address a problem—and there is a problem.
Saying that there is a one-party state is overstating it, but we miss the experience of having Scottish nationalist party Members in this House contributing to this debate. It is mirrored in some ways in the Scottish Parliament where the committee system was supposed to balance things. However, I understand that one party controls the committee chairs and members of committees. They are not operating as a check and balance on the Executive. That is to be regretted.
My noble friend Lord Foulkes has no great expectation —although you never know—of this amendment being incorporated into the Bill, but he has sparked a debate about a real issue that we need to address, which the people of Scotland, the Scottish nationalist party and the other Scottish political parties have to look at as well. I take the point from the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that this is probably not the Bill to do that in, but by moving the amendment my noble friend has raised the issue, highlighted it and received some very thoughtful contributions from noble Lords. They had elements of negativity, but they nevertheless addressed the problem. I will not mention anyone in particular who has been negative all night, but he knows who is.
My noble friend has done us all a service by bringing this forward. The details are in the amendment and noble Lords will understand the amount of work that has been put in by my noble friend in assembling it. It is a first-class amendment and we are not opposed to it. We congratulate our noble friend on bringing it forward and hope that it sparks a debate not just in this Chamber but with our Scottish National Party colleagues in Scotland so that they can turn their mind to this. That would be the real bonus to come from my noble friend’s contribution. If we can spark a debate in Scotland so that the situation is looked at, my noble friend will have done a commendable service. I therefore appeal to our colleagues in Scotland to give this proposal particular attention.
We can be proud of the example we set. Most of us here, although not all, are determined not to destroy the place by what could be called irresponsible behaviour. Most of us are committed to the positive side of this House and the revising job that it does. I would like to see something like that in Scotland and I hope that we can take our Scottish National Party colleagues along with us. I think that the people of Scotland would be better served by that. I close by again thanking my noble friend for his extremely thoughtful contribution.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
As the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, might appreciate, I am increasingly conscious that the robust scrutiny of this Chamber could be seen as an elegant example of how a second Chamber can operate. Be that as it may, the proposal he has put forward by way of his amendment is not a reflection of what was contained in the Smith commission agreement. The establishment of a second Chamber did not feature. However, as noble Lords will be aware, the noble Lord, Lord Smith, in his personal recommendations observed that the transfer of these substantial new powers would mean that the Scottish Parliament’s oversight of the Scottish Government would need to be strengthened. I recognise the noble Lord’s desire to see that the exercise of these substantial new powers should be properly and effectively scrutinised.
This Government fully endorse the recommendation made by the noble Lord, Lord Smith, that the Scottish Parliament’s oversight of the Scottish Government needs to be strengthened, but as the noble Lord set out, it is in the first instance the responsibility of the Presiding Officer and the Scottish Parliament to take forward this important work. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, for his contribution to this debate and for putting before us what was noted by the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, to be a real issue. Nevertheless, I say on behalf of the Government that this is not the place for such an amendment. This is not a place to bring in such a proposal when it was not addressed in the Smith commission agreement, and I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord McAvoy
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Earl and congratulate him on his amendment. I will be relatively brief as well. We support much of what is suggested, other than proposed new paragraph (2)(d), as we do not believe that the “appropriateness” of devolution needs to be reviewed. We will be proposing similar arrangements with regard to the transfer of the welfare provisions, so the amendment is extremely useful.
I think the noble Earl would accept that such arrangements are founded on mutual respect and co-operation between the two Governments. We all have to be careful with the sensitivity of language but we cannot have it portrayed—I know the noble Earl has not done this—as Westminster talking down to Holyrood. But conducted in an atmosphere of co-operation, friendship and mutual respect, I think there can be a great service done to the Scottish people and the rest of the United Kingdom.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Earl for putting forward this amendment. As your Lordships are aware, the matter of intergovernmental working was addressed by the noble Lord, Lord Smith, in his introduction to the Smith commission agreement, in which he emphasised its importance in achieving the aims of devolution.
A considerable degree of very positive co-operation between the Scottish and United Kingdom institutions takes place on a daily basis, from routine dialogue on matters such as planning for civil contingencies to supporting business and exports. It would be difficult to report on each and every one of these interactions. Nevertheless, it is important to recognise that they should be as transparent as possible.
Specific steps have been taken recently in encouraging more regular collaboration between the United Kingdom and Scottish Governments in areas of joint interest. One example of such work is the cross-Administration “Devolution and You” Civil Service capability campaign, which the Cabinet Secretary launched in June 2015. In addition, there is now the Joint Ministerial Working Group on Welfare, which was established to provide a forum for discussion and decision-making on implementation of the welfare-related aspects of the Smith commission agreement.
I also welcome the work of the Constitution Committee on behalf of this Chamber and note its recommendations regarding increased cross-parliamentary scrutiny of intergovernmental relations. This was also recommended by the Scottish Parliament’s Devolution (Further Powers) Committee. It will be important to see how Parliament responds to these recommendations. Furthermore, my noble friend Lord Dunlop set out during Second Reading details of how we are working with the three devolved Administrations to review intergovernmental arrangements and ensure effective working relationships with those Administrations.
