Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, this draft instrument forms part of our ongoing work to ensure that, if the UK leaves the EU without a deal, our legal system will continue to work effectively for our citizens. If Parliament approves the withdrawal agreement, which includes an implementation period, and passes the necessary legislation to implement that agreement, the Government would defer the coming into force of these instruments until the end of that implementation period. Once a deal on our future relationship has been reached, we envisage that they would be revoked entirely.

Your Lordships will be aware that, as part of these preparations, the Government have published a series of technical notices to outline the implications of a no-deal exit for citizens and businesses. One of these, published on 13 September 2018, was titled Handling Civil Legal Cases that Involve EU Countries if There’s No Brexit Deal. It set out the implications of a no-deal exit for the rules on how to resolve cross-border disputes in civil and commercial cases.

The Secretary of State, the Ministry of Justice ministerial team and officials have had regular engagement with key stakeholders in the field of civil, commercial and family justice, including the Law Society of England and Wales, the Bar Council, through the Brexit Law Committee, and individuals. This has included discussions on the technical notice, to ensure that our policy proposals in respect of no deal provide the best outcome for citizens and businesses. The instruments we are discussing today are designed to implement the policy outlined in the technical notice. The Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments reviewed the statutory instrument and had no substantive comments.

This draft instrument makes changes to the rules in England and Wales, in Northern Ireland and in Scotland that determine which courts should have jurisdiction in cross-border civil and commercial cases involving courts in EU and relevant EFTA countries—that is, those party to the Lugano convention: Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. It also changes the rules on how to ensure that any judgments or decisions can be enforced across the EU and relevant EFTA states.

It may be helpful if I explain the current effect of EU law in this area. The current principal measure in relation to civil and commercial law is known as the Brussels Ia regulation, as it replaced the so-called Brussels I regulation. Denmark has a separate agreement with the other EU member states, based on Brussels Ia, to give Denmark access to the EU’s system of civil judicial co-operation, because it does not normally participate in EU justice and home affairs measures, pursuant to Protocol 22 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. There is also a separate but similar agreement, the 2007 Lugano convention, based on Brussels I, between the EU and Norway, Switzerland and Iceland. It also applies to Denmark. Brussels I, as distinct from Brussels Ia, remains of some continuing relevance because it applies in respect of actions commenced prior to 10 January 2015, but it is of limited relevance to the present issue.

The Brussels regime provides clear and reciprocal rules on jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters—that is, which court should hear a cross-border case. Its application is mandatory. There is no discretion for courts to act otherwise than in accordance with the regime. This means that if, for example, a UK consumer or business has a dispute with a party in another EU member state or a Lugano party, there are clear rules to follow to determine where the case should be heard. This negates the risks of parallel proceedings and more than one court hearing the same case.

There is almost automatic recognition and enforcement of judgments from one participating state in another. This means that if a business successfully sues a business in one participating state, it can enforce the resulting judgment where it needs to without going through costly and time-consuming additional processes. This is possible because all participating states must apply uniform rules of jurisdiction and can trust that jurisdiction was taken properly and appropriately.

The Brussels regime operates almost entirely on a reciprocal basis. Its effectiveness is founded on mutual co-operation between states. Countries respect the jurisdiction of each other’s courts and recognise and enforce each other’s judgments. However, with some limited exceptions, including consumer and employment cases, the Brussels rules do not apply if the defendant to the dispute is domiciled outside the EU. In such cases, EU member states and the Lugano parties apply their own national rules when dealing with cross-border matters.

What will change should we leave the EU without a deal? If the UK leaves without an agreement, the current EU regime for determining these matters will cease to apply to us. After such an exit, the reciprocity in the EU regime will no longer apply in relations between the EU member states and the UK, nor between the Lugano parties and the UK. Furthermore, there are no unilateral actions that the UK can take to compel the EU as a whole to continue to apply the reciprocal jurisdictional rules or to enforce judgments. Simply put, the rules under which we currently operate under the Brussels regime would cease to function effectively in the event of a no-deal exit.

