Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Beith
Main Page: Lord Beith (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Beith's debates with the Scotland Office
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI am happy to take an intervention from the noble and learned Lord, even though he was not prepared to take one from me. I will speak later in the debate but I just want to put on record that I find his actions extremely disrespectful to the Committee. That alone would lead me to wish to negative the instrument, because the Minister is not subjecting himself to the proper process of interrogation and answering questions on the regulations. It is immensely disrespectful and the first time that a Minister has come to a Grand Committee and not been prepared to answer questions in the normal way.
My Lords, when I looked at the instrument, I began to wonder whether the Minister was open to the charge from some of his colleagues here and in the other place that he was part of Project Fear, because the instrument sets out some consequences of Brexit, both in general and in a no-deal scenario, pretty starkly.
The loss of reciprocity is central to this instrument. I did not notice the Minister express any concern or grief at this but it represents the removal of something that we have developed in recent years, to the great advantage of litigants, and which we are about to lose, to our detriment. The consequence is that separate enforcement will be required in many cases, including judgments of foreign courts; by foreign, I mean courts in the EU or the Lugano states. Incidentally, that includes Norway, a state with which we have particularly close and friendly relations.
The Explanatory Notes to the regulations show that the Government go only this far by stating:
“The impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies of this instrument is, on balance, expected to be positive when compared to making no changes to retained EU law”.
However, in the same paragraph the notes go on to explain that,
“an increased risk of parallel proceedings … could increase the number and complexity of disputes before the courts and the cost of litigation for parties … Common law rules also involve a less efficient mechanism for recognising and enforcing judgments than using existing EU rules deriving from the Brussels regime, which will cost those seeking to have their judgment recognised in the UK more money and time”.
There is a serious loss in that and a further loss in relation to the European Judicial Network, another development that has been beneficial to this country and to justice across Europe generally. Again, a bald statement is made in paragraph 7.14:
“The inability of the UK to continue to take part in this network is as a result of EU Exit, this SI simply reflects that new status”.
Another valuable judicial development is to be simply cast aside.
Thank you. The Justice Sub-Committee prepared a detailed report drawing attention to exactly what the noble Lord has referred to. There was an impassioned debate—I do not know whether the noble Lord was present—at which these points were made. The criticism is not against us, as it were, because in this House we have been taking our responsibilities seriously. However, I understand the point the noble Lord makes about the effect of leaving the EU and the distress he feels.
There is one thing the Government have not made clear. The impact statement, brief as it is, is structured around there being two options—the other option being not to change retained EU law. As I understood it, that option implied that in a no-deal situation, if we did not have this instrument, the courts would be left behaving as they had previously and hoping that courts in other countries would do the same. One of the things that was not explained very well in the impact statement—perhaps the Minister can clarify this later—is what the other option the Government rejected was.
My Lords, I have practised law for a long time—fortunately none of it in relation to the EU and the complications we are debating today. I defer to the more qualified Members of the Committee today, some of whom have already addressed us.
These regulations might best be described as a hors d’oeuvre to the four-course Brexit banquet we are being served today—although, curiously, neither the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments nor the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has raised any concerns.
In addition to reverting to the pre-EU membership system, the statutory instrument repeals a decision that currently allows the UK to co-operate on civil and commercial matters in the EU judicial network. What estimate have the Government made of the impact on the UK of that change, and what consultation took place with industry or other potentially interested parties given that the so-called Brussels regime operated on a reciprocal basis?
The Law Society, which is generally supportive of the statutory instrument, is concerned about the loss of the existing framework for determining which national court has jurisdiction and for recognising whether or not there is a choice of court between the parties to disputes.
The impact assessment contains a disturbing paragraph which states:
“Businesses and individuals litigating in the courts of EU countries will have an advantage over those litigating in the UK as UK litigants cannot guarantee the judgment they get from the UK courts is enforceable in the EU but litigants who get a judgment from the EU courts, will almost always be able to obtain enforcement of it in the UK”.
It is a one-sided deal, as it were. The English legal system has prospered remarkably through its participation in the EU but that looks to be one of the costs and losses that it will incur.
The Law Society notes that hitherto the existing system has fostered cross-border trade and encourages litigants to use the UK courts in the knowledge that their judgments would be enforceable across the EU and calls on the Government to accede to the Lugano convention—which, as the noble and learned Lord has indicated, is not an EU organisation although the EU is a party to it. Can the Minister indicate the Government’s response to that suggestion?
I take the noble Lord’s point when he says “negotiate”; that is the whole point. If he looks at the political declaration, there is a reference to the desire of all parties to negotiate on this among other issues so that we may be part of a regime perhaps similar to Lugano. Let us be clear: we have not only applied to become an individual signatory to Hague 2005, which involves reciprocity between the convention members and ourselves—although I say, quite candidly, that it is not as perfect as Brussels Ia, being more akin to Brussels I. That is why it is in many ways a second best to that extent, but that is as far as we can go. We have also applied to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to the Lugano convention—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. That will of course require the consent of the EFTA parties and of the EU, and it will be subject to negotiation, but we hope also to be a member of the Lugano convention.