There is a concern that a statutory duty to report on these interactions could prove burdensome and might prove unnecessary. However, we—the Government —are happy to take away and consider what the noble Earl has suggested, and explore how we may incorporate these suggestions into the work which is going on with regard to intergovernmental relations. I would be happy to discuss this with him. However, having regard to the present terms of the Bill and the comments that have been made, I invite my noble friend to withdraw this amendment.
The Earl of Dundee
My Lords, I thank all of your Lordships for your kind support for this amendment, starting with the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord McAvoy. The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, emphasised and drew to our attention the vital importance of the two Parliaments and Governments being on equal terms. That must be key to success.
The noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, gave us an example from his own experience, which started off in an intransigent way with people not talking to each other. As he said, that can be converted to something constructive when people do otherwise.
I take the point made by my noble friends Lord Lang, Lord Sanderson and Lord Lindsay, who commented that the amendment might go further than it does. My noble friend also suggested that it should apply to all parts of the Bill and instanced, from his past committee work, evidence from other institutions and Parliaments in other parts of the world which proves beyond doubt that successful government comes from proper co-operation between the parties concerned.
I am extremely grateful to my noble and learned friend for what he has just said—namely, that he will take this amendment away. Meanwhile, I now beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, Clauses 3 to 10 devolve full powers to the Scottish Parliament in respect of the registration, franchise, administration and conduct of Scottish parliamentary elections, with the exception of certain specified subject matters which are reflected in the Smith commission agreement.
Government Amendment 24 removes what is now a redundant provision in respect of the Scottish Ministers’ order-making powers under new Section 12 of the Scotland Act 1998, which is to be inserted by Clause 4. Following amendment on Report in the Commons, new Section 12(1) allows the Scottish Ministers to make provision under that section if it,
“would be within the legislative competence of”,
the Scottish Parliament,
“if included in an Act of the Scottish Parliament”.
Since the digital service is reserved under new Section B3(B) of Schedule 5 to the Scotland Act 1998, as inserted by Clause 3, the order-making power of the Scottish Ministers under the new Section 12 cannot extend to making provision about the digital service. In Clause 6, additional powers are transferred to Scottish Ministers to make provision about the digital service in relation to Scottish parliamentary elections and to local government elections in Scotland, with the agreement of UK Ministers. Amendment 24 is essentially a technical amendment which arises out of the amendment on Report in the Commons to new Section 12(1).
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My Lords, I am conscious of the late hour but I would like to move Amendment 26. As we have already discussed during the course of the evening, there is no second Chamber in the Scottish Parliament. This House has an important constitutional role in preventing the House of Commons from extending its own life. Although the circumstances in which that might happen are hard to consider, it is an important check and balance.
This amendment seeks to make it quite clear that the Scottish Parliament cannot extend the interval between ordinary general elections and therefore prolong its own life under any circumstances. It would have been possible of course to make that subject to the agreement of the Westminster Parliament—the British Parliament—but I think that an absolute prohibition on extending the life is the most appropriate way to proceed. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I note the reasoning behind the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. At present, Section 2 of the Scotland Act 1998 provides that general elections are to be held every four years. That power is to be devolved to the Scottish Parliament, but it will not be without limitation. The Scottish Parliament cannot pass legislation that is not compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights. Pursuant to Article 3 of the First Protocol to the Convention, there is a requirement for free and fair elections at reasonable intervals. The Smith commission agreement proposes that it should be for the Scottish Parliament to determine those reasonable intervals. We consider that that is appropriate and in accordance with the recommendations of the agreement, which the Bill seeks to implement. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I have to say to my noble and learned friend that I do not think that that is a very satisfactory response. There was talk earlier in the evening about a one-party state and the dominance of the Parliament by one party. The precedent is long established that it is not possible for the other place to extend the life of a Parliament. Were it to try to do so, this House has an important role, which would prevent that from happening except in the most exceptional circumstances. Perhaps I have misunderstood what my noble and learned friend said, but he appeared to say that it is a matter for the Scottish Parliament to decide what the timing is between elections, and that cannot be right.
I am not suggesting for a moment that the Scottish Parliament might decide to do this under its current regime and Administration but I rather anticipated in putting down this amendment that my noble and learned friend would tell me that there was some other protection. Frankly, for this Government of all Governments to say that we should rely on the European Convention on Human Rights is ironic—to put it mildly. I hope that my noble friend will at least undertake to give this further consideration before we return to later stages of the Bill.
Lord Keen of Elie
I first apologise to the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy. I had not appreciated that he intended to speak in the context of this proposed amendment and intervened too early. For that I apologise.