For this reason, it is necessary to legislate now to provide clarity about how the UK will determine whether it has jurisdiction in a civil and commercial case and when UK courts will recognise and enforce judgments from EU countries. However, let me be absolutely clear: without a reciprocal agreement in this area, we cannot determine what rules the EU will apply. This will be down to member states’ own national laws.

As set out in the instrument before us, the Government’s response to this is, with limited exceptions, to revert to the rules on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of judgments that currently apply to cross-border disputes where the Brussels regime does not apply—that is, for disputes involving parties from the UK on the one hand and countries outside the EU and the Lugano parties on the other. This instrument is not creating new policy but transitioning to a well-developed and understood set of rules that provide an effective framework for UK courts to work with and take into account the lack of reciprocity in this area.

There are a few exceptions to this general approach. Importantly, the rules of the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005 will continue to apply, as the UK is acceding to it as a contracting state. This is being brought into UK law post-EU exit by a separate SI, which has been subject to the negative procedure—that is, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 2005) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018. Broadly speaking, this means that the courts of a part of the UK will take jurisdiction whenever a valid choice of court agreement to which the convention applies has been made and will readily recognise and enforce a foreign judgment from a foreign court validly selected under such an agreement. Courts of other contracting states to that convention will equally recognise and enforce a judgment from a UK court to which the convention applies.

The EU was a signatory to the 2005 Hague convention on behalf of all members of the EU. It is therefore necessary that we should become a signatory to that convention as an individual state on exit. The application to do so was made on 28 December 2018. It will become effective under the terms of the convention as of 1 April this year.

Secondly, we have sought where we can to maintain jurisdictional protections for UK consumers and employees contained in the Brussels regime. These rules are not restricted to EU-domiciled defendants, so we can retain to a large degree the consumer and employee-friendly approach of the Brussels regime while restating them in a manner specific to UK-based consumers and employees. This largely obviates the need for a consumer or employee to sue abroad in these cases, with the expense and difficulty that brings.

This instrument is necessary to fix the statute book in the event of a no-deal exit. We have assessed its impact and published a full impact assessment. Broadly, we have concluded that although in certain respects the common law may operate less efficiently than the existing Brussels regime to which the UK is party as a result of EU membership, only negligible costs would arise from this SI, relative to the alternative of leaving legislation on the statute book that ceases to operate effectively in the absence of reciprocity after the UK leaves the EU.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am not taking interventions during the opening speech. It is the Government’s view that removing deficient retained EU law and associated domestic legislation from domestic law will clarify the rules that apply to determine jurisdiction, recognition and the enforcement of judgments post exit. This has the benefit of protecting litigants from unnecessary expense and making UK legislation more transparent, therefore protecting its reputation. This will also ensure that the same rules apply to cross-border matters involving EU and non-EU countries.

There will be deficiencies in retained EU law, which implements the instruments of the Brussels regime, due to a lack of reciprocity. That will become obvious if we leave the EU without a deal. This SI fixes those deficiencies and establishes a practicable set of rules for dealing with cross-border disputes in civil and commercial matters in such a scenario.

[Lord Adonis]

My Lords, before the Minister sits down—

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I have already sat down.

[Lord Adonis]

The Minister said that he would not take interventions.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is correct.

[Lord Adonis]

That is extremely disrespectful to the Committee, if I may say so, because now there is no other way for us to ask the Minister questions before he responds at the end of the entire debate—and we will have no means to come back on his statements at that point because the Question will be put at the end.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Just to be clear, I have already sat down.

[Lord Adonis]

I am happy to take an intervention from the noble and learned Lord, even though he was not prepared to take one from me. I will speak later in the debate but I just want to put on record that I find his actions extremely disrespectful to the Committee. That alone would lead me to wish to negative the instrument, because the Minister is not subjecting himself to the proper process of interrogation and answering questions on the regulations. It is immensely disrespectful and the first time that a Minister has come to a Grand Committee and not been prepared to answer questions in the normal way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Adonis]

So why does it say that they are not applicable? These issues are significant.