If noble Lords have regard to the impact assessment, they will see that under option two we looked at simply leaving the UK law as it is—in other words, embracing all those relevant terms of Brussels Ia without any right to reciprocity from the EU 27. The difficulty there is that in the absence of reciprocity, people would not know what they were going to get from those provisions. Furthermore, it would raise two obvious difficulties. First, corporations, companies and associations within Europe could secure a decree there and automatically seek to secure enforcement in the UK, but companies, corporations and associations in the UK that secured a judgment from a UK court could not expect to enforce it in the EU 27 countries. That is why I stressed the concept of reciprocity. Yes, we want to negotiate and to secure reciprocity, but until we do, we have to make sure that the statute book is in some sort of order for a no-deal exit—which, as far as I am aware, no one truly wishes for.
Secondly, if we embrace the Brussels Ia regime without being a member of the EU, we would be discriminating between the EU 27 jurisdiction and all the other third-party countries. We would be giving some benefits to the EU 27 under Brussels Ia, albeit without reciprocity, but we would not be giving the same benefit to third-party countries such as the United States, India and China, and Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand. That raises real issues about discrimination in the context of wider issues on services and so on.
I thank the Minister for explaining the Government’s objections to option two. It might have been a good thing if he had written the impact assessment and developed those points. I shall still disagree with him on some other matters, including the fundamental issue here, but he has clarified that very helpfully.
I am obliged to the noble Lord. I know the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, made much of this, but that is why the impact assessment is between the statute book as it is upon exit and the statute book as it would be under the instrument upon exit, because Parliament has made the law and Parliament is determined to exit on 29 March. If that is reversed, so be it, but that is where we are and that is the impact that we have to properly address in this context.
On the wider point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the benefits of being in the EU and within Brussels Ia, I am not going to seek to disagree with him. Brussels Ia was a marked improvement on Hague 2005, for example; we all know that. Therefore, in many senses, exit from the EU without a deal is unattractive in the context of the provision of legal services in the UK, as indeed are the implications of that for those who have to engage those services and have recourse to the courts. No one is denying that either, but these are the consequences of the law that Parliament has made in these circumstances.
The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, asked what steps are being taken with regard to reciprocity. As I say, we are applying to become signatories to the Hague convention 2005, which will give us certain reciprocal rights. We are applying to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to that, which will give us reciprocal rights with the EFTA countries. In addition, we are intent upon negotiating around the whole issue of judicial co-operation in future, which is why it features in the political declaration. At this stage we cannot demand reciprocity from the EU 27 and they are certainly not prepared to offer it at this stage. At a very early point there were discussions about, for example, the recognition of legal qualifications and mutual issues of that kind, and the EU made it very clear at that stage that that was a discussion for another day. That is where we are.
Coming on to a further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about what happens to the SI, if we have an agreement on the terms of the present withdrawal agreement then we go into a two-year implementation period where we will remain a part of the Brussels Ia regime, so the instrument itself will essentially be suspended by the withdrawal agreement Bill. However, it will not be completely done away with because at the end of the implementation period—two, three or four years, whatever it might be—we will then have to decide whether or not we have achieved agreement with the EU 27 on future judicial co-operation. That might be on essentially identical terms to what we have now, in which case we will not need the instrument at all, or it may be that we cannot achieve agreement at that stage, in which event we will need to revive the instrument in order to bring the statute book into proper order. That is why I have referred to it as being “deferred” in that context; it is deferred for the implementation period, whatever that period might ultimately turn out to be. That is where we are on that.
On the issue of forum non conveniens, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, alluded to, that has always been a part of our common law because we apply it in the context of third party countries outwith the Brussels Ia convention. The noble and learned Lord may recollect the litigations that took place around the Pan Am/Lockerbie case and the attempts to take it further than just applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens but rather to apply the issue of interdict against the raising of proceedings in a third party country, which is attendant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens—although I recall being in a Texas court where the judge asked it to be pointed out to me that in Texas they do not have forum non conveniens, and we have to accept that there are some jurisdictions of that ilk. Nevertheless, the courts will fall back upon these common-law concepts which have not been done away with but have not applied in the context of the Brussels Ia regime for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord very carefully pointed out.
The European Judicial Network is a very fine body but it was set up in order that there could be engagement across the EU 28 about the operation of the regime that at the moment we are referring to as Brussels Ia, but it also looks at Brussels IIa and other issues. It concerns the operation of that regime and how it may be improved. For example, it contributes to how you move from Brussels I to Brussels Ia. If we are not part of the regime, we are not part of the European Judicial Network and we really have no part to play in that. But again if, going forward, we are able to achieve a negotiated position with the EU 27 where we are, if you like, semi-detached from Brussels Ia and the other Brussels regime, no doubt they will consider allowing us a seat perhaps not at the table but at least in the room of the judicial network in order that we can contribute to it. However, that too is a negotiation for another day. It is not what this instrument is addressing and not what it is intended to do. So, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, there is no elephant in the room. Parliament removed the elephant when it decided that, as a matter of law, we would leave on 29 March 2019. The Executive have to address that point in order to put the statute book in proper order.