I will just add that the Smith commission agreement determined, on the basis of the consensus of five political parties, that elections to the Scottish Parliament should be devolved, and that the timing of those elections should be devolved to the Scottish Parliament. We must regard the Smith commission agreement as the product of a responsible negotiation by responsible political parties, and we must regard the Scottish Parliament as a responsible devolved body. We have no right to do otherwise, if I might respectfully say so. Given the existing backstop in terms of convention law pursuant to which, under Article 3 of Protocol 1, there is a requirement for free and fair elections at reasonable intervals, in my submission that appears an appropriate way forward.
On the matter of extending the life of the Parliament, as raised by my noble friend Lord Forsyth, an Order in Council under Section 30 in October 2015 allowed the Scottish Parliament to set the 2016 election at more than four years, extending it to five years. I am not aware of another occasion.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
On my noble and learned friend’s reference to the European convention, what constitutes a reasonable interval? Would five or six years constitute a reasonable interval?
Lord Keen of Elie
That would be a matter for the Scottish Parliament to determine, and is subject to review. If it gets that wrong, any legislation that it passes is not law, pursuant to Section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998.
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to noble Lords. Clearly I cannot comment on any dialogue that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has had recently with the noble Lord, Lord Smith. I merely observe that there is a distinction between improving the Bill in order to implement the Smith commission agreement and, on the other hand, extending the Bill so that it goes beyond the terms of the agreement, or in fact retreating so that the Bill does not implement it. We would of course be happy to pursue further dialogue ourselves with the noble Lord, Lord Smith, if he felt that that would be useful.
These amendments seem to fall into two broad categories: on the one hand, amendments to the current clauses that are intended to improve the drafting of the Bill, and, on the other, a second theme extending the scope of the supermajority clause to matters that were not included in the Smith commission agreement. I shall deal with these in turn. I turn first to those amendments put forward as a means of improving the operation of Clause 11 as and when it is implemented. Amendment 35 would allow for a Bill to be passed without a Division. Our considered position is that a Division is the most straightforward way of verifying that a two-thirds majority in the Scottish Parliament has been achieved. For this reason, we cannot agree with the proposal in Amendment 35, which provides for a Bill to be passed by consensus.
In addition, we do not agree with the proposal in Amendment 39 that the Scottish Parliament should be able to “reconsider” a Bill if the Presiding Officer decides that a supermajority is required and the Supreme Court later affirms this. Nor do we agree with Amendment 40, which appears to provide that the Scottish Parliament should be able to reconsider a Bill if the Presiding Officer decides that a supermajority is required and the Bill receives only a simple majority. We consider that in both these situations there should be careful consideration and no short-cut to a final vote which requires the supermajority in the context of such legislation.
While we agree with the rationale behind Amendments 30 and 38 and parts of Amendments 37 and 40, we believe that the Bill as drafted provides for these considerations and that therefore such amendment is unnecessary. We would of course be happy to discuss this further with the proposers of the amendments.
I will address those amendments which seek to extend the scope of the supermajority provision, particularly Amendments 31 and 33, and I think a part of Amendment 34. Amendments 31, 33 and 34 seek to ensure that legislation brought forward by the Scottish Parliament concerning the period of time between ordinary general elections to the Scottish Parliament should also be covered by the requirement for a two-thirds majority. The second part of Amendment 33 seeks to ensure that Bills concerning the alteration of boundaries of constituencies, regions or any equivalent electoral area for the Scottish Parliament should also be covered by the two-thirds majority. The simple response of the Government is that the Smith commission agreement specifically outlined the subject matter, which it considered should be subject to the supermajority requirement. It did not propose that legislation concerning the term length of the Scottish Parliament, the date of any Scottish Parliament elections or the alteration of boundaries should be subject to a two-thirds majority of the Scottish Parliament. In these circumstances, we would not be content with the proposed amendments. I therefore invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment in view of the points that have been made by the noble and learned Lord.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My Lords, the hour is late, but I will say just a few words in respect of this amendment, which, basically, ensures that changes to the franchise, the constituencies and the number of MSPs—which under the provisions of the Bill require a two-thirds majority—have also to be approved at Westminster. I am not a great believer in opinion polls; as we discovered at the general election, they can be quite wrong. However, it is not inconceivable that two-thirds of the Scottish Parliament at the forthcoming elections could be composed of people who believe that Scotland would be better off independent. If that were to happen, and this Parliament, which is the United Kingdom Parliament, had created circumstances in which it was possible for fundamental changes to be made to the franchise, the constituencies and the number of MSPs, that would be a matter of very considerable concern. Personally, I do not like the idea of two-thirds supermajorities; it is an unfortunate intrusion into our constitutional affairs. It has knock-on implications for other devolved institutions and for Westminster, but of course the Smith commission has recommended it, so it would appear that we have to go along with it. The amendment would provide a belt-and-braces safeguard to ensure that key issues such as the franchise, the constituencies and the number of MSPs were approved at Westminster, having also had a two-thirds majority in the Scottish Parliament. I beg to move.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, Clause 11 requires certain types of electoral legislation to be passed by a two-thirds majority, or supermajority, of the Scottish Parliament. Paragraph 27 of the Smith commission agreement states in terms that this is:
“To provide an adequate check on Scottish Parliament legislation”,
in these areas. An “adequate check” was the consensus of the five political parties which took part in the Smith commission and which arrived at the Smith Commission agreement.