The final issue in the debate, to which I hope the noble and learned Lord will respond, was raised by my noble friend Lord Beecham and other noble Lords. It is about the losses to this country of not being part of the European Judicial Network. My understanding is that there is nothing statutory about the network. Am I wrong? Is the network a formal institution of the European Union? If it is an informal body, and if belonging to it brings us great benefits, why can we not continue to be members of it even after we leave the European Union? Indeed, to the lay man, being part of the network would seem positively beneficial because, presumably, the network co-ordinates and promotes joint understandings. If we will be separate jurisdictions, with neither wanting, as far as possible, to operate in parallel, is that not all the more reason for us to be part of the network and not seek to leave it? If we crash out with no deal and all losses as set out or implied in the Explanatory Memorandum, why we are not seeking to remain part of the European Judicial Network? Might it be in the country’s best interests for the Government to seek to keep us in the network?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this Parliament decided that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union on 29 March this year. That is the determination that has been made. That date has been set in law. The Executive must respect the law as determined by Parliament and respond responsibly to it, as laid down by Parliament. Therefore, they must address the implications of us leaving on 29 March if, as at present, we do not have a withdrawal agreement concluded with the European Union. That is what this statutory instrument seeks to address.

In that context, we must address the difference between leaving on 29 March and doing nothing about the existing state of the law—with regard to judicial recognition, identity of choice of court and law, the enforcement of judgment and so on—and doing something about it. I quite understand the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the benefits of our being in the Brussels Ia system, but we can be in the Brussels regime only as a member of the European Union. According to Parliament and the law it made, we will cease to be a member of the European Union on 29 March 2019. Although the Brussels regime can be dated back to 1968, it was in that context a regime for existing European Union members and not open to non-members, to clarify a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis.

The first point is that we have to consider the impact of us leaving on the date I have mentioned if we make no change to the existing law, and the impact if we change the existing law. I quite understand the point repeatedly made, that in many ways we would prefer the cake analogy: we would like to have our cake and eat it. We would like to remain within the regime, even if, as Parliament has determined as a matter of law, we are leaving on 29 March 2019. But we cannot have it, because Parliament has made that determination. Many may regret it now, and many may regret it later, but that is the law as determined by this Parliament, and we have to accept that. We can seek to change the law—of course we can—and no doubt there are many who may, even now, seek to change it. However, the law is as determined by this Parliament.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I hope that the noble and learned Lord will at least address my question on what consideration has been given to applying to join the Brussels regime entirely separately. Although he says that it is a creature of the European Union, and by and large of course it is, there do not seem to be insuperable obstacles to negotiating reciprocity around the context of the Brussels regime but outside the European Union.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I take the noble Lord’s point when he says “negotiate”; that is the whole point. If he looks at the political declaration, there is a reference to the desire of all parties to negotiate on this among other issues so that we may be part of a regime perhaps similar to Lugano. Let us be clear: we have not only applied to become an individual signatory to Hague 2005, which involves reciprocity between the convention members and ourselves—although I say, quite candidly, that it is not as perfect as Brussels Ia, being more akin to Brussels I. That is why it is in many ways a second best to that extent, but that is as far as we can go. We have also applied to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to the Lugano convention—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. That will of course require the consent of the EFTA parties and of the EU, and it will be subject to negotiation, but we hope also to be a member of the Lugano convention.

If noble Lords have regard to the impact assessment, they will see that under option two we looked at simply leaving the UK law as it is—in other words, embracing all those relevant terms of Brussels Ia without any right to reciprocity from the EU 27. The difficulty there is that in the absence of reciprocity, people would not know what they were going to get from those provisions. Furthermore, it would raise two obvious difficulties. First, corporations, companies and associations within Europe could secure a decree there and automatically seek to secure enforcement in the UK, but companies, corporations and associations in the UK that secured a judgment from a UK court could not expect to enforce it in the EU 27 countries. That is why I stressed the concept of reciprocity. Yes, we want to negotiate and to secure reciprocity, but until we do, we have to make sure that the statute book is in some sort of order for a no-deal exit—which, as far as I am aware, no one truly wishes for.

Secondly, if we embrace the Brussels Ia regime without being a member of the EU, we would be discriminating between the EU 27 jurisdiction and all the other third-party countries. We would be giving some benefits to the EU 27 under Brussels Ia, albeit without reciprocity, but we would not be giving the same benefit to third-party countries such as the United States, India and China, and Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand. That raises real issues about discrimination in the context of wider issues on services and so on.

[Lord Beith]

I thank the Minister for explaining the Government’s objections to option two. It might have been a good thing if he had written the impact assessment and developed those points. I shall still disagree with him on some other matters, including the fundamental issue here, but he has clarified that very helpfully.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. I know the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, made much of this, but that is why the impact assessment is between the statute book as it is upon exit and the statute book as it would be under the instrument upon exit, because Parliament has made the law and Parliament is determined to exit on 29 March. If that is reversed, so be it, but that is where we are and that is the impact that we have to properly address in this context.

On the wider point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the benefits of being in the EU and within Brussels Ia, I am not going to seek to disagree with him. Brussels Ia was a marked improvement on Hague 2005, for example; we all know that. Therefore, in many senses, exit from the EU without a deal is unattractive in the context of the provision of legal services in the UK, as indeed are the implications of that for those who have to engage those services and have recourse to the courts. No one is denying that either, but these are the consequences of the law that Parliament has made in these circumstances.

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, asked what steps are being taken with regard to reciprocity. As I say, we are applying to become signatories to the Hague convention 2005, which will give us certain reciprocal rights. We are applying to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to that, which will give us reciprocal rights with the EFTA countries. In addition, we are intent upon negotiating around the whole issue of judicial co-operation in future, which is why it features in the political declaration. At this stage we cannot demand reciprocity from the EU 27 and they are certainly not prepared to offer it at this stage. At a very early point there were discussions about, for example, the recognition of legal qualifications and mutual issues of that kind, and the EU made it very clear at that stage that that was a discussion for another day. That is where we are.

Coming on to a further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about what happens to the SI, if we have an agreement on the terms of the present withdrawal agreement then we go into a two-year implementation period where we will remain a part of the Brussels Ia regime, so the instrument itself will essentially be suspended by the withdrawal agreement Bill. However, it will not be completely done away with because at the end of the implementation period—two, three or four years, whatever it might be—we will then have to decide whether or not we have achieved agreement with the EU 27 on future judicial co-operation. That might be on essentially identical terms to what we have now, in which case we will not need the instrument at all, or it may be that we cannot achieve agreement at that stage, in which event we will need to revive the instrument in order to bring the statute book into proper order. That is why I have referred to it as being “deferred” in that context; it is deferred for the implementation period, whatever that period might ultimately turn out to be. That is where we are on that.

On the issue of forum non conveniens, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, alluded to, that has always been a part of our common law because we apply it in the context of third party countries outwith the Brussels Ia convention. The noble and learned Lord may recollect the litigations that took place around the Pan Am/Lockerbie case and the attempts to take it further than just applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens but rather to apply the issue of interdict against the raising of proceedings in a third party country, which is attendant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens—although I recall being in a Texas court where the judge asked it to be pointed out to me that in Texas they do not have forum non conveniens, and we have to accept that there are some jurisdictions of that ilk. Nevertheless, the courts will fall back upon these common-law concepts which have not been done away with but have not applied in the context of the Brussels Ia regime for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord very carefully pointed out.

The European Judicial Network is a very fine body but it was set up in order that there could be engagement across the EU 28 about the operation of the regime that at the moment we are referring to as Brussels Ia, but it also looks at Brussels IIa and other issues. It concerns the operation of that regime and how it may be improved. For example, it contributes to how you move from Brussels I to Brussels Ia. If we are not part of the regime, we are not part of the European Judicial Network and we really have no part to play in that. But again if, going forward, we are able to achieve a negotiated position with the EU 27 where we are, if you like, semi-detached from Brussels Ia and the other Brussels regime, no doubt they will consider allowing us a seat perhaps not at the table but at least in the room of the judicial network in order that we can contribute to it. However, that too is a negotiation for another day. It is not what this instrument is addressing and not what it is intended to do. So, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, there is no elephant in the room. Parliament removed the elephant when it decided that, as a matter of law, we would leave on 29 March 2019. The Executive have to address that point in order to put the statute book in proper order.