The Government consider that the supermajority requirement provides an appropriate check on this type of Scottish Parliament legislation. Indeed, to approve this amendment would be to give with one hand and then take away with the other so far as the Scottish Parliament is concerned. It would not be in accordance with the spirit of the Smith commission agreement, let alone with the terms of paragraph 27. In these circumstances, I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My noble and learned friend’s only argument has been, once again, to rest on the Smith commission. He keeps saying that it had the support of all five political parties. I am not aware of the members of the Conservative Party being consulted at all on the Smith commission proposals; nor am I aware of any discussion on those matters in the other place or in this place. What happened was that people nominated by the political parties got together and produced a report. It really is quite misleading to keep saying that this was endorsed by all the political parties. That may have been true of the Liberal Democrats or other parties but it certainly was not true of the Conservative Party. Furthermore, this was all done at an enormous pace—it was all agreed in eight weeks. As we have heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, the noble Lord, Lord Smith, himself has not sought to argue that he has endorsed this Bill in terms of the provisions of the Smith commission.
Extradition: UK Law and Practice (Extradition Law Committee Report)
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The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I am pleased to be here to speak for the Government on the matter of extradition, in which I know the House has taken a close interest over recent years. I will seek to reply to all the points made during what has been an illuminating debate.
I start by thanking my noble friend Lord Inglewood for leading this debate and extend my thanks to the Select Committee members for their thorough analysis of our extradition law and practice.
Of course, this is not the first time that our extradition laws and practices have been reviewed. In recent years, we have seen the independent Baker review and reports from the Home Affairs Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights, among others. The Government always read these reports with great interest.
The Extradition Law Committee’s report was particularly timely, with the newer provisions inserted into the Extradition Act 2003 in the last Parliament—such as the forum and proportionality bars—having begun to operate only quite recently. The committee’s review and scrutiny of those reforms have been of help to the Government, and we are grateful for that.
Like the committee, the Government believe that the changes made in recent years to UK extradition law mean that the process now operates more fairly and in a way in which the rights of persons are effectively balanced against the interests of justice. It was under the present Home Secretary that a number of important reforms to the system were made: for example, the introduction of the forum bar and the removal of the Secretary of State’s consideration of human rights issues in favour of that of the courts. Furthermore, the reforms of the European arrest warrant go some way, I believe, to meeting criticisms which have been made of its operation in the past. I will attempt to look at each of the points which have been raised, Should I omit any, I undertake to write to your Lordships on those matters.
I begin by mentioning, by way of background, some very basic statistics. We should remember that, in the context of extradition, we are dealing not just with persons liable to trial but with persons who have already been convicted of criminal offences. In the period between 2009 and 2014, for which figures are available, the United Kingdom received in excess of 29,000 requests for arrest warrants. Of those, fewer than 5% pertained to British nationals. So far as Part 2 requests are concerned—that is, those that fall outwith the European arrest warrant system—there were, in the same period, only 336 requests. That is a tiny proportion of the total. The United States has been repeatedly referred to, and I have just noticed that in the same period, 82 requests were received from the United States and 67 people were surrendered in consequence of those requests. On the other hand, as has already been noted, the United States responded to each and every extradition request which was submitted to it by the United Kingdom. That is an attempt to put the matter into context.
My noble friend Lord Inglewood raised a series of issues—such as assurances, sensitive information being dealt with by counsel, qualified solicitors and legal aid—all of which, to a greater or lesser extent, were touched upon by other noble Lords. I will take some of these matters in turn.
The matter of legal aid was raised by a number of your Lordships. The position of the Government remains as stated in their response to the report. It is considered inappropriate for extradition cases to form an exception to the normal provisions with regard to means testing for legal aid. There is no justification for such a position to be adopted, in our view. In the past year, 1,586 persons were the subject of a European arrest warrant, of whom just in excess of 1,000 made an application for legal aid. In 90% of those cases where legal aid was applied for, the completed application for extradition proceedings to be legally aided was processed within two working days. There are exceptions, and there may be cases where someone refused legal aid seeks a review and further documentary evidence is requested with regard to their means, which can be time consuming. But we are talking about a tiny proportion of a small number of cases. That does not, on the face of it, account for any three-month delays in the extradition process.
Connected to legal aid is the requirement for expert advice to be available to persons who are going to be the subject of extradition proceedings. The noble Lord, Lord Bach, noted that it is not the Government’s position that some form of test or certification should be required in the context of the matter of extradition. I quote from the oral evidence of the district judges which was given to the committee in October 2014:
“There is the duty solicitor situation, which is at the first hearing. We are enormously reliant on our duty solicitors, and our view is that, with one or two possible exceptions, they perform their task extremely well. I am not able to give you, and I do not think either of my colleagues here is able to give you, any example of where we thought that an individual was let down by the duty solicitor”.
Given that evidence, in our view as a Government it is difficult to justify the potentially considerable cost and inconvenience of seeking to introduce a certification system in regard to extradition. Accordingly, it remains the Government’s position that we will not go down that route.
My noble friend Lady Wilcox alluded to the provision of personal support units in the matter of civil cases before the courts and inquired whether it might be possible to extend such a provision to cases of extradition. It is a point that we notice and a point of interest, and I will undertake to write to her on the subject to see whether that matter can be taken forward. It is a novel suggestion, and one that we are willing to consider very seriously.
On assurances, matters are still the subject of inquiry. We are asked when it is likely that the Government will complete their analysis of this matter. They have undertaken to do so before the end of the year. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, will be aware, winter comes early in Scotland, and so when we refer to “autumn” we may be there already. We are concerned that that should be done thoroughly and carefully rather than quickly. I can assure your Lordships that once that inquiry has been completed, we will seek to make your Lordships aware of its terms.
A further matter arose from the context of the United States so far as assurances are concerned. It is the position of the Government that courts are best positioned to determine what assurances may be required in each individual case of extradition. That extends to the matter of how a person is to be transferred, how the risk is to be assessed so far as their transfer is concerned, and what demands might be sought by way of assurances for bail; remembering, of course, that extradition can proceed only in trial-ready cases. However, of course, that may nevertheless involve delay before a trial commences.
There are of course varying standards of prisons, and various standards are applied in the matter of bail as between different jurisdictions. As a matter of comity, we have to be prepared to accept that in order that the extradition system can operate. There has to be a degree of reciprocity.
The noble Lord, Lord Jones, alluded to the shock and fear of persons facing a foreign court. I can appreciate that. Equally, there is the shock and fear of persons facing a British court when charged with serious criminal offences. I might go further and speak by way of personal experience of the shock and fear faced by advocates sometimes facing British courts. However, it does not understate the problem. One understands that anyone who is faced with serious criminal charges will be shocked and fearful for their future, and all the more so when they are placed in a foreign jurisdiction. Nevertheless, these issues are incident to the comity that applies in the context of extradition.
If we wish to ensure that we are not a haven for criminals, we must maintain a civilised and suitable system of extradition. If we wish to secure the return of those who have committed serious criminal offences in this country, we must be prepared to allow for some degree of give and take over standards of bail, imprisonment and sentencing.
That brings me to the issue of plea bargaining. Much is said about that in the context of the United States, but at the end of the day, it is not accepted by any court that the plea bargain system is not convention-compliant. We have to acknowledge that. It may not be something that we would wish to embrace; it may not be a system we admire—but again, as a matter of comity, there has to be a degree of give and take if the extradition system is to function effectively and properly.
The noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, asked about the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant in its present form. We are confident that, with the addition of the proportionality issue and the forum issue, we now have an effective system for the European arrest warrant. There were difficulties in the past, but we believe that we have moved on from there. Going back to the subject of the United States, it is again important to bear in mind the question of forum. It will be for a British court to determine where, essentially, a crime is considered to have been committed. We live in an internet age and a joined-up world. An act in one country can have its effect in another, many miles away. Nevertheless, the introduction of the forum defence—or the forum issue—gives us a further lever to ensure that appropriate cases are dealt with in British courts and are not the subject of extradition.
In that context, I would add that we still regard the arrest warrant as the final step to be taken. I reassure your Lordships that that remains the Government’s view: it is a matter of last resort.
Lord Rowlands
I apologise for interrupting the Minister, but could he advise us what stage has been reached with the Commission’s revised handbook, in which the Government have said they want to embed the principle of last resort?
Lord Keen of Elie
I understand that we are working with other EU states and the Commission on this matter. One of the aims is to ensure that appropriate consideration is given to other instruments, but there is no clear idea of when that work will be concluded.
I have been given a two-minute warning, so I will endeavour to deal with the other matters that have been raised now, if I can. I have talked about legal aid and accreditation, and proportionality. As for certification, as I have said, we hope to publish the review before the end of the year, and I would be happy to write to my noble friend Lord Inglewood and the Home Affairs Select Committee when it is available, so that it may be given consideration.
The noble Lord, Lord Bach, raised the question of liaison with family courts in the context of extradition. I can advise that there is ongoing discussion with the profession and the courts over that issue. We understand its importance, and we are seeking to explore it and come to a view, so there is ongoing work there.
My noble friend Lord Inglewood raised a further point about proportionality. I will just make it clear that, as matters now operate with the European arrest warrant, consideration will only be given to cases where, subject to trial, a sentence of at least three years’ imprisonment would be imposed. In the context of a convicted party, a sentence of at least four months should have been imposed before extradition will be considered. That has to be borne in mind. Consequently, we are in a position to avoid the sort of trivial cases—or cases that were claimed to be trivial—that were made in the past. However, the Government do not consider that it would be possible to go further than this when dealing with cases of conviction without potentially breaching the framework decision that underpins the arrest warrant itself. That is why we feel it would be difficult to go further in that context.
I have some figures among my many notes that I want to mention in answer to the question which I think the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, asked about proportionality. Since the introduction of the proportionality bar in July 2014, the National Crime Agency has refused to certify 224 European arrest warrants on the basis of the bar and other discretionary grounds. I hope that figure assists the noble Lord.
The Government are confident that the extradition process now operates in an effective and appropriate manner, balancing the interests of justice with those of the individual. The necessary protection is provided by the courts, which have the means to seek assurances from other jurisdictions in particular circumstances and according to individual cases. Of course, the question of policing those assurances is a difficult one, but the Government do not believe that a memorandum of understanding is the way forward, as that would simply raise the question of how we police the memorandum of understanding. As I say, that matter is still the subject of further inquiry.
In closing, I once again thank my noble friend Lord Inglewood, the members of the committee and all those who have spoken today. I only hope that in replying, I have done justice to the debate.
Lord Empey
My Lords, before the Minister sits down, could he update us on the Polish situation, which was producing such a vast number of cases at the time we were investigating?
Lord Keen of Elie
I am aware that, according to the statistics over the past five years, a very large proportion of European arrest warrant requests—in excess of 30%—did emanate from Poland. I will write to the noble Lord with updated figures, as I do not have them to hand at present.
Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedules 4 and 5) Order 2015
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Lord Keen of Elie
That the draft order laid before the House on 29 June be approved.
Relevant document: 1st Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments. Considered in Grand Committee on 7 September.
Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedules 4 and 5) Order 2015
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Lord Keen of Elie
That the Grand Committee do consider the Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedules 4 and 5) Order 2015.
Relevant document: 1st Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I beg to move that the draft order laid before the House on 29 June 2015 now be considered. If it pleases the Committee, I will provide a brief summary of the background to this order and set out what it seeks to achieve.
When the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 was passed, it provided that the next general election for membership of this Parliament would be 7 May 2020. That same Act also provided that the next Scottish parliamentary general election would be 5 May 2016. The Scotland Act 1998 provides for the poll at Scottish parliamentary general elections to be held on the first Thursday in May every fourth year. This all combines to mean that, as things currently stand, there are due to be general elections to both the UK and Scottish Parliaments on 7 May 2020. Clearly, such a clash of elections is undesirable and this Government have always been committed to ensuring that it should be avoided.
The Government are also committed to implementing the recommendations of the Smith commission agreement. One of those recommendations is that the Scottish Parliament should have all powers in relation to Scottish parliamentary and local government elections in Scotland. As noble Lords will be aware, the current Scotland Bill makes provision to implement that recommendation. However, as both the UK and Scottish Governments agree that Scottish parliamentary electors should be aware of the term of the Scottish Parliament to which they are electing Members when they vote in May 2016, we are faced with an issue of timing. If the Scottish Parliament is to legislate in advance of the May 2016 election to determine a date for the first Scottish parliamentary ordinary general election after that one, the power to do so needs to be devolved now. Devolving that power is exactly what this order does.
The order is made under Section 30 of the 1998 Act, which provides a mechanism whereby Schedules 4 and 5 to that Act can be modified by an Order in Council, subject to the agreement of both the UK and Scottish Parliaments. This order will amend both Schedules 4 and 5 to the 1998 Act, with the agreement of both Parliaments. Schedule 4 to the 1998 Act lists enactments which are protected from modification by the Scottish Parliament. Much of the 1998 Act is included in that list. As I have previously mentioned, the 1998 Act provides for the poll at Scottish parliamentary general elections to be held on the first Thursday in May every fourth year. Section 2(2) of the 1998 Act makes that provision. Therefore, this order will amend Schedule 4 to the 1998 Act to allow the Act of the Scottish Parliament to modify Section 2(2) in relation to the first Scottish parliamentary ordinary general election after 2016. Secondly, Schedule 5 to the 1998 Act lists the matters that are reserved to this Parliament. Among other things, elections for membership of the Scottish Parliament are reserved. In order that the Scottish Parliament can determine the day of the poll at the first Scottish parliamentary ordinary general election after 2016, this order will amend Schedule 5 to provide that that matter will no longer be a reserved matter.
The amendments to both schedules will combine to ensure that the Scottish Parliament has the power to determine the date of the first Scottish parliamentary ordinary general election after that to be held next May. The order also amends Section 2 of the 1998 Act in connection with the amendments to the schedules. However, the order places certain limitations on the day which can be chosen by the Scottish Parliament. Specifically, the order will prevent the day of the poll determined by the Scottish Parliament being the same as the day of the poll at a UK parliamentary general election, a European parliamentary election or ordinary local government elections in Scotland. I note that these limitations were as recommended in the Smith commission agreement.
I also take time to anticipate two matters in relation to the order. First, devolving this power to the Scottish Parliament will mean that the Scottish Parliament can, in respect of that election, legislate for the term of the relevant Parliament. Some have asked whether that could result in there being a term of 50 years determined by the Scottish Parliament. To that the Government have two responses. First, the Scottish Parliament is a responsible, democratic body; there is no realistic prospect of such a thing happening. But even if it was contemplated in the wilder imaginings of any parliamentarian, let me also point out that pursuant to Article 3 of the first protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, there is a requirement for free elections at reasonable intervals. The Scottish Parliament, pursuant to Section 29 of the Scotland Act 1998 can bring forward only legislation that complies with the convention—and, in particular, Article 3 of the first protocol.
Lord Steel of Aikwood (LD)
My Lords, I, too, support the order. I welcome the Advocate-General’s introduction of it. My mind goes back to the passage of the 1998 Bill through this House. At that time, I tried to move amendments that would have covered exactly the issues we are debating today. I am sorry to say that I did not get any support from the Labour Government, or indeed from the Conservative Opposition at that time. It struck me as odd that we were establishing a new Parliament in Scotland, yet this Parliament was going to continue to control that Parliament’s internal affairs. That seemed to me to be wrong. I was reinforced in that view when I took office as the first Presiding Officer at the Scottish Parliament and found that silly things such as the number of Deputy Presiding Officers we were allowed to have was laid down by this Parliament—that we could do nothing to make any internal changes. I therefore welcome the order. The Smith commission was very clear in stating that the Scottish Parliament should have all powers in relation to its own elections and,
“powers to make decisions about all matters relating to the arrangements and operations of the Scottish Parliament”.
That seems to me to be common sense. I very much welcome it.
If we leave this order as it is, it is open to the Scottish Parliament to change the predicted date of a Scottish Parliament election. I have tried to work it out. I hope that my arithmetic is correct, but if we leave things as they are and the Westminster Parliament is on a fixed basis of elections every five years and the Scottish Parliament is on a fixed basis of every four years, every 20 years there will be a clash. The Scottish Parliament would therefore have to use the powers in the order to make the changes. In the light of that, it would be sensible if the Scottish Parliament were to reflect on the fact that we have a fixed-term Parliament here and in Scotland, and that it would make more sense for the fixed term to be the same so that the dates do not clash at any time. That is a matter for the Scottish Parliament to decide in the future. In the mean time, I thank the Advocate-General for the introduction of this change to Schedules 4 and 5 to the original Act and I give it a full welcome.
Lord Keen of Elie
I first acknowledge the perspicacity of the noble Lord, Lord Steel, at the time of the passage of the 1998 Act. However, I was not here. I thank the noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, for the position that he has expressed. Of course, there has been more than one Pauline conversion on the road to final devolved settlement. We all hope that there will be more, even among the nationalists.
Housing: Leaseholders
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The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con) (Maiden Speech)
My Lords, it was a singular honour to be introduced to your Lordships’ House. I am obliged for the consideration and courtesy extended to me by Members and staff, and more immediately by my noble friend Lord Trefgarne and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. My first week in this House was one of lost and found: I got lost and was found by the doorkeepers. Matters deteriorated slightly when I attempted my first Division on Wednesday of this week. I moved with alacrity to the not-content corridor. I passed through that corridor, turned right and right again. I became slightly confused but joined a group of Members standing in the vicinity of the Chamber. After a minute or so chatting away, I noticed that we were shuffling in a particular direction. It occurred to me that I was re-entering the not-content corridor. I rather thought at this moment that not even the Chief Whip would welcome my attempts to vote twice in a single Division, and I slipped away quietly to reconsider the geography of your Lordships’ House.
I thank my noble friend Lady Gardner for raising this Question and for the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. Two particular issues are touched upon: commonhold and the right to manage. Although they appear to converge and to be related, they are of course materially very different. They are quite distinct concepts. The right to manage is, as it says, about the right of leaseholders to take over the management of a multi-unit block. Commonhold, on the other hand, is a matter concerned with the law of property—a more fundamental issue of rights and obligations.
The Government welcome suggestions to improve the working of the law of property for property owners who live in multi-occupation buildings and will of course consider all proposals carefully. However, the Government are also mindful of the need to strike a balance between the interests of all those who would be affected by any change, whether as freeholders, leaseholders or commonholders. We are also mindful of the need to avoid putting unnecessary regulatory burdens on property owners, whether they are freeholders or leaseholders.
On the matter of right to manage, that specific statutory right was conferred on long residential leaseholders in 2003. The right to manage can be assumed by an administrative process. There is no legal process required and in that way expense is kept to a minimum. It can be achieved effectively by a majority of the leaseholders in a multi-unit building. It has clearly been, in relative terms, a success. We know that because we have seen the registration of at least 4,000 right-to-manage companies at Companies House. The process is straightforward and fair. It does not involve the long leaseholders in the expense of having to acquire by enfranchisement the freeholder interest in any property.
However, one has to remember that the right to manage brings with it very material obligations and, in that context, it is important that there should so far as possible be a consensus between leaseholders as to whether they wish to assume those rights and obligations. There can be difficulties in tracing some leaseholders, but there are means by which this can be achieved if a right-to-manage company is incorporated with the intention of taking over the management of a block.
Pursuant to Section 93 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002, the RTM can require the landlord to provide information with regard to the whereabouts of leaseholders. There are similar rights under Section 82 of the same Act. Our perception at this time is that the right to manage is a welcome addition to the armoury of leaseholder rights and is proving effective in the protection of those rights.
I turn now to the matter of commonhold. My noble friend Lady Gardner observed that we could trace matters back to the Wilberforce committee of 1965—that is true. The coining of the term “commonhold” dates back to 1984 and a report from the Law Commission. Thereafter, I think it would have to be accepted that matters moved slowly until we had the 2002 Act, which came into force in 2004. Part of the difficulty, which I intend to address in a moment, can be discerned from the title of that Act—the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002. Hand in hand with the introduction of commonhold came very material improvements in leasehold. In a sense, that carried the seeds of the difficulty encountered by commonhold as a form of land or property holding.
It was anticipated by the then Lord Chancellor in 2004 that some 6,500 commonholds would be created in each year after the Act came into force. In the event, there were not 6,500 a year; there were not 650 a year; there were not 65 a year; and there were not six a year. There have in fact been a total of 17 commonholds created since 2004. A great deal of effort, intelligence, research and work went into the creation of commonhold. It sailed under the fair wind of good intentions into a legislative Bermuda Triangle and nothing—nothing—came out.
Why should that have been? As I say, at the same time as commonhold was created, leasehold reform appeared. With those improvements, it became apparent that market forces would move in favour of continued use of leasehold rather than the adoption of commonhold. That carried with it a multitude of potential difficulties, we see now with the benefit of hindsight, including: the need to incorporate a company limited by guarantee; the need for there to be directors of that company; and the need for the directors of that company to accept the obligations of directors, including their fiduciary duties and the obligations now contained within Section 174 of the Companies Act. So we had a concept unfamiliar to property lawyers involving a further concept—corporations subject to guarantee—that was not particularly familiar to company lawyers. In these circumstances, the market has simply moved away from the idea of adopting commonhold. That is something we have to accept.
Reference was made by my noble friend Lady Gardner and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, to the employment of something other than the 100% rule for commonhold. But that is not an answer to the problem; that is a means of creating a further layer of complexity and difficulty. I say that in this context: if you were to allow commonhold by virtue of the votes of a majority of those in a unit, would you, first of all, be excluding the rights of the freeholder, whose rights would be extinguished? If so, that is a deprivation of property, contrary to Article 1 of the first protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Secondly, will you deprive those non-consenting leaseholders of their rights as leaseholders, which are substantial because of the statutory protections now available to them? If so, that is a potential deprivation of property contrary to Article 1 of the first protocol.
Alternatively, will you allow those non-consenting leaseholders to remain as leaseholders of the commonhold, in which case you create not the intended community that commonhold was intended to bring about but something quite different: a division or pepperpot. There will be on the one hand commonholders of units and on the other long leaseholders who wish to remain long leaseholders within the same unit. Yet the commonholders may find that they then have a responsibility to the leaseholders because the leaseholders continue to have statutory rights about the level of service charge quite different from those of commonholders.
The commonholders’ rights and obligations in respect of the service charge are determined by contract and agreement. They do not have to be reasonable; they simply have to be agreed. However, the leaseholders who remain are entitled to the statutory protections already conferred on them. You could have a situation in which the commonholders decide on a service charge at one level—let us say, £10,000—and the consequence is that the leaseholders then have theirs reduced to £5,000. Who will pay the difference? As I say, introducing the idea of commonhold is an attractive way forward for property law—but only up to a point.
I am reminded that I have only one minute and have traversed but little territory. I apologise, but let me say this: despite being a Scot I cannot embrace the idea that Scotland has a better system. It has a different system, which traces its roots to the introduction of the feudal system by David I in the 14th century. There were proposals to abolish the feudal system in the 16th century but it took a further 500 years of consideration before that came about. However, the distinction is that real burdens could always be carried by property in Scotland—that is, perishable property title—because of the superiority. Even when that was abolished in 2003, real burdens could continue. It is not easy to compare the two systems because of the fundamental differences in property law and property title, so we can gain only little assistance from what happened there.
On consolidation, while the law is still in a state of flux, consolidation is not the way forward and therefore there are no proposals for it at present. On a review of the right to management, there seems no pressing reason for review. On commonholding, it is a voluntary scheme. It is open for the market to embrace it and perhaps there are steps that can be taken to encourage the market to do so. But as we have seen, the market finds it an unattractive offering despite all the efforts that were made to bring it to the market. It remains and will remain a voluntary scheme for those undertaking multi-unit development but we can see that it has not taken off at present. I apologise if I have overstayed my welcome and thank noble Lords for their attention.